Anon. "US Secretary of State Baker's Five-Point Plan - English Text" Retrieved from https://ecf.org.il/media_items/564.

Baker's Five Points

December 6, 1989

1. The United States understands that because Egypt and Israel have been working hard on the peace process; there is agreement that an Israel delegation should conduct a dialoguewith a Palestinian delegation in Cairo.

2. The United States understands that Egypt cannot substitute itself for the Palestinians and Egypt will consult with Palestinians on all aspects of that dialogue. Egypt will also consult with Israel and the United States.

3. The United States understands that Israel will attend the dialogue only after a satisfactory list of Palestinians has been worked out.

4. The United States understands that the Government of Israel will come to the dialogue on the basis of the Israeli Government's Initiative. The United States further understands that Palestinians will come to the dialogue prepared to discuss elections and the negotiating process in accordance with Israel's initiative. The united States understands, therefore, that Palestinians would be free to raise issues that relate to their opinions on how to make elections and the negotiating process succeed.

5. In order to facilitate this process, the United States proposes that the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Egypt, and the United States meet in Washington within two weeks.

Anon. Egyptian President Mubarak's Ten-Point Plan - English Text. Retrieved from https://ecf.org.il/media_items/562.

  Mubarak's Ten Points

  September 19, 1989

  1. Free and democratic elections;

  2. The right to vote and to be elected applies to all Arab residents of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and of the Gaza Strip;

  3. The prerequisites for any negotiation process are the following principles: The acceptance of both sides of UN Resolutions 242 and 338; a permanent solution based on "Land-for-peace"; the political rights of the Palestinians; security for all sides including Israel;

  4. Neutral, third-party observers will oversee the elections process;

  5. The Israel Defense Forces will retreat from areas of the election polls;

  6. Israel is obliged to accept the results of the elections;

  7. There will be freedom to organize and an open election campaign;

  8. On the day of elections, Israelis will not be allowed into the Territories except for those who live and work there;

  9. There will be a two month preparatory period for the formation of the Palestinian delegation for the Israeli-Palestinian talks; Egypt and the United States will help where needed;

  10. The establishment of settlements will be frozen during the negotiating period;

Various. "Peace Initiative of the National Unity Government" Retrieved from https://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/peace_init_eng.htm.

Also called the "Shamir-Rabin peace initiative," this initiative was a proposal brought before the National Unity Government on May 14^th 1989 by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin.

  The initiative was presented by Shamir to US President George Bush during his visit to Washington in April 1989. It included four main issues: Strengthening of the peace between Israel and Egypt on the basis of the Camp David Accords; establishing peace between Israel and other Arab countries; finding a solution to the problem of Arab refugees; and holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a Palestinian leadership which will be able to negotiate an interim agreement for self-government and on a subsequent permanent solution.

  A fifth issue, concerning weapon control in the Middle East, was removed from the plan at Rabin’s request. The proposal for elections of a Palestinian leadership was first mentioned in a mutual press conference held by Rabin and Shimon Peres on October 18^th 1988, prior to the elections for the Twelfth Knesset, and was first presented as an operative plan by Rabin on January 1989.

  The plan was based on several assumptions: Direct negotiations between Israel and Arab representatives; a veto on the option of establishing two Palestinian entities - in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; Israel will not negotiate with the PLO; and, as per the Government’s decision, there will be no change in the status of sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip (hence, no withdrawal from these territories).

  In September 1989, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak proposed that Israeli and Palestinian delegates meet in Cairo to begin preparation for elections. He also publicized his Ten Points Plan for implementation of the Israeli initiative, based on a similar document composed within the Labor Party and given to him by an advisor to Shimon Peres. The Likud rejected Mubarak’s plan, for it included the participation in the elections of Palestinians from East Jerusalem and promoted the exchange of land for peace. Following a visit to Cairo, Rabin proclaimed that the Ten Points Plan was considerate of Israeli requirements, as it did not mention the PLO, nor the right of the Palestinians for self-definition or the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

  In response to Mubarak’s plan, American Secretary of State James Baker published his own Five Points Plan on December 6^th 1989. Baker discussed the technical aspects for enabling an Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo. One of his steps had become a pitfall: The understanding that Israel will take part in the dialogue only after approving the list of candidates proposed by the Palestinians. With this issue unresolved, Baker referred the following question to Israel in early March: “Will the Israeli Government be willing to negotiate with the Palestinians, citizens of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, on an individually named basis?” To this, Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Arens complied, but Shamir objected. On these grounds, the Labor Party decided to dissolve the government through a motion of no-confidence.