(L-R) German
Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, European Union High Representative
Federica Mogherini, Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Russian
Deputy Political Director Alexey Karpov and British Foreign Secretary Philip
Hammond are seen following nuclear talks at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology in Lausanne (Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne) April 2,
2015, after Iran and world powers reached a framework on curbing Iran’s nuclear
program at marathon talks. (Brendan Smialowski/Reuters)
Negotiations over a potential agreement about Iran’s
nuclear program are coming to a head this week, with a new deadline of July 7
set for the outcome of high-level talks in Vienna. Discussions of the Iranian
nuclear talks often treat the P5+1 (the permanent five members of the U.N.
Security Council plus Germany) side as a unified actor across the table from
Tehran, but the P5+1 includes six great powers with diverging interests and
perspectives on the negotiations. Maintaining the internal cohesion among these
six players, as well as key allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia, has been a
central part of the long strategic bargaining process, one that will
undoubtedly become even more important in the aftermath of a deal.
The P5+1 has maintained an impressive degree of unity
thus far, but this accord may be tested as the talks reach a conclusion. It is
not only Russian and Chinese views that color the talks. The European
participants are also skeptical of U.S. intentions. During our recent research
in several European capitals, it became clear that some there view the
negotiations as a trading of interests between Iran and the United States,
leaving them out of the process. However, the Europeans are crucial to the
negotiations, the implementation of a potential deal and the viability and
sustainability of the sanctions regime.
U.S. decision-makers should not take the European
Union’s commitment and partnership to negotiations and the implementation of an
agreement for granted or assume that if the talks are torpedoed in Washington,
the E.U. will easily be on board to reimpose sanctions. If the U.S. Congress
says it can act unilaterally and break down the process, it is ignoring the
crucial foundations of the multilateral process. After all, Iran came back to
the negotiating table in part due to sanctions, the strength and effectiveness
of which stems from P5+1 unity. While many in Washington think the United
States can and should act unilaterally, in reality, the United States needs and
depends on the European Union for the implementation and sustainability of a
final agreement on the Iranian nuclear program.
The divide should not be overly exaggerated. The
European Union shares some of the same goals as the other parties to the
negotiations. Much like the United States, the European Union wants to curb
Iran’s nuclear program, ensuring that Tehran does not weaponize. But much like
Iran, E.U. businesses in particular want sanctions lifted as soon as possible.
This difference between the interests of E.U. politics and economics places
Brussels in a difficult position. Nuances among the three lead European states
involved in the talks — Germany, Britain and France — further complicate
matters.
While Germany is the most eager to resolve the
nuclear issue in order to reenter the Iranian market, Britain is cautious and
more focused on nuclear restrictions than economic benefits of a deal. France
is the most interesting case. While its government is notorious for its hard
line in the negotiations, France’s businesses are biting at the bit to exploit
the potential of the Iranian market. The French government’s position has been
a source of contention not only between Paris and the rest of the P5+1 but also
between the Foreign Ministry and other parts of government and businesses.
But recent U.S. activities have united the European
Union in their discontent. In particular, many E.U. countries view Washington’s
unilateral sanctions as advancing U.S. interests at the expense of E.U.
businesses. A complaint often heard in E.U. capitals is that the United States
dragged them to impose sanctions on Iran, creating real tensions among the 28
countries of the European Union. Recent unilateral efforts by the U.S. Congress
to derail the talks have worsened these tensions. The European Union paid high
costs for this process, and E.U. officials feel they are being undermined.
E.U. businesses in particular worry about the
aftermath of an agreement. They fear that even if a deal lifts E.U. sanctions,
U.S. sanctions may only be suspended. This means that the third-party component
of U.S. sanctions remains. Businesses are naturally risk-averse and will not
shoulder the costs of jeopardizing business with the United States to enter the
Iranian market. European businesses have an edge, because they have more recent
infrastructure and access in Iran that they can kick into gear. Their
competitive position is stronger than assumed.
However, U.S. businesses are in a privileged position
to navigate the post-sanctions minefield. They are used to working with the
U.S. Treasury Department and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and
better understand the complex web of U.S. legislation. If the Americans add to
that advantage by pushing their own companies in, as the Europeans feel they
are doing, the European Union would lag behind. E.U. businesses feel they will
not be able to reap the benefits of reentering the Iranian market.
The United States is confident that regardless of its
internal differences and their impact on the negotiations, the rest of the P5+1
will remain unified, but the aftermath of an agreement may change this. Should
implementation of a potential agreement proceed flawlessly, there is no reason
to challenge the P5+1. However, if there are hiccups along the way, the P5+1’s
unity will be tested. Short of a glaring Iranian-caused implementation problem,
Russia and China are unlikely to stay on board, and it would be difficult to
convince them to reimpose sanctions on Iran.
But that is no surprise. E.U. commitment to reimpose
sanctions will also be tested. While politically, the willpower might only be
diminished rather than destroyed, economically it is a different matter. E.U.
businesses will kick up a real fuss if they are ordered to take a step back,
especially if that order comes from the United States. If the United States is
the reason behind the implementation challenges in the first place — Congress
taking unilateral action, for instance — E.U. partners may express even greater
concern.
Serious attention needs to be paid to the demands of
maintaining the coalition, both during these tense, final negotiations and in
the implementation phase that follows. Preserving E.U. interests and the desire
to work with the United States is crucial, especially as it will be increasingly
difficult to get Russia and China on board should things go haywire. Sustained
attention to these intra-alliance challenges will be essential for the success
of any agreement.
For more analysis and background, see POMEPS
Studies 13, Iran and the Nuclear Deal
Dina Esfandiary (@DEsfandiary) is a
McArthur Fellow in the Centre for Science and Security Studies at King’s
College London. Ariane Tabatabai (@ArianeTabatabai) is a
visiting assistant professor in the Security Studies Program at the Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service and a columnist for The Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists.
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