The temptation in most world capitals will be to
denounce North Korea’s Wednesday nuclear test but do little beyond attempting
to bribe dictator Kim Jong Un with more cash in return for more disarmament
promises. The more realistic view is to see this as another giant step toward a
dangerous new era of nuclear proliferation that the world ignores at its peril.
This threat is growing well beyond Asia as the North
makes progress on warhead miniaturization and missile delivery. U.S. Admiral
Bill Gortney of the North American Aerospace Defense Command said last year
that Pyongyang has “the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear
weapon from a rocket.”
The North conducted an apparently successful
submarine missile test last month. Pyongyang helped Syria build a secret
plutonium reactor that the Israeli air force destroyed in 2007, and it has
worked with Iran on long-range missiles and possibly nuclear technology.
The larger story here is the rapid fraying of the world’s
antinuclear proliferation regime, assisted by the illusion of arms control. The
failure with North Korea goes back to Bill Clinton’s 1994 Agreed Framework,
which he hailed as “a good deal” because “North Korea will freeze and then
dismantle its nuclear program” in return for food and energy aid. The North
took the cash and kept working toward a plutonium and uranium bomb.
The Bush Administration tried a tougher approach at
first but lost its nerve in the second term and also went the bribery route.
We’ve praised President Obama for not doing the same, but the Administration
mustered no response to the North’s 2013 nuclear test and only light sanctions
after its 2014 cyberattack against Sony. The North has now escalated.
The West wants to believe the Iran nuclear deal is an
antiproliferation triumph, but Iran’s neighbors view it as a delaying action at
best. They think it guarantees that Iran will eventually build a weapon. Over
time this will encourage others in the Middle East to seek their own nuclear
deterrent.
In Asia, too, the question is whether North Korea’s
growing nuclear arsenal will now cause Japan and South Korea to get their own
deterrent. South Korean President Park Geun-hye warned in 2014 that after a
fourth North Korean test “it would be difficult to prevent a nuclear domino
from occurring in this area.”
North Korea’s latest test should spur a new global
resolve against Pyongyang, but it probably won’t. China once again expressed its
disapproval but it has never been willing to squeeze its client state.
The U.S. could revive the targeted economic sanctions
that in 2005 hit Macau’s Banco Delta Asia and forced others to cut ties with
Pyongyang, squeezing its supplies of arms and luxury goods. The U.S. also
hasn’t designated the North as a “primary money-laundering concern” despite its
racket in counterfeit currency and drugs. The North Korea Sanctions Enforcement
Act, long stalled in Congress, would fix such oversights.
At the very least the U.S. and South Korea could
finally deploy the missile-defense system known as Thaad, for Terminal
High-Altitude Area Defense. Beijing has pressured Seoul not to use the
U.S.-built platform, which would integrate with U.S. and Japanese defenses. But
Thaad is the strongest system available, and China’s patronage of Pyongyang is
a main reason the region is under threat.
The Obama Administration has shown no inclination to
do any of this, and it is unlikely to start now. The result is that while Mr.
Obama entered office promising to pursue “a world without nuclear weapons,” he
will leave having set loose a new era of nuclear proliferation.
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