After three Nuclear tests, North Korea is a
de facto Nuclear State. While the recent Nuclear tests and the processes of
developing a Nuclear Weapons capability since the first Nuclear crisis in 1993
receive much more attention from policy circles, this chapter aims to bring the
attention back to the origins of North Korea’s efforts to develop Nuclear
Weapons. As it is unlikely that North Korea will disarm in the near future, it
is more important to understand why North Korea first became interested in developing
a Nuclear Deterrent while it was under the Nuclear umbrella of the Soviet Union
and, later, China. The United States, which provides a Nuclear umbrella to
cover its East Asia Allies, could learn lessons from the North Korean
proliferation. While it is true that North Korea faced external Threats from
the United States and South Korea, this chapter argues that North Korea first
explored its Nuclear programme decades ago due to the unreliability of the
extended Deterrence of its Ally.
Introduction
In March 1993, North Korea (officially the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK), one of the last bastions of unreformed
Communism following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, declared its intent to
withdraw from [] (NPT), sending the signal that it was moving forward in
developing an indigenous Nuclear programme. (2) This set the stage for what is
commonly referred to as the first Nuclear crisis. Pyong-yang later suspended
its withdrawal and entered into an Agreement with Washington that was intended
to pave the way to normalisation of Relations between the two States. The
“Agreed Framework” broke down, and in 2003 North Korea actually carried out its
Threat to withdraw from the NPT – making it the first State to do so. In 2006,
North Korea became the ninth Country to obtain Nuclear Weapons. (3) Today,
North Korea is an isolated, impoverished Nation that possesses Nuclear Weapons.
It is this nexus of Nuclear Weapons and improverishment, along with the concern
that the cash-strapped Regime may sell Weapons to irreponsible States or even
terrorist Groups, that have pushed North Korea to the top of the U.S. Foreign
Policy agenda. (4)
Many scholars and policy analysts who write about the
Motivations for North Korea’s Nuclear programme overemphasise the importance of
the external environmental Security Threats to which North Korea was exposed
after the collapse of its patron Ally, the Soviet Union. (5) However, newly
declassified Soviet documents from September 1991 (before the collapse of the
Soviet Union) demonstrate that Soviet officials already held serious concerns
about a North Korea Nuclear programme for several years. In a meeting between
Soviet Foreign Ministry officials and the North Korean ambassador, Son
Seong-Pil, soviet officials pressured North Korea to sign the safeguard
Agreement with the [IAEA], threatening to terminate Nuclear power plant
construction assistance, halt the supply of Fuel Resources, and end all
Military assistance. (6)
Long before the end of the Cold War, in the early
1960s, and three decades before the isolated North Korean Regime used the
Threat of developing an indigenous Nuclear Weapons programme as leverage over
the United States, the DPRK sought a nuclear deterrent. North Korea pursued
Nuclear Weapons despite being protected by the Nuclear arsenals of its Allies:
the Soviet Union – which possessed a Nuclear arsenal – and China, which by 1964
had detonated its own device. (7) using newly obtained and translated primary
source documents from the archives of North Korea’s present and former
Communist Allies, this chapter aims to go beyond the conventional explanation
of Nuclear proliferation in North Korea – that is, the deterioration of
external Security Environment as the trigger of the programme. (8) Rather, this
chapter attempts to show that the unreliability of the Soviet Nuclear umbrella
– and, after Nuclear umbrella – and, after 1964, the Chinese umbrella as well –
contributed to North Korea’s initial decision to fortify its national Security
by developing an indigenous Nuclear Weapons programme.
While other scholars (9) have identified Moscow’s
perceived unreliability as a motivating factor in the evolution of North
Korea’s thinking about an indigenous Nuclear Deterrent, this chapter utilises
new Russian and Chinese documents, including recently obtained conversations
with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, to confirm and reinforce this argument.
These newly obtained archival documents describe a process of
hypermilitarisation of North Korea starting in December 1962 under the
so-called Byungjin Line (byungjin rosun), which called for the simultaneous
development of heavy Industry and national Defense capabilities. As the
documents reveal, a critical component of the buildup of national Defense
capabilities was the development of an indigenous Nuclear Weapons programme,
though this was not to be achieved for another four decades.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In
the following section, the existing literature on why States proliferate in
relations to North Korea’s case is discussed to see how the case could be
better understood. In the next section, the inception stage of North Korea’s
Nuclear programme is investigated, as well as the reasons why the unreliability
of its Soviet Alliance compelled North Korea to develop Nuclear Weapons using
Soviet Nuclear Technology. In the final section, policy recommendations for
current Nuclear umbrellas in the context of future East Asian Nuclear
proliferation are presented.
Alliance Dynamics and
Proliferation
Threats to national Security are thought to be the
major Motivation for States to seek Nuclear Weapons. (10) However, in case of
junior Allies, who are heavily dependent on patron Allies for their national
Security, Threat perception can be swayed by Alliance dilemmas and patron
Ally’s extended Deterrence guarantees. (11) Moreover, the Fear of
“abandonment,” resulting from a junior Ally’s perception that a patron Ally’s
conventional and Nuclear Security guarantees are reduced or absent, can trigger
junior Allies’ pursuit of a Nuclear Weapons programme.
Recent research on Nuclear proliferation takes this
Alliance dynamic into consideration. Political scientist Avery Goldstein argues
that three second-ranking Powers – Britain, China, and France – did not value
the Security guarantee provided by their Superpower partners, the United States
and the Soviet Union, leading to those countries’ decisions to proliferate.
(12) For example, Britain and France, even with NATO Security guarantees, did
not fully trust that the United States would come to their Aid in the case of a
confrontation with the Soviet Union. (13) However, Goldstein’s analysis is
limited to second-ranking Powers’ decision and does not account for what made
the patron Allies unreliable. While it is important to analyse great Powers’
and second-tier Powers’ Security policies, if the conflicts in the post-Cold
War international system are caused by small States such as North Korea and
Iran, it is also important to study those States’ Histories and policies.
International Relations scholar Etel Soligen also
argued that the Security Threat cannot be the main reason behind North Korea’s
Nuclear development. (14) First, North Korea was under the Nuclear umbrellas of
two great Power Allies (following the 1964 detonation of the Chinese Bomb)
through mutual Defense Treaties signed in 1961. The rationale behind this
argument is that, even if you have enemies such as the United States and South
Korea, due to the extended Deterrence provided by major Power Allies the Security
Threat should bee reduced. Also, when North Korea
started to develop the Weapons program in the 1960s, the United States, the
greatest Threat to North Korea, was focused on the War in Vietnam. North Korea
understood that the United States would not want to open another front in Asia
and start the second Korean War. (15) However, Soligen does not trace
the History of why North Korea had to develop their Nuclear programme to defend
against the Superpower Threat while under the Soviet and Chinese Nuclear umbrellas.
(16)
In the following section, using primary source
documents, the History of North Korea’s Weapons programme as part of its
hypermilitarisation under the Byungjin Line will be explored in order to shed
light on the relations with its Superpower Ally and the unreliability of its
Nuclear umbrella.
History of North Korea’s
Mistrust and Longing for Autonomy
While it is difficult to get into the minds of
leaders, one can easily surmise that North Korea’s Kim Il Sung had an
appreciation for the Power of Nuclear Weapons dating back to 1945. Despite
Korean attempts to achieve national Liberation through nearly fifteen years of
guerrilla Warfare against Japan, it was two U.S. bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that brought an end to Japanese colonial Rule over Korea. (17)
In the years following the establishment of the DPRK
in 1948, Kim Il Sung, who had come to Power with Soviet backing, maintained
close Relations with Moscow, which had become a Nuclear Power in 1949.
Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Kim also
developed strong Relations with Beijing. North Korea benefited tremendously
from these two Alliances Relationships during the 1950-1953 Korean War. Moscow
provided Military equipment and Beijing dispatched several hundred thousand
“volunteers” that prevented North Korea from being wiped off the map. Yet, it
was during this period that tensions and doubts also began to emerge in
Pyongyang’s Relations with its two patron Allies. [] Stalin’s refusal to
directly commit Troops following the September 1950 Incheon Landing, which
resulted in a complete rout of North Korean Forces, and Chinese commander Peng
Dehuai’s heavy-handed treatment of Kim Il Sung, led to tensions that lingered
on even after the July 1953 Armistice. (18)
Despite tensions, North Korea maintained close
Relations with the Soviet Union and China, partly because of the tremendous
role the two patron Allies played in the reconstruction of the War-torn Country
throughout the 1950s but also to gain access to advanced Technologies,
particularly from Moscow and its Eastern and central European satellite States.
This included Nuclear Technology. In 1956, the Soviets signed an Agreement to
train North Korean technicians in peaceful use of Nuclear Technology at Soviet
Nuclear research facilities. (19) In 1959, the Soviets signed another deal with
the North Koreans to provide them with a research reactor, which was completed
in 1965. (20)
While China was incapable of providing the advanced
Technology North Korea desired, tens of thousands of Chinese “volunteers”
remained in North Korea after the War to help with reconstruction. The
lingering tensions after the 1956 incident in which Chinese and Soviet
officials interfered in an internal North Korea dispute and the desire to limit
the influence of Pyongyang’s patron Allies over North Korean Politics led Kim
Il Sung, in 1957, to propose the withdrawal of the remaining Chinese Forces
from the Country. (21) This pullout was carried out in the Fall of 1958, over
seven years after Chinese Forces entered Korea. By coincidence, as Chinese
Troops withdrew from Korea, the United States began to introduce “new Weapons”
to South Korea. Specifically, the United States developed Honest John Missiles
and 280-mm atomic cannons to the peninsula. (22) North Korea was well aware of
U.S. Nuclear capabilities and the consequences they would bring for the
peninsula. Therefore, in this period, North Korea began to discuss the prospect
of Nuclear Weapons. (23)
With the introduction of Nuclear
Weapons to South Korea, the importance of Pyong-yang’s Military Alliances,
particularly with the more technologically advanced and Nuclear-armed Moscow,
became more important. While traveling to Moscow in late January 1959 to attend
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) 21st Congress, Kim proposed
signing a mutual cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union. Though Khrushchev
consented and also agreed to visit Pyongyang later that year to sign the
Agreement, for over two years the Kremlin Leader found reasons to postpone his
trip to the North Korean capital. Khrushchev was scheduled to travel to
Pyongyang in the fall of 1959 but canceled, suggesting that it would be
inadvisable to sign such an Agreement with North Korea in the wake of his trip
to Washington. (24) The trip was rescheduled for September of 1960, though it
was again postponed because he was allegedly too busy preparing for the CPSU’s
22nd Congress later in October. In the spring of 1961, Khrushchev again
explained that it would be difficult to travel to North Korea. After two
previous cancellations, however, Khrushchev had become aware that Kim Il Sung
was growing impatient and believed the cancellations to be connected to the
Soviet leader’s desire to improve Relations with the United States. (25)
On the southern half of the Peninsula, Major General
Park Chung Hee seized Power through a military Coup d’État on 16 May 1961. As
newly obtained and translated Chinese records reveal, the alarming events in
Seoul put Pyongyang in Crisis mode. Two days after the Coup, the North Korean
Leadership abandoned plans for economic Reform and instead proposed shifting
expenditures towards national Defense Industries. (26)
In late May, Khrushchev dispatched First Deputy
Premier Alexei Kosygin to Pyongyang. Kosygin, perhaps as a response to the
troubling developments in South Korea, invited Kim Il Sung to visit Moscow to
sign the Agreement. In late June, barely six weeks after the Park Chung Hee
Coup d’État, Kim departed for the Soviet capital. During his visit, he and
Khrushchev finally signed the Agreement. Days later, Kim traveled to Beijing,
where he signed a nearly identical Agreement with China, which, having fallen
out with the Soviets, sought to win the allegiance of the North Koreans. It is not
clear from the documentary evidence how valuable Kim believed the Sino-DPRK
Treaty to be, as Beijing had not yet detonated its first Nuclear device and did
not have as advanced a Weapons Industry as Moscow.
While Kim Il Sung must have been relieved to finally
have a Security guarantee from Moscow after the introduction of Nuclear Weapons
to Seoul and the Park Chung Hee Coup d’État, the difficulties he encountered in
signing the Agreement likely left him with the impression that Khrushchev did
not fully appreciate Kim’s Security concerns, leading to doubts about Moscow’s
commitment to North Korea’s Security.
By October 1962, Kim, already full of doubts, had his
suspicions confirmed after the Cuban Missile Crisis, when Khrushchev “betrayed
Cuba.” (27) North Korean Vice Premier Kim Il later explained to Alexei Kosygin
that as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the North Korean Leadership felt
that it “could not count that the Soviet Government would keep the obligations
related to the defense of Korea it assumed in the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.” (28) What the North Koreans viewed as
Soviet capitulation in the face of pressure from the Kennedy Administration
demonstrated that Khrushchev was more concerned about peaceful coexistence than
he was in aiding smaller socialist Countries vulnerable to being picked off,
one by one, by the United States. (29)
North Korea’s Rodong
Sinmun published an editorial on 29 October 1962, harshly criticising
Khrushchev for capitulating to the United States. (30) Moreover, as newly
obtained Soviet records reveal, Kim Il Sung informed Soviet ambassador
Moskovsky that after “new American equipment” was introduced in South Korea,
North Korea’s decision on strengthening the DPRK’s battle readiness and defense
Forces was no longer sufficient. Therefore, Kim asked for permission to send a
delegation to Moscow to discuss Military Aid. (31) Kim requested that the
Soviet Union deliver – “free or charge” – over 100 million rubles in Military
Aid to North Korea. Specifically, to enhance coastal defenses, he asked for
submarines, and for the defense of Cities he requested an unspecified number of
MiG-21s and 12 surface-to-air Missile batteries. Kim played up the Threat not
just to North Korea but also to the Soviet Union if North Korea, which borders
the Soviet Far East, were to fall to the imperialists. Kim slyly remarked, “I
know that [First Secretary Khrushchev and Second Secretary Frol Kozolv] are no
less concerned than I about the Defense of the Far Eastern forward post ... It
provides a convenient platform for the Enemy’s landing.” (32) After receiving
word through Ambassador Moskovsky that the Soviet Leadership was prepared to
receive a North Korean delegation to discuss Military Assistance, Kim
dispatched Deputy Premier Kim Gwanghyeop to Moscow in late November to work out
the terms of the Military Aid to the DPRK. Yet, the visit to Moscow ended in
failure. Kim Il Sung’s Government could not pay for this vital Military
Assistance; Moscow would sell the Weapons to Pyongyang but not give them for
free or even on credit. (33)
This certainly reinforced Pyongyang’s mistrust of the
Soviet Leadership. One week after the delegation returned from Moscow, the
Fifth Plenum of the Fourth Central Committee of the ruling Korean Worker’s
Party was held in secret, an unusual move even by North Korean standards. The
North Koreans were so frustrated by the perceived Soviet betrayal that they did
not even bother to inform the embassy of the December Plenum, which had been a
standard practice. (34) The plenum formally adopted the Byungjim Line, or the
“equal emphasis policy,” which called for simultaneous Development of heavy
Industry and Defense capabilities. The plenum also declared Four Military
Guidelines (sadae kunsanoseon): to
arm the entire Population; to fortify the entire Country; to train the entire
Army as a “cadre Army”; and to modernise Weaponry, Doctrine, and Tactics under
the principle of self-reliance in national Defense. (35) The Party also revived
the Wartime Military Committee (kunsa
wiweonhoe). (36) These measures resulted in a hypermilitarisation of North
Korea Society.
It is important to note just how extreme a measure
this was for North Korea, which had recently completed a highly successful
Five-Year Plan. While Chinese documents reveal that the Standing Committee of
the Korean Worker’s Party Central Committee had recommended modifying the
Seven-Year Plan in the wake of the May 1961 military Coup d’État in South
Korea, that plan was suspended and the plan was launched as originally
conceived, perhaps after signing Agreements with both Moscow and Beijing. The
Seven-Year Plan, by December 1962 already completing its first year, was slated
to de-emphasise heavy Industry and focus – after eight years of intense heavy
Industry centered Development – on the improuvement of Living Conditions
through the Development of light Industry and Consumer Goods. Thus, changing
the Seven-Year Plan at this stage was an extreme measure signaling a complete
change in North Korean planning.
North Korea took immediate measures to enhance
Defense capabilities and began the construction of fortifications in mountains
throughout the Country. (37) As Soviet and Hungarian records reveal, in
addition to these measures, North Korea also sought to obtain the Technology to
develop an indigenous Nuclear Weapons programme. This pursuit of a Nuclear
Deterrent became clear through a sudden and keen interest in Nuclear Technology
from the Spring of 1963. In the early 1960s, Soviet specialists were in the
DPRK conducting tests on uranium ore found on the northern half of the
peninsula. Alarm bells were set off in the Soviet embassy when North Korean
officials suddenly began to make inquiries about how they might develop the
mining of uranium ore on a broad scale. The Soviet specialists explained that
such an Operation would be very costly. Moreover, they informed the North
Koreans that Korean uranium ore was “not rich” and “very scarce.” (38) This did
not deter those making the inquiries, who only days later asked about Korea’s
prospects for building their own Atomic Bomb. Attempting to discourage his
interlocutors, the specialists insisted that “the Economy of the DPRK cannot
cope with the creation of Nuclear Weapons.” Again undeterred, the North Korean
retorted that “it would cost much less in the DPRK than in other Countries. If
we tell our workers, ... they will agree to work free of charge for several
years.” The Soviet embassy gave explicit instructions to the specialists to
avoid all further Discussions about uranium and Weapons with North Koreans.
(39)
North Korea would not develop an indigenous Nuclear
Weapons programme for another fifty years. However, lack of Faith in the Soviet
extended Deterrent, coupled with an unfavourable status quo following the
introduction of Nuclear Weapons to South Korea and the presence of an
antiCommunist military Junta in Seoul, led to North Korea’s initial decision to
seek a Nuclear Deterrent of its own. As a result of Moscow’s lack of
credibility, the course of North Korean economic and military planning was
forever altered. This had a transformative effort on the Country, which became
hypermilitarised under the Byungjin Line. North Korea began to make a
multidecade and extremely costly Investment in Science and Technology in
pursuit of its national Defense goals. By 1965, the share of national Defense
to the total national Budget had risen to over 30 percent, representing 1.2
billion won, from a mere 4.3 percent less than a decade before. (40) The goal
of this costly programme was to maximise indigenous Production and minimise
reliance on foreign Suppliers. This did not mean that Pyongyang was unwilling
to assimilate foreign Science and Technology. This was particularly the case
with Nuclear Weapons Technology. The DPRK even asked China, once Relations were
restored in the mid-1970s following a Sino-Korean split during the Cultural
Revolution, to train North Korean specialists in the Development of Nuclear
Weapons. Even until the 1980s, North Korea showed an effort to receive civilian
Nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European Allies.
(41)
Conclusion
While there are several Motivations behind a State’s
pursuit of Nuclear Weapons, for junior Allies, the unreliability of its patron
Ally’s Nuclear umbrella could be the biggest motivating factor. For North
Korea, the difficulty of receiving a written assurance and the way the Soviet
Union handled the Cuban Missile Crisis made North Korea realise that the Soviet
Union was not trustworthy, and these issues dramatically shifted Pyongyang’s
Domestic Policy to fortify the Country from December 1962. This was a
monumental shift in North Korean planning that, in part, likely led to the
Country’s economic slowdown by the 1970s and eventual and dramatic collapse in
the 1990s.
Tracing the origins of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
does not indicate how those Weapons changed – or did not change – the State’s
strategic calculus. However, understanding why they first explored the Weapons
helps to understand why small States might seek Nuclear Weapons while under a
Nuclear umbrella. While there are many arguments that bilateral Security
guarantees of U.S.-South Korea and U.S.-Japan have been the main reason why the
two junior Allies have not developed their own Nuclear Weapons, it is less
commonly thought that North Korea might have wanted the Weapon early on due to
the fact that the Soviet Nuclear umbrella was less credible. Rather than
treating North Korea as a rogue Regime, it is advisable to try to understand the
reasons for its conduct.
Even with Allies, and even with one (and later two)
Nuclear umbrella(s), North Korea sought its own Deterrent through the
development of an indigenous Nuclear Weapons programme. On 12 February 2013,
two decades since the first Nuclear crisis, North Korea conducted its third
underground Nuclear test, the first under the new leadership of Kim Jong-un.
North Korea is not likely to give up its Nuclear capabilities. (42) Indeed, one
month after the third Nuclear test, North Korea reintroduced the Byungjin Line,
but the 2013 version calls for the simultaneous development of the Nuclear
programme and improvements to Living Conditions. While the term used is the
same, Byungjin of 1962 and its 2013 version are fundamentally different in that
the recent programme’s aim seems to be to reduce Expenditures on conventional
Military Forces and focus on the Nuclear Deterrent so that the Country can at
long last improuve Living Conditions, a goal that had been scuttled after the
1962 change to the Seven-Year Plan. To be realistic, this makes it less likely
that North Korea will be willing to disarm. The international Community can
reduce the possibility of potential Nuclear standoff in the Region by learning
from the sources of North Korean conduct and apply it to other cases. (43) If a
Nuclear-armed patron Ally does not want to see further proliferation in East
Asia or in the World in general, the Nuclear umbrella has to be credible. North
Korea’s case demonstrates that even if junior Allies enjoy formal Alliances
with patron Allies, if the Nuclear umbrella is not credible, they can seek
their own Nuclear deterrent. With a February 2013 South Korean poll revealing a
high level of support for a domestic Nuclear programme, the more urgent task
for the United States as a patron Ally may not be a speedy resolution to North
Korea’s disarmament – which, given its History, will likely not be carried out
voluntarily – but to credibly project its Nuclear umbrella so that both South
Korea and Japan see no need to develop their own Weapons programmes. (44) A
statement by former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa summarises the
importance of the U.S. Nuclear umbrella very well: “It is in the interest of
the United States, so long as it does not wish to see Japan withdraw from the
[NPT] and develop its own Nuclear Deterrent, to mainain its Alliance with Japan
and continue to provide a Nuclear umbrella.” (45)
There was debate about whether the United States and
other Countries should engage or contain North Korea during Negotiations in the
1990s and early 2000s. (46) The issue of whether or not the United States
should have engaged with North Korea is not covered in this chapter. But whether or not
a Bomb was a goal all along for North Korea, it is clear that the possession of
Nuclear Weapons by the DPRK or other small Countries in the future does not
help the United States because it limits U.S. Freedom of Action. (47) The United States has to take into
consideration the possibility of North Korea’s Nuclear retaliation against U.S.
Cities or allied Territory when taking action against North Korea. [Fuck me.]
The United States can learn a lesson from the North Korean case and better
understand why having a credible Nuclear umbrella is essential to prevent
Allies from going Nuclear in the future and consequently limiting its Freedom
of Action.
1.
Jooeun Kim is a PhD
candidate in the Department of Government at Georgetown University.
2.
For example, “N Korea withdraws from nuclear
pact,” BBC News, January 10, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2644593.stm;
“North Korea leaves nuclear pact,” CNN, January 10, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/10/nkoreatreaty/index.html?_s=PM:asiapcf;
“North Korea Assailed for Withdrawing from Arms Treaty,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/10/international/10CND_KORE.html.
3.
There is still some Debate about whether the
first Test was a success, as the explosion yield was low.
4.
See Robert S. Litwak, Outlier States: American
Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 2012): 138.
5.
For example, David Kang argues, “Although during
the Cold War the North was the aggressor, this shift in Power put in on the
defensive. It was only when the balance began to turn against the North that it
began to pursue a Nuclear Weapons programme.” Victor Cha and David Kang,
Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 45; Similarly, Victor Cha, when analysing the purpose
of a Weapons programme, claims, “At a minimum, one could posit that a primarily
political goal of the DPRK Regime and its juche
Strategy is State survival and protection of national Sovereignty, given the
deterioratioing domestic and geostrategic condition since the end of the Cold
War.” Victor Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Shields,
or Swords?,” Political Science Quarterly
117, no. 2 (2002): 214.
6.
Record of Conversation
between F.G. Kundaze and Son Seong-Pil (State Archive of the Russian Federation
[GARF], 20 September 1991), fond 10026, opis 4, delo 2803, listy 1-3.
7.
While North Korea enjoyed Alliances with two
great Powers, I only focus on its Alliance with the superpower Ally, the Soviet
Union, because I only treat the inception stage of North Korea’s Nuclear
programme.
8.
There are some examples that used the primary
documents and analysed the Motivation behind North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
programme: However, recently more documents have been uncovered, and we can
more definitely trace the thinking of North Korean leadership. For recent
examples, see Jonathan D. Pollack, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and
International Security (New York: Routledge, 2011); Balazs Szalontai and Sergey
Radchenko, North Korea’s Efforts to Acquire Nuclear Technology and Nuclear
Weapons: Evidence from Russian and Hungarian Archives (working paper,
Washington, DC: Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, August 2006).
9.
See, for example, Alexandre Mansourov, “The
Origins, Evolution, and Current Politics of the North Korean Nuclear Program,”
Nonproliferation Review (spring-summer 1995); Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea
and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1995); Pollack, No Exit.
10.
Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear
Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3
(winter 1996-1997): 54-86. Sagan also published this article in revised form as
“Rethinking the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: Three Models in Search of a
Bomb,” in The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, US Interests, and World
Order, ed. Victor A. Utgoff (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); Kenneth Waltz,
“Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84,
no. 3 (September 1990): 731-745; Kenneth M. Waltz, “More May Be Better,” in The
Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, eds. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz
(New York/London: W.W. Norton, 1995)
11.
On Alliance dilemmas, see Glenn H. Snyder,
Alliance Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007).
12.
Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the free ride:
alliance and security in the postwar world,” International Organization 49, no.
1 (winter 1995): 39-71; Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century:
China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution
(Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000).
13.
Also, for a similar argument on Britain, see
Kenneth N. Waltz, Peace, Stability, and Nuclear Weapons (policy paper, San Diego,
CA: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation,
August 1995): 5.
14.
Etel Solingen, Nuclear
logics: Contrasting paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2009): 119.
15.
Richard Rosecrance, The Dispersion of Nuclear
Weapons: Strategy and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964),
301, as quoted in Solingen, Nuclear logics.
16.
Solingen also mentions that South Korea’s
Nuclear programme did not start until the 1970s; therefore the “reactive
proliferation” argument is also not sufficient. See Solingen, Nuclear logics.
However, Michael Mazarr gives a contrasting view on South Korea’s role in North
Korea’s Nuclear Motivation. See Michael J. Mazarr, “Going Just a Little
Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea,” International Security 20,
no. 2 (fall 1995): 100.
17.
Mansourov, “Origins, Evolution and Current
Politics,” 28.
18.
See, for example, “Information on the Situation
in the DPRK,” April 1955, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114590.
19.
See, for example, “Journal of Soviet Ambassador
in the DPRK A.M. Puzanov for 17 May 1958,” May 17, 1958. History and Public
Policy Program Digital Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116144.
20.
Alexander Zhebin, “A Political History of
Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation,” in The North Korean Nuclear Program:
Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, eds. James Clay Moltz and
Alexandre Y. Mansourov (New York: Routledge, 2000), 28-30.
21.
See “Journal of Soviet Ambassador to the DPRK
A.M. Puzanov for 4 June 1957,” June 04, 1957, History and Public Policy Program
Digital Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115623;
and “Minutes of Conversation between Zhou Enlai and Soviet Ambassador Yudin
(Excerpt),” January 08, 1958, History and Public Policy Program Digital
Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114179.
22.
See National Archives and Records Administration,
“Records of the Department of State Internal Affairs of Korea, 1955-1959,”
Decimal File 795, .00/7-157 to .00/2-2458, Roll #6.
23.
Pollack, No Exit, 47.
24.
See “Report, Embassy of the Hungarian People’s
Republic in the DPRK to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary,” March 16,
1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113387.
25.
“Memorandum of Conversation between N.S.
Khrushchev and Kim Gwanghyeop, March 1961,” from the personal archive of V.P.
Tkachenko, cited in Koreiskii Poluostrov i interesi Rossii [The Korean
Peninsulla and Russia’s Interests] (Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2000),
20-21.
26.
“Contents of the May 18th North Korean Party
Central Standing Committee Meeting,” May 21, 1961. History of Public Policy
Program Digital Archive, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110055.
27.
“Embassy of Hungary in
North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, 8 January 1965,” MOL, XIX-J-1-j
Korea, 1965, 73, doboz, IV-100, 001819/1965. In the recent H-Diplo
debate, Matthew Fuhrmann, Matthew Kroenig, and Todd S. Sechser argued against
Frank Gavin, claiming that Gavin does not provide the criteria for an important
case of Nuclear Deterrence and Coercion when arguing that the 1958-1962 case is
critical in understanding Nuclear Weapons. They also argue that by no means
would policymakers go back to this case in the past in order to derive policy
implications for the cases of Iran and North Korea. However, while I do not
dispute their claim that focusing on just one case is not enough for
generalisation and policy implications of Nuclear issues, we need to understand
for North Korea’s case that the Cuban Missile Crisis changed Alliance dynamics
with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Nuclear umbrella’s credibility. See
Matthew Fuhrmann, Matthew Kroenig, and Todd S. Sechser, “Response: ‘The Case
for Using Statistics to Study Nuclear Security,’” H-Diplo/ISSF Forum, 2014.
28.
“Record of a conversation with the Soviet
Ambassador in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovsky about the negotiations between
the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Kosygin,
and the governing body of the Korean Workers Party,” February 16, 1965, Czech
Foreign Ministry Archive. Similarly, according to Wolf Mendl, the French Nuclear
Armament can be justified by events surrounding the War in Indochina and Suez
Crisis in 1956: “Both these incidents provide a basis for the Theory that in
conditions of Nuclear stalemate between the super Powers a Nation cannot rely
upon its Ally for protection when the issue is not of vital interest to that
Ally.” Wolf Mendl, Deterrence and Persuasion (London: Faber and Faber, 1970).
29.
“Record of a
conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.”
30.
Yonhap News Agency, North Korea Handbook (Seoul:
East Gate, 2002): 948. Also see James F. Person, “North Korea and the Cuban
Missile Crisis,” Wilson Center, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/north-korea-and-the-cuban-missile-crisis.
31.
“Memorandum of
Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim
Il Sung,” November 1, 1962.
32.
Ibid.
33.
See Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the
Khrushchev Era, Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism,
1953-1964 (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 192.
34.
“Memorandum of
Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and
North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Seongcheol,” December 29, 1962.
35.
“Report, Embassy of Hungary
in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” February 15, 1963.
36.
As Daesook Suh writes, the Supreme People’s
Assembly had established the Military Committee during the Korean War. The
Party revived it under the auspices of the Central Committee in 1962. See
Daesook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korea Leader (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1988), 215.
37.
“Report, Embassy of
Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry,” May 27, 1963.
38.
“Conversation between
Soviet Ambassador in North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Soviet specialists in
North Korea,” September 27, 1963.
39.
Ibid., October 16, 1963.
40.
“Record of a
conversation with the Soviet Ambassador, in the DPRK Comrade V.P. Moskovskyi
about the negotiations between the Soviet delegation, led by the USSR Council
of Ministers Chairman Kosygin, and the governing body of the Korean Workers
Party, which took place at the USSR Embassy in the DPRK on February 16, 1965,”
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.
41.
Hymans argues that the DPRK sought to obtain
Nuclear Weapons due to a combination of Security and prestige purposes. Because
of this, his argument is, “therefore, they resolved to block its attempt to
gain the expertise and equipment necessary for the bomb.” However, while North
Korea sought autonomy through Nuclear Weapons acquisition, they certainly
sought its Allies’ assistance. See Jacques Hymans, “Assessing North Korean
nuclear intentions and capacities: A new approach,” Journal of East Asian Studies 8, no. 2 (2008): 271.
42.
Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb, 101.
43.
Mark Hibbs, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, believes that because Nuclear Technology is
easier to achieve even as an isolated Country such as North Korea, “Nuclear
proliferation has to be countered through addressing the complex political
factors underlying it.” Export Control is not effective as providing
Protection, because the Technology can be obtained through illicit networks.
Armin Rosen, “How North Korea Built Its Nuclear Program,” Atlantic, April 10,
2013, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/how-north-korea-built-its-nuclear-program/274830.
44.
See Asan Institute, “The Fallout: South Korean
Public Opinion Following North Korea’s Third Nuclear Test” (issue brief,
February 24, 2013), http://en.asaninst.org/issue-brief-no-46-the-fallout-south-korean-public-opinion-following-north-koreas-third-nuclear-test/.
45.
See Morihiro Hosokawa, “Are U.S. Troops in Japan
Needed? Reforming the Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 (July/August 1998),
5.
46.
The most representative scholarly work is by Cha
and Kang.
47.
Kenneth Waltz, “Peace, Stability and Nuclear
Weapons,” 11; Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010).
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