Indonesia and Portuguese Timor
Portuguese Timor is a small (population 600,000)
hitherto neglected Portuguese colony occupying half the island of Timor. The
other half is Indonesian territory. The inhabitants of the two halves are
ethnically indistinguishable, although centuries under separate rules have
created social and cultural differences. Indonesia does not claim the colony,
and the Suharto government has been content to leave it indefinitely in
Portuguese hands. The GOI does, however, look with concern at the idea of an
independent Portuguese Timor, fearing that its backwardness and lack of
economic viability would open it to pervasive outside – especially Chinese –
influence which could spread into Indonesia.
Background
A small scale civil war broke out between rival
political parties in Portuguese Timor last August. Unable to restore order, the
Portuguese evacuated their remaining citizens and moved their administration to
a small off-shore island. Fretilin, a vaguely leftist party favoring early
independence, quickly gained ascendency when it won the support (and the
weapons) of the 2,000-odd Timorese soldiers from the disbanded Portuguese
garrison. The Indonesians, however, have trained and equipped units from the
two main rival parties and sent them back into Portuguese Timor with a
stiffening of disguised Indonesian special forces troops. The latter have been
pressing Fretilin back toward Dili, the capital. Latest reports indicate that
hostilities have decreased while the pro-Indonesian forces consolidate their
position.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, meeting
recently in Rome with his Portuguese counterpart, obtained the latter’s segment
to a statement reasserting Portugal’s responsibility for the territory and
calling for a conference between the Timorese parties and the Portuguese to end
the fighting and resume the “orderly” process of decolonization disrupted last
August. The statement favors Indonesia, in that it refutes Fretilin’s claim to
control of the territory and has Fretilin outnumbered in a conference by the
two rival parties now under de facto Indonesian control.
Current Situation
Preoccupied with the crisis at home and with their
focus on colonial problems limited to agonizing over Angola, Portugal’s chief
interest is to get out gracefully, leaving behind a semblance of order on which
legal factions can agree. The Portuguese have called a conference of the three
main Timorese parties, suggesting Darwin as the site. None of the three parties
have rejected the proposal, but there is disagreement and bickering over the
location.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian UN Mission has circulated a
policy statement emphasizing Portugal’s continuing responsibility for “orderly
decolonization” of Timor, calling for an act of self-determination by the
“entire people,” pledging to abide by the outcome, and welcoming them to
“become independent through integration with Indonesia” if they wish. In a
passage aimed at Fretilin, the statement declared that “Indonesia cannot accept
a solution imposed by any party through armed force.”
Prognosis
A Portuguese sponsored conference of the three main
Timorese parties (assuming it is eventually held) could result in a cease-fire
call and perhaps a token return of the Portuguese administration to Dili,
although an actual restoration of Portuguese authority seems most unlikely.
Although the Indonesians would probably give a cease-fire their public
blessing, we expect that they will keep up their clandestine pressure on
Fretilin until the party is defeated or breaks up. The GOI has displayed
patience and some subtlety in its efforts to date, however, and will try to
reach its objective with minimum outside impact.
U.S. Interest
We have taken the position that the U.S. should
eschew involvement in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the
Indonesians, Portuguese, Australians and Timorese themselves. There are no
present calls for our involvement, with the parties concerned in direct touch
with each other and none seeking our help.
A particular concern for us has been the possibility
of an overt Indonesian military move into the territory, inevitably using
US-supplied weapons in the process. We have brought the matter quitely to the
attention of the Indonesian leaders, however, and this has been a major factor
in restraining Jakarta to date.
Drated by: EA/IMS:EC Ingraham:lgr
11-21-75 ext
21236
Clearances: EA – Mr. Miller
EUR/WE – Mr.
Fourier
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