Tuesday, August 19, 2014

RaulHilberg. The Destructions of the european jews.3e. vol.3. chap.10. Reflections. The Perpetrators. Excerpt. Yale University Press. 2003.

The attempt to rationalize the deed was two-pronged. One line of contention was designed to show that all actions were countermeasures, that in essence they were defensive. This kind of explanation, furnished by an army of propagandists, was centered entirely on the Jews. The other approach, which was internal, offered reassurances to those who performed specific acts by virtue of their positions. Such were dealt only with the perpetrator himself. Yet, taken together, the two strategies were complementary, and each carried a set of exculpatory themes.
The open propaganda campaign was fashioned to portray the Jew as evil, and that message was formulated for long-range effect. The allegation was repeated often enough so that it could be stored in the mind and drawn upon according to need. Thus the statement “The Jew is evil,” taken from the storehouse, could be converted by a perpetrator into a complete rationalization: “I kill the Jew because the Jew is evil.” To understand the function of such formulations is to realize why they were being constructed until the very end of the war. Propaganda was needed to combat doubts and guilt feelings wherever they arose, whether inside or outside the bureaucracy, and whenever they surfaced, before or after an event.
In fact, we find that in April 1943, after the deportations of the Jews from the Reich had largely been completed, the press was ordered to deal with the Jewish question continuously and without letup. (111) In order to build up a storehouse, the propaganda had to be turned out on a large scale. “Research institutes” were formed, (112) doctoral dissertations were written, (113) and volumes of propaganda literature were printed by every conceivable agency. Sometimes a scholarly investigation was conducted too assiduously. One economic study, rich in the common jargon but uncommonly balanced in content, appeared in Vienna with the notation “Not in the book trade.” The author had discovered that the zenith of Jewish financial power had been reached in 1913. (114) On the other hand, the publication of more suitable literature could even lead to bureaucratic competition. Thus Unterstaatssekretär Luther of the Foreign Office had to assure Obergruppenführer Berger of the SS Main Office that the Foreign Office’s pamphlet Das Russische Tor ist aufgestossen (The Russian Gate Is Thrown Open) in no way compared with Berger’s masterpiece Der Untermensch (The Subhuman). (115)
What did all this propaganda accomplish? How was the Jew portrayed in this unending flow of leaflets and pamphlets, books, and speeches? How did the propaganda image of the Jews serve to justify the destruction process?
First of all, the Germans drew a picture of an international Jewry ruling the world and plotting the destruction of Germany and German life. “If international-finance Jewry,” said Adolf Hitler in 1939, “inside and outside of Europe should succeed in plunging the nations into another world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and with it the victory of the Jews, but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.” (116) In 1944 Himmler said to his commanders. “This was the most frightening order which an organization could receive, the order to solve the Jewish question,” but if the Jews had still been in the rear, the front line could not have been held, and if any of the commanders were moved to pity, they had only to think of the bombing terror, “which after all is organized in the last analysis by the Jews.” (117)
The theory of world Jewish rule and of the incessant Jewish plot against the German people penetrated into all offices. It became interwoven with foreign policy and sometimes led to preposterous results. Thus the conviction grew that foreign statesmen who were not very friendly toward Germany were Jews, part-Jews, married to Jews, or somehow dominated by Jews. Streicher did not hesitate to state publicly (118) that he had it on good Italian authority that the Pope had Jewish blood. Similarly, Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office once questioned the British chargé d’affaires about the percentage of “Aryan” blood in Mr. Rublee, an American on a mission in behalf of refugees. (119)
This type of reasoning was also applied in reverse. If a power was friendly, it was believed to be free of Jewish rule. In March 1940, after Ribbentrop had succeeded in establishing friendly relations with Russia, he assured Mussolini and Ciano that Stalin had given up the idea of world revolution. The Soviet administration had been purged of Jews. Even Kaganovich (the Jewish Politburo member) looked rather like a Georgian. (120)
The claim of Jewish world rule was to be established irrefutably in a show trial. Toward the end of 1941 the Propaganda Ministry, the Foreign Office, and the Justice Ministry laid plans for the trial of Herschel Grynzpan, the man who had assassinated a German embassy official (vom Rath) in Paris in 1938. (121) The trial was to prove that Grynzpan’s deed was part of a “fundamental plan by international Jewry to drive the world into a war with National Socialist Germany,” (122) but it was never held because the Justice Ministry in its eagerness had made the fatal mistake of adding homosexuality to the indictment. At the last moment it was feared that Grynzpan might reveal “the alleged homosexual relations of Gesandtschaftsrat vom Rath.” And so the whole scheme was dropped. (123)
When Germany began to lose the war in Stalingrad, the propaganda machine sought to make up in sheer volume of endless repetition for the “proof” it had failed to obtain in the ill-fated Grynzpan trial. The Jew was now the principal foe, the creator of capitalism and communism, the sinister force behind the entire Allied war effort, the organizer of the “terror raids,” and, finally, the all-powerful enemy capable of wiping Germany off the map. By February 5, 1943, the press had to be cautioned not to “over-estimate the power of the Jews.” (124) On the same day, however, the following instructions were issued:

Stress: If we lose this war, we do not fall into the hands of some other states but will be annihilated by the world Jewry. Jewry firmly decided [fest entschlossen] to exterminate all Germans. International law and international custom will be no protection against the Jewish will for total annihilation [totaler Vernichtungswille der Juden]. (125)

The idea of a Jewish conspiracy was also employed to justify specific operations. Thus the Foreign Office pressed for deportations from Axis countries on the ground that the Jews were a security risk. (126) The jews were the spies, the enemy agents. They could not be permitted to stay in coastal areas because, in the event of Allied landings, they would attack the defending garrisons from the rear. The Jews were inciters of revolt; that was why they had to be deported from Slovakia in 1944. The Jews were the organizers of the partisan war, the “middlemen” between the Red Army and the partisan field command; that was why they could not be permitted to remain alive in partisan-threatened areas. The Jews were the saboteurs and assassins; that was the army chose them as hostages in Russia, Serbia, and France. (127) The Jews were plotting the destruction of Germany; and that was why they had to be destroyed. In Himmler’s words: “We had the moral right vis-à-vis our people to annihilate this people which wanted to annihilate us.” In the minds of the perpetrators, therefore, this theory could turn the destruction process into a kind of preventive war.
The Jews were portrayed not only as a world conspiracy but also as a criminal people. This is the definition of the Jews as furnished in instructions to the German press:

Stress: In the case of the Jews there are not merely a few criminals (as in every other people), but all of Jewry rose from criminal roots, and in its very nature it is criminal. The Jews are no people like other people, but a pseudo-people welded together by hereditary criminality [eine zu einem Scheinvolk zusammengeschlossene Erbkriminalität] .... The annihilation of Jewry is no loss to humanity, but just as useful as capital punishment or protective custody against other criminals. (128)

And this is what Streicher had to say: “Look at the path which the Jewish people has traversed for millennia: Everywhere murder; everywhere mass murder!” (129)
A Nazi researcher, Helmut Schramm, collected all the legends of jewish ritual murder. (130) The book was an immediate success with Himmler. “Of the book The Jewish Ritual Murders,” he wrote to Kaltenbrunner, “I have ordered a large number. I am distributing it down to Standartenführer [SS colonel]. I am sending you several hundred copies so that you can distribute them to your Einsatzkommandos, and above all to the men who are busy with the Jewish question.” (131) The Jewish Ritual Murders was a collection of stories about alleged tortures of Christian children. Actually, hundreds of thousands of Jewish children were being killed in the destruction process. Perhaps that is why The Jewish Ritual Murders became so important. In fact, Himmler was so enthusiastic about the book that he ordered Kaltenbrunner to start investigations of “ritual murders” in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. He also suggested that Security Police people be put to work tracing British court records and police descriptions of missing children, “so that we can report in our radio broadcasts to England that in the town of XY a child is missing and that it is probably another case of Jewish ritual murder.” (132)
How the notion of Jewish criminality was applied in practice may be seen in the choice of some of the expressions in the reports of the killing operations, such as the term execution (in German, hingerichtet, exekutiert, Vollzugstätigkeit). In correspondence dealing with the administration of the personal belongings taken from dead Jews, the SS used the cover designation “utilization of the property of the Jewish thieves [Verwertung des jüdischen Hehler und Diebesgutes].” (133)
A striking example of how the theory invaded German thinking is furnished in the format of portions of two reports by the army’s Secret Field Police in occupied Russia: (134)

Punishable offenses by members of the population
Espionage 1
Theft of ammunition 1
Suspected Jews (Judenverdacht) 3

Punishable offenses by members of the population
Moving about with arms (Freischärlerei) 11
Theft 2
Jews 2

In the culmination of this theory, to be a Jew was a punishable offense (strafbare Handlung). Thus it was the function of the rationalization of criminality to turn the destruction process into a kind of judicial proceeding.
A third rationalization that focused on the Jew was the conception of Jewry as a lower form of life. Generalgouverneur Frank was given to the use of such phrases as “Jews and lice.” In a speech delivered on December 19, 1943, the chief of the Generalgouvernment Health Division reported during a meeting that the typhus epidemic was subsiding. Frank remarked in this connection that the “removal” (Beseitigung) of the “Jewish element” had undoubtedly contributed to better health (Gesundung) in Europe. He meant this not only in the literal sense but also politically: the reestablishment of sound living conditions (Gesunder Lebensverhältnisse) on the European continent. (136) In a similar vein, Foreign Office Press Chief Schmidt once declared during a visit to Slovakia, “The Jewish question is no question of humanity, and it is no question of religion; it is solely a question of political hygiene [eine Frage der politischen Hygiene].” (137)
In the terminology of the killing operations, the conception of Jew as vermin is again quite noticeable. Dr. Stahlecker, the commander of Einsatzgruppe A, called the pogroms conducted by the Lithuanians “self-cleansing actions” (Selbstreinigungsaktionen). In another report we find the phrase “cleansing-of-Jews actions” (Judensäuberungsaktionen). Himmler spoke of “extermination” (Ausrottung). Many times the bureaucracy used the word Entjudung. This expression, which was used not only in connection with killings but also with reference to Aryanization of property, means to rid something of Jews. (138) One of the most frequently applied terms in this vocabulary was judenrein, which means clean of Jews. Finally, it should be noted that at the spur of the moment a German fumigation company, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Schädlingsbekämpfung, was drawn into the killing operations by furnishing one of its lethal products for the gassing of a million Jews. Thus the destruction process was also turned into a “cleansing operation.”
In addition to the formulations that were used to justify the whole undertaking as a war against “international Jewry,” as a judicial proceeding against “Jewish criminality,” or simply as a “hygienic” process against “Jewish vermin,” there were also rationalizations fashioned in order to enable the individual bureaucrat to justify his individual task in the destruction process. It must be kept in mind that most of the participants did not fire rifles at Jewish children or pour gas into gas chambers. A good many, of course, also had to perform these very “hard” tasks, but most of the administrators and most of the clerks did not see the final, drastic link in these measures of destruction.
Most bureaucrats composed memoranda, drew up blueprints, signed correspondence, talked on the telephone, and participated in conferences. They could destroy a whole people by sitting at their desks. Except for inspection tours, which were not obligatory, they never had to see “100 bodies lie there, or 500, or 1,000.” However, these men were not naïve. They realized the connection between their paperwork and the heaps of corpses in the East, and they also realized the shortcomings of arguments that placed all evil on the Jew and all good on the German. That was why they were compelled to defend their individual activities. Their justifications contain the implicit admission that the paperwork was to go on regardless of the actual plans of world Jewry and regardless of the actual behavior of the Jews who were about to be killed. The rationalizations focused on the perpetrators can be divided into five categories.
The oldest, the simplest, and therefore the most effective device was the doctrine of superior orders. First and foremost there was discipline. First and foremost there was duty. No matter what objections there might be, orders were given to be obeyed. A clear order was like absolution. Armed with such an order, a perpetrator felt that he could pass his responsibility and his conscience upward. When Himmler addressed a killing party in Minsk, he told his men that they need not worry. Their conscience was in no way impaired, for they were soldiers who had to carry out every order unconditionally. (139)
The reality was more complex. Even in the field it was sometimes possible to refuse participation in a shooting without suffering dire consequences, especially if the objection could be perceived as an expression of a psychological inability rather than an undisguised challenge. Once, when members of the 2d Lithuanian Schutzmannschaft Battalion who had just arrived in Byelorussia were ordered to shoot Jews in the town of Rudensk, a young man said that he could not kill the people. The Lithuanian company commander then suggested that all those who could not shoot step back. Fifteen or seventeen men accepted this offer and watched the shooting by their compatriots from a distance of 20 to 30 yards. (140) In the Lublin District, the commander of the 101st Reserve Police Battalion, Major Trapp, went further. Full of qualms himself, he invited the older men who could not shoot women and children to step out. (141) In both cases the choice had been given to men without experience in such killing, and both of these units were involved in subsequent shooting with less hesitation. (142)
As to those who occupied desks, flexibility was greater. Opportunities for evading instructions almost always increase as one ascends in the hierarchy. Even in Nazi Germany orders were disobeyed, and they were disobeyed even in Jewish matters. We have mentioned the statement of Reichsbankdirektor Wilhelm, who would not participate in the distribution of “second-hand goods.” Nothing happened to him. A member of the Reich Security Main Office, Sturmbannführer Hartl, simply refused to take over an Einsatzkommando in Russia. Nothing happened to this man either. (143) Even Generalkommissar Kube, who had actually frustrated a killing operation in Minsk and who had otherwise expressed himself in strong language, was only warned.
The bureaucrat clung to his orders not so much because he feared his superior (with whom he was often on good terms) but because he shrank from his own conscience. The many requests for “authorization,” whether for permission to mark Jews with a star or to kill them, demonstrate the true nature of these orders. When they did not exist the bureaucrats had to invent them.
The second rationalization was the administrator’s insistence that he did not act out of personal vindictiveness. In the mind of the bureaucrat, duty was an assigned path; it was his “fate.” The German bureaucrat made a sharp distinction between duty and personal feelings. He insisted that he did not “hate” Jews, and sometimes he even went out of his way to perform “good deeds” for Jewish friends and acquaintances. When the trials of war criminals started, there was hardly a defendant who could not produce evidence that he had helped some half-Jewish physics professor, or that he had used his influence to permit a Jewish symphony conductor to conduct a little while longer, or that he had intervened on behalf of some couple in mixed marriage in connection with an apartment. While these courtesies were petty in comparison with the destructive conceptions that these men were implementing concurrently, the “good deeds” performed an important psychological function. They separated “duty” from personal feelings. They preserved a sense of “decency.” The destroyer of the Jews was no “anti-Semite”.
Staatssekretär Keppler of the Office of the Four-Year Plan was interrogated after the war as follows:

Question [by Dr. Kempner of the prosecuting staff]: Tell me, Mr. Keppler, why were you so terribly against the Jews? Did you know the Jews?
Answer: I had nothing against the Jews.
Question: I am asking for the reason. You were no friend of the Jews?
Answer: Jews came to me. Warburg invited me. Later Jews looked me up in the Reich Chancellery and asked me to join the board of directors of the Deutsche Bank.
Question: When were you supposed to join the board of directors?
Answer: I didn’t want to; it was in 1934, they wanted to give me a written assurance that I would be a director in half a year. If I had been such a hater of Jews, they would not have approached me.
Question: But you transferred capital from Jews into Aryan hands.
Answer: Not often. I know the one case of Simson-Suhl. Also the Skoda-Wetzler Works in Vienna. But it turned out that was no Jewish enterprise.

Keppler was then asked whether he had not favored the “disappearance” of the Jews from Germany. The Staatssekretär fell back on Warburg, with whom he had once had an “interesting discussion.” The interrogator broke in with the remark that “now we do not want to talk about anti-Semitism but about the final solution of the Jewish question.” In that connection, Keppler was asked whether he had heard of Lublin. The Staatssekretär admitted hesitantly that he had heard of Lubin and offered the explanation that he was “deeply troubled by this matter [dass mich das furchtbar peinlich berührt].” What did Keppler do when he was touched like this? “It was very unpleasant for me, but after all it was not even in my sphere of jurisdiction.” (144)
Another defendant in a war crimes trial, the former commander in Norway, Generaloberst von Falkenhorst, offered the following explanations for his order to remove Jews from Soviet prisoner-of-war battalions in his area. Von Falkenhorst pointed out that, to begin with, there were no Jews among these prisoners, for the selection had already taken place in Germany (i.e. the Jewish prisoners had already been shot as they were shuttled through the Reich). The order was consequently “entirely superfluous and might just as well not have been included. It was thoughtlessly included by the officer of my staff who was working on it, from the instructions sent to us, and I overlooked it.” The general then continued:

For the rest it may be inferred from this that the Jewish question played as infamous a part in Norway as elsewhere, and that I and the Army were supposed to have been particularly anti-Semitic.
Against this suspicion I can only adduct the following: First, that in Scandinavian countries there are only very few Jews. These few are hardly ever in evidence. The sum total in Norway was only about 350. {Actual figure, 2,000.] A negligible number among two or three million Norwegians. These [Jews] were collected by [Reichskommissar] Terboven and according to orders despatched to Germany by steamship. In this manner the Jewish problem in Norway was practically solved [i.e., by deportation to Auschwitz].
As regards myself, I made at this time an application to Terboven at the requests of the Swedish Consul, General Westring, in Oslo, who did not much like visiting Terboven, for the release of a Jew of Swedish nationality and of his family with permission to leave the country, gladly and, as a matter of course, fulfilling the Consul’s wish to facilitate the return of these people to Stockholm.
If I had been a rabid anti-Semite I could, without further ado, have refused this request, for the matter did not concern me in the slightest.
On the one hand, however, I wanted to help the Swedish Consul, and, on the other hand, I have nothing against the Jews. I have read and heard their writings and compositions with interest, and their achievements in the field of science are worthy of the highest respect. I have met many fine and honorable people among them. (145)

How widespread the practice of “good deeds” must have been may be gauged from the following remark by Heinrich Himmler: “And then they come, our 80,000,000 good Germans, and each one has his decent Jew. It is clear, the others are swine [Schweine], but this one is a first-class Jew. Of all those who speak thus, no one has seen it, no one has gone through it.” (146) But even if Himmler regarded these interventions as expressions of misplaced humanity, they were necessary tools in the attempt to crystallize one of the important justifications for bureaucratic action – duty. Only after a man had done “everything humanly possible” could he devote himself to his destructive activity in peace.
The third justification was the rationalization that one’s own activity was not criminal, that the next fellow’s action was the criminal act. The Ministerialrat who was signing papers could console himself with the thought that he did not do the shooting. But that was not enough. He had to be sure if he were ordered to shoot, he would not follow orders but would draw the line right then and there.
The following exchange took place during a war crime trial. A Foreign Office official, Albrecht von Kessel, was asked by defense counsel (Dr. Becker) to explain the meaning of “Final Solultion.”

ANSWER: This expression “final solution” was used with various meanings. In 1936 “final solution” meant merely that all Jews should leave Germany. And, of course, it was true that they were to be robbed; that wasn’t very nice, but it wasn’t criminal.
JUDGE MAGUIRE: Was that an accurate translation?
DR. BECKER: I did not check on the translation. Please repeat the sentence.
ANSWER: I said it was not criminal; it was not nice, but it was not criminal. That is what I said. One didn’t want to take their life; one merely wanted to take money away from them. That was all. (147)

The most important characteristic of this dividing line was that it could be shifted when the need arose. To illustrate: Once there was a Protestant pastor by the name of Ernst Biberstein. After several years of ministering to his congregation, he moved into the Church Ministry. From that agency he came to another office which was also interested in church matters: the Reich Security Main Office. That agency assigned him to head a local Gestapo office. Finally he became the chief of Einsatzkommando 6 in southern Russia. As commander of the Kommando, Biberstein killed two or three thousand persons. These people, in his opinion, had forfeited the right to live under the rules of war. Asked if there were Jews among the victims, he replied: “It is very difficult to determine that. Also, I was told at that time that wherever there were Armenians, there were not so many Jews.” (148) To Biberstein the moral dividing line was like the receding horizon. He walked toward it, but he could never reach it.
Among the participants in the destruction process there were very few who did not shift the line when they had to cross the threshold. One reason why the person of Generalkommissar Kube is so important is that he had a firm line beyond which he could not pass. The line was arbitrary, and very advanced. He sacrificed Russian Jews and fought desperately only for the German Jews in his area. But the line was fixed. It was not movable, it was not imaginary, it was not self-deceptive. The destruction process was autonomous, in that it could not be stopped internally. The adjustable moral standard was one of the principal tools in the maintenance of this autonomy.
There was a fourth rationalization that implicitly took cognizance of the fact that all shifting lines are unreal. It was built on a simple premise: No man alone can build a bridge and no man alone can destroy the Jews. The participant in the destruction process was always in company. Among his superiors he could always find those who were doing more than he; among his subordinates he could always find those who were ready to take his place. No matter where he looked, he was one among thousands. His own importance was diminished, and he felt that he was replaceable, perhaps even dispensable.
In such reflective moments, the perpetrator quieted his conscience with the thought that he was part of a tide and that there was very little a drop of water could do in such a wave. Ernst Göx, who served in the Order Police and who rode the trains to Auschwitz, was one of those who felt helpless. “I was always a socialist,” he said, “and my father belonged to the Socialist Party for fifty years. When we talked with each other – which was often – I always said that if there was still justice, things could not go on like that much longer.” (149) When Werner von Tippelskirch, a Foreign Office official, was interrogated after the war, he pointed out that he had never protested against the killing of Jews in Russia because he had been “powerless.” His superiors, Erdmannsdorff, Wörmann, and Weizsäcker, had also been “powerless.” All of them had waited for a “change of regime.” Asked by Prosecutor Kempner whether it was right to wait for a change of regime “and in the meantime send thousands of people to their death,” von Tippelskirch replied, “A difficult question.” (150) [[WoodyAllen.]] For Staatssekretär von Weizsäcker himself the question of what he could have done was circular. If he had had influence he would have stopped measures altogether. But the “if” presupposed a fairlyland. In such a land he would not have had to use his influence. (151)
The fifth rationalization was the most sophisticated of all. It was also a last-ditch psychological defense, suited particularly to those who saw through the self-deception of superior orders, impersonal duty, the shifting moral standard, and the argument of powerlessness. It was a conclusion also for those whose drastic activity or high position placed them out of reach of orders, duty, moral dividing lines, and helplessness. It was the jungle theory.
Oswald Spengler once explained this postulate in the following words: “War is the primeval policy of all living things, and this to the extent that in the deepest sense combat and life are identical, for when the will to fight is extinguished, so is life itself.” (152) Himmler remembered this idea when he addressed the mobile killing personnel at Minsk. He told them to look at nature. Wherever they would look, they would find combat. They would find it among animals and among plants. Whoever tired of the fight went under. (153)
From this philosophy Hitler himself drew strength in moments of meditation. Once, at the dinner table, when he thought about the destruction of the Jews, he remarked with stark simplicity: “One must not have mercy with people who are determined by fate to perish [Man dürfe kein Mitleid mit Leuten haben, denen das Schicksal bestimmt habe, zugrunde zu gehen].” (154)

111.         Instructions by Reich Press Chief, April 29, 1943, NG-4705.
112.         Notably the Institut zut Erforschung der Judenfrage in Frankfurt, under Dr. Klaus Schickert. Steengracht to Rosenberg, January 22, 1944, NG-1689.
113.         Dr. Hans Praesent, “Neuere deutsche Doktorarbeiten über das Judentum,” Die Judenfrage, November 15, 1943, pp. 351-53.
114.         Wolfgang Höfler, Untersuchungen über die Machtstellung der Juden in der Weltwirtschaft. Vol. 1, England und das Vornationalsozialistche Deutschland (Vienna, 1944)
115.         Luther to Berger, June 22, 1942, NG-3304.
116.         Hitler speech, January 30, 1939, German press.
117.         Himmler speech, June 21, 1944, NG-4977.
118.         Memorandum by Ribbentrop, November 18, 1939, on the Italian protest in the Streicher affair. Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Ser. D, IV, 524-25. The pontiff in question was the “temperamental Pope,” Pius XI, not the “diplomatic Pope,” Pius XII.
119.         Weizsäcker to Wörmann, trade and legal divisions, Referat Deutschland (Aschmann), November 7, 1938, NG-4686. The British diplomat replied that he didn’t think Rublee had any Jewish blood.
120.         Summary of conference between Ribbentrop, Mussolini, and Ciano, May 10, 1940, PS-2835.
121.         Ministerialrat Diewerge (Propaganda Ministry) to Gesandter Dr. Krümmer (Foreign Office), December 22, 1941, NG-971. Krümmer to Foreign Office press division, January 2, 1942, NG-971. Summary of international conference, January 23, 1942, NG-973. Rintelen to Weizsäcker, April 5, 1942, NG-179. Krümmer via Luther to Weizsäcker, April 7, 1942, NG-179. Schlegelberger to Goebbels, April 10, 1942, NG-973. Memorandum by Diewerge, April 11, 1942, NG-971.
122.         Rintelen to Weizsäcker, quoting Ribbentrop’s views, April 2, 1942, NG-179.
123.         Summary of Grynzpan conference, January 23, 1942, NG-973. Louis P. Lochner, ed., The Goebbels Diaries (Garden City, N.Y., 1948), entries for February 11 and April 5, 1942, pp. 78, 161. Grynzpan was kept “on ice.” In 1957 he was reported living quietly in Paris. Kurt R. Grossman, “Herschel Gruenspan lebt!” Aufbau (New York), May 10, 1957, pp. 1, 5-6. He was not found.
124.         Zeitschriften Dienst (Propaganda Ministry), February 5, 1943, NG-4715.
125.         Deutscher Wochendienst, February 5, 1943, NG-4714.
126.         Summary of Mussolini-Ribbentrop conference, held on February 5, 1943, and dated February 27, 1943, D-734. Veesenmayer (German Minister in Hungary) via Ambassador Ritter to Ribbentrop, July 6, 1944, NG-5684.
127.         Military Commander in Armyansk to Army Rear Area Commander 533/Quartermaster, in Simferopol, November 30, 1941, NOKW-1532. Staatsrat Turner (Serbia) to Higher SS and Police Leader in Danzig, Hildebrandt, October 17, 1941, NO-5810. Military Commander in France (von Stülpnagel) to High Command of the Army/Quartermaster General, December 5, 1941, NG-3571.
128.         Deutscher Wochendienst, April 2, 1944, NG-4713.
129.         Speech by Streicher in Nuremberg, September 1939, M-4.
130.         Helmut Schramm, Der jüdische Ritualmord – Eine historische Untersuchung (Berlin, 1943).
131.         Himmler to Kaltenbrunner, May 19, 1943, NG-4589.
132.         Ibid.
133.         August Frank (WVHA) to Chief of Standortvertwaltung Lublin and Chief of Administration Auschwitz, September 26, 1942, NO-724.
134.         Secret Field Police Group 722 to 207th Security Division/Intelligence, February 23, 1943, NOKW-2210. Group 722 to 207th Security Division/Intelligence, March 25, 1943, NOKW-2158. The division was located in northern Russia and Estonia.
135.         Speech by Frank to men of guard battalion, December 19, 1940, Frank Diary, PS-2233.
136.         Summary of Generalgouvernement health conference, July 9, 1943, Frank Diary, PS-2233.
137.         Donauzeitung (Belgrade), July 3, 1943, p. 3.
138.         Compare Entlausung (ridding of lice) and Entwesung (ridding of vermin, or fumigation).
139.         Von dem Bach in Aufbau (New York) August 23, 1946, pp. 1-2.
140.         Deposition of Martynus Kaciulis, August 16, 1982, in United States v. Jurgis, U.S. District Court in Tampa, C.A. No. 81-1013-CIV-T-H. The deponent was an eyewitness. The officer was 1st Lieutenant Kristaponis, Commander of 2d Company. The battalion commander was Major Impulevicius.
141.         Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men (New York, 1992), notably pp. 1-77, 191.
142.         For other examples of refusals, see David Kitterman, “Those Who Said ‘No,’” German Studies Review 11 (1988): 243-54.
143.         Affidavit by Albert Hartl, October 9, 1947, NO-5384.
144.         Interrogation by Kempner of Keppler, August 20, 1947, NG-3041.
145.         Affidavit by von Falkenhorst, July 6, 1946, in Trial of Nikolaus von Falkenhorst (London, 1949), p. 25.
146.         Speech by Himmler, October 4, 1943, PS-1919.
147.         Testimony by Albrecht von Kessel, Case No. 11, tr. pp. 9514-15.
148.         Interrogation of Biberstein, June 29, 1947, NO-4997.
149.         Statement by Göx, April 6, 1972. Landesgericht, Vienna, Case Novak, file 1416/16, vol. 18, pp. 330-32.
150.         Interrogation of Tippelskirch by Kempner, August 29, 1947, NG-2801.
151.         Note by Ernst von Weizsäcker in his diary, following May 23, 1948, in Leonidas E. Hill, Die Weizsäcker-Papiere 1933-1950 (Vienna and Frankfurt am Main, 1974), p. 425.
152.         Oswald Spengler, Der Untergang des Abendlandes (Munich, 1923), vol. 1, pp. 545-46.
153.         Von dem Bach in Aufbau (New York) August 23, 1946, pp. 1-2.
154.         Henry Picker, ed., Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier 1941-1942 (Bonn, 1951), entry for April 2, 1942, p. 227. The entries are summaries by Picker of “Hitler’s remarks at the dinner table.”

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