1.
Lynn-Jones: I’m Sean Lynn-Jones, I edit the quarterly journal
on International Security which is based here at the Belfer Center at the
Harvard Kennedy School. Today I’m Talking to Joshua Itzkowitz Shifrinson who’s
an assistant professor in the department of international affairs at the George
Bush School at Texas A&M University. Josh is also a fellow at the Dickey
Center, Dartmouth College. Josh is the author in an article that appears in the
Spring 2016 issue of International Security.
It’s called “Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the US Offer to Limit
NATO Expansion.” This article in now available not only in the print edition of
the Spring 2016 issue, but it’s also online at the International Security
website. Thanks so much for being with us today,
Josh, very happy to have you here.
2.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Oh, it’s
a Pleasure to be here, Sean, thanks for having me.
3.
Lynn-Jones: Your article looks at some Negociations
that occurred back at the End of the Cold War. Can you just refresh our Memories
a little bit on what was at stake in those Talks and who was involved?
4.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Sure. The End of the Cold War
involved the Negociation on the one hand between the US and the USSR as well as
the policymakers leading East and West Germany, Britain, France and other Countries
in Europe. It involved the Question of whether Germany which had been divided
throughout the Cold War would reunify under Western auspices within NATO or under Soviet auspices within the Warsaw Pact or go neutral entirely. This carried implications for
the Future of the two Alliance Systems in Europe at the Time with NATO, which
was the US Alliance System and the Warsaw Pact, which was the Soviet Alliance
System.
5.
Lynn-Jones: What’s the central Argument that you
make in your article? Can you sum it up in a nutshell?
6.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I can sum it up in a nutshell, or at
least I’ll certainly try. The central Argument I make is on the one hand
these Negociations over the Fate of Germany at the End of the Cold War involve
an US offer, an implicit offer, to the Soviet Union that if the Soviet Union
allow Germany to reunify within NATO, then after Reunification, NATO would not
expand further eastward, that is, further into Eastern Europe and former member
to the Warsaw Pact, toward the Soviet Union’s Borders. At
the same Time, just as that implicit offer was being made to the Soviet Union,
the US, behind the scenes, in its own narrative, had every intention of
expanding NATO further eastward or at least creating the Opportunity, so that
if it decides to do so in the Future, it could.
7.
Lynn-Jones: You’re basically saying the United
States pledged not to expand NATO but maybe the United States wasn’t being
entirely sincere?
8.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Correct. It was a wink and a nod.
9.
Lynn-Jones: How does
this Argument differ from what other writers have discovered when they’ve
looked at this Period?
10.
Itz-Ko-Witz: It’s a
great Question. I would say the literature right now, at least the
policy making and academic literature right now is divided into two Camps. On
the one hand you have People like Mark Kramer, who denied that any non-Expansion offer that had
any implications at all for Eastern Europe was ever advanced. On the other
hand, you have People like Mary Soratti, there’s a story on Mary Soratti, along with many
former policymakers, who offer that maybe there were winks and nods and head
bugs towards a non-Expansion pledge, but that that offer was quickly taken off
the table by February of 1990 and from then on out the US was very open in
telling the Soviet Union that Expansion might be on the table.
11.
Lynn-Jones: When you researched this Question, I
assume you had access to some of the documents from the archives, and I wonder
if you could tell us about the key Evidence that supports your claim. Clearly
other scholars have a different opinion, so why are you Right, why are they Wrong?
12.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Why am I Right and why are they Wrong? It’s
the great scholarly Question. I would say three things in responds
to this. Number one, I spent approximately three
or four months, cumulatively, in the George Bush Library and that was made
quite a bit easier because my office is across the street from the George Bush Library.
Just combing through National Security Council records and State Department and
Defence Department records that are in the archives. Just the quantity involved
let me see a fuller picture, in private scholars. That’s number one. Number two. Building on that, I was able to assemble
key diplomatic correspondence, key Meetings between then Secretary of State,
James Baker, President Bush and other US policymakers with their Soviet
counterparts. I was able to see, simultaneously, what was being told to the
Soviets to their faces and what the US was telling itself in the backroom. Or
at least telling its Allies and itself in the back room. I guess the third point is to say, there are key moments in
these Negociations. I mentioned one a second ago, February 1990 and there are
few others, where the historical narratives diverge, and looking at these key
diplomatic documents, these key Meeting Transcripts, I was able to come down
one way or another on the Evidence and weigh into this Debate.
13.
Lynn-Jones: When you look at the documents, and
you obviously came to a general conclusion that there had been, at least an
informal pledge not to expand NATO. Were there any other surprising Findings
that came out? What was the most surprising Finding to you, as a Researcher?
14.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I mentioned a second ago how in
public, or at least, vis-à-vis the Soviets, the US would offer one narrative,
whereas in private there was an entirely different narrative. I think that was
very surprising, because in public, or at least towards the Soviets, what was
being portrayed was a very cooperative, integrating, mutually accommodating post-Cold
War World. Whereas in private the US did not think this was going to be
damaging to the Soviet Union, there was no malice involved, but it was clearly
understood that the US was going to be dominant and the big dog on the block and
running the show. Whereas in public there’s a very much a Cooperation
narrative. In private, it’s much more a story of American power maximisation. I think that was a
very striking Finding. It’s not at all what I expected to find.
15.
Lynn-Jones: Well, it certainly will confirm the
suspicion of those of us who are cynical about international Politics and Diplomacy.
16.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I think that’s entirely correct,
and it’s being traumatising for these young scholars to realise that.
17.
Lynn-Jones: When the various Participants in
these Negociations look back now. The Soviet Union is essentially Russia or
Russia has inherited the Soviet’s role here. Of course, the United States and
European Countries are still involved and interacting. How do they interpret
what happened back in 1990 and how do their narratives diverge?
18.
Itz-Ko-Witz: It’s very interesting to look at
it. If I
say Soviets I mean the Russians, because many of the policymakers have just put
on a different hat since that Time Period, but many of the Russians
actually claim very openly, Mikhail Gorbachev, the former Soviet President,
Boris Yeltsin, Russian President, Vladimir Putin. President, Prime Minister and
President of Russia, have repeated claimed that informal non-Expansion pledge
was offered by the US in 1990. For the last 25 years, Western policymakers, at
least in the US, have roundly said, “No, we didn’t.” Nothing was written down
and it wasn’t signed so it doesn’t matter if it did. What
I found was that the Russian narrative is basically exactly what
happened. In this case, the Russians are telling the broad truth as to what
happened in 1990. Europeans, I’ll just note, the Germans especially, who are
particularly invested in this are a little more sympathetic to the Russian
narrative than the US is. I would say there’s actually a transatlantic
divergence on this that in some ways mirrors what one would expect if you are a
policymaker of the System’s Hegemony, trying to legitimate or justify or
explain away your post-Cold War Dominance.
19.
Lynn-Jones: If the Russians are basically
correct, that there was at least an informal promise by the United States not
to expand NATO, why weren’t they able to follow up and attempt to at least
continue the Negociations in the 1990s after the initial around the Discussions
on the German Unification back in 1990?
20.
Itz-Ko-Witz: It is interesting. If you think
about the position of Russia in the early 1990s, this is a State that is
shattered, it’s politically dis-elude, it’s economically on the ropes, it’s
militarily irrelevant. It operates, many ways on the Generosity of the West in
many ways at least for the early and mid-1990s. When NATO began to move
eastwards, starting
in 1993, 1994 and 1995, Boris Yeltsin and former Soviet policymakers are
very open in complaining that this violates the NATO Expansion pledge. Yeltsin writes
letters, Gorbachev gives Interviews that say the same thing as Yeltsin, this is
violating the non-Expansion deal, but at the end of the day the Russians are beholden
to the West and they will have many cards to play. Geopolitically,
going back to that cynical World view you mentioned a second ago, the Russians
have very few cards to play and very stark incentives to at least play along. I’ll
just note, that doesn’t mean they gave in or accepted NATO Expansion. It is a
statement that they had other issues that needed to be addressed at the moment,
that prevented them from pushing that hard.
21.
Lynn-Jones: There’s obviously still some Discussion
of this topic going on today, and the Russians and the US Government go back
and forth. How has your article been received in this contemporary Debate? What
sort of reactions have you had? I also want to point out you published an
op-ed, I think in the Los Angeles Times, that drew more attention to these Ideas
and probably got some Reactions as well.
22.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I would say that’s a fair Thing to
describe. I would say that the Western consensus in Washington has been
somewhat opposed to the article that I’m offering. People from the Atlantic Council
have written blogpost that critique my piece. Some scholars have come out and
say that my Work is shoddy. It’s a fair Argument to be had, although I don’t
think my Work is shoddy, I think it just make me a tricky hypothesis. Many People
in Russian, many People in Europe have been sympathetic to the Argument and
even some academics have come forward to say, “There’s something here because what
it suggests and this placing to the ongoing events in Ukraine and Georgia and
beyond, maybe the current US and Russia standoff, maybe it’s a spiral in Security,
where each side has done things to antagonised the other.” It’s not one sided
as People and many policymarkers in the West might prefer to have it.
23.
Lynn-Jones: Of the criticisms and the rebuttals
that you’ve heard, of your Work and the challenges to your Argument. Which do
you think is the most important, the most significant?
24.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I would say that the most significant, the
strongest, is that this was 25 years ago, 30 years ago in some cases, what does
it matter. The Russians are using this instrumentally and that what happened in
1990 has no bearing upon Politics in 2016 or beyond. That’s a very
fair critique, I think it’s a very fair criticism to level. I will just
note, however, that if we’re going to go forward and treat Russia as an
antagonist, this is a nuclear-armed State that has recovered from the doldrums
of the 1990, Military is important to Europe’s strategic Future. We should be
careful before deciding that they’re unalterably liars and cheaters. If there
is some Evidence that cuts in the other direction, we should pay attention to
that and take it as a signal of some kind rather than outright deception Campaign
or effort to divide Western leaks.
25.
Lynn-Jones: You’ve raised a Question of what
your findings mean for contemporary US-Russian Relations. I wonder if you think
that your findings, that there was some kind of pledge not to expand NATO that
United States apparently broke. Does that, somehow
excuse Russia’s behavior in, for example, Ukraine, Crimea?
26.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Absolutely
not. There is no reason that Russia should be supporting fighters in Ukraine,
invading Georgia, all those gesticulating against the Baltic States.
What it does do is explain how we got to this situation, highlight pathways
forward, or potential options going forward. It doesn’t excuse Russian Behaviour,
it just explains it.
27.
Lynn-Jones: You mentioned pathways going forward,
and clearly almost as we speak, there have been developments with respect to
new NATO military deployments in the Baltic and elsewhere in Eastern Europe,
and this topic has been in the news a great deal. Tell me, what do you think of
what United States and NATO are doing now vis-a-vis Russia, to respond to a
Russian military challenge, and would you do anything differently in light of
what you found about what happened back in 1990?
28.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Sure. Let
me take those points in order. Current US policy, current NATO policy in
Eastern Europe is the worst of all Worlds. It’s Expansionist enough and evolves
four Deployments efficient to antagonise Russia to further annoy Russia in the
sense of signalling to the West isn’t a reliable negotiating partner, and yet
militarily it’s totally insignificant. There is no way that four Battalions are
going to defend the Baltic State, for example. It’s the worst of all Worlds, not
enough to nail Russia, not enough to deter Russia. On
the other hand, what would I do going forward. First of all, I think
these Troop Diplomacy that we’re talking about today are terrible Idea, point
number one, but that’s short term. I think longer term,
we need to credibly commit to forego further NATO Expansion, work to repair Relations
with Russia, and that’s a halo statement, I’m going to come back to that and
explain that a little bit more in just a second. And
then finally accept that the Russian narrative might have some validity
to this. Just as a way of signaling that the West understands where Russia is
coming from and Values improved Relations with Russia. That would help to
improve Relations with Russia, which was my second point, and might build NATO Solidarity
as members of NATO buy into this narrative more than the US does.
29.
Lynn-Jones: Turning from the particular Questions
of Relations between the United States and Russia, between NATO and Russia
today, to the more general Question of what does this mean more broadly. What
do you think your finding suggests, for how we understand international Relations,
not just the particular bilateral Relationship?
30.
Itz-Ko-Witz: That’s in some ways the heart and
soul of the project, because scholars, 25 years ago, spoke of the End of the Cold
War as failure of Realism. Dozens of articles were written about this, several
edited volumes, and many Theories have come out of the End of the Cold War, US-Soviet
Dialogue as showcasing how Great Powers can cooperate with each other. John Ikenbury, Keren
Yarhi-Milo, Andrew Kidd, scholars talk about Institution, talk about Trust-building,
talk about overcoming Security dilemmas, point to this case as a leading
example by which Great Powers can overcome past Tension and move forward in a
benign fashion. In fact, the US was publicly
cooperating, yet privately sharpening its knife to curve up the Russian Caucus,
the Soviet Caucus, then we really need to revisit many of those Theories and at
least see if they don’t succeed in this critical case, whether they apply more
broadly.
31.
Lynn-Jones: What’s your own agenda for further Research
and what do you think others need to Research, both in terms of the overall
implications and for further Research on the particular case or US, Russian Relations
and the promise to not expand NATO?
32.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I think, first
and foremost, scholars need to really re-engage Theories of Cooperation
that use the End of the Cold War case in some detail. I think now that we have
thousands of high-level documents coming to light, we have interviews of former
policymakers out there in the public record. We really need to re-evaluate our Theories,
we need to evaluate the outcome of the case and reevaluate the Theories based
on the outcome of the case. That’s a bigger IR project, because as I noted,
this case is held at as a critical juncture and a critical case for many big Theories
of Cooperation of international Politics. That’s number one. Number two, the particulars of the case. We’re getting
to the point now where archival Evidence allows us to re-evaluate how we got
the post-Cold War World, and this is a World where the US was dominant on
several Continents, had extra regional Hegemony. If you want to use a Political
Science catch phrase. It had a dominant role overseas and it had oversight of
many Countries that could have been potential rivals. Germany, for example,
Japan and beyond. I think it’s worthwhile now that we’re getting documents from
the Bush, and increasingly Clinton years, that we re-evaluate these specifics
of late Cold War and post-Cold War American foreign policy, rather than just relying on memoir and secondary sources.
33.
Lynn-Jones: Do you have the specific Research
agenda for looking into this Question?
34.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Well, I’m finishing up a book right
now that deals in large part with how the US managed the Decline of the Soviet
Union, and I think there will be several spin-off projects that delve into the History
of these cases and try to engage some of those IR Theory Debates that I flagged
a moment ago. I really hope in doing so, that my Work, at least, engages in a Dialogue
with existing Arguments so that we now have more Evidence, rather than just a
World War I-World War II-Cold War cases. We actually have new Evidence from the
End of the Cold War that allows us to push the balance of International Relations
Theory and policy Discourse.
35.
Lynn-Jones: It sounds as though this article
will stimulate maybe some others to continue to look into this topic.
36.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I hope so.
37.
Lynn-Jones: Certainly as the basis for your own,
continue to research.
38.
Itz-Ko-Witz: I really hope other scholars pick
up and go with this. I don’t have the last word here and I don’t want to have
the last word here. People think I’m Wrong, I welcome that Debate. I think we
should push the Conversation forward. The case, as you mentioned with US,
Russia Relation, stays with us today. We need to understand the History of the
late-Cold War Period and early post-Cold War Period to understand the World we
live in today, because these Debates aren’t going away and especially if we
worry about how Power Relations have changed between US and China, how NATO,
and how Alliances respond to new Threats, new Security Environments. These are
all phenomenon that we have echos of in the late-Cold War Period. We now have
new Data, new Evidence that we can use to push some of these Conversations.
39.
Lynn-Jones: Well, I’m sure that these Debates
aren’t going to go away but we’re unfortunately just about out of Time for
today. I’d like to thank you again Josh, for being
with us. It’s been a Pleasure.
40.
Itz-Ko-Witz: It’s my
Pleasure to be here. Thanks for having me.
41.
Lynn-Jones: Josh Itzkowitz Shifrinson is an
assistant professor in the Department of International Affairs at the George
Bush School at Texas A&M University, and he’s also currently a fellow at
the Dickey Center at Dartmouth. Josh is the author of an article called ‘Deal
or No Deal: The End of the Cold War and US offer to limit NATO Expansion.’ It
appears in the Spring 2016 issue of International Security, and shorter version
was published in the Los Angeles Times as an op-ed, and you can read either
online. Thank you again Josh for being with us
today.
42.
Itz-Ko-Witz: Thank
you, Sean, for having me.
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