No substantive progress has been made toward the
creation of a Middle
Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The only way to change this is by adopting an incremental
approach to the zone: phasing weapons out by category, beginning with chemical
weapons.[1]
Although some leaders and analysts oppose the idea of
breaking up the task by weapons categories, the regional landscape at the moment
makes this the best approach to a complete WMD-free zone in the Middle East. To
build the necessary trust, parties will need to select an issue that is
significant enough to be meaningful to all parties, yet provides a realistic
goal. Until a few months ago, beginning with any category of weapon seemed
difficult. Now, however, the Russia-brokered deal on the destruction of Syria’s
chemical weapons and Damascus’ subsequent accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), as
well as the interim deal on the Iranian nuclear program, have provided a window
of opportunity to revisit the idea.
The Middle East has been home to some of the largest
stockpiles of chemical weapons and has felt the impact of their use. Following
the use of chemical arms in Syria, there is a groundswell of support in the
region and the rest of the world for the elimination of this category of
weapons. This presents two opportunities: first, to eliminate chemical weapons
in the region and, second, to build on this to work toward a Middle Eastern
WMD-free zone.
The Stalled Process
The goal of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East was
first proposed by Egypt in 1990 as a modification of the
nuclear-weapon-free-zone resolution that Egypt and Iran had promoted at the UN
General Assembly. Although the new proposal outlined a zone free of all
nonconventional weapons, the emphasis continued to be on nuclear weapons, and a
resolution encouraging steps toward a WMD-free zone was adopted by consensus in
the context of the
1995 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference.[2] Frustrated
by lack of progress toward establishing the zone, the 2010 NPT Review Conference adopted an
action plan that set a date for a conference on the zone in 2012 and called for
the appointment of a facilitator.[3]
The year 2012 came and went with no sign of a
conference. Although the facilitator, Finnish Undersecretary of State Jaakko Laajava, worked
tirelessly to try to put the pieces in place for a conference, the United
States announced in November of that year that the conference could not be
convened as scheduled.[4] In their statements at that time, UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon and Russia insisted that the conference be held in the first
half of 2013, but the United States did not specify when or, indeed, whether it
would take place at all.
While parties bickered over blame for the
postponement, zone proponents despaired over the lack of a clear timeline to
get the process on track. The process was put on hold while the conveners
(Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, working with the UN
secretary-general) and regional states debated the arrangements for holding
preparatory consultations. Finally, last October 21-22, Laajava was able to
convene a meeting in Glion, Switzerland. That meeting brought together the
conveners and states in the region, including Iran and Israel, to discuss
preparations for a conference, but did not lead to any breakthroughs other than
scheduling future meetings. A senior Western government official highlighted
what he called “minor progress” in the second Glion meeting November 25-26, saying, “For the first
time in many years, Israelis and Arabs sat together and discussed security
issues.”[5] Iran chose not to attend the meeting despite having said the previous
year it would join a Helsinki conference.
Prior to these meetings, Egyptian Foreign Minister
Nabil Fahmy outlined an initiative on the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone at the
UN General Assembly. The Egyptian initiative calls on all countries in the Middle
East and the five permanent members of the Security Council to file letters to
officially endorse the zone, to ratify WMD treaties that have not yet been
ratified in the region[6] by the end of 2013, and to convene the 2012
conference by the end of 2013 or, “at the latest,” the spring of 2014.[7] In
mid-November, the Arab League met to coordinate its position in preparation for
upcoming talks on the WMD-free zone and the Helsinki conference. Member states
reportedly endorsed Fahmy’s initiative unanimously. No further progress has
been made.
Regional Challenges
In its November 2012 statement on the postponement,
Washington said the conference could not be held because of “present conditions
in the Middle East and the fact that states in the region have not reached
agreement on acceptable conditions for a conference.”[8] In short, Israel had
no interest in attending a gathering where it would be the center of criticism,
and other regional states showed no interest in agreeing to the logistics and
an agenda that would allay Israel’s concerns and give it reason to attend. In
the words of William Potter, director of the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, “[E]verybody’s out of sync.… [I]t’s as if nobody
really wants this to happen.”[9]
Given the rivalry, hostility, suspicion, and
religious and sectarian tensions in the region, it is difficult to be
optimistic about establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The advent of
the Arab Spring only emphasized these problems. The unanticipated changes in
the region resulted in more inward-looking governments, diverting attention
away from goals such as the zone. This is on top of the long-standing lack of
trust among the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) Arabs, Israel, and Iran. The goal of
establishing a WMD-free zone in the region is almost a fantasy.
Although Arab advocates believe the zone would be a
confidence-building measure leading to regional peace, Israel believes it must
be the culmination of a process that addresses regional tensions and conflicts.
In March 2012, Israel said that it would “be willing to attend something like
[the planned 2012 conference] when there is comprehensive peace in the region.
Before that, we feel that this is something that is absolutely not
relevant.”[10]
Israel is also unwilling to take part in the process
of creating a WMD-free zone as long as Arab states continue to single it out as
the only nuclear-weapon state in the region and demand unilateral disarmament.
Yet, the 1995 resolution on the Middle East effectively did just that. Although
it called for the establishment of a WMD-free zone, it also urged “all States
of the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to
the [NPT] as soon as possible” and to place their nuclear facilities under
full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.[11] This clearly
targeted Israel. The
2010 NPT Review Conference went one step further and named Israel in its
final document without mentioning Iran’s safeguards violations and refusal to
abide by UN Security Council mandates.[12] It is not surprising that Israel
insists its security concerns be addressed in negotiations on a zone.
For Arab states and Iran, the main reason to pursue a
WMD-free zone is to curtail or eliminate Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal.
At the same time, this is also why progress has been impossible.
Israel insists that the Helsinki conference not be
held within the context of an NPT process in which it, as an NPT nonsignatory,
did not participate. Arab states do not want to take the zone out of the NPT
framework in part because of the timelines provided by the 2010 NPT Review
Conference final document but largely because of the focus on the Israeli
nuclear program. This has not worked in breaking the long-standing deadlock.
Israel will not agree, at the initial stage, to sacrifice its most prized
strategic asset. The only plausible way to address Arab and Iranian concerns
over Israel’s nuclear program is to begin by eliminating chemical weapons from
the region today, with a view to expanding the ban to other nonconventional
weapons in the future.
Iran also is skeptical of the current process.
Although it was a co-sponsor of the 1974 resolution calling for a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, Tehran was unconvinced about
extending the zone to cover all nonconventional weapons. The “comprehensive
approach” would complicate the process and make the end goal more “elusive,” a
former Iranian official said in 2012.[13]
Instead, Iran chose to focus on the nuclear track. That
approach focuses the discussion on Israel’s undeclared nuclear weapons
capability, making it a pointed statement about Israel’s role in the region,
but making diplomatic progress more difficult than under any other approach. In
addition, expanding the scope of the WMD-free zone to cover delivery systems
capable of carrying nonconventional weapons poses a problem for Iran.[14]
Tehran is unlikely to give up some or all of its prized missile arsenal, which
is considered too important for Iran’s defense posture.[15] Despite expressing
a willingness to attend a conference on a WMD-free zone, Iran clearly has
doubts as to its feasibility. As a victim of chemical weapons use during the
Iran-Iraq war, however, Iran would find it politically awkward to stand in the
way of a regional ban on chemical weapons.
Despite their enthusiasm for the zone, the Persian
Gulf Arab states do not have the political will or influence to lead the
process.[16] The six GCC countries are split by their different threat
perceptions and security priorities. Their lack of personnel to devote to the
process adds to their unwillingness to take a leading role after their failed
attempt in 2005 to form a subregional WMD-free zone, which aimed to address the
Iranian nuclear program.
Today, establishing a Middle Eastern WMD-free zone as
a whole clearly aims too high. The only feasible way to overcome the current
deadlock in negotiations is through an incremental approach. Although this in
itself was unlikely until a few months ago, Syria’s accession to the CWC and
the recent interim deal on Iran’s nuclear program have made such an approach
possible.
Road Map to a Regional Ban
Chemical weapons are devices that, according to the
CWC, contain “toxic chemicals and their precursors” that cause “death or other
harm.”[17] They are relatively inexpensive to produce, have significant
psychological and physical effects, and are weapons of fear and disruption.
Some political leaders see them as “equalizer” weapons—appealing in a region of
asymmetrical military capabilities.
The Middle East has a history of chemical weapons
development and is second only to Europe as a theater for their use. Egypt employed
them in the 1963-1967 North Yemen civil war, and Iraq infamously used
them between 1980 and 1991 against Iran and its own people. Libya did not use
chemical weapons, but developed an extensive stockpile. Iraq’s program was
dismantled in the 1990s, and it became party to the CWC in February 2009. Libya
declared its stockpiles in 2004 and similarly joined the CWC, but by 2011, when
internal violence erupted, only half of its stockpiles of mustard gas and 40
percent of its chemical precursors had been destroyed.[18] Iran has been
accused of having a chemical weapons program.[19]
The Syrian case is most relevant today. As of the
fall of 2013, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad had the fourth-largest chemical
weapons program in the world and the largest in the Middle East: 1,300 metric
tons of chemical warfare agents, including different types of mustard agent and key
chemical components of nerve agents such as sarin and VX, spread throughout 23 different
locations.[20]
In August, video footage of an attack that occurred
in the rebel-friendly area of Ghouta in eastern Damascus showed Syrian victims
poisoned by asphyxiation with no apparent external wounds. A few weeks later,
the United Nations confirmed that chemical weapons had been used.[21] As
concerned countries pondered a response, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
said that Assad could avoid planned U.S. military strikes only by promptly
giving up his chemical weapons arsenal. This sparked an ambitious proposal from
the Russians to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons capability. Although Russia
and the United States had been discussing ways to address the chemical weapons
threat for a while, the proposal came at the right time for U.S. President
Barack Obama, who was looking to minimize U.S. military involvement in Syria. A
week later, Russia and the United States agreed on the plan and its framework.
After the Organisation
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Executive Council and the
UN Security Council endorsed the plan, the process of destroying Syria’s
chemical weapons began.
The crisis in Syria highlighted the devastating
impact of chemical weapons use, the difficulty in securing these weapons, and
the necessity of chemical weapons disarmament. Nevertheless, in early
September, convincing Assad to join the CWC still seemed unlikely. Chemical
weapons were a prized military asset for Assad and a means of pursuing
strategic parity with Israel, with more than 30 years of investment into their
development. The Russian-U.S. deal overcame this problem by forcing Assad to
give up his chemical weapons. After agreeing to adhere to it a month earlier
when the U.S.-Russian plan was concluded, Syria on October 14 became the 190th
state-party to the CWC.
On December 10, while accepting the Nobel Peace
Prize, OPCW
Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü pointed to Syria’s disarmament and called
for remaining holdouts to join the convention: “There has long been no
reasonable defense for not doing so—all the more now in the wake of the robust
international reaction to recent use of chemical weapons.… It’s my fervent hope
that this award will spur on efforts to make the Chemical Weapons Convention a
truly universal norm.”
Today, Egypt and Israel are the only two states in
the region not bound by the CWC. Although Israel signed the CWC in 1993, it
never ratified it. The Israeli government discussed it more than once,[22] but
it deferred ratification because key Arab states had not signed the treaty.
The destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal
removes one of Israel’s main concerns. Last September, Israeli President Shimon
Peres stated that Israel should now consider joining the CWC; other Israeli
officials and analysts agreed, insisting that chemical weapons were not
essential to Israeli national security. Nevertheless, the Israeli cabinet opted
to maintain its ambiguous stance.[23] Past Israeli assertions that it cannot
ratify the treaty because other states in the region do not recognize its
existence are a poor excuse. The only country in the region that currently
remains outside the treaty is Egypt, which recognizes Israel.[24]
Egypt insists that it cannot accept any more nonproliferation
obligations until Israel joins the NPT. In the 1990s, following the drafting of
the CWC, Egypt promoted an Arab boycott of the CWC and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), but
today it is alone in its refusal to accede to them. This makes Egypt look
petulant and isolated. The failure of the linkage policy is clear, but as the
founder of the movement, it is difficult for Egypt to ignore it. Following
Syria’s accession, Israeli ratification could provide Egypt with an opportunity
and a convenient moment to adjust its stance and overcome the unappealing
prospect of being the only nonsignatory in the region, with even Assad’s Syria
having signed the treaty. Along with the reputational consideration, it is in
Egypt’s interest to join the CWC because pursuing the zone incrementally rather
than all at once maximizes the prospects for eventually achieving a WMD-free
zone. That would also mean maximizing the pressure on Israel to join such a
zone.
The removal of the Syrian chemical weapons threat,
coupled with a debate and willingness in sectors of the Israeli government to
ratify the CWC, makes this a plausible way forward. Negotiations for the next
steps in the process should be conducted behind the scenes. To build trust, it
would be preferable that Israeli officials’ discussions over their country’s
ratification of the CWC were conducted with the Arab states, including Egypt,
and Iran. That step, however, is not strictly necessary; Israeli accession
could be a unilateral measure. Once Israel signals its willingness to ratify
the CWC, the region and the designated conveners of the conference on the
WMD-free zone (Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) can begin
negotiations with Egypt over its accession to the treaty.
Israel’s signature would give Egypt political cover
to accede to the CWC while claiming at least a partial victory for its linkage
policy because Israel would have eliminated one category of nonconventional
weapons and joined the CWC, if not the NPT. It would also leave Cairo as the
only government in the region not party to the CWC—an uninviting prospect,
especially after one of the region’s most brutal dictators has joined. The
horrific images from the recent use of chemical weapons by Syria have brought
these weapons to the forefront of the international agenda, making their
destruction an easy sell to a domestic audience.
An all-or-nothing approach by Arab states and Iran
toward Israeli disarmament has not worked and, as Israel grows more wary of its
security because of its unpredictable environment, is highly unlikely to work
in the future. Potentially, the most effective way to change Israel’s security
calculation over its nuclear arsenal is to begin building trust in the region
and tackling a more achievable weapons category in order to get the process
started. It would be a significant first step toward a potential zone free of
all nonconventional weapons, including nuclear weapons.
Negotiations for a zone free of chemical weapons
should be conducted in parallel with discussions over phasing out other
nonconventional, particularly nuclear, weapons. This would reassure states that
a chemical weapons-free zone in the Middle East is not the end goal, but a
first step toward a regional WMD-free zone.
Although the plan for destruction of Syrian chemical
weapons has removed a major cause for concern in the region and has put
regional recognition of the CWC back on the table, the interim deal on the
Iranian nuclear program, signed on November 24, was also a significant regional
diplomatic and nonproliferation victory. The agreement, which suspends key
elements of Iran’s nuclear program, has helped to generate a wave of optimism
and confidence for nonproliferation negotiations in the region. If successful,
the final deal could remove another cause of regional tensions, paving the way
for further discussions and steps towards a region free of chemical weapons and
eventually free of all nonconventional weapons.
Conclusion
The goal of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East
is not new. It has been discussed for more than 30 years, but little progress
has been made. It is clear that tackling the zone as a whole, aiming to ban
all nonconventional weapons simultaneously and addressing all regional security
concerns, is idealistic. The best way to build trust and start the process is
to phase out weapons incrementally. In a region that has been plagued by the
use of chemical weapons, banning them is the only goal that is significant
enough, yet achievable enough to serve as a catalyst for a broader WMD-free
zone.
Until recently, turning the idea of a WMD-free zone
into functional policy was unimaginable. Yet, the recent Syrian chemical
weapons deal has removed one of the major impediments to full regional
acceptance of the CWC. It is vital to make the most of the slim chances of
establishing a WMD-free zone by capitalizing on the momentum generated by the
deals on the Iranian nuclear program and Syrian chemical weapons.
Dina Esfandiary is a research associate in the
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme of the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London. Her research focuses on nonproliferation and
security in the Middle East.
ENDNOTES
1.
For an earlier articulation of this idea, see
Dina Esfandiary, “Building Confidence Towards a MEWMDFZ via a Chemical Weapons
Ban,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, November 2012,
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/backgroundpapers/esfandiary.pdf. See
also Eitan Barak, “Getting the Middle East Holdouts to Join the CWC,” Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 66, No. 1 (January 1, 2010).
2.
1995 Review and Extension Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1995 NPT
Review and Extension Conference), “Final Document,” NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I),
1995, annex (“Resolution on the Middle East”).
3.
2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2010 NPT Review
Conference), “Final Document,” NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)*, p. 29.
4.
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of
State, “2012 Conference on a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (MEWMDFZ),” 2012/1840, November 23, 2012 (hereinafter U.S.
postponement statement).
5.
Senior Western government official, briefing
with author, December 16, 2013.
6.
For the status of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) treaties in the Middle East, see David Santoro, “Status of
Non-Proliferation Treaties, Agreements, and Other Related Instruments in the
Middle East,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, July 2011,
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/backgroundpapers/santoro.pdf. Syria
joined the Chemical Weapons Convention in October 2013.
7.
Nabil Fahmy, address to the 68th session of the
UN General Assembly, September 28, 2013, http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/EG_en.pdf.
8.
U.S. postponement statement.
9.
Elaine M. Grossman, “Arab States Renew Call for
WMD Talks, but May Drop Boycott Threat,” Global Security Newswire, April 16,
2013, http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/arab-states-renew-call-wmd-talks-may-drop-boycott-threat/.
10.
“Peace Crucial to Nuke-Free Middle East, Says UN
Ambassador,” The Times of Israel, March 31, 2012.
11.
1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, “Final
Document,” annex (“Resolution on the Middle East”).
12.
2010 NPT Review Conference, “Final Document,” p.
29.
13.
Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, “A Nuclear Free Zone in
the Middle East: An Iranian Perspective,” Institute for Middle East Strategic
Studies, June 12, 2012, http://en.merc.ir/View/tabid/98/ArticleId/432/A-Nuclear-Free-Zone-in-the-Middle-East-An-Iranian-Perspective.aspx.
14.
Discussions include proposals to ban ballistic
missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers. UN Security Council Resolution
687 required the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, including
all ballistic missile with a range exceeding 150 kilometers, and considered
this as a “step towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free
from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles for their delivery.”
15.
Nasser Hadian and Shani Hormozi, “A WMD-Free
Zone in the Middle East: Iran’s Security Imperatives,” in A WMD-Free Zone in
the Middle East: Regional Perspectives, ed. Paolo Foradori and Martin B Malin
(November 2013), pp. 16-17, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dp_2013-09.pdf.
16.
For more on Persian Gulf state views on the
zone, see Dina Esfandiary, Elham Fakhro, and Becca Wasser, “Obstacles for the
Gulf States,” Arms Control Today, September 2011.
17.
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW), “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,” 1993, art.
1, http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=6357.
18.
Destruction of Libya’s chemical weapons resumed
in March 2013, and the planned completion date was extended to December 2016.
19.
See International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), “Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities,”
February 2011, pp. 96-108.
20.
For more on Syria’s WMD programs, see Michael
Elleman, Dina Esfandiary, and Emile Hokayem, “Syria’s Proliferation Challenge
and the European Union’s Response,” EU Non-Proliferation Consortium
Non-Proliferation Papers, No. 20 (July 2012), http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/michaelellemandinaesfandiaryemilehokayem5033c66600360.pdf.
On the size of the Syrian arsenal, see OPCW Executive Council, “Note by the
Director-General: Progress in the Elimination of the Syrian Chemical Weapons
Programme,” EC-M-34/DG.1, October 25, 2013, http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16847.
21.
UN Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use
of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, “Report on the Alleged Use of
Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013,” September
13, 2013, http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf.
22.
Aluf Benn, “Israel Readies to Join Regional WMD
Clean-up After Libyan, Iranian Moves,” Haaretz, January 2, 2004.
23.
Barak Ravid, “Israel Opts to Stay Vague on
Chemical Arms in Wake of Syria Disarmament,” Haaretz, October 31, 2013.
24.
Mark Fitzpatrick, “High Time for Israel to
Adhere to the Chemical Weapons Convention,” IISS Survival Editors’ Blog,
September 30, 2013, http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20and%20strategy/blogsections/2013-98d0/september-2013-62a6/high-time-8110.
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