Thursday, July 31, 2014

EdwardSHerman. DavidPeterson. The Politics of genocide. Monthly Review Press. 2010. 06. Notes.

1.      No letters appeared in reaction. However, four months later (Oct. 8, 2009), the editors published a “clarification,” which reads as follows: “In his review of Edmund S. Morgans essay collection American Heroes: Profiles of Men and Women Who Shaped Early America [NYR, June 11], Russell Baker, drawing on the estimates mentioned in Morgans‘ 1958 essay ‘The Unyielding Indian,’ wrote that in North America at the time of Columbus, there may have been scarcely more than a million inhabitants. However, archaeological evidence and demographic research in recent decades suggest that the number was much larger, with estimates ranging up to 18 million.”
The “clarification” is perhaps even worse than the original. Baker was not referring to North America (“from the tropical jungle ...”). Over thirty years ago it was well-known that in North America (as defined in NAFTA, including Mexico) the numbers were in the tens of millions, far more beyond; and that even in the U.S. and Canada the numbers were about ten million or more. It was also known, even well before, that the “sparsely populated ... unspoiled world” included advanced civilizations (in the U.S. and Canada too). This remarkable episode remains “genocide denial with a vengeance,” underscored by the “clarification.”
2.      Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan) to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), February 24, 1948, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 1, 524,
3.      See, e.g., Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United Sates Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990); and Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). On the U.S. military-industrial complex, see John Bellamy Foster, Hannah Holleman, and Robert W. McChesney, “The U.S. Imperial Triangle and Military Spending,” Monthly Review 60, October, 2008, On the U.S. “empire of bases,” see Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006); and Catherine Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: Pluto Press, 2009).
4.      United States Objectives And Courses Of Action With Respect To Latin America (NSC 5432/1), September 3, 1954, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. IV, 81, v04.i0009.pdf.
5.      See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979); and Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982).
6.      See the webpage maintained by William Blum, “United States waging war/military action, either directly or in conjunction with a proxy army” (last accessed in September, 2009),
7.      See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, On Power and Ideology: The Managua Lectures (Boston: South End Press, 1987), esp. Chap. 1, “The Overall Framework of Order,” 5–26; Noam Chomsky, Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), esp. the Introduction and Chap. 1, “Cold War: Fact and Fancy,” 1–68.
8.      Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, Counter-Revolutionary Violence: Bloodbaths in Fact and Propaganda (Andover, MA: Warner Modular Publications, Inc., 1973),
9.      Ibid, 7.
10.   See H. Bruce Franklin, M.I.A. or Mythmaking In America (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992).
11.   Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism. For its treatment of Warner CEO William Sarnoff’s suppression of the original 1973 edition of CRV, “an authentic instance of private censorship of ideas per se,” see xiv-xvii.
12.   Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 146–147; 94–95.
13.   Roy Gutman, David Rieff, and Anthony Dworkin, eds., Crimes of War 2.0: What the Public Should Know (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007); Sydney Schanberg, “Cambodia,” 78–79. Also see the Website of the Crimes of War Project,
14.   Aryeh Neier, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Struggle for Justice (New York: Times Books, 1998), 93–95.
15.   Robertson’s use of the word “mistake” is misleading as Diem was literally imported from the United States and imposed on the South Vietnamese by U.S. power, and the U.S. actively supported his terroristic and undemocratic rule until 1963. See George McT. Kahin, Intervention (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 78ff.
16.   Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (New York: The New Press, 2000), 41–42. Here we add that Robertson has defended (“might have been justifiable”) the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, under the concept of “military necessity, by bringing the war to a speedier end with less overall loss of life than would otherwise have been the case” (187). And in his penultimate chapter, “The Guernica Paradox,” Robertson coined the phrase “Bombing for Humanity”—a phrase that will warm the heart of every serially aggressive power (401–436).
17.   Christiane Amanpour, Scream Bloody Murder, CNN, December 4, 2008.
18.   Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers (Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2008), This report does mention Indonesia in passing, but only with respect to USAID “mediation efforts in places such as Aceh” (40) and by way of explaining the nature of Washington’s interest in stopping Jakarta’s rampage in East Timor in 1999 (56, 70). But it never mentions Indonesia as the perpetrator of the mass killings of the 1960s.
19.   Here quoting the phrase associated with the “Responsibility to Protect” paragraphs from the 2005 World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1), UN General Assembly, September 15, 2005, para. 138–139, In this document’s exact, if convoluted words: “The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (para. 139).
20.   See the Preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998,
21.   See “Situations and cases,” International Criminal Court (last accessed in September, 2009), Of these fourteen indictments and arrest warrants, five were against Ugandan members of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (though one indictee has since died), five against nationals of the Democratic Republic of Congo, three against Sudanese nationals charged with prosecuting the government’s counter-insurgency campaign in Darfur (including Sudan’s President Omar Hassan Ahmad al Bashir), and a fourth one against a Sudanese national with the rebel United Resistance Front.
22.   See Philip Gourevitch, “The Life After,” New Yorker, May 4, 2009; also see our Section 4, “Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in the present work.
23.   See Final Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (September 30, 1946),, specifically “The Common Plan or Conspiracy and Aggressive War,”, emphasis added.
24.   See “Human Rights Watch Policy on Iraq,” undated statement, ca. late 2002 or early 2003, iraq/hrwpolicy.htm. For a critique of Human Rights Watch, see Edward S. Herman, David Peterson, and George Szamuely, “Human Rights Watch in Service to the War Party,” Electric Politics, February 26, 2007,
25.   John Ellis, The Social History of the Machine Gun (New York: Pantheon, 1973), 101.
26.   See Richard Seymour, The Liberal Defense of Murder (New York: Verso, 2008).
27.   According to Marc W. Herold at the University of New Hampshire: “Obama’s Pentagon has been much more deadly for Afghan civilians than was Bush’s in comparable months of 2008. During January-June 2008, some 278–343 Afghan civilians perished at the hands of U.S./NATO forces, but for comparable months under Team Obama the numbers were 520–630.” (“Afghanistan: Obama’s unspoken tradeoff,” Frontline (India), August 29 -September 11, 2009, Herold adds that under Obama, two other things have changed as well: The preponderance of U.S.-NATO violence has shifted from aerial attacks to attacks by ground forces; and the “public face of the war” has also shifted, from the rightly discredited George W. Bush, to someone more fluent in the language and imagery of American liberals.
28.   Peter Baker, “Obama’s Choice for U.N. Is Advocate of Strong Action Against Mass Killings,” New York Times, December 1, 2008; Susan E. Rice, “Why Darfur Can’t Be Left to Africa,” Washington Post, August 7, 2005; Susan E. Rice, “Respect for International Humanitarian,” USUN Press Release #020, U.S. Department of State, January 29, 2009.
29.   See “Iraq War,” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, undated,
30.   See the Interactive Thematic Dialogue of the United Nations General Assembly on the Responsibility to Protect, July 23, 2009, which includes the texts of the prepared statements by each of the six presenters, Also see Implementing the responsibility to protect: Report of the Secretary-General (A/63/677), January 12,
31.   See Jean Bricmont, Humanitarian Imperialism: Using Human Rights to Sell War, Trans. Diana Johnstone (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2006).
32.   See Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).
33.   See Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, et al., The Responsibility To Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001),
34.   Our transcription, drawn from John Pilger’s documentary, Death of a Nation: The Timor Conspiracy, 1994.
35.   Our transcription, drawn from the 52-minute “Responsibility to Protect” Press Conference, United Nations, New York City, July 23, 2009, beginning at the 41:45 mark,
36.   In his book, Gareth Evans writes that as of mid-2008, the “clearest prima facie candidates ... for inclusion in ... [an R2P] watch list ... [were] Burma/Myanmar, Burundi, China, Congo, Iraq, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Somalia, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Zimbabwe.” (The Responsibility to Protect, 76.) Evans does not spell-out any reasons for naming these eleven R2P candidates, nor does he name which victims need to be protected from which perpetrators in each of these eleven theaters. In reference to Iraq, Evans has long maintained that the 2003 U.S.–U.K. invasion could not have been justified on “humanitarian” grounds, though he adds that it was a “close call.” (“Humanity did not justify this war,” Financial Times, May 15, 2003.) But as with the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (see n. 27, above) and many other R2P advocates, the only question that Evans entertains is whether the violence of Iraqi national life was sufficient to provide R2P-type justification for the ongoing foreign occupation of Iraq. Left unasked is whether the Iraqis themselves may have ever needed protection from the U.S. and U.K. invader-occupiers of their country. Indeed, this is because it is an article of faith among R2P advocates that the United States and the great Western powers possess a “responsibility to protect” the victims of non-Western perpetrators, but that the victims of the United States and its Western allies have no recourse but to suffer their fate in silence or be labeled “terrorists” (and the like) for resisting. The bias evident here runs deep.
37.   UN Security Council Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990 (S/RES/660) demanded Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait. Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990 (S/RES/661) imposed economic sanctions to enforce Iraq’s compliance with 660. But it was Resolution 687 of April 3, 1991 (S/RES/687, esp. para. 7-14) that called for the disarmament of Iraq’s WMD and created the Special Commission to supervise compliance. Last, Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003 (S/RES/1483) rescinded all of the above, as the scramble for Iraq began.
38.   Patrick E. Tyler, “U.S. Officials Believe Iraq Will Take Years to Rebuild,” New York Times, June 3, 1991; Barton Gellman, “Allied Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq; Officials Acknowledge Strategy Went Beyond Purely Military Targets,” Washington Post, June 23, 1991.
39.   “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,” entered into force on December 7, 1979, Article 54, “Protection of objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.” Therein we read: “1. Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited. 2. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render use-less objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works, for the specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.” Here we note that the U.S. Government has never ratified this Protocol.
40.   Thomas J. Nagy, “The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq’s Water Supply,” The Progressive, September, 2001, The International Study Team reported as early as October 1991 that “modern” Iraq had been destroyed. See Health and Welfare in Iraq after the Gulf Crisis: An in-Depth Assessment, October, 1991. Also see Eric Herring, “Between Iraq and a hard place: a critique of the British government’s case for UN economic sanctions,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, January, 2002; and Joy Gordon, “Economic Sanctions as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Harper’s Magazine, November, 2002.
41.   See the Final reports of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd panels established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 Jan. 1999 (S/1999/100) concerning disarmament, monitoring and verification issues, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and prisoners of war and Kuwaiti property (S/1999/356), specifically Annex II, “Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq,” esp. para. 43–51.
42.   See “Iraq survey shows ‘humanitarian emergency,’” UNICEF, Press Release, August 12, 1999, Also Peter L. Pellett, “Sanctions, Good, Nutrition, and Health in Iraq,” in Anthony Arnove, ed., Iraq Under Siege: The Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War (Boston: South End Press, 2000), 151–168.
43.   Hans C. von Sponeck, A Different Kind of War: The UN Sanctions Regime in Iraq (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 52; n. 93, 47.
44.   Hans C. von Sponeck, “Iraq—Twelve Years of Sanctions: Justified Punishment or Illegal Treatment?” Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research, December 6, 2002.
45.   John Mueller and Karl Mueller, “Sanctions of Mass Destruction,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, 1999. “No one knows with any precision how many Iraqi civilians have died as a result,” they add, “but various agencies of the United Nations, which oversees the sanctions, have estimated that they have contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths.”
46.   “Punishing Saddam,” 60 Minutes, CBS TV, May 12, 1996.
47.   For Table 1, Rows 1–7, the parameters we used for our Factiva database searches were:
Row 1: rst=Iraq and (sanctions w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 1992 through December 31, 2008.
Row 2: rst=(Iraq w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2008.
Row 3: rst=(Bosnia w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 1992 through December 31, 2008.
Row 4: rst=(Kosovo w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2008.
Row 5: rst=(Rwanda w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Kosovo or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) from April 1, 1994 through December 31, 2008.
Row 6: rst=(Congo w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2008.
Row 7: rst=(Darfur w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Kosovo or Rwanda or Turkey or Vietnam) for January 1, 2004 through December 31, 2008.
48.   See, e.g., “The Times and Iraq,” Editorial, New York Times, May 26, 2004, as well as the accompanying “Sample of the Coverage.” Here we simply note that the case against the Times is far stronger than the Times’s editors admitted and that the body of relevant examples of the Times’s and the rest of the establishment media’s role as advocates for the U.S. and U.K. war is far greater in scope than recognized by the Times.
49.   Les Roberts et al., “Mortality before and after the March 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey,” The Lancet (online), October 29, 2004; Gilbert Burnham et al., “The Human Cost of the War in Iraq: A Mortality Study, 2002–2006,” The Lancet, October 21, 2006; and Munqith Daghir et al., “New analysis ‘confirms’ 1 million + Iraqi casualties,” Opinion Research Business, January 28, 2008. For electronic copies of these and related documents, see the Web site maintained by the Center for International Studies at MIT, Iraq: The Human Cost,
50.   A search of the Factiva database (i.e., Iraq w/10 “supreme international crime”) under the broadest “All Sources” category for the seven-year period January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2008 turned up a total of only six items in which someone referred to the U.S. war as an instance of a Nuremberg-class “supreme international crime.” In the single most prominent of these, the former CIA analyst and member of Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity Ray McGovern said over a U.S. television channel: “Nuremberg defined [aggression as] the supreme international crime, holding within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.” From the immediate context, it is unmistakable that McGovern was referring to the U.S. war against Iraq. See The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, PBS–TV, April 24, 2006.
51.   Howard Friel and Richard Falk, The Record of the Paper: How the New York Times Misreports US Foreign Policy (New York: Verso, 2004), 15.
52.   “Statistics on Displaced Iraqis around the World,” UN High-Commissioner for Refugees, September 2007; Iraq: No Let-up in the Humanitarian Crisis, International Committee of the Red Cross, March, 2008; Carnage and Despair: Iraq Five Years On, Amnesty International, March 2008.
53.   Douglas Jehl and Elizabeth Becker, “Experts’ Pleas to Pentagon Didn’t Save Museum,” New York Times, April 16, 2003; Robson was referring to the looting of Iraq’s National Museum just days before, under the watchful eyes of U.S. troops. For an assessment of the responsibility of the occupying army to protect Iraq’s archeological sites, see Amy E. Miller, “The Looting of Iraqi Art: Occupiers and Collectors Turn Away Leisurely from the Disaster,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 37, No. 1, 2005. Also Lawrence Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia: Behind the Looting of the Iraq Museum (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009).
54.   See, e.g., Michael Smith, “The War Before the War,” New Statesman, May 30, 2005.
55.   See David Peterson, “British Records on the Prewar Bombing of Iraq,” ZNet, July 6, 2005,
56.   See David Peterson, “‘Spikes of Activity,’” ZNet July 5, 2005, This catalogues the relevant Iraqi documents from December 16, 2001 through February 11–14, 2003, after which time the series was interrupted by the start of the war and the overthrow of the Iraqi government.
57.   UN Security Council Resolution 1546 (S/RES/1546), June 8, 2004.
58.   See Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, White House Office of the Press Secretary, November 26, 2007,; and Alissa Rubin and Campbell Robertson, “Iraq Approves Deal Charting End of U.S. Role,” New York Times, November 28, 2008.
59.   “Iraq opens its oil fields to foreign companies, 35 qualify,” Oil and Gas News, November 30, 2008; “Northern Iraq Export Prospects Inch Forward,” Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, December 1, 2008; Danny Fortson, “Oil giants are itching to invade Iraq,” Sunday Times (U.K.), December 28, 2008; Patrick Cockburn, “Iraqi Oil Minister accused of mother of all sell-outs,” The Independent, June 18, 2009; Gina Chon, “Big Oil Ready for Big Gamble in Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, June 24, 2009; Sam Dagher, “Defiant Kurds Claim Oil, Gas And Territory,” New York Times, July 10, 2009; Anthony Shadid, “Worries About A Kurdish-Arab Conflict Move To Fore in Iraq,” Washington Post, July 27, 2009; and Patrick Cockburn, “Kurdish faultline threatens to spark new war,” The Independent, August 10, 2009.
60.   The first such comparison was by Lara Marlowe, “Whether occupation forces stay or go, there is going to be bloodshed,” Irish Times, April 15, 2004. After the April 2004 assaults, Marlowe wrote: “In Falluja, US forces used fighter-bombers and attack helicopters against civilian areas for the first time since the fall of Saddam. In the mind of Iraqis, Falluja was a massacre representing something akin to Guernica in the Spanish Civil War, or Bloody Sunday in Northern Ireland.”
61.   “Senator hits out at Maliki, US embassy,” Agence France Presse, October 1, 2007. Then a candidate for the U.S. presidency, Joe Biden was defending his blueprint for dividing Iraq into three self-governing territories.
62.   Table 2 provides a more careful breakdown for the results in Table 1, Row 2. Only 13 items (Row 1) included the claim that Iraqi deaths during this period amount to a “genocide” the cause of which is the U.S. war and military occupation of Iraq. For the same period, 3 items (Row 2) claimed that genocide occurred in Iraq due to the 13-year sanctions-regime; 48 items (Row 3) claimed the regime of Saddam Hussein was the perpetrator of genocide; and 54 items (Row 4) claimed either that a sectarian conflict already had broken out in Iraq that is the cause of genocide, or that a genocidal conflict might breakout inside Iraq, were the occupying U.S. military to withdraw from the country. Last, there were 30 items (Row 5) that used the term “genocide” but did not attribute it to any of the other four categories—as when, for example, the Chicago Sun-Times’s Neil Steinberg mentioned “the bloodbath in Iraq, the genocide in Africa” (“Satan has nothing on monsters among us,” October 30, 2006).
63.   Samantha Power, “Dying in Darfur,” New Yorker, August 30, 2004.
64.   “Darfur rebels adopt charter to topple regime, create ‘democratic Sudan,’” Agence France Presse, March 14, 2003.
65.   “West Sudan’s Darfur conflict ‘world’s greatest humanitarian crisis,’” Agence France Presse, March 19, 2004.
66.   See Eric Reeves, “Unnoticed Genocide,” Washington Post, February 25, 2004. Reeves repeated the same points in his Statement before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, U.S. House of Representatives, March 11, 2004.
67.   Kofi Annan to the UN Commission on Human Rights (SG/SM/9245), April 7, 2004,
68.   Mahmood Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2009), esp. “Arab Perpetrators and African Victims,” 59–71; also see his “The Politics of Naming,” London Review of Books, March 8, 2007,
69.   Nicholas D. Kristof, “Will We Say ‘Never Again’ Yet Again?” New York Times, March 27, 2004. Also see Mamdani, Saviors and Survivors, n. 32, 310, and n. 36, 310–311.
70.   Antonio Cassese et al., Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General (S/2005/60), January 25, 2005, para. 508.
71.   Ibid, para. 510. Although this Commission took great pains to fit the conflicts in the western Sudan into the framework of the Genocide Convention, it could not accomplish this task, and in the end rejected any charge of genocide against the government in Khartoum.
72.   Achim Steiner et al., Sudan: Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, UN Environment Program, 2007,, 329; Ban Ki-moon, “A Climate Culprit In Darfur,” Washington Post, June 16, 2007; and David M. Cacarious Jr. et al., National Security and the Threat of Climate Change, CNA Corporation, April, 2007, 15–20.
73.   See “No End in Sight to Violence and Suffering in Sudan,” Doctors Without Borders, part 8 of its annual “Top Ten” Humanitarian Crises of 2008, December 22, 2008,
74.   See Mark Jones, “Tsunami coverage dwarfs ‘forgotten’ crises,” Reuters-AlertNet, March 10, 2005,, as well as the related charts and graphs for total press coverage during the period March 2004–February 2005. Eliminating the coverage given to the December 26, 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean (an act of nature), this study found that Darfur was the most heavily reported politicalhumanitarian crisis throughout the 12-month period.
75.   John Prendergast, “Sudan’s Ravines of Death,” New York Times, July 15, 2004.
76.   Steven Kull et al., Americans on the Crisis in Sudan, Program on International Policy Attitudes, July 20, 2004, A follow-up poll conducted six-months later simply assumed that genocide was occurring in Darfur, and asked respondents whether they believed that various combinations of military force (unilaterally by the United States, multilaterally by the Security Council) were appropriate to “stop the genocide in Darfur.” Steven Kull et al., Three Out of Four Americans Favor UN Military Intervention in Darfur, Program on International Policy Attitudes, January 24, 2005.
77.   Albright and Cohen, Preventing Genocide, 14.
78.   Benjamin Coghlan et al., Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis, International Rescue Committee–Burnet Institute, January, 2008, ii. Also see the accompanying Press Release, January 22, 2008, (See our section on “Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo.”)
79.   Steven Fake and Kevin Funk, The Scramble for Africa: Darfur— Intervention and the USA (New York: Black Rose Books, 2009), esp. Chap. 8, “Darfur Activism—Aiding the Victims or the Superpower?”
80.   Andrew Heavens, “Sudan’s Darfur no longer at war—peacekeeping chief,” Reuters, August 27, 2009.
81.   Neil MacFarquhar, “ As Darfur Fighting Diminishes, U.N. Officials Focus on the South of Sudan,” New York Times, August 28, 2009.
82.   Ibid.
83.   See the “About Us” function at the Enough Project, (accessed in October 2009). As the opening paragraph explains: “The Enough Project is helping to build a permanent constituency to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity. Too often, the United States and the larger international community have taken a wait-and-see approach to crimes against humanity. This is unconscionable.” Of course, the Enough Project makes no mention of preventing mass-atrocity crimes when the United States and its allies are the perpetrators, rather than bystanders.
84.   See the webpage devoted to the “Keep the Promise: Sudan Now” campaign, where a list of six affiliated organizations is displayed across the bottom, (accessed in October 2009).
85.   Alex de Waal, “‘Save Darfur’: Fast the Eid!” Making Sense of Darfur, September 14, 2009,
86.   For several critical resources relevant to this and to the sections on Kosovo as well as Operation Storm, see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995); Robert M. Hayden, Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999); David Chandler, “Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, 1989–1999,” in Philip Hammond and Edward S. Herman, Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis (Sterling, VI: Pluto Press, 2000), 19–30; Diana Johnstone, Fools’ Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2002); Peter Brock, Media Cleansing: Dirty Reporting. Journalism and Tragedy in Yugoslavia (Los Angeles: GM Books, 2005); and Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “The Dismantling of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention,” Monthly Review 59, September, 2007, http://www.monthly
87.   LTC John E. Sray, “Selling the Bosnian Myth to America: Buyer Beware,” Foreign Military Studies Office Publications, Department of the Army, October, 1995,
88.   See, e.g., Barry Schweid, “Bosnian Leader Appeals for U.S. Support,” Associated Press, January 8, 1993. Schweid paraphrases Bosnian Muslim President Alija Izetbegovic, “frustrated in his call for U.S. military intervention,” telling reporters at a news conference in New York that “some 200,000 people may have died in the former Yugoslav republic in nine months of pounding by Bosnian Serbs.”
89.   For the two principal studies, see Ewa Tabeau and Jakub Bijak, “Warrelated Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” European Journal of Population, Vol. 21, June, 2005, 187–215; Tabeau-Bijak estimate 102,622 total war-related deaths on all sides, of which 55,261 (54%) were civilian and 47,360 (46%) were combatants. Also see Patrick Ball et al., Bosnian Book of the Dead: Assessment of the Database, Research and Documentation Center, Sarajevo, June, 2007, These researchers (one of whom is Ewa Tabeau) estimate 97,207 deaths in all, of which 57,523 (59.2%) were military and 39,684 (40.8%) were civilian. They also provide breakdowns of deaths-by-ethnicity (see “Research Results” > “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Slide 35):
Adapted from Slide 35: Killed and missing by military status and ethnicity, 1991–1995:


90.   See the Judgment, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33-T), ICTY, August 2, 2001, para. 589–598.
91.   Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage, and Crimes Against Humanity (Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004), 159.
92.   See, e.g., George Szamuely, “Securing Guilty Verdicts: The Abuse of Witness Testimony at The Hague,” in Edward S. Herman, ed., The Srebrenica Massacre: Evidence, Context, Politics, forthcoming.
93.   See, e.g., Tim Judah and Daniel Sunter, “How the video that put Serbia in dock was brought to light,” The Observer, June 5, 2005. Although the video itself ultimately was not admitted as evidence to the Milosevic trial, Judah and Sunter referred to the video as the “smoking gun”—”the final, incontrovertible proof of Serbia’s part in the Srebrenica massacres in which more than 7,500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys were murdered.”
94.   The phrase “joint criminal enterprise” was first introduced by the ICTY’s Prosecution in its Initial Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic in relation to Croatia (IT-01-54, September 27, 2001, para. 5-9), then extended to the Second Amended Indictment of Milosevic in relation to Kosovo (IT-99-37, October 16, 2001, para. 16-18), and, finally, for a third time, to the Initial Indictment of Milosevic for Bosnia and Herzegovina (IT-01-51, November 22, 2001, para. 5–9).
95.   “U.N. war crimes tribunal launches Kosovo investigation,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 10, 1998; Philip Shenon, “ U.S. Dispatches Its Balkans Mediator With a Warning to the Serbs,” New York Times, May 9, 1998.
96.   On covert aid to the KLA, see, e.g., Tom Walker and Aidan Laverty, “CIA aided Kosovo guerrilla army,” Sunday Times, March 12, 2000; Peter Beaumont et al., “‘CIA’s bastard army ran riot in Balkans,’” The Observer, March 11, 2001; James Bissett, “We created a monster,” Toronto Globe and Mail, July 31, 2001.
97.   George Robertson, Testimony before the Select Committee on Defense, U.K. House of Commons, March 24, 1999, para. 391. Robertson’s exact words were: “Up until Račak earlier this year the KLA were responsible for more deaths in Kosovo than the Yugoslav authorities had been.”
98.   For the 2,000-figure, see, e.g., “Mutilated Bodies Found After Serb Attack,” New York Times, January 17, 1999; Barton Gellman, “U.S., Allies Order Attack on Serbia,” Washington Post, March 24, 1999.
99.   Population flows in Kosovo prior to and during NATO’s 1999 bombing war correlated, not with a plan of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion, but with strategic military factors, including the intensity of fighting, the operational presence of the KLA in the various theaters of combat, and the relative density of the national groups living in the areas being contested. Across Kosovo’s twenty-nine municipalities, ethnic Albanians did not flee the territory uniformly. Nor were they alone—members of all ethnic groups fled areas where fighting took place. Municipalities in different parts of Kosovo where the KLA’s presence was thin saw relatively little fighting and therefore little refugee flow. This was particularly true prior to the start of NATO’s bombing war on March 24, 1999. See the report published by the OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told. The human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission October 1998 to June 1999, esp. Part III, Ch. 14, “Forced Expulsion,” 146–162; and Part V, “The Municipalities,” 226–585, Also see the treatment of this matter in Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West (Verso, 2000), 114 ff. Chomsky summarizes the work of former New York Times reporter David Binder, who “notes ‘a curiosity’ documented in the OSCE report: 46 percent of the Albanians left Kosovo during the bombing, along with 60 percent of the Serbians and Montenegrins. Thus, ‘proportionately more Serbs were displaced during the bombing, and they did not return to Kosovo’” (114). Last, see the testimony of late British journalist Eve-Ann Prentice during the defense phase of the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Asked her opinion about why so many Kosovo Albanians fled the province during NATO’s bombing war, Prentice said, variously, “we were told many times that ... ordinary civilian ethnic Albanians ... had been told it was their patriotic duty to leave because the world was watching ... and that anybody who failed to join this exodus was somehow not supporting the—the Albanian cause.... [T]hey had been told by KLA leaders that their patriotic duty was to join the exodus, was to leave Kosovo, to be seen to be leaving Kosovo.” (Testimony of Eve-Ann Prentice, Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic (IT-02-54), February 3, 2006, 47908–47909.)
100.          George Jahn, “Charges of Kosovo genocide as NATO bolsters forces,” Associated Press, March 28, 1999.
101.          “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo,” U.S. Department of State, April 19, 1999, Under the heading “Detentions,” this news release stated: “We are gravely concerned about the fate of the missing men. Their number ranges from a low of 100,000, looking only at the men missing from among refugee families in Albania, up to nearly 500,000, if reports of widespread separation of men among the IDPs within Kosovo are true.”
102.          For the “Operation Horseshoe” story, see R. Jeffrey Smith and William Drozdiak, “Serbs’ Offensive Was Meticulously Planned,” Washington Post, April 11, 1999; for the Hashim Thaci story, see Marie Colvin et al., “Slaughter of the Innocents,” Sunday Times, April 4, 1999; and for remarks by Secretary of Defense William Cohen, see Bob Schieffer, Face The Nation, CBS -TV, May 16, 1999. Finally, for a debunking of “Operation Horseshoe,” see Heinz Loquai, Der Kosovo-Konflikt. Wege in einen vermeidbaren Krieg (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000). In English, Loquai’s title translates as “The Kosovo Conflict: The War That Could Have Been Avoided.”
103.          Marlise Simons, “Investigators From Many Nations to Begin Search for War Crimes,” New York Times, June 15, 1999; Julian Borger, “Cook promises to make killers pay; Scenes of mass murder vindicate Nato, says foreign secretary,” The Guardian, June 24, 1999.
104.          See Carla Del Ponte, “Statement to the Press by Carla Del Ponte” (FH/P.I.S./550-e), International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, December 20, 2000, para. 16,; and the International Committee of the Red Cross, “Kosovo: ICRC publishes new edition of ‘Book of the Missing,’” August 29, 2007,
105.          Herman and Peterson, “The Dismantling of Yugoslavia,” 1.
106.          Allison Des Forges et al., “Leave None to Tell the Story”: Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), specifically “The Attack on Habyarimana,” 5–6, 185.
107.          See Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. (or Military II) (ICTR-00-56-I), Transcript, September 19, 2006, 4, lines 13–22.
108.          For the extended testimony of Prosecution witness Alison Des Forges, see Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al., September 18, 2006 through October 16, 2006, which produced a total of seventeen days of testimony. Given that Rwanda’s civilian intelligence services were in the hands of a pro-Rwandan Patriotic Front minister, three consecutive prime ministers under a power-sharing accord had been either pro-RPF or subsidized by it, and Rwanda’s “integrated” military then combined the armed forces of the Tutsi-led RPF that was seeking the overthrow of the government alongside the government’s regular army, the cross-examination of Des Forges from September 21 on shows her failing to support the standard model of the “Rwandan genocide” at every turn.
109.          Alison Des Forges died in a commuter plane crash on February 12, 2009, while returning to her home in Buffalo, New York. An obituary written by Human Rights Watch Executive Director Kenneth Roth praised his longtime colleague for “her central role in the prosecution of the Hutus” (“A Heroine for Human Rights,” Huffington Post, February 15, 2009). It is true that Des Forges acted energetically on behalf of the Prosecution at the ICTR and in similar venues against the Hutu in general, but the perception of her “expertise” flowed less from her knowledge of Rwanda, than her tirelessness as an advocate for the standard model of the “Rwandan genocide” and the thoroughness with which this model has been institutionalized in the United States and Britain. In 1991, Des Forges went to Rwanda on behalf of the U.S. Government and, in her own words, “attempted to put my knowledge into a policy-oriented framework.” “What was new was the relationship to the United States government,” she explained. Later, “I went to Rwanda in July of ‘92 as a consultant to the United States government, again for the same democracy project. Then I went back in the first part of January ‘93 as the co-chair of an international commission to investigate human rights abuses in Rwanda.” (Here quoting Des Forges’ testimony in Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Jean Paul Akayasu (ICTR-96-4), Transcript, February 12, 1997, 112–114.) As the real policy of the U.S. government from at least 1990 on was regime-change in Rwanda, namely, the ouster of the Hutu government by the RPF, as well as the ouster of France from the region (France had backed the Hutu government), we can easily see how Des Forges’ work from 1991 on helped provide cover for the U.S. takeover of as many as four countries via its proxies in Uganda and the RPF in Rwanda. In short, Alison Des Forges’ career is best understood in terms of the services she performed on behalf of U.S. power-projection in Central Africa, with this policy-oriented work couched in the rhetoric of “human rights.” In the process, Des Forges badly misinformed a whole generation of scholars, activists, and the cause of peace and justice as well.
110.          See Jonathan Clayton, “Rwanda to appeal to UN Security Council on rebel invasion,” Reuters, October 15, 1990; UN Security Council Resolution 812 (S/RES/812), March 12, 1993; and UN Security Council Resolution 846 (S/RES/846), June 22, 1993.
111.          For compelling evidence on this point, see Robin Philpot, Rwanda 1994: Colonialism Dies Hard (E-Text as posted to the Taylor Report Website, 2004), esp. Chap. 1–7,
112.          Herman J. Cohen, Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 177–178.
113.          See Philpot, Rwanda 1994: Colonialism Dies Hard, esp. the “Conclusion.”
114.          See the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, signed at Arusha on August 4 1993, U.N. General Assembly (A/48/824-S/26915), December 23, 1993. A total of seven documents were gathered together as the “Arusha Peace Accords,” the earliest the N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement dating from 1991.
115.          See Judgment, The Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al. (ICTR-98-41-T), International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, December 18, 2008, htm. The four defendants in this case were: “Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, the directeur de cabinet of the Ministry of Defence, General Gratien Kabiligi, the head of the operations bureau (G-3) of the army general staff, Major Aloys Ntabakuze, the commander of the elite Para Commando Battalion, and Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the commander of the Gisenyi operational sector” (para. 1).
116.          Ibid, para. 13, quoting from the oral summary of the case read in court the day the verdict was delivered. For the Judgment’s full discussion of the acquittal on this charge, see Sect. 2.1, “Conspiracy to Commit Genocide,” para. 2084–2112.
117.          Allan C. Stam, “Coming to a New Understanding of the Rwanda Genocide,” a lecture before the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, February 18, 2009, our transcription,
118.          “Rwandan embassy closed, U.S. seeks to remove Rwanda from UN Council,” Agence France Presse, July 15, 1994; “Clinton Orders Nonstop Aid Flights for Rwandan Victims,” Associated Press, July 22, 1994; “U.S. recognizes new government in Rwanda,” Reuters, July 29, 1994; “200 U.S. troops going into Kigali to open airport,” Reuters, July 29, 1994.
119.          See UN Security Council Resolution 912 (S/RES/912), April 21, 1994, para. 8. The force levels of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda were reduced to a target of 270 infantry, down from 1515 on April 20, and 2165 as of April 6. In the words of Rwandan UN Ambassador Jean-Damascène Bizimana: “[T]he international community does not seem to have acted in an appropriate manner to reply to the anguished appeal of the people of Rwanda. This question has often been examined from the point of view of the ways and means to withdraw [UNAMIR], without seeking to give the appropriate weight to the concern of those who have always believed, rightly, that, in view of the security situation now prevailing in Rwanda, UNAMIR’s members should be increased to enable it to contribute to the re-establishment of the cease-fire and to assist in the establishment of security conditions that could bring an end to the violence....The option chosen by the Council, reducing the number of troops in UNAMIR ... , is not a proper response to this crisis....” “The situation concerning Rwanda,” UN Security Council (S/PV.3368), April 21, 1994, 6.
120.          Raymond Bonner, “U.N. Stops Returning Rwandan Refugees,” New York Times, September 18, 1994. Also see Chris McGreal and Edward Luce, “Death Threats Force Out Aid Workers,” The Guardian, October 3, 1994; Jean-Michel Stoullig, “UN spotlights claims of summary Rwandan reprisal killings,” Agence France Presse, October 4, 1994.
121.          See the treatment of the Gersony Report in Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” specifically “The Gersony Mission,” 726–732, which reproduces the UNHCR letter stating that the Gersony Report “does not exist” (727).
122.          See the recollection of a meeting with Robert Gersony in Gérard Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 15–16; and n. 59–62, 373. As Prunier describes it: “Gersony’s conclusion was that between early April and mid-September 1994 the RPF had killed between 25,000 and 45,000 people, including Tutsis. The UNHCR, which had commissioned the study for quite a different purpose, was appalled” (16).
123.          George E. Moose, “Human Rights Abuses in Rwanda,” Information Memorandum to The Secretary, U.S. Department of State, undated though clearly drafted between September 17 and 20, 1994. This document was called to our attention by Peter Erlinder, the director of the Rwanda Documents Project at William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota, ICTR Military-1 Exhibit, DNT 264,
124.          Christian Davenport and Allan Stam, Rwandan Political Violence in Space and Time, unpublished manuscript, 2004 (available at Davenport’s personal website: For all of Rwanda from April through July 1994, these authors report a total of 1,063,336 deaths (28), based on their analysis of a minimum of eight different mortality estimates for the relevant period.
125.          Ibid, see esp. 30–33.
126.          Christian Davenport and Allan C. Stam, “What Really Happened in Rwanda?” Miller-McCune, October 6, 2009,
127.          In 1999, former RPF military officer Christophe Hakizimana submitted a letter to the UN Commission of Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Ingvar Carlsson et al.), which detailed the RPF’s military strategy from 1990 on. In his letter, Hakizimana claimed that the RPF was responsible for killing as many as two million Hutu in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and he informed the Commission that by indicting Hutu, the ICTR was focusing on the wrong side in the conflict. We base this on personal communications with the international criminal lawyer Christopher Black of Toronto, who, since 2000, has served as defense counsel before the ICTR on behalf of the Hutu General Augustin Nindiliyimana, a former Chief of Staff of the Rwanda Gendarmerie (or National Police).
128.          For a more critical discussion of these issues, see Stam, “Coming to a New Understanding of the Rwanda Genocide,” and our discussion of this above.
129.          See Davenport and Stam, Rwandan Political Violence in Space and Time. Davenport and Stam organize their work according to three “jurisdictions” that we find deeply flawed: Namely, territory controlled by the Rwandan government and army, by the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and territory that falls along the lines of battle between the two. They write that “the actor with the greatest monopoly of coercion within a specific locale is generally held to be responsible for violent behavior in that locale” (25). (Also see Figure 1, “1994 Rwandan Political Violence: Total Deaths by Troop Control,” 29.) On the basis of this problematic assumption, Davenport and Stam contend that as “the majority of deaths took place within areas under the control of [the Rwandan government and army]—totaling 891,295”—the government and army are responsible for these deaths, which “could be classified” as genocide, among other possible crimes (28). But as the RPF in fact moved rapidly and decisively from battlefield success to control of the entire country, it is frankly counterintuitive to treat the badly out-gunned, out-maneuvered, and ultimately routed government forces as in control of anything. On the contrary, the chief responsibility for Rwandan political violence in 1994 lay with the RPF and its project of driving the coalition government from power and seizing the Rwandan state.
130.          Davenport and Stam, “What Really Happened in Rwanda?”
131.          Affidavit of Michael Andrew Hourigan, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, November 27, 2006, For other sources that discuss the suppression of the Hourigan memorandum, see Robin Philpot, Rwanda 1994, esp. Chap. 6, “It shall be called a plan crash”; Mark Colvin, “Questions unanswered 10 years after Rwandan genocide,” PM, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, March 30, 2004,; Mark Doyle, “Rwanda ‘plane crash halted,’” BBC News, February 9, 2007,; and Nick McKenzie, “UN ‘shut down’ Rwanda probe,” The Age, February 10, 2007,
132.          Richard Goldstone’s remarks were reported by the Danish newspaper Berlingske Tidende. We are taking them from “ICTR/Attack—April 6th 1994 Attack Fits the ICTR’s Mandate (Goldstone),” Hirondelle News Agency, December 13, 2006.
133.          See Philpot, Rwanda 1994, Chap. 6, “It shall be called a plane crash.”
134.          See Jean-Louis Bruguière, Request for the Issuance of International Arrest Warrants, Tribunal de Grande Instance, Paris, France, November 21, 2006, 15-16 (para. 100–103),
135.          Andrew England, “Rwanda president faces arrest,” Financial Times, November 22, 2006; Chris McGreal, “French judge accuses Rwandan President of assassination,” The Guardian, November 22, 2006; Fergal Keane, “Will we ever learn the truth about this genocide?” The Independent, November 22, 2006.
136.          Findings based on both Factiva (tnwp) and NewsBank searches from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2008. The sole truly serious effort in a U.S. newspaper to report and analyze both Michael Hourigan’s and Judge Bruguière’s work was Sebastian Rotella, “French Magistrate Posits Theory on Rwandan Assassination,” Los Angeles Times, February 17, 2007 (later reprinted in the Seattle Times).
137.          Findings based on both Factiva (tnwp) and NewsBank searches from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2008. Using the Factiva database to search the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post for mentions of the name “Bruguière,” we found approximately one hundred items; but when we narrowed this search down to Bruguière’s work in relation to Rwanda, we found only five items in all. Likewise with the NewsBank database for all U.S. newspapers: Bruguière’s work was reported in well over four hundred items, but his work in relation to Rwanda in only seventeen.
138.          Carla Del Ponte, with Chuck Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations with Humanity’s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity: A Memoir (New York: Other Press, 2009), esp. Chap. 9, “Confronting Kigali: 2002 and 2003,” 223–241. Also see Steven Edwards, “Del Ponte says UN caved to Rwandan pressure,” National Post, September 17, 2003.
139.          “Interview with Carla Del Ponte—‘If I Had Had the Choice, I Would Have Remained Prosecutor of the ICTR,’” Hirondelle News Agency, September 16, 2003.
140.          See Florence Hartmann, Paix et Chatiment: Les Guerres Secretes de la Politique et de la Justice Internationales (Paris: Flammarion, 2007), 261–275.
141.          “ICTR/Military I—Dallaire Wanted Americans to Investigate on Presidential Plane Crash,” Hirondelle News Agency, February 9, 2004. In one illustration of Jallow’s foot-dragging, he told the UN Security Council in December 2005 that the “allegations made against the Rwandan Patriotic Front have also been under consideration. Following the evaluation of the results of earlier investigations, it has become necessary to carry out additional inquiries into these allegations.” (UN Security Council (S/PV.5328), December 15, 2005, 14.) But Jallow’s “additional inquiries” were strictly pro forma, and the same delaying tactics served him through the end of 2008, at which date, no member of the RPF had ever been indicted by the ICTR, notwithstanding the chief prosecutor’s “additional inquiries.”
142.          For the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s founding Statute, see the Annex to UN Security Council Resolution 955 (S/RES/955), November 8, 1994, basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf. For a complete list of every case ever to have been indicted by the ICTR, see “Status of Cases,”
143.          Philip Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), 225. Gourevitch concludes: “Kagame had proven himself quite effective at getting what he wanted, and if Kagame truly wanted to find an original response to his original circumstances, the only course open to him was emancipation. That was certainly how he presented it, and I didn’t doubt that that was what he wanted” (226).
144.          Stephen Kinzer, A Thousand Hills: Rwanda’s Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008). Here we are quoting Kinzer’s own words from a two-minute promotional video that his publisher circulated in 2008. At the hagiographic extreme for the literature on Paul Kagame and Rwanda, every chapter of Kinzer’s book is introduced by quotes from Kagame (“For me, human rights is about everything,” Chap. 18). “Kagame is the man of the hour in modern Africa,” Kinzer writes. ”The eyes of all who hope for a better Africa are upon him. No other leader has made so much out of so little, and none offers such encouraging hope for the continent’s future” (337).
145.          Power, “A Problem from Hell,” 334–335. Also see Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” The Atlantic, September, 2001.
146.          See the statement by the Rwandan UN Ambassador Jean-Damascène Bizimana in n. 119, above.
147.          See Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (S/1994/470), April 20, 1994, specifically “Alternative 1,” para. 13-14, which Boutros-Ghali himself endorsed.
148.          Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished: A U.S.–U.N. Saga (New York: Random House, 1999), 129-141. According to Robin Philpot, Boutros-Ghali told him on the record that “The genocide in Rwanda was 100 percent the responsibility of the Americans!” See the Introduction to Philpot, Rwanda 1994.
149.          See Herman, Peterson, and Szamuely, “Human Rights Watch in Service to the War Party,” 02/human_rights_watch_in_service.html.
150.          See Report of the International Commission of Inquiry into human rights violations in Rwanda since October 1, 1990 (New York, March, 1993). Besides Africa Watch (Human Rights Watch, USA), the other NGOs behind this commission were the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (France), the Inter-African Union for Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, and the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada).
151.          Ibid. In a section titled “The Question of Genocide,” after laying out Article II of the Genocide Convention, the Commission concluded that “many Rwandans have been killed for the sole reason that they were Tutsi,” although it added that “casualty figures ... may be below the threshold required to establish genocide” (29). Besides Africa Watch (Human Rights Watch, USA), the other NGOs behind this commission were the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (France), the Inter-African Union for Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, and the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development (Canada).
152.          Des Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story,” 93.
153.          Philpot, Rwanda 1994, Chap. 4, “Scouts at Her Majesty’s Service.”
154.          Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (New York: Zed Books, 2000), 56.
155.          “Rwanda: Report blames government for mass slayings,” Inter Press Service, March 8, 1993.
156.          See n. 78, above.
157.          Filip Reyntjens’ January 11, 2005 letter of resignation to Hassan Jallow is quoted in John Laughland, A History of Political Trials: From Charles I to Saddam Hussein (New York: Peter Lang Ltd., 2008), 211. The Reyntjens letter continued: “Article 6(2) of the [ICTR’s] Statute explicitly rules out immunity, including for Heads of state or government or for responsible government officials. This principle is contravened when, as is currently the case, a message is sent out that those in power need not fear prosecution” (211–212).
158.          The phrase “one tsunami every six months” was used in reference to the eastern Congo by then-head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland, based on the belief at the time that the December 26, 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean had taken 300,000 lives. Hence, in Egeland’s words: “In terms of the human lives lost ... this is the greatest humanitarian crisis in the world today and it is beyond belief that the world is not paying more attention.” In Robert Evans, “UN Sees East Congo as Worse Crisis Than Darfur,” Reuters-AlertNet, March 16, 2005.
159.          See the final two reports by Mahmoud Kassem et al. of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: S/2002/1146, October 8, 2002 (para. 152-153, 12); and S/2003/1027, October 15, 2003. Also see Björn Aust and Willem Jaspers, From Resource War to “Violent Peace”: Transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper No. 50, 2006. These authors note that approximately one-third of the earth’s known cobalt deposits, and two-thirds of its known columbo tantalite (coltan) deposits, are to be found in the DRC (Appendix 2, 149).
160.          See Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, Updated Ed., 1999), esp. Chap. 5, “Peace for Galilee,” 181–328.
161.          Amnon Kapeliouk, Sabra and Shatila: Inquiry into a Massacre, Trans. Khalil Jahshan (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1984), 8.
162.          Ibid, 12, 14, 16.
163.          Ibid, 23, 30–31, 86. Israel’s official Report of the Israeli Commission of Inquiry (Kahan Commission) estimated upwards of eight hundred Palestinians massacred in the two refugee camps. See “Excerpts from Report on Israel’s Responsibility in Massacre,” New York Times, February 9, 1983. Kapeliouk estimated that “Between 3,000-3,500 men, women and children were massacred within 48 hours between September 16 and 18, 1982,” of which “approximately one-fourth of the victims were Lebanese, and the rest Palestinians” (63). For more on the Kahan Commission’s whitewash of the massacre, see n. 166, below.
164.          For Table 3, Rows 1–13, the parameters we used for our Factiva database searches were:
Row 1: rst=tnwp and (Mozote w/5 massacre)
Row 1: rst=tnwp and (Mozote w/10 genocid*)
Row 2: rst=tnwp and (Rio Negro w/5 massacre)
Row 2: rst=tnwp and (Rio Negro w/10 genocid*)
Row 3: rst=tnwp and ((Sabra or Shatila) w/5 massacre)
Row 3: rst=tnwp and (Sabra or Shatila) w/10 genocid*)
Row 4: rst=tnwp and (Halabja w/5 massacre)
Row 4: rst=tnwp and (Halabja w/10 genocid*)
Row 5: rst=tnwp and (Bosnia and (market* w/5 massacre))
Row 5: rst=tnwp and (Bosnia and (market* w/10 genocid*))
Row 6: rst=tnwp and (Srebrenica w/5 massacre)
Row 6: rst=tnwp and (Srebrenica w/10 genocid*)
Row 7: rst=tnwp and ((Operation Storm or Krajina) w/5 massacre)
Row 7: rst=tnwp and ((Operation Storm or Krajina) w/10 genocid*)
Row 8: rst=tnwp and (Račak w/5 massacre)
Row 8: rst=tnwp and (Račak w/10 genocid*)
Row 9: rst=tnwp and (Liquiçá w/5 massacre)
Row 9: rst=tnwp and (Liquiçá w/10 genocid*)
Row 10: rst=tnwp and (Dasht w/5 massacre)
Row 10: rst=tnwp and (Dasht w/10 genocid*)
Row 11: rst=tnwp and (Falluja* w/5 massacre)
Row 11: rst=tnwp and (Falluja* w/10 genocid*)
Row 12: rst=tnwp and (Gaza w/5 massacre)
Row 12: rst=tnwp and (Gaza w/10 genocid*) [checked carefully]
165.          “Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was quoted today as saying that his group was sending personnel and weapons back into southern Lebanon. ‘We have the right after Sabra and Shatila and other genocides to help our people protect themselves, and to help the Lebanese people protect themselves’, the English-language newspaper Arab News quoted Mr. Arafat as saying in an interview. ‘So it is our duty and right’.” (“PLO Sends Arms, Arafat Says,” AP, New York Times, July 27, 1985. This AP report was also printed in the Toronto Globe and Mail, July 27, 1985.)
166.          As Noam Chomsky has written: “[T]he Commission presents sufficient evidence that the top [Israeli] leadership fully expected a massacre when they sent the Phalange into the camps. They justified entry into West Beirut as an effort to prevent a Phalange massacre, and then proceeded to send the Phalange into the homes of their worst enemies—but with no intent to harm the population, the Commission ‘asserts’ without equivocation. Again, one can only conclude that the Report is designed for true believers, not for people capable of independent thought.” Fateful Triangle, 397-410.
167.          See the Judgment, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33-T), August 2, 2001, para. 590.
168.          See UN General Assembly Resolution 37/123 (A/RES/37/123), Section D, para. 2, December 16, 1982. But as the Israeli novelist Yitzhar Smilanski wrote at the time: “We have released famished lions into the arena. They devoured the people, therefore, the lions are the guilty party.”
169.          Jacques Clement, “‘Ten times worse than an earthquake’ in Gaza,” Agence France Presse, January 19, 2009.
170.          Gaza: 1.5 million people trapped in despair, International Committee of the Red Cross, June 29, 2009, eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/palestine-report-260609/$File/gazareport-ICRC-eng.pdf.
171.          John Dugard et al., No Safe Place, Report of the Independent Fact Finding Committee On Gaza, League of Arab States, April 30, 2009, NAL.pdf. Also see Israel/Gaza: Operation “Cast Lead”: 22 days of death and destruction, Amnesty International, July, 2009, en/8f299083-9a74-4853-860f-0563725e633a/mde150152009en.pdf.
172.          See “UN urged to ‘find truth’ about Gaza conflict,” Amnesty International, March 16, 2009; and Amira Hass, “Judges, scholars call on UN to probe war crimes by both sides in Gaza,” Haaretz, March 20, 2009. Among this open letter’s signatories were Amnesty International, South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Irish former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, and the South African judge Richard Goldstone.
173.          Ban Ki-moon, Letter dated 4 May 2009 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council: Summary by the Secretary-General of the report of the United Nations Headquarters Board of Inquiry into certain incidents in the Gaza Strip between 27 December 2008 and 19 January 2009, (A/63/855–S/2009/250), 2. Also see “Beholden to the Big Powers: Israel, Gaza and the UN,” Media Lens (U.K.), May 18, 2009,
174.          Ben Smith, “Obama-era goodwill for Rice at U.N.,”, April 4, 2009. In Susan Rice’s words, by rejoining the Human Rights Council, “We are much better placed to be fighting for the principles we believe in—protection of human rights universally, fighting against the anti-Israel crap and for meaningful action on issues that we care about and ought to be the top of the agenda, things like Zimbabwe, Sudan [and] Burma.”
175.          “Recognizing Israel’s right to defend itself against attacks from Gaza, reaffirming the United States’ strong support for Israel, and supporting the Israel–Palestinian peace process” (H.Res. 34), U.S. House of Representatives, January 9, 2009. For the comments made from the floor of the U.S. Senate, see the Congressional Record, January 8, 2009, S181ff. For Barack Obama’s remarks, “President Obama Delivers Remarks to State Department Employees,” Washington Post, January 22, 2009.
176.          Richard Falk, “Gaza: Silence is Not an Option,” United Nations Press Release, Geneva, December 9, 2008.
177.          For a discussion of recent Israeli practices through the first quarter of 2008, see Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “Principles of the Imperial New World Order,” Electric Politics, May 1, 2008, For the remarks by Cardinal Renato Martino, see ”Vatican deplores Gaza situation,” BBC News, January 8, 2009.
178.          Richard Falk, “Statement of the Special Rapporteur for the Palestinian Territories ... ,” UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, January 9, 2009; “Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza civilian areas,” Amnesty International, January 19, 2009; and Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories: The conflict in Gaza: A briefing on applicable law, investigations and accountability, Amnesty International, January 19, 2009.
179.          “The grave violations of human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ...” (A/HRC/S-9/L.1), UN Human Rights Council, Geneva, January 12, 2009. The vote was thirty-three in favor, one against (Canada), and thirteen abstentions.
180.          For four analyses of the Israelis’ wholesale slaughter of the Gaza Palestinians, see Noam Chomsky, “‘Exterminate all the Brutes’: Gaza 2009,” ChomskyInfo, January 19, 2009,; Norman Finkelstein, “Behind the Bloodbath in Gaza: Foiling Another Palestinian ‘Peace Initiative,’” CounterPunch, January 28, 2009; Henry Siegman, “Israel’s Lies,” London Review of Books, January 29, 2009; and Michael Mandel, “Self-Defense Against Peace,” CounterPunch, February 5, 2009.
181.          2005 World Summit Outcome (A/60/L.1), UN General Assembly, September 15, 2005,, para. 138–140.
182.          “Civilians in armed conflict,” First Session (S/PV.6066) and Second Session (S/PV.6066 Resumption 1), January 14, 2009. In Egyptian Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz’s words: “[Egypt] believes that the Security Council has a great responsibility to impose the international will represented in its resolutions and statements ... and provide international protection through a protection force for the Palestinian people, in implementation of the principle of the responsibility to protect. Some seek to apply that principle to specific countries, while bypassing others toiling under brutal occupation and confronting ferocious aggression without any international force to protect them” (Second Session, 31).
183.          “The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect: A Background Note,” Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, City University of New York, August 19, 2008.
184.          Factiva database search carried out under both “Wires” (twir) and “Newspapers: All” (tnwp) categories for the twenty-three day period from December 27, 2008 through January 18, 2009. Exact search parameters were: rst=(twir or tnwp) and (responsibility to protect or r2p) and gaza.
185.          See Richard Goldstone et al., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (A/HRC/12/48), UN Human Rights Council, September 15, 2009,
186.          Louis Charbonneau, “U.S. doubts UN report on possible Israel war crimes,” Reuters, September 17, 2009.
187.          Goldstone et al., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, para. 1677–1692.
188.          Achim Steiner et al., Environmental Assessment of the Gaza Strip Following the Escalation of Hostilities in December 2008–January 2009, UN Environment Program (Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme, September, 2009), 3, 55–60, 70–71,
189.          Herb Keinon and E.B. Solomont, “PM appeals to world leaders to reject Goldstone findings,” Jerusalem Post, September 17, 2009. Similarly, the Israeli political leadership spoke in a single voice of Israel’s right and of the right of “all democracies” to defend themselves against terrorism, and of how the world “should be worried that [the Goldstone] report throws out the narrative of democracies fighting terrorists, and embraces the idea that terrorists are freedom fighters entitled to act the way they do” (the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Simona Halperin).
190.          Benjamin Netanyahu, Address before the General Debate of the 64th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, September 24, 2009.
191.          Benjamin Netanyahu, Terrorism: How the West Can Win (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1986), 9.
192.          “Peres: Goldstone report mocks history,” UPI News Tracker, September 16, 2009; Alan M. Dershowitz, “UN Investigation of Israel Discredits Itself and Undercuts Human Rights,” Huffington Post, September 18, 2009; and Gerald M. Steinberg, “U.N. Smears Israeli Self-Defense As ‘War Crimes,’” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2009.
193.          Goldstone et al., Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, para. 1766. The Commission made exactly the same recommendation with regard to the Gaza Palestinian leadership.
194.          See “Why No Justice in Gaza? Israel Is Different, and so ... ,” Human Rights Watch, October 1, 2009; “UN: US Block on Goldstone Report Must Not Defer Justice,” Human Rights Watch, October 2, 2009; and “UN rights body defers vote on Gaza war crime report,” Reuters, October 2, 2009.
195.          See, e.g., Tim Ripley, Operation Deliberate Force: the UN and NATO Campaign in Bosnia 1995 (Lancaster: Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, 1999), pp. 177–200, esp. the maps detailing the large, simultaneous, and clearly coordinated Croat and Bosnian Muslim offensives against the Krajina’s ethnic Serb population (186–189); and Ken Silverstein, Private Warriors (New York: Verso, 2000), esp. Chap. 4, “Mercenary, Inc.,” 171–175.
196.          See “The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (S/PV.3564), UN Security Council, August 10, 1995, 6–7; and “Croatia” (S/PV.3563), UN Security Council, August 10, 1995, 20.
197.          See the Judgment, Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33-T), August 2, 2001, para. 589.
198.          Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina et al. (IT-06-90), June 23, 2008, 4937, lines 1-8; 4939, lines 13–14.
199.          “U.S. rejects British claim of Croat ethnic cleansing,” Reuters, August 8, 1995, citing Galbraith’s comments over BBC Radio.
200.          See Edward S. Herman, “Why the ‘International Community’ Does Not Deal with the Huge Dasht-e-Leili Massacre,” ZNet, April 7, 2004,
201.          Babak Dehghanpisheh et al., “The Death Convoy of Afghanistan,” Newsweek, August 26, 2002.
202.          Kathy Gannon, “Group: Mass Graves in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, May 1, 2002; Carlotta Gall, “Study Hints at Mass Killing of the Taliban,” New York Times, May 1, 2002; and “Physicians for Human Rights Calls for End to Stalling of Investigation into Afghan Mass Graves,” News Release, August 18, 2002.
203.          “Statement by Frank Donahue, CEO, on Dasht-e-Leili Mass Grave in Afghanistan,” Physicians for Human Rights, December 11, 2008; Tom Lasseter, “Mass graves still unguarded as U.S., UN, Afghans duck task,” McClatchy Newspapers, December 18, 2008.
204.          See James Risen, “U.S. Inaction Seen After Taliban P.O.W.s Died,” New York Times, July 11, 2009; and “The Truth About Dasht-i-Leili,” Editorial, New York Times, July 14, 2009.
205.          See John F. Burns, “Foreign Prisoners Becoming a Problem for Karzai,” New York Times, August 23, 2002; and John F. Burns, “Political Realities Impeding Full Inquiry Into Afghan Atrocity,” New York Times, August 29, 2002.
206.          “The Truth About Dasht-i-Leili,” Editorial, New York Times, July 14, 2009.
207.          John F. Burns, “Political Realities Impeding Full Inquiry Into Afghan Atrocity,” New York Times, August 29, 2002. “Shibarghan” refers to a prison in northern Afghanistan to and from which the captured enemies of the U.S.–led forces were transported in airtight shipping containers in which several thousand are believed to have died.
208.          See the entries for Turkey in the annual Human Rights Watch World Reports dating back as far as HRW’s electronic archives run,
209.          See, e.g., John Tirman, Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America’s Arms Trade (New York: The Free Press, 1997), Chap. 23, “The Terrible Reckoning,” 254-278. We differ with Tirman in this respect: That we believe the U.S. policymaking elite is second-to-none in regarding military aid (arms sales, training, “interoperability”) as the “fulcrum, the sine qua non,” of the U.S. link to foreign governments. Indeed, it is hardly an afterthought when the “arrival of shiny hightech weapons, the conveyance of case, the primary of military-to-military lines in the bilateral relationship—all bolster the military elites, enabling them to exert more political power, draw on more national resources, and, of course, shape national policy.” Washington gets what it pays-for. (Cf. Chap. 24, “The Moral Equation,” 279–287.)
210.          Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 2002), xxi.
211.          Factiva database searches carried out under the “Wires” (twir) and “Newspapers: All” (tnwp) categories for the years 1984-2008; searches performed on January 26, 2009. We used the database operators w/5 and * to capture all variations of words occurring anywhere within five words of the other primary search terms; and we used the limiter not to exclude all items that also mentioned any one or more of the other search terms. The exact search parameters were:
(1) rst=(twir or tnwp) and Turkey and (Kurd* w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Vietnam or Armen*) : 20
(2) rst=(twir or tnwp) and Turkey and (Armen* w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Iraq or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Vietnam or Kurd*) : 9,627
(3) rst=(twir or tnwp) and Iraq and (Kurd* w/5 genocid*) not (Afghanistan or Bosnia or Burundi or Cambodia or Congo or Darfur or East Timor or Ethiopia or Guatemala or Indonesia or Kosovo or Rwanda or Sudan or Turkey or Vietnam or Armen*) : 296.
212.          John Pilger, “Land of the Dead,” The Nation, April 25, 1994.
213.          Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place (New York: Little Brown, 1978), 247.
214.          See Chomsky and Herman, The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism, Sect. 3.4.4, “East Timor: Genocide on the Sly,” 129–204.
215.          Henry Kamm, “The Silent Suffering of East Timor,” New York Times Magazine, February 15, 1981; Henry Kamm, “Post-Colonial Oppressors,” New York Times Book Review, January 11, 1987.
216.          See Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “How the New York Times Protects Indonesia Terror in East Timor,” Z Magazine, July, 1999,; and “East Timor: From Humanitarian Bombing to Inhumane Appeasement,” Covert Action Quarterly, Fall/Winter 1999, No. 68,
217.          See Richard Lloyd Parry, “Timor’s fear of Jakarta troops,” The Independent, October 9, 1998; Richard Lloyd Parry, “Troops sent in despite promises,” The Independent, October 24, 1998; and Richard Lloyd Parry, “Timor military retreat ‘a sham,’” The Independent, October 30, 1998.
218.          Allan Nairn, “License to Kill in Timor,” The Nation, May 31, 1999.
219.          See “Unlawful Killings and Enforced Disappearances,” para. 774–778, a section of Chap. 2 of the larger Chega! Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor, International Center for Transitional Justice, January 30, 2006, For the higher estimates, see Lindsay Murdoch, “Horror Lives On For Town Of Liquiçá,” Sydney Morning Herald, April 8, 2000; and Barry Wain, “Will Justice Be Served in East Timor?” Wall Street Journal, April 14, 2000.
220.          Allan Nairn, “U.S. Complicity in Timor,” The Nation, September 27, 1999.
221.          Jose Ramos-Horta, “Yes to Kosovo, No to East Timor?” International Herald Tribune, April 29, 1999.
222.          Belisario Betancur et al., From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador. Report of the Commission for Truth of El Salvador, March, 1993, Part IV, “Cases and Patterns of Violence,” Section C, “Massacres of Peasants by Armed Forces,” specifically “El Mozote 1981,” 993_toc.html%20.
223.          Christian Tomuschat et al., Guatemala: Memory of Silence: Report of the Commission for Historical Clarification (Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, February 1999), specifically the “Conclusions,” para. 86, and “Map: Number of Massacres by Department,”
224.          Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, Chap. 3, “Legitimizing versus meaningless Third World Elections: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua,” 87-142. The authors conclude with the “tentative generalization that the U.S. mass media will always find a Third World election sponsored by their own government a ‘step toward democracy’, and an election held in a country that their government is busily destabilizing a farce and a sham”—in short, “what a propaganda model would predict” (141).
225.          See Raymond Bonner, Weakness and Deceit: U.S. Policy and El Salvador (New York: Times Books, 1984).
226.          “[T]he vaunted Col. Domingo Monterrosa ordered the attack in El Mozote, which [former Salvadoran soldier] Salgada said he now considers ‘a genocide.’” (Washington Post, January 29, 2007.)
227.          Tomuschat, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, specifically “Conclusions,” para. 120, 122.
228.          Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, Ch. 2, “Worthy and Unworthy Victims,” 37-86; esp. 71–79.
229.          AP, “Mutilated Bodies Found After Serb Attack,” New York Times, January 17, 1999; Juliet Terzieff, “Kosovo Serbs massacre 45 villagers,” Sunday Times (U.K.), January 17, 1999; Guy Dinmore, “Villagers Slaughtered in Kosovo ‘Atrocity,’” Washington Post, January 17, 1999.
230.          Barton Gellman, “The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Its Allies Went to War,” Washington Post, April 18, 1999.
231.          The Kosovo Verification Mission was created by the agreement between Belgrade and NATO special representative Richard Holbrooke in October 1998, and called for up to 2,000 unarmed monitors to operate inside Kosovo to verify Serbian compliance with a cease-fire and partial withdrawal of Serbian troops from the province. But as a Swiss member of the mission later told the Swiss journal La Liberté: “We understood from the start that information gathered by OSCE patrols during our missions was destined to complete the information that NATO had gathered by satellite. We had the very sharp impression of doing espionage work for the Atlantic Alliance.” See Diana Johnstone, “Humanitarian War: Making the Crime Fit the Punishment,” in Tariq Ali, ed., Masters of the Universe: NATO’s Balkans Crusade (New York: Verso, 2000), 162.
232.          According to Michael Mandel, William Walker’s “unsavory missions” in the 1980s included activities to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua that led to his being a “‘subject of investigation’ in the Iran/Contra Affair for his involvement with Oliver North....” (How America Gets Away With Murder, 77, and n. 98, 267.)
233.          Lee Hockstader, “Our Man in El Salvador,” Washington Post, December 19, 1989; Elizabeth Shogren, “William Walker, once criticized for his inaction in El Salvador, is treated like a hero by ethnic Albanian refugees,” Los Angeles Times, April 14, 1999.
234.          See our treatment of the “Račak Massacre” in Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, “CNN: Selling NATO’s War Globally,” in Hammond and Herman, Degraded Capability, 111–122, esp. 117–119. (Also posted at
235.          This account draws in part on the personal statement issued by the Finnish pathologist Helena Ranta on March 17, 1999, in conjunction with the release of the Report of the EU Forensic Team on the Račak Incident. Ranta participated in the Team’s work in performing the autopsies. Her statement appears in Marc Weller, ed., The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999 (Cambridge, U.K.: Documents & Analysis Publishing, Ltd., 1999), 333–335.
236.          “Forty-five slain in Kosovo massacre,” Agence France Presse, January 16, 1999. A flattering profile of William Walker on ABC–TV’s Nightline called him a “Man With a Mission” (January 29, 1999).
237.          Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989–1999, 291.
238.          “Forensic expert says she was told to blame Serbs for Račak killings,” Agence France Presse, October 22, 2008. The biography reported here is by Kaius Niemi, and titled “Helena Ranta, Human Mark.”
239.          Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, 73.
240.          See J. Rainio et al., “Independent forensic autopsies in an armed conflict: investigation of the victims from Račak, Kosovo,” Forensic Science International, Vol. 116, No. 2, 2001, 171–185, 003923/abstract.
241.          Ibid, Table 3, Principal Findings, 179.
242.          Rainio et al. clearly distinguish between cause of death (i.e., in the present cases, gunshot wounds) and manner of death, i.e., combatant versus noncombatant, or deaths occurring in battle and executionstyle deaths. Only execution-style death qualifies for inclusion in the “massacre” model.
243.          Ibid, 180, 183.
244.          For some additional sources, see “Forensic Institute Says No Evidence Kosovo Albanians Massacred,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,” February 18, 1999; “Prosecutor Says No Reason to Charge Police Involved in Attack in Kosovo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 12, 1999; “Finnish autopsies on Račak massacre are inconclusive: report,” Agence France Presse, March 17, 1999; and “Yugoslav Forensic Experts Say ‘No Massacre’ in Kosovo,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 18, 1999; and Julius Strauss, “Kosovo killings inquiry verdict sparks outrage,” Daily Telegraph, March 18, 1999.
245.          “Clinton Voices Anger and Compassion at Serbian Intransigence on Kosovo,” New York Times, March 20, 1999.
246.          Prosecutor Against Slobodan Milosevic et al. (IT-99-37), May 22, 1999. See Schedule A: “Persons Known by Name Killed at Račak—15 January, 1999.” The very next incident covered by the Initial Indictment for Kosovo, listed in Schedule B, occurred at Bela Crkva, and was dated March 25, 1999—one day after NATO launched Operation Allied Force on March 24.
247.          Holding our media universe constant for the nineteen-year period from 1990 through 2008, we find that in 1990 forms of the word “genocide” appeared in 1,352 different items. But by 1999, usage of the word had increased by 252% (4,758 items), and by 2006, the highwatermark for “genocide” usage through 2008, it had increased by 297% (5,369 items). Factiva database searches on a year-by-year basis, using the parameters: rst=(nytf or j or wp or usat or atjc or bstngb or sfc or dal or grdn or ob or ind or indos or t or st or ec or smhh or glob or tor or lba) and genocid*.
248.          Herman and Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent, xxi.
249.          A search of the UN News Center’s database for reports that mentioned Darfur and reports that mentioned Iraq during the five year period from 2004 through 2008 found that whereas Darfur was mentioned in 1,711 different UN News Center reports, Iraq was mentioned in 1,555—10% fewer than Darfur. In short, the UN’s subservience to the United States succeeded in channeling its attention toward Darfur, crowding out the conflicts and crises caused by the U.S. war and occupation of a sovereign country, in unambiguous violation of both the letter and the spirit of the United Nations’ primary reason-for-being.
250.          Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor’s Statement on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest under Article 58 Against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, International Criminal Court, The Hague, 2, 14-ENG.pdf; also see the accompanying Press Release, July 14, 2008,
251.          For example: “[T]he clearest assertion that in the 21st century, mass murder is no longer a ruler’s prerogative” (Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, February 26, 2009); “[A]n important declaration to the world that no person, no matter how powerful, is immune from the reach of justice in the 21st century” (Lloyd Axworthy, former Foreign Minister of Canada, Toronto Globe and Mail, March 4, 2009); “Not even presidents are guaranteed a free pass for horrific crimes” (Richard Dicker, International Justice Program Director, Human Rights Watch, March 4, 2009); “This announcement is an important signal—both for Darfur and the rest of the world—that suspected human rights violators will face trial, no matter how powerful they are” (Irene Khan, Secretary General, Amnesty International, March 4, 2009); “[I]t tells the 300,000 brutally killed and 2.5 million displaced and raped and maimed that justice must always prevail. That the rest of the world sees their struggle and stands up and demands justice” (George Clooney, Hollywood actor and UN Messenger for Peace, The Daily Beast, March 4, 2009); “[T]he message for tyrants the world over must be that they cannot evade justice forever” (The Times of London, March 5, 2009); “There can be no impunity for such atrocities.... Any country that continues to enable Mr. Bashir should be branded as an accomplice to his many horrors” (New York Times, March 7, 2009).
252.          See Tsegaye Tadesse, “ICC genocide charge sought for Sudan’s Bashir,” Reuters, July 7, 2009. On July 3, citing its unhappiness with the UN Security Council’s refusal “to defer the proceedings against al-Bashir,” the African Union issued a declaration stating that “the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities, for the arrest and surrender of President Bashir.” Coming only four days later, Moreno-Ocampo’s call for the ICC to re-hear his evidence for the “genocide” count against al-Bashir showed the politicization of the ICC once again.
253.          Judge Akua Kuenyehia et al., The Case of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), International Criminal Court, The Hague, March 4, 2009, para. 40, 42,
254.          “[T]he Chamber observes that, ... article 27(1) and (2) of the [Rome] Statute provide for the following core principles: (i) ‘This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity’; (ii) ‘... official capacity ... shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute ...’.” Ibid, para. 43.
255.          Kofi Annan, “Statement by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan,” July 18, 1998.
256.          See the Rome Statute,
257.          See the website of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC, Through 2009, the plans were to base the ICC’s definition of aggression on the UN General Assembly’s definition of December 14, 1974 (A/RES/3314—see the Annex). In brief, while excluding acts of terrorism carried out by non-state actors, the proposed definition would include “invasion, attacking another State, or the military occupation of another State, however temporary,” as well as “bombardments against another State, carrying out blockades, allowing another State to perpetrate acts of aggression against a third State, or sending armed bands to carry out grave acts against other States.” See “Press Conference on Special Working Group on Crime of Aggression,” UN Department of Public Information, February 13, 2009, However, we strongly suspect that this Working Group’s mission will remain unfulfilled. Or, even if it were to succeed, the new prohibition would be implemented in as selective and discriminatory a fashion as are the rest of the Rome Statute’s laws today.
258.          Michael Mandel, How America Gets Away With Murder, 207–208.
259.          Ibid, 208–209. The phrase “standing tribunal that could be activated immediately” derives from David J. Scheffer, the Clinton Administration’s Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes and the chief U.S. negotiator at the Rome Conference, “The United States and the International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, 1999.
260.          See UN Security Council Resolution 1593 (S/RES/1593), March 31, 2005.
261.          See “State Parties to the Rome Statute,” International Criminal Court, Other noteworthy non-States Parties as of mid-2009 included China, Russia, India, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Rwanda, and the Sudan—the Sudan’s case only having been placed under the ICC’s jurisdiction through a referral by the Security Council.
262.          Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Correspondence dated February 9, 2006, senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf.
263.          See Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY, June, 2000, para. 90,
264.          See Louise Arbour, Prosecutor of the Tribunal Against Slobodan Milosevic et al. (IT-99-37), Schedules A–G, May 22, 1999, These schedules list the names of 344 dead Kosovo Albanians whom, in this particular case, constituted a sufficient “crime base” to bring the indictment. As noted, however, the deaths of only the forty-five persons named in Schedule A (“Račak,” January 15, 1999) date from prior to the start of NATO’s war. As we point out in our text, the “Račak Massacre” is almost surely mythical.
265.          “Press Conference Given by NATO Spokesman Jamie Shea, and SHAPE Spokesman, Major General Walter Jertz,” NATO HQ, Brussels, May 17, 1999,
266.          Conservative estimates of the number of Ugandans killed under the Idi Amin dictatorship (1971–1979) are 100,000 victims, with highend estimates of some 300,000. See Richard H. Ulmann, “Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States Versus Idi Amin,” Foreign Affairs, April, 1978. As Ulmann noted at the time, “In any contemporary lexicon of horror, Uganda is synonymous with statebecome-slaughterhouse.” This is manifestly not true of Rwanda or the Democratic Republic of Congo in the areas under Kagame-RPF control: No matter how many lives Kagame and the RFP have taken, and these number many times the Idi Amin toll, their reign of terror has never entered the contemporary lexicon of horror.
267.          See the verbatim record of the oral arguments by the U.S. legal representatives, Request for the indication of provisional measures, Yugoslavia v. United States of America, ICJ, 4:30 PM, May 12, 1999, para. 2.1–2.24, here para. 2.22,
268.          See Yugoslavia v. United States of America, June 2, 1999, para. 26–34, Each of the other nine cases (i.e., against Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) turned out the same.
269.          See the press release, “ICC issues a warrant of arrest for Omar Al Bashir, President of Sudan” (ICC-CPI-20090304-PR394), International Criminal Court, The Hague, March 4, 2009.
270.          We are referring to Samantha Power’s 2002 “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, awarded the 2003 Pulitzer Prize in the General Nonfiction category.

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