The Tonkin Gulf Narrative and Resolutions
I. PROLOGUE: ACTIONS AND
PROGRAMS UNDERWAY
Several forms of pressure were already being applied
against North Vietnam by July of 1964. Moreover, contingency plans for other
forms—should political and military circumstances warrant a decision to use
them—were continually being adjusted and modified as the situation in Southeast
Asia developed.
The best known of these pressures was being applied
in Laos. Since 21 May, U.S. aircraft had flown low-level reconnaissance
missions over communist-occupied areas. In early June Premier Souvanna Phouma
both gave and reaffirmed his permission for armed escort of these missions,
which included the right to retaliate against hostile fire from the ground.
This effort was supplemented at the end of the month when the United States
decided to conduct transport and night reconnaissance operations and furnish
additional T-28 aircraft and munitions to support a Royal Laotian
counteroffensive near Muong Soui. This decision came in response to Souvanna’s
request, in which he equated the protection of Muong Soui with the survival of
the Laotian neutralist army. Air strikes conducted by the Royal Lao Air Force,
with T-28s obtained from the United States, were later credited with playing a
major role in the success of the RLG’s operations. Other actions obviously
designed to forestall communist aggressive intentions were taken in different
parts of Southeast Asia. In June, following the Honolulu strategy conference.
State and Defense Department sources made repeated leaks to the press affirming
U.S. intentions to support its allies and uphold its treaty commitments in
Southeast Asia. U.S. contingency ground-force stockages in Thailand were
augmented and publicly acknowledged. Revelations were made that USAF aircraft
were operating out of a newly constructed air base at Da Nang. Moreover, the
base was characterized as part of a network of new air bases and operational
facilities being developed in South Vietnam and Thailand. On 10 July, the Da
Nang base was the site of a well-publicized Air Force Day display of allied
airpower, including aircraft from a B-57 wing recently acknowledged to have
been permanently deployed to the Philippines from Japan. Less known were
parallel actions taken within the Government. U.S. resolve to resist aggression
in Southeast Asia was communicated directly to North Vietnam by the newly
appointed Canadian member of the International Control Commission, Blair
Seaborn. Stressing that U.S. ambitions were limited and its intentions were “essentially
peaceful,” Seaborn told Pham Van Dong that the patience of the U.S. Government
was not limitless. He explained that the United States was fully aware of the
degree to which Hanoi controlled the Viet Cong insurgency and the Pathet Lao
and might be obliged to carry the war to the North if DRV-assisted pressures
against South Vietnam continued. He further cautioned that U.S. stakes in
resisting a North Vietnamese victory were high, since the United States saw the
conflict in Southeast Asia as part of a general confrontation with guerrilla
subversion in other parts of the world, and that “in the’ event of escalation
the greatest devastation would of course result for the DRVN itself.” Also
underway were efforts directed toward educating the American public regarding
our national interests in Southeast Asia and the extent of the U.S. commitment
there. In reporting to the President, Administration officials who participated
in the Honolulu Conference stressed the need for a domestic information effort
to “get at the basic doubts” of the importance of the U.S. stake ji in
Southeast Asia. The program was to be focused both on key members of the ( Congress
and on the public. Thereafter, work was begun under State Department guidance
to assemble information in answer to some of the prevalent public questions on
the U.S. involvement. Of special concern was a recent Gallup poll showing only
37 percent of the public to have some interest in our Southeast Asian
policies. Administration officials viewed this group as consisting primarily !
of either those desiring our withdrawal or those urging our striking at North Vietnam.
A general program was proposed with the avowed aims of eroding public support
for these polar positions and solidifying a large “center” behind the thrust of
current Administration policies. These aims were to be accomplished ! by
directing public comment into discussions of the precise alternatives available to the United States, greater exposure to which it was believed would
alienate both “hawk” and “dove” supporters. Less than a week after this
proposal was submitted, the White House published a NSAM, naming its proponent,
Robert Manning, as coordinator of all public information activities for
Southeast Asia and directing all agencies to cooperate in furthering the
Administration’s ini formation objectives. One of the principal foci of the
subsequent information program was the compilation of a pubhc pamphlet of
questions raised by critics of Administration policy together with answers
furnished and coordinated by 1 several interested Government agencies. Unknown to more than a limited number of Government officials were a ‘ variety
of covert military or quasi-military operations being conducted at the expense
of North Vietnam. U.S. naval forces had undertaken intermittent patrol operations
in the Gulf of Tonkin designed to acquire visual, electronic and photographic
intelligence on infiltration activities and coastal navigation from North
Vietnam to the South. To carry out these missions, destroyers were assigned to
tracks between fixed points and according to stipulated schedules. Designated DE
SOTO Patrols, the first such operation of 1964 occurred during the period 28
February-10 March. On this patrol the U.S.S. Craig was authorized to approach to
within 4 n.m. of the North Vietnamese mainland, 15 n.m. of the Chinese mainland
and 12 n.m. of Chinese-held islands. No incidents were reported as resulting
from this action. The next DE SOTO Patrol did not occur until 31 July, on which
the U.S.S. Maddox was restricted to a track not closer then 8 n.m. off the
North Vietnamese mainland. Its primary mission, assigned |on 17 July, was “to
determine DRV coastal activity along the full extent of the patrol track.”
Other specific intelligence requirements were assigned as follows: (a) location
and identification of all radar transmitters, and estimate of range
capabilities; (b) navigational and hydro information along the routes traversed
and particular navigational lights characteristics, landmarks, buoys, currents
and tidal information, river mouths and channel accessibility; (c) monitoring a
junk force with density of surface traffic pattern; (d) sampling electronic
environment radars and navigation aids; (e) photography of opportunities in
support of above....’ Separate coastal patrol operations were being conducted
by South Vietnamese naval forces. These were designed to uncover and interdict
efforts to smuggle personnel and supplies into the South in support of the VC insurgency.
This operation had first been organized with U.S. assistance in December 1961;
to support it a fleet of motorized junks was built, partially financed with
U.S. military assistance funds. During 1964 these vessels operated almost
continually in attempts to intercept communist seaborne logistical operations.
As Secretary McNamara told Senate committees: In the first seven months of this
year [1964], they have searched 149,000 junks, some 570,000 people. This is a
tremendous operation endeavoring to close the seacoasts of over 900 miles. In
the process of that action, as the junk patrol has increased in strength they
[sic] have moved farther and farther north endeavoring to find the source of
the infiltration. In addition to these acknowledged activities, the GVN was
also conducting a number of operations against North Vietnam to which it did
not publicly admit. Covert operations were carried out by South Vietnamese or
hired personnel and supported by U.S. training and logistical efforts. Outlined
within OPLAN 34A, these operations had been underway theoretically since
February but had experienced what the ICS called a “slow beginning.” Despite an
ultimate objective of helping “convince the North Vietnamese leadership that it
is in its own selfinterest to desist from its aggressive policies,” few
operations designed to harass the enemy were carried out successfully during
the February-May period. Nevertheless, citing DRV reactions tending “to
substantiate the premise that Hanoi is expending substantial resources in
defensive measures,” the ICS concluded that the potential of the OPLAN 3 4-A
program remained high and urged its continuation through Phase II
(June-September). Operations including air-infiltration of sabotage teams,
underwater demolition, and seizures of communist junks were approved for the
period, and a few were carried by specially trained GVN forces during June and
July. In the process of combined GVN-U.S. planning, but not yet approved for execution,
were cross-border operations against VC-North Vietnamese logistical routes in
Laos. This planning provided for both air attacks by the VNAF and “ground
operations up to battalion size” in the Laotian Panhandle. Preparations for
such actions had been approved in principle since March but since then little further
interest had been shown in them. Toward the end of July, the air force portion
was examined seriously by Administration officials as a means not only to
damage the Communist logistical effort but also “primarily for reasons of morale
in South Vietnam and to divert GVN attention from [a] proposal to strike North
Vietnam.” In addition to both the open and covert operations already underway,
a number of other actions intended to bring pressure against North Vietnam had
been recommended to the White House. Receiving considerable attention among
Administration officials during May and June was a proposed request for a
Congressional Resolution, reaffirming support by the legislators for
Presidential action to resist Communist advances in Southeast Asia during an
election year. In some respects paralleling this domestic initiative, the
President was urged to present to the United Nations the detailed case
assembled by the Government supporting the charges of DRV aggression against
South Vietnam and Laos. He was also urged to authorize periodic deployments of
additional forces toward Southeast Asia as a means of demonstrating U.S.
resolve to undertake whatever measures’ were required to resist aggression in
that region. Moreover, in OPLAN 37-64, there was fully developed a listing of
forces to be deployed as a deterrent to communist escalation in reaction to
U.S./GVN actions against North Vietnam. Finally, it was recommended that the
President make the decision to use “selected and carefully graduated military
force against North Vietnam” if necessary to improve non-Communist prospects in
South Vietnam and Laos. The source documents available to this writer are not
clear on the exact decisions made in response to each of these recommendations,
or indeed on the precise form or context in which the recommendations were
presented. It is evident that the proposal to seek a Congressional Resolution
was not favorably received, but as subsequent events indicate neither was it
rejected out-of-hand. It proved very useful in largely the same language just
two months later. Less certain are the decisions made about the other
proposals. Certainly they were not approved for immediate implementation.
However, it is not clear whether they were (1) flatly disapproved, (2) merely
postponed, or (3) approved in principle, subject to gradual implementation. At
the Honolulu Conference, where many of the proposed actions were discussed with
U.S. officials from the theatre, many practical considerations were aired which
showed that delayed implementation would be a reasonable course of action. But
such factors would have provided equally valid reasons for either deciding
against the proposals or for merely deferring a decision until a later, more
appropriate time. The most significant point, for an understanding of the
events and decisions of the second half of 1964, is that these options remained
“on the shelf” for possible implementation should favorable circumstances
arise.
II. THE TONKIN GULF
CRISIS
Several of the pressuring measures recommended to the
White House in May or June were implemented in conjunction with or in the
immediate aftermath of naval action in the Tonkin Gulf. It is this fact and the
rapidity with which these measures were taken that has led critics to doubt
some aspects of the public account of the Tonkin incidents. It is also this
fact, together with later Administration assessments of the Tonkin Gulf
experience, that give the incidents greater significance than the particular
events seemed at first to warrant.
THE FIRST INCIDENT
What happened in the Gulf? As noted eariler, U.S.S.
Maddox commenced the second DE SOTO Patrol on 31 July. On the prior night South
Vietnamese coastal patrol forces made a midnight attack, including an
amphibious “commando” raid, on Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands, about 19° N.
latitude. At the time of this attack, U.S.S. Maddox was 120-130 miles away just
heading into waters off North Vietnam. On 2 August, having reached the
northernmost point on its patrol track and having headed South, the destroyer
was intercepted by three North Vietnamese patrol boats. Apparently, these boats
and a fleet of junks had moved into the area near the island to search for the
attacking force and had mistaken Maddox for a South Vietnamese escort vessel.
(Approximately eleven hours earlier, while on a northerly heading, Maddox had
altered course to avoid the junk concentration shown on her radar; about six
hours after that—now headed South — Maddox had altered her course to the
southeast to avoid the junks’ a second time.) When the PT boats began their
high-speed run at her, at a distance of approximately 10 miles, the destroyer
was 28 miles from the coast and heading farther into international waters. Two
of the boats closed to within 5,000 yards, launching one torpedo each. As they
approached, Maddox fired on the boats with her 5-inch batteries and altered
course to avoid the torpedoes, which were observed passing the starboard side
at a distance of 100 to 200 yards. The third boat moved up abeam of the
destroyer and took a direct 5-inch hit; it managed to launch a torpedo which
failed to run. All three PT boats fired 50-caliber machine guns at Maddox as
they made their firing runs, and a bullet fragment was recovered from the
destroyer’s superstructure. The attacks occurred in midafternoon, and
photographs were taken of the torpedo boats as they attacked.
Upon first report of the PT boats’ apparently hostile
intent, four F-8E aircraft were launched from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga,
many miles to the South, with instructions to provide air cover but not to fire
unless they or Maddox were fired upon. As Maddox continued in a southerly
direction, Ticonderoga aircraft attacked the two boats that had initiated the
action. Both were damaged with Zuni rockets and 20mm gunfire. The third boat,
struck by the destroyer’s 5-inch, was already dead in the water. After about
eight minutes, the aircraft broke off their attacks. In the meantime, Maddox
had been directed by the 7th Fleet Commander to retire from the area to avoid
hostile fire. Following their attacks on the PT’s, the aircraft joined Maddox
and escorted her back toward South Vietnamese waters where she joined a second
destroyer, C. Turner Joy. The two ships continued to patrol in international
waters. Approximately two hours after the action, in early evening,
reconnaissance aircraft from Ticonderoga located the damaged PT’s and obtained
two photographs. The third boat was last seen burning and presumed sunk.
On 3 August a note of protest was dispatched to the
Hanoi Government, reportedly through the International Control Commission for
Indo-China. Directed by the President, the note stressed the unprovoked nature
of the North Vietnamese attack and closed with the following warning:
The U.S. Government expects that the authorities of
the regime in North Vietnam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave
consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked
offensive military action against U.S. forces.
On that same day, measures were taken to increase the
security of the DE SOTO Patrol, the approved schedule of which still had two
days to run. At 1325 hours (Washington time) the ICS approved a CINCPAC request
to resume the patrol at a distance of 1 1 n.m. from the North Vietnamese coast.
Later in the day, President Johnson announced that he had approved doubling the
patrolling force and authorized active defensive measures on the part of both
the destroyers and their escorting aircraft. His press statement included the
following:
I have instructed the Navy:
1. To continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off
the coast of North Vietnam.
2. To double the force by adding an additional
destroyer to the one already on patrol.
3. To provide a combat air patrol over the
destroyers, and
4. To issue orders to the commanders of the combat
aircraft and the two’ destroyers; (a) to attack any force which attacks them in
international waters, and (b) to attack with the objective not only of driving
off the force but of destroying it.
THE SECOND INCIDENT
Late the following evening the destroyers, Maddox and
C. Turner Joy, were involved in a second encounter with hostile patrol boats.
Like the first incident, this occurred following a South Vietnamese attack on
North Vietnamese coastal targets—this time the Rhon River estuary and the Vinh
Sonh radar installation, which were bombarded on the night of 3 August. The
more controversial of the two, this incident occurred under cover of darkness
and seems to have been both triggered and described largely by radar and
sonar images. After the action had ! been joined, however, both visual
sightings and intercepted North Vietnamese communications confirmed that an
attack by hostile patrol craft was in progress.
At 1940 hours, 4 August 1964 (Tonkin Gulf time),
while “proceeding S.E, at best speed,” Task Group 72.1 {Maddox and Turner Joy)
radioed “RCVD INFO indicating attack by PGM P-4 iminent.” Evidently this was
based on an intercepted communication, later identified as “an intelligence
source,” indicating that ! “North Vietnamese naval forces had been ordered to
attack the patrol.” At thetime, radar contacts evaluated as “probable torpedo
boats” were observed about 36 miles to the northeast. Accordingly, the Task
Group Commander altered course and increased speed to avoid what he evaluated
as a trap. At approximately 2035 hours, while west of Hainan Island, the
destroyers reported radar sightings , of three unidentified aircraft and two
unidentified vessels in the patrol area. On receiving the report, Ticonderoga
immediately launched F-8s and A-4Ds to provide a combat air patrol over the
destroyers. Within minutes, the unidentified ) aircraft disappeared from the
radar screen, while the vessels maintained a dis-tance of about 27 miles.
Actually, surface contacts on a parallel course had been shadowing the
destroyers with radar for more than three hours. ECM contacts maintained by
the C. Turner Joy indicated that the radar was that carried aboard DRV patrol
boats.
New unidentified surface contacts 13 miles distant
were reported at 2134 hours. These vessels were closing at approximately 30
knots on the beam and were evaluated as “hostile.” Six minutes later (2140)
Maddox opened fire, and at 1242, by which time two of the new contacts had
closed to a distance of 1 1 miles, aircraft from Ticonderoga’s CAP began their
attacks. Just before this, one of the PT boats launched a torpedo, which was
later reported as seen passing about 300 feet off the port beam, from aft to
forward, of the C. Turner Joy. A searchlight beam was observed to swing in an
arc toward the C. Turner Joy by all of the destroyer’s signal bridge
personnel. It was extinguished before it illuminated the 1 ship, presumably
upon detection of the approaching aircraft. Aboard the Maddox, Marine gunners
saw what were believed to be cockpit lights of one or more small boats pass up
the port side of the ship and down the other. After approximately an hour’s
action, the destroyers reported two enemy boats sunk and no damage or
casualties suffered.
In the meantime, two patrol craft from the initial
surface contact had closed to join the action, and the engagement was described
for higher headquarters — largely on the basis of the destroyers’ radar and
sonar indications and on radio intercept information. [Three lines illegible.]
the count reached 22 torpedoes, a total which caused the Commanding Officer,
once the engagement had ended, to question the vaUdity of his report and
communicate these doubts to his superiors:
Review of action makes many recorded contacts and
torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects and overeager sonarman
may have accounted for many reports.
In addition to sonar readings, however, the Task
Group had also reported intercepting communications from North Vietnamese naval
craft indicating that they were involved in an attack on U.S. (“enemy”) ships
and that they had “sacrificed” two vessels in the engagement.
THE RESPONSE IN
WASHINGTON
Sometime prior to the reported termination of the
engagement, at 0030 hours, 5 August (Tonkin Gulf time), “alert orders” to
prepare for possible reprisal raids were sent out by naval authorities to
Ticonderoga and to a second aircraft carrier, Constellation, which started
heading South from Hong Kong late on 3 August. Such raids were actually ordered
and carried out later in the day. “Defense officials disclosed [in public
testimony, 9 January 1968] that, when the first word was received of the second
attack ‘immediate consideration was given to retaliation.’ “ That apparently
began shortly after 0920 hours (Washington time), when the task group message
that a North Vietnamese naval attack was imminent was first relayed to
Washington. From this time on, amid a sequence of messages describing the
attack, Secretary McNamara held “a series of meetings with [his] chief civilian
and military advisers” concerning the engagement and possible U.S. retaliatory
actions. As he testified before the Fulbright Committee:
We identified and refined various options for a
response to the attack, to be presented to the President. Among these options
was the air strike against the attacking boats and their associated bases,
which option was eventually selected. As the options were identified
preliminary messages were sent to appropriate operational commanders alerting
them to the several possibilities so that initial planning steps could be
undertaken.
At 1230, the President met with the National Security
Council. Having just come from a brief meeting with the JCS, attended also by
Secretary Rusk and McGeorge Bundy, Secretary McNamara briefed the NSC on the
reported details of the attack and the possibilities for reprisal. Shortly
thereafter (presumably during a working lunch with the President, Secretary
Rusk and Bundy) and after receiving by telephone the advice of the JCS,
McNamara and the others recommended specific reprisal actions. It was at this
point that the President approved “a response consisting of an air strike on
the PT and SWATOW boat bases and their associated facilities.”
Returning from this session shortly after 1500,
Secretary McNamara, along with Deputy Secretary Vance, joined with the JCS to
review all the evidence relating to the engagement. Included in this review was
the communications intelligence information which the Secretary reported,
containing North Vietnamese reports that (1) their vessels were engaging the
destroyers, and (2) they had lost two craft in the fight. In the meantime,
however, messages had been relayed to the Joint Staff indicating considerable
confusion over the details of the attack.’ The DE SOTO Patrol Commander’s
message, expressing doubts about earlier evidence of a large-scale torpedo
attack, arrived sometime after 1330 hours. Considerably later (it was not sent
to CINCPACFLT until 1447 EDT), another message arrived to the effect that while
details of the action were still confusing, the commander of Task Group 72.1
was certain that the ambush was genuine. He had interviewed the personnel who
sighted the boat’s cockpit lights passing near the Maddox, and he had obtained
a report from the C. Turner Joy that two torpedoes were observed passing
nearby. Accordingly, these reports were discussed by telephone with CINCPAC,
and he was instructed by Secretary McNamara to make a careful check of the
evidence and ascertain whether there was any doubt concerning the occurrence
of an attack. CINCPAC called the JCS at least twice more, at 1723 and again
at 1807 hours, to state that he was convinced on the basis of “additional
information” that the attacks had taken place. At the time of the earlier
call Secretary McNamara and the JCS were discussing possible force deployments
to follow any reprisals. On the occasion of the first call, the Secretary was
at the White House attending the day’s second NSC meeting. Upon being informed
of CINCPAC’s call, he reports:
I spoke to the Director of the Joint Staff and asked
him to make certain that the Commander in Chief, Pacific was willing to state
that the attack had taken place, and therefore that he was free to release the
Executive Order because earlier in the afternoon I had told him that under no
circumstances would retaliatory action take place until we were, to use my
words, “damned sure that the attacks had taken place.”
At the meeting of the National Security Council,
proposals to deploy certain increments of OPLAN 37-64 forces to the Western
Pacific were discussed, and the order to retaliate against North Vietnamese
patrol craft and their associated facilities was confirmed. Following this
meeting, at 1845, the President met with 16 Congressional leaders from both
parties for a period of 89 minutes. Reportedly, he described the second
incident in the Gulf, explained his decisions to order reprisals, and
informed the legislators of his intention to request a formal statement of
Congressional support for these decisions. On the morning following the
meeting, the Washington Post carried a report that none of the Congressional leaders
present at the meeting had raised objections to the course of action planned.
Their only question, the report stated, “had to do with how Congress could show
its agreement and concern in the crisis.”
In many ways the attacks on U.S. ships in the Tonkin
Gulf provided the Administration with an opportunity to do a number of things
that had been urged on it. Certainly it offered a politically acceptable way of
exerting direct punitive , pressure on North Vietnam. In South Vietnam, the
U.S. response served to satisfy for a time the growing desire for some action
to carry the war to the North. Relative to the election campaign, it provided a
means of eliminating any doubts about President Johnson’s decisiveness that may
have been encouraged by his preferred candidate’s image as the restrained man
of peace. The obvious coni’ venience and the ways in which it was exploited
have been at the root of much of the suspicion with which critics of
Administration policy have viewed the incident.
The documents available to this writer are not
conclusive on this point, but the evidence indicates that the occurrence of a
DRV provocation at this time [‘resulted from events over which the U.S.
Government exercised little control. It has been suggested that the incidents
were related in some way to pressure coming’ from the GVN for U.S. action
against North Vietnam. However, the patrol was authorized on or prior to 17
July, and General Khanh’s oft-cited “Go North” appeal wasn’t made until 19
July. The first attack almost certainly was a case of mistaken judgment on the
part of the local Vietnamese commander. His probable association of U.S.S.
Maddox with the South Vietnamese raiding force is indicated by the
circumstances preceding the event, the brief duration and character of it, and
the long-delayed (not until 5 August) and rather subdued DRV public comment.
Moreover, there is little reason to see anything more than coincidence in the
close conjunction between the GVN’s maritime operations against the North
Vietnamese coast and the scheduling of the DE SOTO Patrol. The two operations
were scheduled and monitored from different authorities and through separate
channels of communication and command. Higher U.S. naval commands were informed
of the operations against the two islands by COMUSMACV, but the task group
commander had no knowledge of where or when the specific operations had taken
place. As Secretary McNamara told Senator Morse, in response to charges that
U.S. naval forces were supporting the GVN operation,
Our ships had absolutely no knowledge of it, were not
connected with it; in no sense of the word can be considered to have
backstopped the effort.
In addition, there was no reason on the basis of
earlier DE SOTO Patrol experience to even suspect that patrol activity might
precipitate hostile action by North Vietnam.
Although the events of the second attack were less
clear-cut, the evidence does not support beliefs (which have been expressed)
that the incident was staged. On the contrary, the evidence leads readily to
other explanations, which are at least equally as plausible.
DRV motivations for the second attack are unclear,
but several possibilities provide rational explanations for a deliberate DRV
decision. Those given credence at the time—that the DRV or China wanted to
increase pressures for an international conference or that the DRV was testing
U.S. reactions to a contemplated general offensive—have lost some credibility.
Subsequent events and DRV actions have appeared to lack any consistent
relationship with such motives. Perhaps closer to the mark is the narrow
purpose of prompt retaliation for an embarrassing and well-publicized rebuff by
a much-maligned enemy. Inexperienced in modern naval operations, DRV leaders
may have believed that under cover of darkness it would be possible to even the
score or to provide at least a psychological victory by severely damaging a
U.S. ship. Unlike the first incident, the DRV was ready (5 August) with a
propaganda blast denying its own provocation and claiming the destruction of
U.S. aircraft. Still, regardless of motive, there is little question but that
the attack on the destroyers was deliberate. Having followed the destroyers for
hours, their course was well known to the North Vietnamese naval force, and its
advance units were laying ahead to make an ambushing beam attack fully 60 miles
from shore.
The reality of a North Vietnamese attack on 4 August
has been corroborated by both visual and technical evidence. That it may have
been deliberately provoked by the United States is belied to a considerable
degree by circumstantial evidence. Operating restrictions for the DE SOTO
Patrol were made more stringent following the first attack. The 11 a.m., rather
than 8 a.m., off-shore patrolling track indicates an intention to avoid—not
provoke—further contact. On February the rules of engagement were modified to
restrict “hot pursuit” by the U.S. ships to no closer than 11 a.m, from the
North Vietnamese coast; air’ craft were to pursue no closer than 3 a.m. Given
the first attack, the President’s augmentation of the patrol force was a normal
precaution, particularly since both Ticonderoga and C. Turner Joy were already
deployed in the immediate vicinity as supporting elements. Moreover, since the
augmentation was coupled with a clear statement of intent to continue the
patrols and a firm warning to the DRV that repetition would bring dire
consequences, their addition to the patrol could be expected to serve more as a
deterrent than a provocation.
The often alleged “poised” condition of the U.S.
reprisal forces was anything but extraordinary. U.S.S. Constellation was well
out of the immediate operating area as the patrol was resumed on 3 August. In
fact, one reason for delaying the launching of retaliatory air strikes
(nearly 1100 hours, 5 August—Tonkin Gulf ! time) was to permit Constellation to
approach within reasonable range of the targets. Target lists from which to
make appropriate selections were already available as a result of routine
contingency planning accomplished in June and July. In preparation for the
resumed DE SOTO Patrol of 3-5 August, the patrol track was moved farther north
to make clearer the separation between it and the 34-A operations. The ways in
which the events of the second Tonkin Gulf incident came about give little
indication of a deliberate provocation to provide opportunity for reprisals.
BROADENING THE IMPACT
There is no question, however, that the second
incident was promptly exploited ‘ by the Administration. The event was seized
upon as an opportunity to take several measures that had been recommended earlier
and which were now seen as useful means of turning an essentially unique and
localized incident into an ‘ event with broader strategic impact. The extent to
which the strategic utility of these actions was perceived during the two days
between the incidents is not clear, Certainly the disposition of U.S.S.
Constellation does not suggest a picture of intensive preparation for a planned
series of new military and political pressures against North Vietnam.
Moreover, there is no record in the usual sources of the series of staff
meetings, task assignments and memoranda that typically accompany preparations
for coordinated political and military initiatives. Whatever was contemplated
between 2 and 4 August, the deliberations immediately preceding the reprisal
decision seem to have been largely ad hoc, both within DOD and among the
President’s principal advisers.
The most reasonable explanation for the actions which
accompanied the rej prisals, and for the rapidity of their implementation, is
the fact that each of them ! had been proposed and staffed in detail months
before. These “on the shelf” : options had been recommended unanimously by the
principal officials responsible for security matters in Southeast Asia. The
fact that they were implemented in August indicates that the President did not
disapprove of them, but rather that the domestic and international political
environments had probably been judged inappropriate earlier in the summer. The
measures apparently had been considered either too costly or too risky (perhaps
politically or perhaps in terms of communist reactions), given the President’s
election strategy and his policy theme of “maximum effect with minimum
escalation.” The kind of circumstances created by the Tonkin Gulf affair enabled
them to be carried out at lower cost and with less risk. The promptness with
which these actions were to be taken now is perhaps as much a direct result
of the President’s well-known political astuteness and keen sense of timing as
any other single factor.
One of the first actions taken was to deploy
additional U.S. military forces to the Western Pacific. This was done in part
as a measure to deter any hostile responses by Hanoi or Peking to the reprisal
raids. It also enabled making a stronger signal of U.S. resolve to defend its
interests throughout Southeast Asia, as recommended at the end of May. Orders
directing the deployment of selected 37-64 forces and the alerting of others
were dispatched from the Pentagon shortly after the President’s meeting with
Congressional leaders on the evening of 4 August. Shortly after midnight, on 5
August, and again later in the day, Secretary McNamara announced the specific
measures by which U.S. military capabilities around Southeast Asia were being
augmented:
First, an attack carrier group has been transferred
from the First Fleet on the Pacific coast to the Western Pacific. Secondly,
interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into South Vietnam.
Thirdly, fighter bomber aircraft have been moved into Thailand. Fourthly,
interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons have been transferred from the United
States into advance bases in the Pacific. Fifthly, an antisubmarine task force
group has been moved into the South China Sea.
It is significant, relative to the broader purpose of
the deployments, that few of these additional units were removed from the
Western Pacific when the immediate crisis subsided. In late September the
fourth attack aircraft carrier was authorized to resume its normal station in
the Eastern Pacific as soon as the regularly assigned carrier completed
repairs. The other forces remained in the vicinity of their August deployment.
Other actions taken by the Administration in the wake
of Tonkin Gulf were intended to communicate to various audiences the depth and
sincerity of the U.S. commitment. On the evening of 4 August, in conjunction
with his testing of Congressional opinion regarding reprisal action, President
Johnson disclosed his intention to request a resolution in support of U.S. Southeast
Asian policy. This he did through a formal message to both houses on 5 August.
Concurrently, identical draft resolutions, the language of which had been
prepared by executive agencies, were introduced in the Senate by J. William
Fulbright (D., Ark.) and in the House by Thomas E. Morgan (D., Pa.) and
co-sponsored by bi-partisan leadership. Discussed in committee on 6 August, in
response to testimony by leading Administration officials, the resolution was
passed the following day—by votes of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to in the
House.
Despite the nearly unanimous votes of support for the
Resolution, Congressional opinions varied as to the policy implications and the
meaning of such support. The central belief seemed to be that the occasion
necessitated demonstrating the nation’s unity and collective will in support of
the President’s action and affirming U.S. determination to oppose further
aggression. However, beyond that theme, there was a considerable variety of
opinion. For example, in the House, expressions of support varied from
Congressman Laird’s argument, that while the retaliation in the Gulf was
appropriate such actions still left a policy to be developed with respect to
the land war in Southeast Asia, to the more reticent viewpoint of Congressman
Alger. The latter characterized his support as being primarily for purposes of
showing unity and expressed concern over the danger of being dragged into war
by “other nations seeking our help.” Several spokesmen stressed that the
Resolution did not constitute a declaration of war, did not abdicate Congressional
responsibility for determining national policy commitments,’ and did not give
the President carte blanche to involve the nation in a major Asian war.
Similar expressions were voiced in the senior
chamber. For example, Senator Nelson sought assurances that the Resolution
would not be exploited to commit the United States further in the direction of
a large land war in Asia without an expression of specific Congressional
approval. In response, Senator Fulbright stated that he did not believe that
the Resolution changed in any way the Administration’s concept of keeping the
conflict in Vietnam as limited as possible. He identified the purposes of the
Resolution as being only ( 1 ) “to make it clear that the Congress approves the
action taken by the President to meet the attack on U.S. forces . . .” and (2)
to declare support for the resolute policy enunciated by the President in order
to prevent further aggression, or to retaliate with suitable measures should
such aggression take place.” However, in subsequent discussion it was made
clear that preventing or retaliating against further aggression was interpreted
rather broadly at the time:
(Mr. Cooper) . . . are we now giving the President
advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting
South Vietnam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other
country included in the [SEATO] treaty?
(Mr. Fulbright) I think that is correct.
(Mr. Cooper) Then, looking ahead, if the President
decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will
give that authority by this resolution?
(Mr. Fulbright) That is the way I would interpret it.
If a situation later developed in which we thought the approval should be
withdrawn it could be withdrawn by concurrent resolution.
The Congressional Resolution had several intended
audiences. First, it was aimed at the communist powers who might not believe
the President would risk legislative debate over strong military actions in an
election year. Second, it was intended to reassure our allies, particularly in
Asia, who might doubt the ability of the President to rally the necessary
public resolve should stronger military measures be needed. Finally it was directed
at the U.S. public, whose appreciation of national interests in Southeast Asia
might be strengthened through observation of combined executive-legislative and
bipartisan political support.
The United Nations was the target of a separate
statement, on 5 August, as Ambassador Stevenson described the events in the
Gulf for members of the Security Council and specifically related the DRV
provocation to the wider campaign of terror and infiltration occurring in South
Vietnam and Laos. This address was designed to establish the legitimacy of our
actions in the Gulf under provisions of the UN Charter and to reaffirm that
U.S. policy in Southeast Asia had limited aims and was based on upholding
provisions of existing international agreements.
The third communication was directed specifically to
Hanoi, on 10 August, through the Canadian I.C.C. representative and was
intended to strengthen the warning which he conveyed on his initial visit. In
addition to repeating points made earlier, Seaborn’s second message conveyed
the U.S. Government’s uncertainty over DRV intentions in the 4 August attack
and explained that subsequent U.S. deployments of additional airpower to South
Vietnam and Thailand were “precautionary.” In addition, the new message
stressed: (1) that the Tonkin Gulf events demonstrated that “U.S. public and
official patience” was wearing thin; (2) that the Congressional Resolution
reaffirmed U.S. determination “to continue to oppose firmly, by all necessary
means, DRV efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and Laos”; and (3) that
“if the DRV persists in its present course, it can expect to suffer the
consequences.”
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the provocation
handed the U.S. Government in the Tonkin Gulf, the Administration was able to
carry out most of the actions recommended by its principal officials early in
the summer. By the same token, it was reducing the number of unused measures
short of direct military action that had been conceived as available for
exerting effective pressure on the DRV. In effect, as it made its commitments
in Southeast Asia clearer it also deepened them, and in the process it denied
itself access to some of the uncommitting options which it had perceived
earlier as offering policy flexibility. Meanwhile, other events were also
having the effect of denying options which had been considered useful
alternatives to strikes against the North.
III. POST-TONKIN POLICY
ASSESSMENTS
The Tonkin Gulf incidents were important not only
because of what they enabled the United States to do in response—but also
because of the way what was done began to be regarded by policymakers. The fact
that U.S. forces had responded to hostile acts by making direct attacks on
North Vietnam, albeit limited ones under unique circumstances, had rather
significant impacts on the Administration’s policy judgments. These impacts
appeared as it became increasingly evident that the United States actually had
fewer options than it once believed available.
DILEMMAS IN LAOS
One of the areas where the Administration first saw
its freedom of action being impaired was Laos.
Prior to the events in Tonkin Gulf, the situation in
Laos had become increasingly complex, thus making U.S. policy choices
increasingly delicate. Since the end of May, U.S. hopes for a stabilized Laos
had been based largely on a Polish proposal to convene a preliminary conference
among six nations. Particularly promising was the Soviet Union’s willingness to
support the proposal. Toward the end of June, as the Laotian government warned
of the imminent threat of a major communist offensive near Muong Soui, the
Soviet Union asked Great Britain to postpone efforts toward such a conference,
and the Poles seemed to back away from their original initiative. On 25 July
the Soviet Union announced her return to the 14-Nation formula, and threatened
to resign her co-chairman role if a conference were not called. The Soviet
threat to withdraw from the international machinery that is basic to the
neutralist Laotian government’s claim to legitimacy was a matter of
considerable mutual concern in Vientiane and Washington.
One of the major reasons for U.S. support of the
Polish 6-Nation preliminary conference was its value in forestalling pressure
for a Geneva-type meeting. It was hoped that such a conference could be
prolonged well into the autumn to give the political and military situation in
South Vietnam time to be improved, and to build a more favorable political
climate for an eventual 14-Nation confer’ ence on Laos. The latter could be
accomplished, it was hoped, by: (1) demonstrating the extent of communist
responsibiHty for Laotian instabiHty; (2) getting the LC.C. to function more
effectively; (3) strengthening international backing for Souvanna’s position;
and (4) thereby obtaining support for his insistence on Pathet Lao withdrawal
from the Plaine des Jarres as a precondition for a new Geneva settlement.
Insofar as Laos was concerned, the United States recognized that a new
conference was probably desirable, as long as it did not occur too soon. However,
it also recognized the suspicion with which the GVN would regard any kind of
negotiations over Southeast Asia and the likelihood that backcorridor discussions
of the Vietnamese problem would be an almost inevitable by-product. In time
such a procedure might be useful, but for the balance of 1964 it was to be
avoided in order to promote GVN stability and encourage a more vigorous GVN war
effort.
The pressure for a Geneva-type conference had been
building ever since the resumption of fighting in Laos in May. The chief
protagonist in the quest for negotiations was France, who first proposed
reconvening the 14-Nation Conference to deal with the crisis on 20 May. What
made French policy so dangerous to U.S. interests, however, was that its
interest in a Geneva solution applied to Vietnam as well. On 12 June, De Gaulle
publicly repeated his neutralization theme for all Indo-China and called for an
end to all foreign intervention there; on 23 July he proposed reconvening the
1954 Geneva Conference to deal with the problems of Vietnam.
The Soviet Union’s return to the 14-Nation formula in
July (it had endorsed the original French proposal before indicating
willingness to support the 6-Nation approach) indicated solidarity in the
communist camp. The call was endorsed by North Vietnam on the following day.
Communist China first announced support for a 14-Nation Conference (on Laos) on
9 June, repeating this through notes to the co-chairman calling on the 13th for
an “emergency meeting.” On 2 August, the Chinese urged the USSR not to carry
out its threat to abandon its cochairman role, apparently viewing such a
development as jeopardizing the possibilities for a Geneva settlement.
Great Britain also urged the Russians to stay on, and
during the last days of July it attempted to make arrangements in Moscow to
convene a 14-Nation assembly on Laos. The negotiations failed because Britain
insisted on Souvanna’s prerequisite that the communists withdraw from positions
taken in May and was unable to gain Soviet acquiescence. However, U.S. leaders
were aware that Britain’s support on this point could not be counted on
indefinitely in the face of increasing pressure in the direction of Geneva.
In the meantime, however, Laotian military efforts to
counter the communist threat to key routes and control points west of the
Plaine des Jarres were showing great success. As a result of a counteroffensive
(Operation Triangle), government forces gained control of a considerable amount
of territory that gave promise of assuring access between the two capitals
(Vientiane and Luang Prabang) for the first time in three years.
In effect, the government’s newly won control of
territory and communication routes in Central Laos created a new and more
favorable balance of power in that country, which in the perceptions of the
Administration should not be jeopardized. A threat to this balance from either
(1) communist reactions to additional pressure, or (2) Laotian insistence on
extending their offensive into the Plaine des Jarres, was cited to discourage
proposals near the end of July to permit the VNAF to bomb infiltration routes
in the Laotian Panhandle. This “don’t rock the boat” policy was given added
encouragement when, on 1 August,’ Great Britain initiated a promising effort
toward a new diplomatic solution. Acting on Souvanna Phouma’s request, the
British government urged the I.C.C. members to arrange a meeting among the
three Laotian political factions.
Concern over not provoking a communist military
escalation that would upset the relatively stabilized situation in Laos figured
prominendy in a tentative analysis of U.S. strategy for Southeast Asia made and
circulated for comment by the State Department in mid-August. It had a
significant impact on the Administration’s assessment of its options in the
post-Tonkin period. Among other effects, this concern caused it to withhold for
several weeks its approval of continuing proposals for air and ground
initiatives in the Panhandle as means to improve the situation in South
Vietnam.
CONCERN OVER PRESSURES
FOR NEGOTIATIONS
One of the Tonkin Gulf impacts which was perceived
within the Administration served to exacerbate its policy dilemmas regarding
Laos. Administration officials were apprehensive that the international crisis
precipitated by incidents in the Gulf might intensify the kind of Geneva
conference pressures generated previously. Administration concern was
apparently well founded. On 5 August UN Secretary General U Thant stated that
the 14-Nation assembly should be reconvened to deal with the Tonkin Gulf debate
then being urged on the UN Security Council. (He had earlier urged reconvening
the 1954 Conference to negotiate a Vietnam settlement.) Two days later, during
the debate, the French delegation urged the calling of a conference for the pacification
of all of Indo-China. Reports appeared on 10 August that the Chinese People’s
Daily published an editorial arguing that a Geneva settlement was the only
effective way to solve the problem of South Vietnam. On the 19th, in a note
rejecting potential UN Security Council findings regarding responsibility for
the Tonkin Gulf incidents, North Vietnam declared its insistence on a Geneva
conference.
Such was the Administration’s concern in the
immediate aftermath of the crisis, that it contemplated a diplomatic initiative
relating to Laos that was designed to counteract the expected pressure.
Reflecting a point of view reportedly also becoming attractive to Souvanna
Phouma, the State Department sought reactions to a policy direction that would
no longer insist on Pathet Lao withdrawal from the Plaine des Jarres as a
precondition to an international conference. The gains recently achieved
through “Operation Triangle” were so significant, it reasoned, that they more
than offset communist control of the Plaine. And it was clear that any
negotiations by which a communist withdrawal might be arranged would include
reciprocal demands for the government to relinquish its recently won gains.
Moreover, passage of the Congressional Resolution and the strong DRV naval
attacks had accomplished the exact kind of actions believed to be necessary
earlier to demonstrate U.S. firmness in the event negotiating pressure should
become compelling.
Reactions to this tentative policy change were
unfavorable. It was seen as likely to have a demoralizing impact on the GVN. It
was also seen as possibly eroding the impression of strong U.S. resolve, which
the reprisal air strikes were believed to have created. For example, Ambassador
Taylor cabled:
. . . rush to conference table would serve to confirm
to CHICOMS that U.S. retaliation for destroyer attacks was transient phenomenon
and that’ firm CHICOM response in form of commitment to defend NVN has given U.S.
“Paper tiger” second thoughts....
In Vietnam sudden backdown from previously strongly
held U.S. position on [Piaine des Jarres] withdrawal prior to conference on
Laos would have potentially disastrous effect. Morale and will to fight and
particular willingness to push ahead with arduous pacification task . . . would
be undermined by what would look like evidence that U.S. seeking to take
advantage of any slight improvement in non-Communist position as excuse for
extricating itself from Indo-China via [conference] route....
Under circumstances, we see very little hope that
results of such a conference would be advantageous to us. Moreover, prospects
of limiting it to consideration of only Laotian problem appear at this time
juncture to be dimmer than ever....
CONCERN OVER TONKIN REPRISAL SIGNALS
Contained in Ambassador Taylor s views was yet
another of the Administration’s reflections on the impact of the Tonkin Gulf
incidents. Officials developed mixed feelings regarding the effect of the
Tonkin reprisals for signaling firm f U.S. commitments in Southeast Asia. On
one hand, it was conceded that the reprisals and the actions which accompanied
them represented the most forceful expression of U.S. resolve to date.
Improvements were perceived in South Vietnamese morale, and the combination of
force and restraint demonstrated was : believed effective in interrupting
communist momentum and forcing a reassessment of U.S. intentions. On the other
hand, they reflected concern that these effects might not last and that the
larger aspects of U.S. determination might still be unclear.
Several officials and agencies indicated that our
actions in the Tonkin Gulf represented only one step along a continually
demanding route for the United States. They expressed relief that if a
persuasive impression of firmness were to be created relative to the general
security of Southeast Asia, we could not rest on our laurels. Ambassador
Taylor expressed the limited impact of the Tonkin Gulf action as follows:
It should be remembered that our retaliatory action
in Gulf of Tonkin is in effect an isolated U.S.-DRV incident. Although this has
relation ... to the larger problem of DRV aggression by subversion in Viet-Nam
and Laos, we have not (repeat not) yet come to grips in a forceful way with DRV
over the issue of this larger and much more complex problem.
Later, he described a need for subsequent actions
that would convey to Hanoi that “the operational rules with respect to the DRV
are changing.” Assistant Secretary of State Bundy believed that Hanoi and
Peking had probably been [Convinced only “that we will act strongly where U.S.
force units are directly involved . . . [that] in other respects the communist
side may not be so perisuaded that we are prepared to take stronger action....”
He saw the need for a continuous “combination of military pressure and some
form of communication” to cause Hanoi to accept the idea of “getting out” of
South Vietnam and Laos. CINCPAC stated that “what we have not done and must do
is make plain Hanoi and Peiping the cost of pursuing their current objectives
and impeding’ ours.... Our actions of
August 5 have created a momentum which can lead to the attainment of our
objectives in S.E. Asia. ... It is most important that we not lose this
momentum.” The JCS urged actions to “sustain the U.S. advantage [recently]
gained,” and later cautioned: “Failure to resume and maintain a program of
pressure through military actions . . . could signal a lack of resolve.”
What these advisors had in mind by way of actions
varied somewhat but only in the extent to which they were willing to go in the
immediate future. Bundy stressed that policy commitments must be such that U.S.
and GVN hands could be kept free for military actions against DRV infiltration
routes in Laos. Ambassador Taylor, CINCPAC and the JCS urged prompt air and
ground operations across the Laotian border to interrupt the current (though
modest) southward flow of men and supplies. Both Taylor and CINCPAC indicated
the necessity of building up our “readiness posture” to undertake stronger
actions—through additional deployments of forces and logistical support
elements and strengthening of the GVN political base.
The mood and attitudes reflected in these viewpoints
were concrete and dramatic expressions of the increased U.S. commitment
stemming from the Tonkin Gulf incidents. They were candidly summed up by
CINCPAC in his statement:
. . . pressures against the other side once
instituted should not be relaxed by any actions or lack of them which would
destroy the benefits of the rewarding steps previously taken....
Increasingly voiced by officials from many quarters
of the Administration and from the professional agencies were arguments which
said, in effect, now that we have gone this far we cannot afford to stop and go
no farther; our original signal must continually be reinforced. What was not
stated—at least not in documentary form—were estimates of how long the process
might have to continue or to what extent the actions might have to be carried.
REASSERTION OF THE ROSTOW
THESIS
Soon after the Tonkin Gulf incidents State Department
Counselor Walt Rostow reformulated and circulated his earlier thesis that
insurgencies supported by external powers must be dealt with through measures
to neutralize the sources of that support. First presented to President Johnson
in December 1963, variations on this theme had been proposed by Rostow at
various times throughout 1964, the most recent occasion being in June, right
after the Honolulu Conference. Now in mid-August, his newly articulated
arguments were passed to the White House, Department of State, Department of
Defense and the JCS.
The “Rostow thesis” was generalized—not explicitly
dealing with a particular insurgency—but it was evident that considerations of
the U.S. dilemmas in Southeast Asia affected its formulation. It started with a
proposition:
By applying limited, graduated military actions
reinforced by political and economic pressures on a nation providing external
support for insurgency, we should be able to cause that nation to decide to
reduce greatly or eliminate altogether support for the insurgency. The
objective of these pressures is not necessarily to attack his ability to
provide support, although economic and certain military actions would in fact
do just that. Rather, the objective’ is to affect his calculation of interests.
Therefore, the threat that is implicit in initial U.S. actions would be more
important than the military effect of the actions themselves.
In Rostow’s view, the target government’s “calculation
of interests” could be affected by a number of factors, none of which would
preclude, however, the need for effective counterinsurgency programs within the
country already under attack. The factors included: (1) loss, and fear of
further loss, of military and economic facilities; (2) fear of involvement in a
much larger conflict; (3) fear of increased dependence upon, and loss of
independent action to, a major communist country; and (4) fear of internal
political upheaval and loss of power. The coercive impacts of the pressures
were to be their principal objectives. Significant (in view of currently
espoused rationale for increased pressures on North Vietnam) was the explicit
caution that improved morale in the country troubled by insurgency and ‘‘improved
U.S. bargaining leverage in any international conference on the conflict” were
to be considered merely as “bonus effects.”
The coercive pressure was to result from “damaging
military actions” coupled with concurrent political, economic and psychological
pressures. The former could include selective or full naval blockade and “surgical”
destruction of specific targets by aerial bombardment or naval gunfire. They
could be supported by such nondestructive military actions as aerial
reconnaissance, harassment of civil aviation and maritime commerce, mock air
attacks, and timely concentrations of U.S. or allied forces at sea or near
land borders. Following a line of reasoning prevalent in the Government during
the early 60s, Rostow observed 1 that a target government might well reduce its
insurgency supporting role in the face of such pressures because of the
communists’ proverbial “tactical flexibility.”
The thesis was subjected to a rather thorough
analysis in OSD/ISA and coordinated with the Department of State. The nature of
this review will be discussed on later pages and in a different context.
ACCOMPANYING PAUSE IN
PRESSURES
The foregoing policy assessments were conducted in an
atmosphere relatively free of even those pressure measures that preceded the
Tonkin Gulf crisis. Since the force deployments of 6 August, little military
activity had been directed at the DRV. U-2 liights over North Vietnam and
reconnaissance of the Laotian Panhandle were continued. Military operations
within Laos were limited to the consolidation of gains achieved in Operation
Triangle. A deliberate stand-down was adopted for all other
activities—including DE SOTO Patrols and the GVN’s covert harassing operations.
The purpose of this “holding phase,” as it was called, was to “avoid actions
that would in any way take the onus off the Communist side for [the Tonkin]
escalation.”
However, during the “holding phase” some of the
administrative impediments to wider military action were cleared away. One
measure that was taken was to relax the operating restrictions and the rules of
engagement for U.S. forces in Southeast Asia. This was accomplished in response
to JCS urging that attacking forces not be permitted sanctuaries from which to
regroup and perhaps repeat their hostile acts. Prior rules had not permitted pursuit
of hostile aircraft outside South Vietnam or authorized intercept of intruders
over Thailand. Under the revised rules of 15 August 1964, U.S. forces were
authorized to attack and destroy any vessel or aircraft “which attacks, or
gives positive indication of intent to attack” U.S. forces operating in or over
international waters and in Laos, to include hot pursuit into the territorial
waters or air space of North Vietnam and into the air space over other
countries of Southeast Asia. “Hostile aircraft over South Vietnam and Thailand”
could be engaged as well and pursued into North Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
Another prerequisite to wider military action that
was accomplished was the combined GVN-U.S. planning for cross-border ground
operations. By 16 August, this had proceeded to such an extent that COMUSMACV
believed it necessary to seek approval of the concept and appropriate to urge
that Phase I of the program get underway. Significant for understanding the
pressure for wider actions increasingly being brought to bear on the
Administration was the fact that MACV made the request despite explicit comment
that the concept was “an overly ambitious scheme.” Presumably, he considered it
likely to be ineffective militarily, but perhaps important in stimulating more
vigorous GVN efforts. Whatever his particular reasons at the time, MACV
repeated the recommendations later in the month as part of several measures to
be taken inside and outside South Vietnam. These were designed “to give the VC
a bloody nose,” to steady the newly reformed South Vietnamese government, and
to raise the morale of the population. However, the earlier MACV cable had
already acknowledged what must have been one of the Administration’s key
inhibitions against undertaking cross-border actions: General Westmoreland
stated, “It should be recognized that once this operation is initiated by the
GVN, U.S. controls may be marginal.”
The period of the “holding phase” was also a period
of significant developments within South Vietnam. Ambassador Taylor’s initial
report (10 August) made clear that the political situation was already
precarious, giving Khanh only a 50-50 chance of staying in power and
characterizing the GVN as ineffective and fraught with conflicting purposes. In
Taylor’s view, the leadership in Saigon showed symptoms of “defeatism” and a
hesitancy to prosecute the pacification campaign within South Vietnam.
Meanwhile, however, its popular support in the countryside seemed to be
directly proportional to the degree of protection which the government
provided. In view of this shaky political base. General Khanh seized upon the
occasion of post-Tonkin euphoria—apparently with Ambassador Taylor’s
encouragement—to acquire additional executive authority. On 7 August,
announcing the necessity for certain “emergency” powers to cope with any
heightened VC activity, he proclaimed himself President and promulgated the
Vung Tau Charter. This action, which gave him virtually dictatorial power over
several aspects of South Vietnamese life, met with hostile reactions. In late August,
Khanh’s authority was challenged in the streets of Saigon, Hue and Da Nang,
during several days of student protest demonstrations and clashes between Buddhist
and Catholic groups. In response to student and Buddhist pressures primarily, he
resigned his recently assumed post as President and promised that a national
assemblage would be called to form a more popularly based government. On 3
September, Khanh returned to assume the premiership, but clearly with weaker
and more conditional authority than before the government crisis.
Meanwhile, as the GVN’s lack of cohesion and
stability was being demonstrated, the infiltration of communist forces into
South Vietnam may have been on the increase. At least, belief in an increase in
the rate of this infiltration apparently gained currency in various U.S.
agencies at this time. The documents available to this writer from the period
neither refute nor substantiate the increase, but several of them contained
references to this perception. For example, a State Department memorandum,
dated 24 August, acknowledged a “rise and change in the nature of infiltration
in recent months.” Later analyses confirmed’ that increases had taken place,
but the precise period when they began was not identified. Hence, unless there
were other intelligence data to confirm them, any implications regarding North
Vietnamese policy decisions were largely speculative.
Possibly influencing the judgments of August was the
fact that increased communist movement of men and supplies to the South was
expected, resulting in part from a DIA assessment (7 August) of the most likely
DRV reactions to the Tonkin reprisals. Moreover, the State Department’s
analysis of next courses of action in Southeast Asia had made “clear evidence
of greatly increased infiltration from the North” an explicit condition for any
policy judgment that “systematic military action against DRV” was required
during the balance of 1964. And leading officials from several agencies were
beginning to feel that such action might be inevitable.
The combined effects of the signs of increased VC
infiltration and of continuing upheaval in Saigon caused great concern in
Washington. The central perception was one of impending chaos and possible
failure in South Vietnam. Among several agencies, the emerging mood was that
some kind of action was urgently needed—even if it had the effect merely of
improving the U.S. image prior to pulling out. It was this mood that prevailed
as the period of “pause” drew to a close.
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA
25 May 1964
Whereas the signatories of the Geneva Accords of
1954, including the Soviet Union, the Communist regime in China, and Viet Nam
agreed to respect the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam,
Laos and Cambodia; and the United States, although not a signatory of the
Accords, declared that it would view any renewal of aggression in violation of
the Accords with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace
and security;
Whereas the Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with
the aid and support of the Communist regime in China, has systematically
flouted its obligations under these Accords and has engaged in aggression
against the independence and territorial integrity of South Viet Nam by
carrying out a systematic plan for the subversion of the Government of South
Viet Nam, by furnishing direction, training, personnel and arms for the conduct
of guerrilla warfare within South Viet Nam, and by the ruthless use of terror
against the peaceful population of that country;
Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression and
subversion the Government and people of South Viet Nam have bravely undertaken
the defense of their independence and territorial integrity, and at the request
of that Government the United States has, in accordance with its Declaration of
1954, provided military advice, economic aid and military equipment;
Whereas in the Geneva Agreements of 1962 the United
States, the Soviet Union, the Communist regime in China, North Viet Nam and
others solemnly undertook to respect the sovereignty, independence, neutrality,
unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos;
Whereas in violation of these undertakings the
Communist regime in North Viet Nam, with the aid and support of the Communist
regime in China, has engaged in aggression against the independence, unity and
territorial integrity of Laos by maintaining forces on Laotian territory, by
the use of that territory for the infiltration of arms and equipment into South
Viet Nam, and by providing’ direction, men and equipment for persistent armed
attacks against the Government of National Unification of the Kingdom of Laos;
Whereas in the face of this Communist aggression the
Government of National Unification and the non-Communist elements in Laos have
striven to maintain the conditions of unity, independence and neutrality
envisioned for their country in the Geneva Agreements of 1962;
Whereas the United States has no territorial,
military or political ambitions in Southeast Asia, but desires only that the
peoples of South Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia should be left in peace by their
neighbors to work out their own destinies in their own way, and, therefore, its
objective is that the status established for these countries in the Geneva
Accords of 1954 and the Geneva Agreements of 1962 should be restored with
effective means of enforcement;
Whereas it is essential that the world fully
understand that the American people are united in their determination to take
all steps that may be necessary to assist the peoples of South Viet Nam and
Laos to maintain their independence and political integrity.
Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled:
That the United States regards the preservation of the independence and
integrity of the nations of South Viet Nam and Laos as vital to its national
interest and to world peace;
Sec. 2. To this end, if the President determines the
necessity thereof, the United States is prepared, upon the request of the
Government of South Viet Nam or the Government of Laos, to use all measures,
including the commitment of armed forces to assist that government in the
defense of its independence and territorial integrity against aggression or
subversion supported, controlled or directed from any Communist country.
Sec. 3. (a) The President is hereby authorized to use
for assistance under this joint resolution not to exceed $_______ during the
fiscal year 1964, and not to exceed $______ during the fiscal year 1965, from
any appropriations made available for carrying out the provisions of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in accordance with the provisions
of that Act, except as otherwise provided in this joint resolution. This
authorization is in addition to other existing authorizations with respect to
the use of such appropriations.
(b) Obligations incurred in carrying out the
provisions of this joint resolution may be paid either out of appropriations
for military assistance or appropriations for other than military assistance,
except that appropriations made available for Titles I, III, and VI of Chapter
2, Part I, of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, shall not be
available for payment of such obligations.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, when the President determines it to
be important to the security of the United States and in furtherance of the
purposes of this joint resolution, he may authorize the use of up to $______ of
funds available under subsection (a) in each of the fiscal years 1964 and 1965
under the authority of section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, and is authorized to use up to $______ of such funds in each such year
pursuant to his certification that it is inadvisable to specify the nature of
the use of such funds, which certification shall be deemed to be a sufficient
voucher for such amounts.
(d) Upon determination by the head of any agency
making personnel available under authority of section 627 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or otherwise under that Act, for purposes
of assistance under this joint resolution, any officer or employee so made
available may be provided compensa’ tion and allowances at rates other than
those provided by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, the Career
Compensation Act of 1949, as amended, and the Overseas Differentials and
Allowances Act to the extent necessary to carry out the purposes of this joint
resolution. The President shall prescribe regulations under which such rates of
compensation and allowances may be provided. In addition, the President may
utilize such provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, as he
deems appropriate to apply to personnel of any agency carrying out functions
under this joint resolution.
SOUTHEAST ASIA RESOLUTION
Text of Public Law 88-408
[H.J. Res. 1145], 78 Stat. 384, approved Aug. 10, 1964.
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in
Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United
States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby
created a serious threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and
systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam
has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the
collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of
southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or
political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be
left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the Congress
approve and support the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief,
to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of
the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and
security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United
States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is,
therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps,
including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of
its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the
President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably
assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or
otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of
the Congress.’
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