An internal
European Union document on proposed sanctions against Israel, which Haaretz
obtained in its entirety on Monday, reveals new details on the suggestions
being made in the internal discussions among EU member states that have been
taking place in Brussels. Among the options under consideration are measures
against European companies that work in settlements in the West Bank and East
Jerusalem.
If this
measure should be carried out, it could harm quite a few Israeli businesses
that work with European companies on projects in the settlements. For example, the Dutch Foreign Ministry recommended that
the Dutch water company Vitens not carry out projects in the settlements in
collaboration with Israel’s water company, Mekorot. Several months previously,
the Dutch government recommended that the Royal Haskoning infrastructure
company reconsider constructing a sewage purification plant in East Jerusalem
for the Jerusalem municipality.
High-ranking
European diplomats who were involved in discussions about the document told
Haaretz that work on the topic began on September 11. The EU’s Political and
Security Committee in Brussels, which is made up of the ambassadors of the EU’s
28 member states, gave the committee of experts on Middle Eastern affairs –
which is known in EU jargon as the Mashreq-Maghreb Working Party, or MaMa for
short – the task of drafting a document containing the response measures to
acts by the Israeli government that are liable to make the two-state solution
an impossibility.
Examples of this
are construction projects in the E1 area between Ma’aleh Adumim and Jerusalem,
and in the Jerusalem neighborhoods of Givat Hamatos and Har Homa, both of which
are over the Green Line. The European Union believes that construction in these
places endangers the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state with
territorial contiguity and could keep Jerusalem from being the capital of both
states.
The
high-ranking European diplomats emphasized that, contrary to the claims of
Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, the EU European External Action Service –
and particularly its director, Christian Berger – served only as coordinator
between the member states that made the action proposals included in the
document.
“A large
group of member states pushed for this move after the failure of the talks
between Israel and the Palestinians, and after the war in Gaza,” the European
diplomats said.
“Several
states, including some that are considered great friends of Israel, are the
ones who conceived the move and are now hiding behind the EU’s foreign service
so that it can act as the bad cop.”
The senior
European diplomats said the document was written after a mandate was received
from the political echelon of all 28 member states. “This is not a case in
which eurocrats in Brussels are working against Israel on their own,” the
European diplomats said. “This is a sign that a great deal of anger and
frustration exist in the member states. In recent months there were meetings of
European foreign ministers in which ministers, who are considered extremely
close to Israel, spoke in the most critical way against the policies of
Netanyahu’s government.”
The European
diplomats added that although the Israeli Foreign Ministry knows very well
which countries are behind this move, it finds it convenient to accuse the EU’s
foreign service.
“The fact is
that there is an agreement among all 28 member countries of the European Union
to discuss measures against Israel, and that is what should worry the
government in Jerusalem and the Israeli public,” they said. “This paper will be
handed over to the political echelon in Europe, which will decide which
actions, if at all, to take.”
The full
document about the sanctions includes further measures in addition to the ones
reported in the two articles on the topic that were published in Haaretz over
the past two days.
The section
about relations with the Palestinians proposes that the EU reassess “EU funding
or capacity-building activities indirectly helping to perpetuate the status quo
of occupation” to make sure that the funds are not used indirectly to
perpetuate the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.
That section
also proposes “support, or non-opposition,” of unilateral Palestinian actions
such as “applications to international organizations” or requests for
recognition.
The document
also proposes examining the possibility that additional European countries
recognize a Palestinian state, as Sweden did recently.
On the other
hand, the paper also suggests punitive measures against the Palestinians. For
example, in response to negative actions by the Palestinians, “the EU could
continue to dissuade [the Palestinians] from moving ahead in the context of
international organizations and use its leverage to that end.”
In the
section about bilateral relations with Israel, the document proposes actions
such as a “no contact policy with settler organizations/Refuse to engage with
settlers, including public figures and those publicly rejecting the two-state
solution.”
A measure of
this kind could lead to a boycott of senior government ministers such as
Naftali Bennett and Uri Ariel of Habayit Hayehudi, many Knesset members from
Likud, and, even in extreme cases, President Reuven Rivlin, who does not
support the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.
The document
also states that one of the measures could be a reassessment of the
distribution of EU funds that are provided to joint projects with Israel “in
line with the ‘more for more, less for less’ policy.” In other words, it also
includes an incentive in the form of greater European investments in joint
projects with Israel in response to progress in the peace process.
Another
incentive in the document is the issuing of statements, coordinated with all 28
EU member states, “to openly support Israeli leaders taking hard decisions and
help recreating a positive dynamic, including in relations with the
Palestinians.”
Non
paper based on MS inputs on possible follow-up on east Jerusalem
Following the
PSC endorsement of the MaMa report 14303/14 on east Jerusalem, and its tasking
to the MaMa WP of 11 September, and following the subsequent discussions and
the request by the WP, please find below a “non paper,” based on the informal
inputs provided by Member States, aimed at facilitating the discussion on
possible further EU action. In order to provide the full picture of the
potential of the EU policy, you will find in each area of action the reference
to the possible “incentives,” taking into account the work done in the past
year by the EEAS and the Council.
Diplomatic
steps
National,
coordinated or EU statements/ Coordinated demarches in Tel Aviv or summons in
capitals/ Tougher Council Conclusions/ Other forms of public messaging/ Letters
by EU Ministers or Head of Governments/ Recalling Ambassadors/ Most of these instruments can of course be
used in a positive way to openly support Israeli leaders taking hard decisions
and help re-creating a positive dynamic, including in relations with
Palestinians.
Reassessing
EU strategy at the HRC in Geneva (e.g. Item 7)/ Sticking to the EU agreed strategy
Insist on the
establishment of a formal dialogue with Israel on Human Rights with possible
linkage with other subcommittes/ Continue
to engage through the informal working group and the political dialogue
Bilateral
relations
Actions to uphold
or strengthen the principle of the ‘territorial scope’ (e.g. refer to the scope
in EU documents, including trade figures; systematic territorial clause in all
EU/MS agreements, Action Plan, MoUs)/ No
related incentives
Reassessing
distribution of ENI funds, in line with the ‘more for more, less for less’
policy/ address the issue of compensations through the ENI funds/ Enhance financial engagement through ENI
funds; strengthen and increase the twinning projects with Israel
Actions to
strengthen advice to EU citizens, public diplomacy and public communication on
settlements and settlement economic activities/ Possible targeting and differentiation of the EU messages
Actions
relating to the future development of the EU-Israeli relations (with regard to possible
new or renewed agreements, EU programs, MoUs, Action plan)/ Actions can be undertaken to slow down/limit
or accelerate/expand the future development of the bilateral relations
Restricted
Actions
related to the current EU-Israeli relations (under the framework of the
Association Agreement; under the current Action Plan; current economic and
other programs; subcommittees structure; missions and other activities)/ The EU and IL are already tapping the
potential of the current Action Plan; it may be difficult to develop further
incentives in this context
Actions vis-à-vis EU companies operating in settlements/ No related incentives
Actions vis-à-vis
settlers (no contact policy with settler organisations/ Refuse to engage with
settlers including public figures and those publicly rejecting the two state
solution/ Assess possible EU entry policy for violent settlers)/ No related incentives
In terms of “incentives” the EU has already
promoted at political level the “Special Previleged Partnership” with Israel
(and Palestine), meant to be a broad framework for enhancing the cooperation
with the EU in the context of a final status agreement (CCs December 2013). It
should consist of a combination of bilateral EU-Israel (and EU-Palestine)
initiatives and joint trilateral Israel-EU-Palestine cooperation in all
possible areas.
Relations
with Palestinians
Actions
reinforcing the Palestinian “statehood” (with regard the denomination and
protocol issues; support, or non-opposition, to applications to international
organisations; recognition)/ The EU could
continue to dissuade PAL from moving ahead in the context of international
organisations and use its leverage to that end
Reassessing
EU funding or capacity-building activities indirectly helping to perpetuate the
status quo of occupation/ Continuing and
trying to enhance EU funding and capacity building in coordination with
Palestinians and Israelis
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