WASHINGTON
April 20, 2010
His Excellency
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
President of the Federative Republic of Brazil
Brasilia
Dear Mr. President:
I want to thank you for our meeting with Turkish
Prime Minister Erdogan during the Nuclear Security Summit. We spent some time
focused on Iran, the issue of the provision of nuclear fuel for the Tehran
Research Reactor(TRR), and the intent of Brazil and Turkey to work toward
finding an acceptable solution. I promised to respond in detail to your ideas.
I have carefully considered our discussion, and I would like to offer a
detailed explanation of my perspective and suggest a way ahead.
I agree with you that the TRR is an opportunity to
pave the way for a broader dialogue in dealing with the more fundamental
concerns of the international community regarding Iran’s overall nuclear
program. From the beginning, I have viewed Iran’s request as a clear and
tangible opportunity to begin to build mutual trust and confidence, and thereby
create time andspace for a constructive diplomatic process. That is why the
United States so strongly supported the proposal put forth by former
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General EI Baradei. The IAEA’s
proposal was crafted to be fair and balanced, and for both sides to gain trust
and confidence. For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low
enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce
regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to
underscore that this element is of fundamental importance for the United
States. For Iran, it would receive the nuclear fuel requested to ensure
continued operation of the TRR to produce needed medical isotopes and, by using
its own material, Iran would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intent.
Notwithstanding Iran’s continuing defiance of five United Nations Security
Council resolutions mandating that it cease its enrichment of uranium, we were
prepared to support and facilitate action on a proposal that would provide Iran
nuclear fuel using uranium enriched by Iran — a demonstration of our
willingness to be creative in pursuing a way to build mutual confidence. During
the course of the consultations, we also recognized Iran’s desire for
assurances. As a result, my team focused on ensuring that the lAEA’s proposal
contained several built-in measures, including a U.S. national declaration of
support, to send a clear signal from my government of ourwillingness to become
a direct signatory and potentially even play a more direct role in the fuel
production process, a central role for Russia, and the IAEA’s assumption of
full custody of the nuclear material throughout the fuel production process. In
effect, the IAEA’s proposal offered Iran significant and substantial assurances
and commitments from the IAEA, the United States, and Russia. Dr. EI Baradei
stated publicly last year that the United States would be assuming the vast
majority of the risk in the IAEA’s proposal. As we discussed, Iran appears to
be pursuing a strategy that is designed to create the impression of flexibility
without agreeing to actions that can begin to build mutual trust and
confidence. [Freudian transference?] We have observed Iran convey hints of
flexibility to you and others, but formally reiterate an unacceptable position
through official channels to the IAEA. Iran has continued to reject the IAEA’s
proposal and insist that Iran retain its low-enriched uranium on its territory
until delivery of nuclear fuel. This is the position that Iran formally
conveyed to the IAEA in January 2010 and again in February.
We understand from you, Turkey and others that Iran
continues to propose that Iran would retain its LEU on its territory until
there is a simultaneous exchange of its LEU for nuclear fuel. As General Jones
noted during our meeting, it will require one year for any amount of nuclear
fuel to be produced. Thus, the confidence-building strength of the IAEA’s
proposal would be completely eliminated for the United States and several risks
would emerge. First, Iran would be able to continue to stockpile LEU throughout
this time, which would enable them to acquire an LEU stockpile equivalent to
the amount needed for two or three nuclear weapons in a year’s time. Second,
there would be no guarantee that Iran would ultimately agree to the final
exchange. Third, IAEA “custody” of lran’s LEU inside of Iran would provide us
no measurable improvement over the current situation, and the IAEA cannot
prevent Iran from re-assuming control of its uranium at any time.
There is a potentially important compromise that has
already been offered. Last November, the IAEA conveyed to Iran our offer to
allow Iran to ship its 1,200 kg of LEU to a third country — specifically Turkey
— at the outset of the process·to be held “in escrow” as a guarantee during the
fuel production process that Iran would get back its uranium if we failed to
deliver the fuel. Iran has never pursued the “escrow” compromise and has
provided no credible explanation for its rejection. I believe that this raises
real questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions, if Iran is unwilling to accept
an offer to demonstrate that its LEU is for peaceful, civilian purposes. I would urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity
presented by this offer to “escrow” its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear
fuel is being produced.
Throughout this process, instead of building
confidence Iran has undermined confidence in the way it has approached this
opportunity. That is why I question whether Iran is prepared to engage Brazil
in good faith, and why I cautioned you during our meeting. To begin a
constructive diplomatic process, Iran has to convey to the IAEA a constructive
commitment to engagement through official channels — something it has failed to
do. Meanwhile, we will pursue sanctions on the timeline that I have outlined. I
have also made clear that I will leave the door open to engagement with Iran.
As you know, Iran has thus far failed to accept my offer of comprehensive and
unconditional dialogue.
I look forward to the next opportunity to see you and
discuss these issues as we consider the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program to
the security of the international community, including in the U.N. Security
Council.
Sincerely,
Barack Obama
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