Friday, October 24, 2014

Finkelstein. RuthBBirn. A Nation on trial. The Goldhagen thesis and historical truth. AARGH. 1997.

“Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s ‘Crazy’ Thesis: A Critique of Hitler’s Willing Executioners”, by Norman G. Finkelstein was published in the New Left Review (London), nr 224, July 1997, p. 39-88.

“Historiographical Review: Revising the Holocaust”, by Ruth Bettina BIRN, is from The Historical Journal (Cambridge University Press), 40, 1 (1997), p.193-215.

Goldhagen has threatened the Ruth Birn with a suit.

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Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s ‘Crazy’ Thesis: A Critique of Hitler’s Willing Executioners
Norman G. Finkelstein

In the opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which is contrary to truth can be really useful...
John Stuart Mill

Rarely has a book with scholarly pretensions evoked as much popular interest as Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s study, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1). Every important journal of opinion printed one or more reviews within weeks of its release. The New York Times, for instance, featured multiple notices acclaiming Goldhagen’s book as ‘one of those rare new works that merit the appellation landmark’, ‘historic’, and bringing to bear ‘corrosive literary passion’. Although initial reviews were not uniformly positive, once the Goldhagen juggernaut proved unstoppable, even the dissenting voices joined in the chorus of praise. An immediate national best-seller, Hitler’s Willing Executioners was balled in Time magazine’s year-end issue as the ‘most talked about’ and second best non-fiction book of 1996.(2) Before long, Goldhagen was also an international phenomenon, creating an extraordinary stir in Germany.
What makes the Goldhagen phenomenon so remarkable is that Hitler’s Willing Executioners is not at all a learned inquiry. Replete with gross misrepresentations of the secondary literature and internal contradictions, Goldhagen’s book [39] is worthless as scholarship. The bulk of what follows documents this claim. In the conclusion I speculate on the broader meaning of the Goldhagen phenomenon. 4

I. Before the Genocide

Genocide was immanent in the conversation of German society. It was immanent in its language and emotion. It was immanent in the structure of cognition.
Hitler’s Willing Executioners, p. 449

1. A Nation Crazy with Hatred?
In a seminal study published thirty-five years ago, The Destruction of the European Jews, Raul Hilberg observed that the perpetrators of the Nazi holocaust were ‘not different in their moral makeup from the rest of the population... the machinery of destruction was a remarkable cross section of the German population.’ These representative Germans, Hilberg went on to say, performed their appointed tasks with astonishing efficiency: ‘No obstruction stopped the German machine of destruction. No moral problem proved insurmountable. When all participating personnel were put to the test, there were very few lingerers and almost no deserters.’ Indeed, an ‘uncomfortably large number of soldiers... delighted in death as spectators or as perpetrators.’ (3)
Long before Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s study, it was thus already known that ‘ordinary’ Germans were Hitler’s ‘willing’ and not infrequently cruel ‘executioners’. (4) The main distinction of Goldhagen’s study is the [40] explanation it purports to supply for what Hilberg called this ‘phenomenon of the greatest magnitude.’ (5) It is Goldhagen’s thesis that the ‘central causal agent of the Holocaust’ was the German people’s enduring pathological hatred of the Jews. (Hitler’s Willing Executioners [hereafter HWE] p. 9) To cite one typical passage:

[A] demonological anti-Semitism, of the virulent racial variety, was the common structure of the perpetrators’ cognition and of German society in general. The German perpetrators ... were assenting mass executioners, men and women who, true to their own eliminationist anti-Semitic beliefs, faithful to their cultural anti-Semitic credo, considered the slaughter to be just. (HWE, pp. 392-3)

There are no prima facie grounds for dismissing Goldhagen’s thesis. It is not intrinsically racist or otherwise illegitimate. There is no obvious reason why a culture cannot be fanatically consumed by hatred. One may further recall that, Goldhagen’s claims to novelty notwithstanding, his argument is not altogether new. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the genesis of the Final Solution was located in a twisted ‘German mind’ or ‘German character’. (6) The departure point of much ‘Holocaust scholarship’ is that Germans, nurtured on anti-Semitism, were thirsting for a ‘war against the Jews’. On the eve of Hitler’s ascension to power, wrote Lucy Dawidowicz, Germany was ‘a world intoxicated with hate, driven by paranoia, enemies everywhere, the Jew lurking behind each one.’ (7) This is also the dominant image of the Nazi extermination among Jews and in popular culture generally.
Bolstered as it is by a bulging scholarly apparatus, the audacious sweep, of Goldhagen’s thesis nonetheless merits emphasis. He argues that, for centuries, nearly every German was possessed of a homicidal animus toward Jews. Thus, he suggests that more than 80-90 per cent of the German people would have relished the occasion to torture and murder Jews. (8) Goldhagen takes to task the ‘conventional explanations’ which supposedly ignore the ‘identity of the victims’: ‘That the victims were Jewish – according to the logic of these explanations – is irrelevant.’ Indeed, he declaims that we must ‘abandon the assumption that, by and large, Germans in the nineteenth and twentieth century were not anti-Semitic.’ (HWE, pp. 13, 30-1, original emphasis) In a rejoinder to critics, Goldhagen credits his own book as being the first to correct this misconception: ‘Most seem now to agree that anti-Semitism was a necessary cause of the Holocaust...’ (9) Yet, one is hard-pressed to name a single account of the Nazi genocide that doesn’t crucially situate it within the context of German anti-Semitism. Goldhagen’s true distinction is to [41] argue that German anti-Semitism was not only a significant but rather that it was the sufficient condition for perpetrating the extermination of the Jews: ‘With regard to the motivational cause of the Holocaust, for the vast majority of perpetrators, a monocausal explanation does suffice.’ (10)
The Hitlerite regime accordingly plays a subordinate role in Goldhagen’s comprehension of the Final Solution. Inasmuch as the inclination for ‘killing’ Jews ‘predated Nazi political power’, the Nazis were ‘easily able to harness the perpetrators’ preexisting anti-Semitism once Hitler gave the order to undertake the extermination.’ (HWE, PP. 399, 463; see also pp. 418-19) All Hitler did was ‘unleash the pent-up anti-Semitic passion’, ‘unshackle and thereby activate Germans’ preexisting, pent-up anti-Semitism’, and so on. (HWE, pp. 95, 442,443)

Why was the Holocaust Unique to Germany?
Leaving to one side the question of its veracity, this last formulation of Goldhagen’s is still problematic. Consider that he repeatedly contradicts it. Had it not been for ‘Hitler’s moral authority’, Goldhagen observes, the ‘vast majority of Germans never would have contemplated’ the genocide against the Jews. (11) It was the Nazis’ unprecedentedly ‘extreme and thoroughgoing ... cognitive-moral revolution’ that, Goldhagen suggests, produced Germany’s ‘lethal political culture’. (HWE, p. 456; see also Reply, p. 42) Unaware that ‘these Germans were like no Germans they had ever known’, Goldhagen explains, Soviet Jerry ‘initially greeted’ the Nazi soldiers ‘obligingly and without hostility.’ (HWE, p. 587 n. 87) But if Goldhagen’s thesis is correct, these Germans were like all other Germans.
On a related issue, to explain why the genocide unfolded in Germany and not elsewhere, Goldhagen points up the centrality of Hitler’s regime: ‘Whatever the anti-Semitic traditions were in other European countries, it was only in Germany that an openly and rabidly anti-Semitic movement came to power... that was bent upon turning anti-Semitic fantasy into state organized genocidal slaughter.’ (HWE, p. 419; see also Reply, p. 43.) Yet Goldhagen’s explanation evades an embarrassingly obvious question: if other Europeans were as anti-Semitic as Germans which is what this argument assumes why didn’t a ‘rabidly anti-Semitic movement’ come to power elsewhere? True, Goldhagen argues that ‘Had there not been an economic depression in Germany, then the Nazis, in all likelihood, would never have come to power.’ (Reply, p. 42; see also HWE, p. 87) But that simply evades another obvious question: if Germans were so possessed by a fanatical anti-Semitism – more on which directly – why did a ‘rabidly anti-Semitic movement’ have to await an economic depression to attain power?
Indeed, Hitler’s Willing Executioners is a monument to question-begging. Eschewing the claim that it is ‘inexplicable’, Goldhagen sets as his [42] objective to ‘explain why the Holocaust occurred, to explain how it could occur.’ He concludes that it ‘is explicable historically’. (HWE, pp. 5, 455 [incomplete reference]) Goldhagen’s thesis, however, neither renders the Nazi holocaust intelligible nor is it historical. For argument’s sake, let us assume that Goldhagen is correct. Consumed by a ferocious loathing of the Jews, the German people jumped at Hitter’s invitation to exterminate them. Yet the question still remains, whence the hatred of Jews? A nation of genocidal racists is, after all, not exactly a commonplace.
On this crucial issue, Goldhagen sheds no light. Anti-Semitism, he suggests, was symptomatic of a much deeper German malaise. It served the Germans as a ‘moral rationale’ for releasing ‘destructive and ferocious passions that are usually tamed and curbed by civilization.’ (HWE, p. 397) Yet he neither explains why these normally quiescent passions burst forth in Germany nor why they were directed against the Jews. Goldhagen depicts anti-Semitism as the manifestation of a deranged state. The Germans were ‘pathologically ill ... struck with the illness of sadism ... diseased ... tyrannical, sadistic’, ‘psychopathic’ (HWE, pp. 397, 450, quoting a ‘keen diarist of the Warsaw Ghetto’), in thrall of ‘absolutely fantastical ... beliefs that ordinarily only madmen have of others ... prone to wild, “magical thinking”’ (HWE, p. 412), and so on. (12) Goldhagen never explains, however, why the Germans succumbed and why the Jews fell victim to this derangement.
In what is surely the book’s most evocative analogy, Goldhagen compares the Germans to ‘crazy’ Captain Ahab. Recalling Melville’s memorable description of Ahab’s insanely hateful state as he harpoons the whale, Goldhagen writes: ‘Germans’ violent anger at the Jews is akin to the passion that drove Ahab to hunt Moby Dick.’ (HWE, pp. 398-9) Yet even if the Germans were ‘crazy’ like Ahab, it still remains to explain what drove them to such a frenzied state. In Ahab’s case, the motive is clear: Moby Dick had earlier mangled him. To quote Melville from the passage Goldhagen excerpts: ‘It was revenge.’ But Goldhagen plainly does not believe the Jews inflicted violent injury on Germans. Indeed, he emphatically denies that Jews bear any responsibility for anti-Semitism: ‘the existence of anti-Semitism and the content of anti-Semitic charges... are fundamentally not a response to any objective evaluation of Jewish actions... anti-Semitism draws on cultural sources that are independent of the Jews’ nature and actions.’ (HWE, p. 39, original emphasis) In an almost comically circular argument, Goldhagen concludes that the Germans’ Ahab-like loathing of the Jews originated in their loathing of the Jews: ‘Germans’ anti-Semitism was the basis of their profound hatred of the Jews and the psychological impulse to make them suffer.’ (HWE, p. 584 n. 62; see also p. 399). (13) This argument recalls one of Goldhagen’s key theoretical insights: ‘The motivational dimension is the most crucial for explaining the perpetrators’ willingness to act.’ (HWE, p. 20) [43] Goldhagen approvingly cites the Sonderweg argument that ‘Germany developed along a singular path, setting it apart from other western countries.’ (HWE, p. 419) But Goldhagen’s thesis has precious little in common with this argument. Unlike the Sonderweg proponents, he never once anchors the deformations of the German character in temporal developments. Rather, the perverted German consciousness of Goldhagen’s making floats above and persists in spite of history. Just how little Goldhagen’s argument has in common with any school of history is pointed up by his conclusion that the Germans’ ‘absurd beliefs... rapidly dissipated’ after the Second World War. (HWE, pp. 593-4 n. 53; see also p. 582 n. 38) Indeed, Germans today are ‘democrats, committed democrats.’ (14) Emerging from oblivion and enduring for centuries, the psychopathic German mind vanished again into oblivion in the space of a few decades. Thus Goldhagen renders the Nazi holocaust ‘explicable historically’.
The merit of his thesis, Goldhagen contends, is that it recognizes that ‘each individual made choices about how to treat Jews.’ Thus, it ‘restores the notion of individual responsibility’. (Reply, p. 38) Yet if Goldhagen’s thesis is correct, the exact opposite is true. Germans bear no individual or, for that matter, collective guilt. After all, German culture was ‘radically different’ from ours. It shared none of our basic values. Killing Jews could accordingly be done in ‘good conscience.’ (HWE, p. 15) Germans perceived Jews the way we perceive roaches. They did not know better. They could not know better. It was a homogeneously sick society. Moral culpability, however, presumes moral awareness. Touted as a searing indictment of Germans, Goldhagen’s thesis is, in fact, their perfect alibi. Who can condemn a ‘crazy’ people?

2. Explaining Everything
Goldhagen deploys two analytically distinct strategies to prove his thesis. The first derives from his own primary research on the German perpetrators of the genocide. Goldhagen maintains that certain of his findings ‘defy all of the conventional explanations.’ (HWE, p. 391) In particular, he argues that only a murderously anti-Semitic culture can account for the wanton cruelty of the Germans. (Reply, pp. 38-9) Yet, it is not at all obvious why Goldhagen’s thesis is more compelling than one that, say, includes the legacy of German anti-Semitism exacerbated by the incessant, inflammatory Jew-baiting of Nazi propaganda, and further exacerbated by the brutalizing effects of a singularly barbarous war. It is perhaps true, as Goldhagen suggests, that such a ‘patchwork explanation’ does not yet fully plumb the depths of German bestiality. (HWE, p. 391) But Goldhagen himself acknowledges that neither does his theory. Ultimately, he concedes, the immensity of German cruelty ‘remains hard to fathom’ and ‘the extent and nature of German anti-Semitism’ cannot explain it. (HWE, pp. 584 n. 62, 584 n. 65; see also p. 399)
The second thrust of Goldhagen’s argument is to demonstrate historically that German society was seething with virulent anti-Semitism on the eve of Hitler’s ascension to power. The undertaking is a daunting [44] one. Goldhagen relies almost entirely on the recent secondary literature on German anti-Semitism. He acknowledges that the evidence does not in a ‘definitive’ manner prove his conclusions. (HWE, p. 47) The problem, however, is rather larger. Profuse as it is, not a jot of this scholarship sustains Goldhagen’s thesis. No serious German historian discounts the legacy of German anti-Semitism; none, however, maintains that German anti-Semitism was in itself sufficiently virulent to account for the Nazi genocide. (15) Indeed, this is one reason why versions of Goldhagen’s thesis have been discarded in serious scholarly inquiry. The task Goldhagen sets himself is to force the new evidence into the Procrustean bed of an obsolete theory. To meet this challenge, Goldhagen fashions a new model of anti-Semitism. Thomas Kuhn suggested that a new paradigm comes into existence when anomalies crop up that the old one can no longer accommodate. The purpose of Goldhagen’s new paradigm, however, is to make the anomalies fit the old one.
The essence of Goldhagen’s new paradigm is what he calls ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’. Goldhagen situates German anti-Semitism along a continuous spectrum. At one extreme was the German perception that Jews were vaguely different. At the other extreme was the perception that Jews were distinctly evil. Between these poles was the perception that Jews were more or less flawed. Moving from one end of the spectrum to the other, the complementary German desire to eliminate an unappealing feature of the Jews rapidly yielded to the desire to eliminate Jews altogether. ‘The eliminationist mind-set’, Goldhagen proclaims, ‘tended towards an exterminationist one.’ (HWE, p. 71, emphasis in original; see also pp. 23, 77, 444) Thus, any German who questioned the group loyalty or objected to the business practices of Jews was effectively a Nazi brute. Wedded as it was to an assimilationist version of the ‘eliminationist mind-set’, even German liberalism inexorably led to Auschwitz.
Rescuing an otherwise improbable thesis, ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ serves as Goldhagen’s deus ex machina. Indeed, using this device, it is not at all difficult to prove that nearly every German was a latent Hitler. It would also not be at all difficult to prove that nearly every white American is a latent Grand Wizard. How many white Americans do not harbour any negative stereotypes about black people? If Goldhagen is correct, we are all closet racial psychopaths. Why then did the ‘Holocaust’ happen in Germany? If we all suffer from an ‘eliminationist mind-set’ then that alone cannot account for what Goldhagen calls a ‘sui generis event’. (HWE, p. 419)
Casting as a theoretical novelty the distinction between ‘type[s] of anti-Semitism’, Goldhagen dismisses previous scholars who ‘typically... treated’ anti-Semitism ‘in an undifferentiated manner’. Before he came along, ‘a person [was] either an anti-Semite or not.’ (HWE, pp. 34-5; see also Reply, p. 41) Leaving aside the fact that the contrast he proposes [45] between, say, religious and racial or latent and manifest anti-Semitism is standard in the Nazi holocaust literatures, (16) it is Goldhagen himself who radically undercuts all distinctions: on the ‘eliminationist’ spectrum, every manifestation of anti-Semitism and even philosemitism ‘tend[s] strongly towards a genocidal “solution”.’ (17)
In this connection, Goldhagen’s resolution of a key controversy in the Nazi holocaust literature is noteworthy. Historians have long disputed whether Hitler sought from the outset (the intentionalist school) or was pressed by circumstances (the functionalist school) to exterminate the Jews. To prove the intentionalist thesis, Goldhagen simply lumps Hitler’s various initiatives together: they were all effectively genocidal. Thus, Hitler’s pre-invasion orders that limited the extermination of Soviet Jews to adult males was ‘still genocidal’. His ghettoization and deportation schemes were ‘bloodlessly genocidal’, ‘proto-genocidal’, ‘psychologically and ideologically the functional, if not the eventual, actual equivalent of genocide’, ‘quasi-genocidal’, ‘bloodless equivalents of genocide’, and so on. Even the destruction of Jewish synagogues during Kristallnacht was a ‘proto-genocidal assault... the psychic equivalent of genocide.’ (18) The very basis of the intentionalist-functionalist controversy, however, is that the distinction between riot, expulsion, and mass murder, on the one hand, and genocide, on the other, does count. Why else focus on Hitler’s decision to initiate the judeocide? Goldhagen’s ‘proof annuls the debate’s central premise. It also annuls the central premise of his own book. If all these policies evidence genocidal intent, then genocidal intent is very far from uncommon in human history. Yet, Goldhagen maintains that ‘the Holocaust is ... utterly new’, and it is ‘crucially’ the genocidal intent that makes it so. (HWE, p. 5; Reply, p. 45)
Once Goldhagen attends to the matter of distinctions, the bankruptcy of his explanatory model stands exposed. Thus, he also enters the strong caveat that German ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ was equally compatible with a broad range of social outcomes. It was ‘multipotential.’ Indeed, ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ could ‘obvious[ly]’ culminate in everything from ‘total assimilation’ to ‘total annihilation’, with ‘verbal assault’, ‘legal [46] restraints’, ‘physical assault’, ‘physical separation in ghettos’, ‘forcible and violent expulsion’, all being intermediate possibilities. (HWE, pp. 69, 70, 132-6, 444, 494 n. 92) These multiple options, Goldhagen further elucidates, ‘were rough functional equivalents from the vantage point of the perpetrators.’ (HWE, p. 135; see also p. 70) Yet, if all these policy options were ‘rough functional equivalents’ for the ‘eliminationist mind-set’, then that mind-set plainly cannot account for the genocidal variant. So capacious is his conceptual device, Goldhagen suggests, that it can explain in a ‘logical’ manner the full gamut of unfolding German anti-Jewish policies. (HWE, p. 444) True it explains all of them; it also explains none.
Goldhagen’s survey of German anti-Semitism roughly divides at the Nazis’ ascension to power. In the next two sections, I shall consider his analysis of Germany before and after the Nazis took over.

3. Pre-Nazi Germany
In his introductory chapter, Goldhagen emphasizes an analytical distinction: ‘Some anti-Semitisms become woven into the moral order of society; others do not.’ Theorizing that the former are potentially more explosive, Goldhagen puts ‘the conception of Jews in medieval Christendom’ in this category: ‘its uncompromising non-pluralistic and intolerant view of the moral basis of society... held the Jews to violate the moral order of the world ... Jews came to represent ... much of the evil in the world; they not only represented it but also came to be seen by Christians as being synonymous with it, indeed as being self-willed agents of evil.’ (HWE, pp. 37-8; see also p. 51) Alas, Goldhagen also argues that anti-Semitism was not at the core of premodern Christianity: ‘In medieval times ... Jews were seen to be responsible for many ills, but they remained always somewhat peripheral, on the fringes, spatially and theologically, of the Christian world, not central to its understanding of the world’s troubles ... even if the Jews were to disappear, the Devil, the ultimate source of evil, would remain.’ (HWE, p. 67; see also p. 77) Apart from his theoretical insight – or perhaps insights – Goldhagen skips quickly over the pre-modern era.
Except perhaps for an obscure, unpublished, thirty-year-old doctoral dissertation, Goldhagen acknowledges, the extant scholarly literature on modern German anti-Semitism does not reach his conclusions. If, however, the same findings are ‘reconceptualize[d]’ in a ‘new analytical and interpretative framework’, they do, he believes, sustain his novel thesis. (HWE, pp. 488 n. 17, 76-7; see also Reply, p. 41) Summarizing his conclusions for the nineteenth century through World War I, Goldhagen writes:

It is... incontestable that the fundamentals of Nazi anti-Semitism... had deep roots in Germany, was part of the cultural cognitive model of German society, and was integral to German political culture. It is incontestable that racial anti-Semitism was the salient form of anti-Semitism in Germany and that it was broadly part of the public conversation of German society. It is incontestable that it had enormously wide and solid institutional and political support in Germany at various times ... It is incontestable that this racial anti-Semitism which held the Jews to pose a mortal threat to Germany was pregnant with murder. (HWE, pp. 74-5; see also p. 77)

[47] No serious historian doubts that anti-Semitism persisted in modern Germany. The question is, what was its scope and nature? (19) Goldhagen argues that anti-Semitism was ubiquitous in Germany. Yet German Social-Democracy forcefully denounced anti-Semitism and, as the single largest political party (the SPD), commanded the allegiance of fully a third of the electorate by the early twentieth century. Not the working-class base, Goldhagen suggests, but only ‘the core of the socialist movement, its intellectuals and leaders’ repudiated anti-Semitism. It was merely a ‘small group’. (HWE, p. 74; see also p. 72) The only source he cites is Peter Pulzer’s Jews and the German State, which enters no such qualification. (20) Indeed, turning to Pulzer’s authoritative companion study, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, we learn that ‘anti-Semitism drew little strength from ... the working-class ... The [German worker] knew that national and religious arguments were at best irrelevant to a solution of his problems and at worst a deliberate attempt to cloud his view of the “real issues”.’ (21) A compelling example of popular German anti-Semitism cited by Goldhagen is the recurrence of ritual murder accusations. ‘In Germany and the Austrian Empire’, he reports, twelve such trials took lace between 1867 and 1914.’ (HWE, pp. 63-4) Goldhagen cites Pulzer’s The Rise of political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria. Turning to the cited page, we find that Goldhagen has reversed the import of Pulzer’s finding. The remainder of the sentence reads: ‘eleven of which collapsed although the trials were by jury’. (22)
To further document the extent of German anti-Semitism, Goldhagen recalls a ‘spontaneous, extremely broad-based, and genuine’ petition campaign in Bavaria opposing the full equality of Jews. Yet, the corresponding note tucked in the book’s back pages reveals that actually the campaign was carefully orchestrated by ‘priests and other anti-Jewish agitators’ and that ‘many’ signatories were ‘indifferent’ to the Jews. Ian Kershaw adds that ‘many petitioners... knew little of any Jewish Question.’ Unfazed, Goldhagen concludes his endnote: ‘because agitators could so easily induce them to anti-Semitic expression’, the petition drive still proves ‘how anti-Semitic Bavarians were’. (23)
[48] Even if Goldhagen were able to prove that German culture was ‘axiomatically anti-Semitic’ (HWE, p. 59), that in itself would not yet prove that the German people strained at the bit to murder Jews. Thus, as seen above, Goldhagen also argues that German anti-Semitism was pervasively homicidal. Consider some other representative passages:

By the end of the nineteenth century, the view that Jews posed extreme danger to Germany and that the source of their perniciousness was immutable, namely their race, and the consequential belief that the Jews had to be eliminated from Germany were extremely widespread in German society. The tendency to consider and propose the most radical form of elimination – that is, extermination – was already strong and had been given much voice. (HWE, p. 72, original emphasis)
... the cognitive model of Nazi anti-Semitism had taken shape well before the Nazis came to power, and ... this model, throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was also extremely widespread in all social classes and sectors of German society, for it was deeply embedded in German cultural and political life and conversation, as well as integrated into the moral structure of society. (HWE, p. 77)

Pulzer, however, maintains that only ‘a small, though growing, and noisy minority’ even held that ‘Jews were a separate, unassimilable race’. A second authority frequently cited by Goldhagen, Shulamit Volkov, similarly concludes that nineteenthcentury German anti-Semitism did not ‘bring forth’ the Nazi genocide. Indeed, it was ‘closer to the French version of that time than to later National Socialist positions.’ (24)

The Jews as a Separate Race
To document his thesis, Goldhagen repeatedly points to the proliferation of radically anti-Semitic literature in Germany. For instance, he cites the ‘startling’ statistic that 19 of 51 ‘prominent anti-Semitic writers’ advocated the ‘physical extermination of the Jews.’ (HWE, p. 71, original emphasis; see also p. 64) One would perhaps also want to note that an overwhelming majority did not. As Goldhagen himself acknowledges two pages earlier: ‘a large percentage of the anti-Semites proposed no action at all.’ Goldhagen deems this last fact ‘astonishing’ – but it would be astonishing only if his thesis were true. Goldhagen also never asks who read this literature. Scoring Germany as the birthplace and headquarters of ‘scientific’ anti-Semitism, Eva Reichmann nonetheless cautions that ‘an anti-Semitic literature does not of necessity prove a wide anti-Semitic response among the public.’ (25)
Ill suited to his thesis, the scholarly evidence is recast by Goldhagen with [49] the aid of his novel methodology. (26) Thus, Goldhagen suggests that any German who believed that Jews constituted a ‘religion, nation, political group, or race’ and thus were an ‘alien body within Germany’, or that Jews engaged in ‘underhanded’ or ‘parasitic’ business activities fell on the eliminationist spectrum gliding to murder. (27) The identical image of Jews as a ‘nation’ or ‘race’ that was ‘alien’ to and ‘parasitical’ on European society was also, however, a staple of Zionist ideology. Indeed, as one Zionist historian copiously documents, ‘the Jewish self-criticism so widespread among the German Zionist intelligentsia often seemed dangerously similar to the plaints of the German anti-Semites.’ (28) Does that make all Zionists homicidal anti-Semites as well? Pressed into Goldhagen’s conceptual meat grinder, even German ‘liberals’, ‘philosemites’, and ‘Progressives’, with their ambivalent prescriptions for Jewish emancipation, emerge as racial psychopaths. Thus, Goldhagen reckons that Enlightenment Germans were ‘anti-Semites in sheep’s clothing’, ‘philosemitic anti-Semites’, in thrall to the ‘assimilationist version of the eliminationist mind-set’, and so forth. (HWE, pp. 56-9, 70, 74, 78) Small wonder that Goldhagen is able to prove that Germany was a nation of murderous Jew-haters.
For all its social turbulence, modern Germany prior to Hitler witnessed only episodic spasms of anti-Jewish violence. Indeed, there was no equivalent of the riots that attended the Dreyfus Affair or the pogroms in Russia. If Germany was brimming with pathological anti-Semites, why did Jews so rarely suffer their wrath? Alas, Goldhagen only briefly touches on this – for his thesis – plainly pivotal question. He writes, ‘As powerful and potentially violent as the anti-Semitism was ... the state would not allow it to become the basis of collective social action of this [50] sort. Wilhelmine Germany would not tolerate the organized violence for which the anti-Semites appeared to long.’ (HWE, p. 72) Yet, why was the State immune to the pathological anti-Semitism infecting the German body-politic? Indeed, winning the 1893 election, the Conservative Party, which according to Goldhagen was ‘thoroughly anti-Semitic’, along with allied avowedly anti-Semitic parties, proved a force to reckon with in the State. (HWE, pp. 56, 74-6) Why did these violent anti-Semites ‘not tolerate’ anti-Semitic violence?
Disobeying orders that they opposed, the Germans did not, according to Goldhagen, blindly defer to State authority. Indeed, if the State violated a normative value, ‘ordinary citizens’ entered into ‘open rebellion’ against, and ‘battled in the streets... in defiance of ... and in order to overthrow it.’ (HWE, pp. 381-2) Goldhagen further maintains that all the non-governmental centres of power in Germany – what he calls its ‘Tocquevillian substructure’ – were packed with insane Jew-haters. (HWE, pp. 59-60, 72-4) If they were thus driven by fanatical anti-Semitism that was the German ‘cultural norm’ (HWE, p. 61), the German people should have risen up against the Wilhelmine state that was shielding the Jews. Jewish blood should have been flowing in German streets. Luckily for the Jews, but unluckily for Goldhagen’s thesis, this never happened. Ironically, the only ‘continual legislative and parliamentary battles’, ‘bitter political fights’, and so forth Goldhagen chronicles were over Jewish emancipation. (HWE, p. 56) If, as Goldhagen writes in the very same paragraphs, the ‘vast majority’ of Germans were ‘thoroughly anti-Semitic’, why was there such intense political discord on the Jewish Question?
Goldhagen acknowledges only parenthetically that, for all the entrenched anti-Semitism, modern German Jews experienced a ‘meteoric rise from pariah status.’ (HWE, p. 78) Indeed, German Jerry at the century’s turn – recalls one historian – ‘thrived in this atmosphere of imperfect toleration; their coreligionists throughout the world ... looked to them for support and leadership.’ (29) Goldhagen wisely does not even try to reconcile the ‘meteoric rise’ of German Jews with the thesis that Germany was seething with psychopathic anti-Semitism.
Saturated with Jew-hatred, Weimar Germany was, according to Goldhagen, all of a piece. Thus ‘virtually every major institution and group ... was permeated by anti-Semitism’, ‘nearly every political group in the country shunned the Jews’, ‘Jews, though ferociously attacked, found virtually no defenders’, ‘the public conversation about Jews was almost wholly negative’, and so on, and so on. (HWE, pp. 82-4)
It is true that anti-Semitism persisted in the Weimar era. Goldhagen recalls the ‘Aryan paragraphs’ that restricted Jewish entry into universities and student organizations. (HWE, p. 83) Yet Jews in England and the US suffered similar exclusions. Popular anti-Semitic violence occasionally flared up during the years 1917-23 when German society tottered on the brink of total collapse. Once the new regime stabilized, however, almost all vandalization of Jewish property was connected [51] with the Nazis. Unlike Goldhagen, Pulzer reports that the Social-Democratic Party proved during Weimar ‘a committed opponent of organized anti-Semitism’, and Niewyck reports that ‘the penetration of anti-Jewish opinions into the organized Socialist working class was kept to an unmeasurable minimum’. To document that the ‘SPD did little to attack the Nazis ‘anti-Semitism’, Goldhagen cites Donna Harsch’s study, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism. (HWE, p. 497 n. 16) Turning to the cited page, we learn that, although the SPD did react defensively to slurs that it was beholden to the Jewish community, ‘all Social Democrats’ proved ‘consistent’ in their ‘advocacy of the civil rights of German and East European Jews’. (30)
Goldhagen’s monochromatic thumbnail sketch also completely omits the remarkable successes registered by German Jews. Occupying a salient place in German life, Weimar Jewry assembled a record of achievements in the arts, politics and the economy rivaled only by that of American Jewry after World War II. ‘Had the German population been uniquely rabid in its hatred’, Sarah Gordon reasonably concludes, ‘it is inconceivable that Jews could have fared so well, especially compared to Jews in other nations.’ (31)

How Public Were Hitler’s Intentions?
Shouting from the rooftops his maniacal hatred of the Jews, Hitler fully and incessantly apprised the German people, according to Goldhagen, of his genocidal plans: ‘In his writing, speeches, and conversation, Hitler was direct and clear. Germany’s enemies at home and abroad were to be destroyed or rendered inert. No one who heard or read Hitler could have missed this clarion message.’ (HWE, p. 86) And again: ‘Rarely has a national leader so openly, frequently, and emphatically announced an apocalyptic intention – in this case, to destroy Jewish power and even the Jews themselves – and made good on his promise.’ (HWE, p. 162; see also p. 424)
Yet, Goldhagen adduces only three pieces of evidence for the period up to the eve of World War II to document this claim: the notorious passage from Mein Kampf, which perhaps few Germans read and even fewer took literally; a speech of 1920 when Hitler was ‘still politically obscure’; and Hitler’s conditional and ambiguous January 1939 ‘prophecy’, which was largely ignored by a German public preoccupied with the impending war. (32)
[52] Hitler’s public statements have been subject to numerous analyses. None confirm Goldhagen’s depiction. Indeed, yet again directly contradicting his own thesis, Goldhagen reports that Hitler ‘prudently would not repeat in public’ his explicitly genocidal aims ‘after he had achieved national prominence’. Goldhagen also validates Goebbels’s boast in 1944 that, before seizing power, the Nazis ‘had not made their ultimate intentions known publicly’. (Goldhagen’s paraphrase; HWE, pp. 425, 589 n. 13) The actual documentary record for the period through 1939 shows that: 1) Hitler’s earliest speeches were pervasively anti-Semitic; 2) realizing, however, that anti-Marxism had a wider appeal than anti-Semitism, Hitler muted his attacks on Jews once he entered public life in 1923; 3) attacks on Jews figured only marginally in Hitler’s speeches during the years immediately preceding his electoral triumph; 4) upon taking power and until the eve of World War II, Hitler publicly announced as his ultimate goal not the annihilation but the forced emigration of the Jews. (33)
‘Even during the War, when his machinery of destruction was running at top capacity’, Max Domanis recalls, Hitler ‘confined his remarks on a massacre of Jews to threats within the scope of his foreign policy, knowing only too well that such an openly propagated program of extermination was certain to meet with resistance from the majority of the German people and the bulk of his parry followers.’ (34) Yet, Goldhagen writes: ‘Hitler announced many times, emphatically, that the war would end in the extermination of the Jews. The killing met with general understanding, if not approval.’ The endnote refers readers to Max Domarus. (HWE, pp. 8 [incomplete reference], 477 n. 10)
The Nazi genocide, Goldhagen elucidates, was ‘given shape and energized by a leader, Hitler, who was adored by the vast majority of the [53] German people, a leader who was known to be committed wholeheartedly to the unfolding, brutal eliminationist program.’ (HWE, p. 419) Pointing up ‘Hitler’s enormous popularity and the legitimacy that it helped engender for the regime’, Goldhagen elsewhere refers readers to Ian Kershaw’s important study, The ‘Hitler Myth’. (HWE, p. 512 n. 2) Yet Goldhagen omits altogether Kershaw’s main finding – that anti-Semitism never figured centrally in Hitler’s mass appeal. Thus Kershaw typically writes:

Anti-Semitism, despite its pivotal place in Hitler’s ‘world view’, was of only secondary importance in cementing the bonds between Fuhrer and people which provided the Third Reich with its popular legitimation and basis of plebiscitary acclamation. At the same time, the principle of excluding the Jews from German society was itself widely and increasingly popular, and Hitler’s hatred of the Jews – baleful in its threats but linked to the condoning of lawful, ‘rational’ action, not the unpopular crude violence and brutality of the Party’s ‘gutter’ elements – was certainly an acceptable component of his popular image, even if it was an element ‘taken on board’ rather than forming a centrally motivating factor for most Germans.

Indeed, ‘during the 1930s ... when his popularity was soaring to dizzy heights’, Kershaw underlines, Hitler ‘was extremely careful to avoid public association with the generally unpopular pogrom-type anti-Semitic outrages.’ (35)

Was Anti-Semitism Appealing?
Like Hitler’s public persona, the electoral cycle culminating in the Nazi victory has been closely scrutinized by historians. These contests were a uniquely sensitive barometer of the fluctuations in German popular opinion. The consensus of the scholarly literature is that anti-Semitism did not figure centrally in the Nazis’ ultimate success at the polls. (36) Before the massive economic depression sent German society reeling, neither the Nazis nor any of the other radical anti-Semitic parties were able to garner more than a minuscule percentage of the votes. Even as late as 1928, only 2.8 per cent of the German electorate cast ballots for the Nazi Party. The subsequent spectacular upswing in the Nazis’ electoral fortunes was due [54] overwhelmingly to the solutions they proposed for Germany’s economic crisis. Not the Jews but Marxism and Social Democracy served as the prime scapegoats of Nazi propaganda. Anti-Semitism was not altogether jettisoned by the Nazis; it did not, however, account for the core of their support. In perhaps the single most illuminating interpretive study of the Nazi phenomenon, Eva Reichmann subtly elucidates this relationship:

In an excessively complicated situation Nazism offered to a society in full disintegration a political diet whose disastrous effects this society was no longer able to realize. People felt that it contained tidbits for every palate. The tidbits were, so to speak, coated with anti-Semitism.... But it was not the covering for the sake of which they were greedily swallowed.... The wrapping in which the new security, the new self-assurance, the exculpation, the permission to hate was served might equally well have had another colour and another spice.

The ‘conclusiveness of this analogy’, Reichmann significantly adds, is ‘confirmed’ by the absence of popular anti-Semitic malice prior to the Nazi victory:

If those people who, under the influence of anti-Semitic propaganda, had been moved by outright hatred of the Jews, their practical aggression against them would have been excessive after the Jews had been openly abandoned to the people’s fury. Violence would not then have been limited to the organized activities of Nazi gangs, but would have become endemic in the whole people and seriously endangered the life of every Jew in Germany. This, however, did not happen. Even during the years in which the party increased by leaps and bounds, spontaneous terrorist assaults on Jews were extremely rare ... In spite of the ardent efforts of the [Nazi Party], the boycott against Jewish shopkeepers and professional men before the seizure of power was negligible, although this would have been an inconspicuous and safe way of demonstrating one’s anti-Jewish feeling. From all this all but complete lack of practical anti-Semitic reactions at a time when the behaviour of the public was still a correct index to its sentiments, it can only be inferred that the overwhelming majority of the people did not feel their relations to the Jewish minority as unbearable. (37)

Goldhagen dispatches the crucial cycle of elections culminating in the Nazi victory in one page. He highlights that, in the July 1932 election – the Nazis’ best showing in an open contest – ‘almost fourteen million Germans, 37.4 per cent of the voters, cast their lots for Hitler.’ (HWE, p. 87, original emphasis) He might also have highlighted that more than twenty three million Germans, 62.6 per cent of the voters, did not cast their lot for Hitler. ‘There is no doubt’, Goldhagen concludes, ‘that Hitler’s virulent, lethalsounding anti-Semitism did not at the very least deter Germans by the millions from throwing their support to him.’ (HWE, p. 497 n. 22) This finding, however, feebly sustains Goldhagen’s thesis. If, [55] as Goldhagen claims, the Germans were straining at the bit to murder the Jews, and if, as he claims, Hitler promised to ‘unleash’ them if elected, then Germans should have voted for Hitler not despite but because of his anti-Semitism. Not even Goldhagen pretends this was the case. Indeed, he acknowledges that ‘many people ... welcomed Nazism while disliking certain of its aspects as transient excrescences upon the body of the Party which Hitler ... would slough off as so many alien accretions.’ (HWE, p. 435) This was precisely the case with Nazi anti-Semitism. (38) Finally, to demonstrate Hitler’s greater popularity right after the seizure of power, Goldhagen recalls that the throttling of all dissent ‘did not deter voters, but increased the Nazi vote to over seventeen million people’ in March 1933. (HWE, p. 87) One may have supposed that this increment in Nazi votes was perhaps because all dissent was throttled. Imagine if, to demonstrate the Communist regime’s growing popular appeal, a Soviet historian argued that massive repression ‘did not deter, but increased the vote for Stalin to over...’ It is doubtful that even Pravda would have noticed such a book.

4. The Nazi Years, 1933-1939
In her study of Nazism, Eva Reichmann observes that the ‘spontaneous’ German attitude toward Jews can no longer be gauged after Hitler’s ascension to power. Totalitarian rule corrupted Germans. (39) Goldhagen disagrees. Consistent with his ‘monocausal explanation’, Goldhagen maintains that the Nazi regime’s propaganda and repressive apparatuses did not do special injury to German-Jewish relations. ‘It must be emphasized’, Goldhagen writes, ‘that in no sense did the Nazis “brainwash” the German people.’ Rather, the Germans were already in thrall to a ‘hallucinatory, demonized image of Jews’ long before Hitler came on the scene. (40) Why then did the Nazi regime invest so much of its resources in fomenting Jew-hatred? Goldhagen recalls, for instance, that ‘the most consistent, frequently acted upon and pervasive German governmental policy’ was ‘constant, ubiquitous, anti-Semitic vituperation issued from ... public organs, ranging from Hitler’s own speeches, to never-ending installments in Germany’s radio, newspapers, magazines, and journals, to films, to public signage and verbal fusillades, to schoolbooks.’ Indeed, Goldhagen himself stresses that this ‘incessant anti-Semitic barrage’ took an ‘enormous toll’ not only on Jews but ‘also on Germans’, and was aimed at ‘Preparing Germans for still more drastic eliminationist measures.’ (HWE, pp. 136, 124, 137)
Hitler’s Willing Executioners is in fact replete with illustrations, cited approvingly by Goldhagen, that Nazi Jew-baiting did poison German sensibilities. Germans embraced anti-Semitism, an Einsatzkommando confesses, because ‘it was hammered into us, during the years of propaganda, again and again, that the Jews were the ruin of every Volk in the midst of which they appear and that peace would reign in Europe only... when the Jewish race is exterminated.’ (HWE, p. 442). Popular anti-Semitism ‘was, after all, no surprise’, a German Jew explained in [56] 1942. ‘Because for nearly ten years the inferiority and harmfulness of the Jews has been emphasized in every newspaper, morning and evening, in every radio broadcast and on many posters, etc., without a voice in favour of the Jews being permitted to be raised.’ (HWE, p. 449) ‘I believed the propaganda that all Jews were criminals and subhumans’, a former murderous police battalion member discloses, ‘and that they were the cause of Germany’s decline after the First World War.’ (HWE, p. 179) ‘Nazi schooling produced a generation of human beings in Nazi Germany so different from normal American youth’, an American educator recalls, ‘that mere academic comparison seems inane. ‘(HWE, p. 27)
Indeed, Goldhagen’s crowning piece of evidence confutes the book’s central thesis. ‘In what may be the most significant and illuminating testimony given after the war’, Goldhagen reports, an ‘expert legal brief’ submitted at Nuremberg argued that the Einsatzgruppen ‘really believed’ that Germany was locked in mortal combat with the Jewish agents of a Bolshevik conspiracy. Quoting from this ‘all but neglected’ document, Goldhagen locates the ‘source’ of these psychotic beliefs not in a murderously anti-Semitic German culture but in Nazi propaganda: ‘it cannot be doubted that National Socialism had succeeded to the fullest extent in convincing public opinion and furthermore the overwhelming majority of the German people of the identity of Bolshevism and Jewry.’ (HWE, p. 393, original emphasis) Goldhagen seems totally unaware that he has just highlighted his ‘monocausal explanation’ of the Nazi genocide into oblivion. (41)
Citing the findings of Robert Gellately, ‘the foremost expert on the Gestapo’, Goldhagen reports that only a tiny handful of Germans were prosecuted for verbally dissenting from Nazi anti-Semitism. According to Goldhagen, this German silence cannot, however, be credited to repression. Contrary to widespread belief, Goldhagen maintains, the Hitlerian state was benign. The Nazis ruled ‘without massive coercion and violence’. The regime ‘was, on the whole, consensual’. Germans generally ‘accepted the system and Hitler’s authority as desirable and legitimate’. (HWE, pp. 132, 429-30, 456)
Yet Gellately situates his findings in a radically different context from Goldhagen’s. He proceeds ‘from the assumption that fear was indeed prevalent among the German people.’ To pretend otherwise, he asserts, is ‘foolish’. Denunciation to settle private scores was rampant. Especially vulnerable were Germans critical of Nazi anti-Semitism. With the promulgation of the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, ‘anyone friendly to Jews could be denounced on suspicion of having illicit relationships.’ Thus [57] ‘numerous’ Germans ‘in the employ of Jews or in some kind of business contact with them had brushes with the Gestapo when they persisted in these relations or expressed the mildest kinds of solidarity with the persecuted.’ Indeed, more often than not, transgressions were summarily dealt with: ‘When it came to enforcing racial policies destined to isolate Jews, there can be no doubt that the wrath of the Gestapo knew no bounds, often dispensing with even the semblance of legal procedures. It is important to be reminded of the “legal” and “extra-legal” terror brought down on the heads of those who would not otherwise comply.’ ‘Sometimes... they were driven to suicide.’ Given the scope of the repression, Gellately suggests, care must be exercised not to infer too much from the Gestapo files. They ‘may well underestimate the degree of rejection of Nazi anti-Semitism’. Germans ‘would be foolhardy to speak openly about reservations they might have on that score when brought in for interrogation.’ Moreover, ‘if they were never caught, hence never turned over to the Gestapo, there would be no official record of their activities. In addition, most of the files of those who were caught were destroyed.’
Germans generally ‘accommodated themselves to the official line’, Gellately nonetheless suggests, ‘and to all intents and purposes, did not stand in the way of the persecution of the Jews.’ It was, however, an acquiescence borne not of fanatical hatred but significantly of fear: ‘Being turned into the authorities for the smallest sign of non-compliance was too common not to have struck anxiety in the hearts of anyone who might under other circumstances have found no fault with the Jews.’ (42)
Dissenting, Goldhagen maintains that behind the German silence was not at all fear but ‘ideological congruity’ with the murderous Nazi project. (HWE, p. 591 n. 27) Accordingly, in his overview of the Nazi era, Goldhagen writes: ‘Whatever else Germans thought about Hitler and the Nazi movement, however much they might have detested aspects of Nazism, the vast majority of them subscribed to the underlying Nazi model of Jews and in this sense (as the Nazis themselves understood) were “Nazified” in their view of Jews.’
None of the copious relevant scholarship, Goldhagen acknowledges in the corresponding endnote, reaches his conclusions. Rather, Goldhagen leans on a ‘theoretical [and] analytical account of anti-Semitism’ and an understanding of ‘the nature of cognitions, beliefs, and ideologies and their relation to action.’ (HWE, pp. 87, 497-8 n. 24) Without his novel methodology, Goldhagen is indeed no more able to prove his thesis for the period after Hitler’s ascension to power than he was for the period before it.

German Attitudes to Anti-Jewish Laws
Goldhagen recalls the degrading and onerous proscriptions on Jewish life in Nazi Germany. He cites, for example, the barring of Jews from public facilities (for example, swimming pools and public baths), the exclusion of Jews from prestigious professional associations and institutions (for example, medicine, law and higher education) and later much [58] of the economy, the posting of signs that pointed up the Jews’ pariah status (for example, ‘Jews Not Wanted Here’, ‘Entry Forbidden to Jews’), and so on and so on. (HWE, pp. 91-3, 96-7, 124-5, 137-8)
Implemented ‘with the approval of the vast majority of people’, these measures evinced, according to Goldhagen, the ‘Germans’ eliminationist intent.’ (HWE, pp. 422, 93) The actual record, however, is rather more complex. (43) Acting narrowly on their economic self-interest, Germans generally supported Nazi anti-Jewish initiatives from which they stood to gain materially, and opposed Nazi anti-Jewish initiatives from which they stood to lose materially. Socially restrictive Nazi initiatives initially got a lukewarm reception. Goldhagen suggests otherwise. Citing Gellately, he reports that ‘Germans posted signs’ with anti-Jewish prohibitions. (HWE, pp. 91-2) Turning to the cited page, we learn that the campaign was orchestrated ‘by local hotheads in the Nazi movement , with opportunist Germans occasionally joining in. Succumbing, however, to the combined pressures of propaganda and repression, most Germans, already more or less disposed to anti-Semitic appeals, did come to endorse, with relative ease if not conviction, the social segregation of the Jews. Yet in this respect, the Germans’ ‘radical treatment’ – as Goldhagen puts it (HWE, p. 422) – of the Jews barely differed from the Jim Crow system in the American South. (44)
Consider the Nuremberg Laws. Repeatedly pointing to these enactments as the crystallization of the murderous Nazi mind-set, Goldhagen, for instance, writes:

The eliminationist program had received at once its most coherent statement and its most powerful push forward. The Nuremberg Laws promised to accomplish what had heretofore for decades been but discussed and urged on ad nauseam. With this codifying moment of the Nazi German ‘religion’, the regime held up the eliminationist [59] writing on the Nazi tablets for every German to read. (HWE, pp. 97-8; see also p. 138)

The Nuremberg legislation stripped Jews of the franchise (‘Reich Citizenship Law’) and prohibited sexual relations between Jews and Germans (‘The Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honour’). Yet black people in the American South suffered from identical restrictions. Indeed, they did not effectively secure the vote, and the Supreme Court did not outlaw the anti-miscegenation statutes, until the mid 1960s. These proscriptions enjoyed overwhelming support among Southern whites. Does that mean nearly all Southern whites were genocidal racists waiting for a Hitler to ‘unleash’ them? (45)
The German disposition to anti-Semitic violence is plainly the crucial test of Goldhagen’s thesis. Seizing power, Hitler effectively opened the sluice gates. Moral and legal restraints were lifted. The opposition was crushed. Virulent anti-Semitic incitement was literally in the air. ‘The state’, as Goldhagen puts it, ‘had implicitly declared the Jews to be “fair game” – beings who were to be eliminated from German society, by whatever means necessary, including violence.’ (46) What did the German people do? Did they spontaneously indulge in anti-Semitic pogroms? Did they join in the Nazi pogroms? Did they approve the Nazi pogroms? Did they, at bare minimum, condone the Nazi pogroms? The voluminous scholarly evidence points to a uniform, unequivocal answer to all these questions: No. There were few, if any, popular German assaults on the Jews. Indeed, Germans overwhelmingly condemned the Nazi anti-Semitic atrocities.
For ‘far greater empirical support for my positions than space permits me to offer here’, Goldhagen advises, readers should consult David Bankier’s study, The Germans and the Final Solution: Public Opinion under Nazism. (HWE, pp. 497-8 n. 24) Consider then Bankier’s conclusions. During the first years of Nazi anti-Semitic incitement, most Germans (‘large sectors’, ‘the bulk’, ‘sizable parts’) found ‘the form of persecution abhorrent’, expressed ‘misgivings about the brutal methods employed’, ‘remained on the sidelines’, ‘severely condemned the persecution’, and so on. With the revival of Nazi anti-Semitic terror in 1935, ‘large sections of the population were repelled by the Sturmer methods and refused to comply with demands to take action against the Jews.’ Indeed, the ‘vast majority of the population approved the Nuremberg Laws’ not only because they ‘identified with the racialist policy’ but ‘especially’ because ‘a permanent framework of discrimination had been created that would [60] end the reign of terror and set precise limits to anti-Semitic activities.’ ‘Sturmer methods and the violence’ in the years 1936-37 ‘met with the same disapproval as in the past.’ ‘The overwhelming majority approved social segregation and economic destruction of the Jews’ on the eve of Kristallnacht in 1938 ‘but not outbursts of brute force... it was not Jew hatred in the Nazi sense.’ ‘All sections of the population’, Bankier reports, ‘reacted with shock’ to Kristallnacht. ‘There were few occasions, if any, in the Third Reich’, Kershaw similarly recalls, ‘which produced such a widespread wave of revulsion’, reaching ‘deep into the ranks’ of the Nazi Party itself. The motives behind these outpourings of popular disgust, to be sure, were not unalloyed. Some Germans evinced genuine moral outrage. Some recoiled from the sheer brutality of the violence which also defaced Germany’s image. Some opposed the destruction only because it squandered material resources. Yet, whatever the motive, Goldhagen’s thesis is unsustainable. (47)
For argument’s sake, let us assume the worst-case scenario: Germans repudiated Nazi anti-Semitic violence not on strictly humanitarian grounds but, rather, because it was gratuitously cruel and economically wasteful. According to Goldhagen, however, these were precisely the differentiae of the Nazi genocide. The ‘limitless cruelty’ of the German perpetrators, Goldhagen emphasizes, was ‘a constituent feature of the Holocaust, as central to it as the killing itself.’ (Reply, p. 38; I will return to this crucial distinction in part II) Goldhagen also devotes a significant part of his study (pp. 281-323) to demonstrating that, in the hierarchy of ‘guiding values’ in the German ‘work’ camps, persecution of the Jews always took precedence over ‘economic rationality’. (HWE, p. 322) Regardless of the reason, then, the German people’s overwhelming condemnation of Nazi anti-Semitic violence is conclusive evidence that Goldhagen’s ‘monocausal explanation’ is false. Note further that, according to Goldhagen, a crucial facet of the Nazi genocide was the voluntarism of the perpetrators. Always taking the initiative, ordinary Germans – to quote a typical passage – ‘easily and with alacrity became executioners of Jews’. (HWE, p. 395; I will also return to this point in part II) Yet, as we have seen, spontaneous German anti-Semitic attacks rarely occurred. On the eve of the Nazi holocaust, the German people were, on Goldhagen’s own terms, very far from ‘Nazified.’ Indeed, there was much less popular participation in and [61] support for violent racist incitement in Nazi Germany than in the American South.(48)
Apparently aware that the crushing weight of scholarly evidence obliterates his thesis, Goldhagen improvises a three-pronged damage control strategy: tacit admission, minimization, and misrepresentation. I shall only sample his procedures here (see Table).


Goldhagen acknowledges the evidence but not its devastating implications for his thesis. For example:

‘The law excluding Jews from the civil service, being unaccompanied by public displays of brutality, was, not surprisingly, widely unpopular in Germany.’ (HWE, p. 91)

Recalling the ‘uncoordinated and often wild attacks upon Jews’ during the first years of Nazi rule, Goldhagen observes that ‘many Germans’ felt ‘unsettled.’ (HWE, p. 97)

‘The reaction of the populace at large’ to Nazi initiatives ‘was one of general approval... , though it was accompanied by significant disapproval of the licentious brutality.’ (HWE, p. 99)

To document that ‘workers ... were, on the issue of the Jews, in general accord with the Nazis’, Goldhagen cites an SPD report stating that ‘The general anti-Semitic psychosis affects ... our comrades’ but ‘All are decided opponents of violence.’ (HWE, pp. 106-7)

Goldhagen acknowledges the evidence but denies that it undermines his thesis. For example:

‘The criticism of Kristallnacht’s licentious violence and wasteful destruction that could be heard around Germany should be understood as the limited criticism of an eliminationist path that the overwhelming majority of Germans considered to be fundamentally sound, but which, in this case, had taken a momentary wrong turn.’ (HWE, p. 102; See also pp. 101, 103, 120-1, 123) (Weren’t ‘licentious violence’ and ‘wasteful destruction’ the hallmarks of the Nazi genocide?)

‘Episodic distemper with aspects of the regime’s assault on the Jews should not be understood as being indicative of a widespread, general rejection of the eliminationist ideal and program... the character and overwhelming plenitude of the counter-evidence... is vastly greater than Germans’ numerically paltry expressions of disapproval of what... can be seen to have been generally only specific aspects of the larger eliminationist program and not its governing principles.’ (HWE, p. 120; see also p. 91)

Conceding that ‘Ordinary Germans did not leap to mass extermination on their own, or generally even urge it’, Goldhagen explains that ‘Hitler was already working towards this goal with heart and soul, so many Germans sat by, satisfied that their government was doing the best that any government conceivably could.’ (HWE, p. 445-6) (Weren’t Germans anxiously awaiting Hitler to ‘unleash’ and ‘unshackle’ their ‘pent up anti-Semitic passion’? Seizing every opportunity, didn’t Germans leap ‘with alacrity’ to kill Jews during the Nazi genocide?)

‘No evidence suggests that any but an insignificant scattering of Germans harboured opposition to the eliminationist program save for its most brutally wanton aspects.’ (HWE, pp. 438-9; see also pp. 509-10 n. 165)

Goldhagen mangles the evidence. For example:

spontaneous ones from ordinary Germans and ones orchestrated by government and party institutions’, Goldhagen adds: ‘the vast majority of the German people... were aware of what their government and their countrymen were doing to the Jews, assented to the measures, and, when the opportunity presented itself, lent their active support to them.’ (HWE, pp. 89-90) (Didn’t Goldhagen’s main empirical source state that Germans overwhelmingly opposed Nazi violence?)

‘The attacks upon Jews during the first years of Nazi governance of Germany were so widespread and broad-based that it would be grievously wrong to attribute them solely to the coughs of the SA, as if the wider German public had no influence over, Recalling inter alia the ‘Physical and increased verbal attacks upon Jews, both or part in, the violence.’ (HWE, p. 95)

‘In light of the widespread persecution and violence that occurred throughout ... Germany, Kristallnacht was, in one sense, but the crowning moment in the wild domestic terror that Germans perpetrated upon Jews.’ (HWE, p. 99; see also pp. 100-1)

‘The perpetrators [of the Nazi genocide], from Hitler to the lowliest officials, were openly proud of their actions, of their achievements; during the 1930s, they proclaimed and carried them out in full view and with the general approval of the Volk.’ (HWE, p.429; see also p. 430)

Left without a shred of scholarly evidence that Germans overwhelmingly savoured the prospect of massacring Jewry, Goldhagen devises more ingenious methods of proof. Thus, to document the ‘whiff of genocide’ in the ‘anti-Semitic German atmosphere’, Goldhagen quotes an American journalist’s murderous conversations with ‘Nazi circles’, and ‘at a luncheon or dinner with Nazis.’ (HWE, p. 595 n. 68) ‘It is oxymoronic’, according to Goldhagen, ‘to suggest that those who stood with curiosity gazing upon the annihilative inferno of Kristallnacht’ did not relish the violence and destruction. Apparently never having witnessed a crowd mill about a burning edifice, Goldhagen writes: ‘People generally flee scenes and events that they consider to be horrific, criminal, or dangerous.’(HWE, p. 440)

Although there was no palpable evidence in the 1930s of Americans’ intent to kill Japanese, Goldhagen finally analogizes, they did so ‘willingly... and fully believing in the justice of their cause’ during World War II. (HWE, p. 446) The comparison is instructive. The merciless war in the Pacific, John Dower has argued, was the culmination of a plurality of factors: pervasive anti-Asian prejudice, furore over the Pearl Harbor attack, inflammatory war propaganda, brutalizing combat, and so on . (49) To reckon by Goldhagen’s analogy, however, the explanation is rather more simple: Americans were homicidal racists.

Opposition and Indifference
Even during the early war years, most Germans repudiated Nazi anti-Semitism. In September 1941 the Nazis issued a decree forcing Jews to wear the yellow star. ‘A negative reaction to the labelling’, Bankier reports, was the ‘more typical public response.’ Indeed ‘people were often demonstratively kind’, according to reliable accounts. ‘Many displayed forms of disobedience, offering Jews cigars and cigarettes, giving children sweets, or standing up for Jews on trams and underground trains.’ ‘Germans clearly could not tolerate’, Bankier infers, ‘actions which outraged their sense of decency, even towards stigmatized Jews.’ Shocked and appalled by such dissent, the Nazis intensified anti-Jewish [63] propaganda and even enacted a new law sanctioning philosemitic displays with three months’ internment in a concentration camp. (50) Although listing Bankier’s study as his main empirical source, Goldhagen omits altogether these remarkable findings. Rather he reports:

Wearing such a visible target among such a hostile populace... caused Jews to feel acute insecurity, and, because any German passer-by could now identify them easily, Jews, especially Jewish children, suffered increased verbal and physical assaults ... The introduction of the yellow star also meant that all Germans could now better recognize, monitor, and shun those bearing the mark of the social dead. (HWE, pp. 138-9)

With the passage of time and especially as the war took a more disastrous turn, Germans grew increasingly insensitive to Jewish suffering. Propaganda played a part, as did the escalating repression and physical isolation of the Jews. Then the callousness toward human life typically attending war exacerbated by the terror bombing and worsening deprivations on the home front-set in. Turning ever more inward, Germans focused on the exigencies of survival. Hardened and bitter, in search of a scapegoat, they occasionally lashed out at the weak. (51) To illustrate this gradual coarsening of heart, Bankier first recalls ‘not unusual’ episodes in 1941 when, breaking the law and outraging Nazi authorities, Germans surrendered their tramcar seats to aged Jews, eliciting ‘the general approval of the other passengers.’ Yet by 1942, according to Bankier, Germans displaying sympathy for Jews were hooted in public. He recounts a particularly brutal incident also on a tramcar. Citing only this last episode in his book, Goldhagen goes on to criticize Bankier’s balanced conclusion based on all the evidence:

It is difficult to understand why Bankier ... concludes that ‘incidents of this sort substantiate the contention that day-to-day contact with a virulent, anti-Semitic atmosphere progressively dulled people’s sensitivity to the plight of their Jewish neighbours’... That any but a small number of Germans ever possessed ‘sensitivity to the plight of their Jewish neighbours’ during the Nazi period is an assumption which cannot be substantiated, and which... is undermined by the empirical evidence which Bankier presents throughout his book. (HWE, pp. 105, 502 n. 90)

Truly, the Germans’ progressively dulled sensitivities are ‘an assumption which cannot be substantiated’ – if all the empirical substantiation is subject to excision.
Although unaware of the full scope of the judeocide, most Germans did know, or could have known if they chose to, that massive atrocities were being committed in the East. There is no evidence, however, that most Germans approved of these murderous acts. Indeed, precisely because [64] Hitler knew he could not count on enthusiastic popular support, the Final Solution was shrouded in secrecy and all public discussion of Jewry’s fate was banned. (52) The near-consensus in the scholarly literature is that most Germans looked on with malignant indifference. Ian Kershaw, who has written most authoritatively on this topic, summarizes:

Apathy and ‘moral indifference’ to the treatment and fate of the Jews was the most widespread attitude of all. This was not a neutral stance. It was a deliberate turning away from any personal responsibility, acceptance of the state’s right to decide on an issue of little personal concern to most Germans ... the shying away from anything which might produce trouble or danger. This apathy was compatible with a number of internalized attitudes towards Jews, not least with passive or latent anti-Semitism – the feeling that there was a ‘Jewish Question’ and that something needed to be done about it.

It bears emphasizing that Germany’s anti-Semitic legacy did constitute a vital precondition for the genocide. Had Jews not been placed outside the community of moral concern, Kershaw stresses, the Nazis could not have committed their monstrous deeds: ‘The lack of interest in or exclusion of concern for the fate of racial, ethnic, or religious minority groups marks ... at the societal level a significant prerequisite for the genocidal process, allowing the momentum created by the fanatical hatred of a section of the population to gather force, especially, of course, when supported by the power of the state.’ This is a far cry, however, from asserting that ordinary German anti-Semitism – let alone ordinary German anti-Semitism before Hitler’s reign – in itself accounts for the Nazi genocide.

Indeed, Kershaw suggests that little in the German response was ‘peculiarly German or specific only to the “Jewish Question”‘, and, conversely, that most peoples similarly situated would probably not have responded in a more ‘honourable’ fashion than the Germans. (53) Vehemently dissenting, Goldhagen maintains that such alleged indifference in the face of mass slaughter is a ‘virtual psychological impossibility’. (HWE, pp. 439-41) Yet how differently did ordinary Americans react to the slaughter of four million Indochinese, ordinary French to the slaughter of one million Algerians, or, for that matter, ordinary non-Germans to the slaughter of the Jews?

II. Perpetrating the Genocide
When the correlations are made of the Germans’ anti-Jewish measures with their deduced or imputed intentions, Hitler’s [65] hypothesized psychological states and moods, and the Germans’ military fortune, the correlation that stands out, that jumps out, as having been more significant than any other (than all of the others) is that Hitler opted for genocide at the first moment that the policy became practical. (HWE, p. 161)
With the onset of the Nazi holocaust, the validity of Goldhagen’s thesis ceases to be at issue. On the one hand, all the evidence points to the conclusion that, on the eve of the genocide, the vast majority of Germans were not in thrall to a homicidal malice toward Jerry. On the other hand, it is simply not possible, after 1941, to isolate, among the sundry factors potentially spurring German behaviour – an anti-Semitic legacy, virulent Nazi propaganda, brutalization caused by the war, and so on – a ‘monocausal explanation’ of the judeocide. (54) Thus, even if everything Goldhagen maintains about the Nazi holocaust is accurate, his thesis remains false or at best moot. Goldhagen’s rendering, however, is not accurate. Indeed, in a veritable negative tour de force, Goldhagen manages to get nearly everything about the Nazi holocaust wrong. The wrong questions are posed. The wrong answers are given. The wrong lessons are learned.

5. How Many Willing Executioners?
Crediting himself as being the first to reckon the magnitude of German complicity in the Nazi holocaust, Goldhagen boasts:

Until now no one else has discussed seriously the number of people who perpetrated the genocide ....The critics do not bother to inform their readers that I am the first to discuss the numbers (and the problems of providing an estimate), let alone to convey to readers the significance of the findings or of the fact that we have had to wait until 1996 to learn one of the most elementary facts about the Holocaust. (Reply, p. 42)

Yet consider Goldhagen’s calculations. (HWE, pp. 166-7) He first estimates that, if all German perpetrators, direct and indirect, of the [66] genocide are included, the number ‘ran into the millions’. He next estimates that the ‘the number of people who were actual perpetrators was also enormous’ and ‘might run into the millions.’ He then, however, makes the qualification that ‘the number who became perpetrators of the Holocaust (in the sense that it is meant here) was certainly over one hundred thousand’ and perhaps as many as ‘five hundred thousand or more’. But what is ‘the sense that it is meant here’, if not direct and indirect perpetrators combined or direct perpetrators alone? Compounding the confusion, Goldhagen earlier explicitly defines a perpetrator, for the purposes of his study, as any direct or indirect participant in the genocide. (55) This presumably being ‘the sense that it is meant here’, the total number of direct and indirect German perpetrators thus runs not into the millions but at most the hundreds of thousands. What is more, Goldhagen acknowledges in an endnote that all his calculations are pure guesswork: ‘Early in my research, I decided that deriving a good estimate of the number of people who were perpetrators would consume more time than I could profitably devote to it, given my other research objectives. Still, I am confident in asserting that the number was huge.’ (HWE, p. 525 n. 13) Indeed, even this last asseveration is plainly untrue. The estimate for perpetrators Goldhagen most often cites is 100,000. Even assuming for argument’s sake that it includes only direct participants, this figure is still not at all ‘huge’. Goldhagen seems unaware that his research is significant only if – as Hilberg suggests – the perpetrators of the genocide were qualitatively representative of German society generally. Goldhagen’s quantitative finding is comparatively trivial.
Based mainly on the archives of postwar investigations and trials, the core of Goldhagen’s study is an analysis of the German police battalions. (56) Following Christopher Browning, Goldhagen maintains that these ‘agents of genocide’ were more or less typical Germans. Also like Browning, Goldhagen reports that the police battalions were often not obliged to kill Jews. Explicitly given the option of not participating, the overwhelming majority chose not to exercise it. Indeed, those who opted out suffered no real penalties. (57)
[67] In their testimony, the police battalions did not at all acknowledge anti-Semitism as a motivating factor. Making a persuasive case that the near-total silence on Jews was partly disingenuous, Browning nonetheless flatly denies that virulent, Nazi-like anti-Semitism was the prime impetus behind the police battalions’ implementation of the Final Solution. (58) To sustain his contrary thesis, Goldhagen focuses on the gratuitous cruelty attending the genocide. The argument he makes comprises two interrelated but also distinct propositions: 1) gratuitous cruelty is the hallmark of virulent, Nazi-like anti-Semitism, and 2) the police battalions implemented the Final Solution with gratuitous cruelty. I will address these propositions in turn.

Psychopaths or Bureaucrats?
‘Not only the killing but also how the Germans killed must be explained’, claims Goldhagen. ‘The “how” frequently provides great insight into the “why”.’ It is Goldhagen’s main theoretical contention that the propensity for ‘gratuitous cruelty, such as beating, mocking, torturing Jews’ – a cruelty ‘which had no instrumental, pragmatic purpose save the satisfaction and pleasure of the perpetrators’ – was the hallmark of the ‘Nazified German mind’ in thrall to ‘demonological anti-Semitism’. Contrariwise, had they not been Nazi-like anti-Semites, the German perpetrators would have been ‘cold, mechanical executioners’, ‘emotionless or reluctant functionaries’. (59)
The remarkable thing about Goldhagen’s argument is that the exact opposite is true. What distinguished Nazi anti-Semitism was the reluctant and mechanical, as against the gratuitously cruel implementation, of the Final Solution. ‘The killing of the Jews’, reports Raul Hilberg, ‘was regarded as historical necessity.’
The soldier had to ‘understand’ this. If for any reason he was instructed to help the SS and Police in their task, he was expected to obey orders. However, if he killed a Jew spontaneously, voluntarily, or without instruction, merely because he wanted to kill, then he committed an abnormal act, worthy perhaps of an ‘Eastern European’.... Herein lay the crucial difference between the man who ‘overcame’ himself to kill and one who wantonly committed atrocities. The former was regarded as a good soldier and a true Nazi; the latter was a person without self-control ...
[68] Addressing the Nazi fighting elite, SS leader Heinrich Himmler accordingly avowed that the Final Solution had become ‘the most painful question of my life’; that he ‘hated this bloody business’ that had disturbed him to the ‘depth’ of his ‘soul’, but everyone must do his duty, ‘however hard it might be’; that ‘we have completed this painful task out of love for our people’; that it was ‘the curse of the great to have to walk over corpses’; that ‘we have been called upon to fulfill a repulsive duty’, and he ‘would not like it if Germans did such a thing gladly’; that ‘an execution is a grim duty for our men’ and ‘if we had not felt it to be hideous and frightful, we should not have been Germans’, but nevertheless ‘we must grit our teeth and do our duty’, and so on.
In his perversely sanctimonious postwar memoir, Commandant of Auschwitz (generally accepted by scholars as representing honest, if barbaric, sentiments), the exemplary ultra-Nazi Rudolf Hoess similarly recalled being ‘deeply marked’ and ‘tormented’ by the ‘mass extermination, with all the attendant circumstances’ of this ‘monstrous “work”.’ Regarding the ‘Extermination Order’ for the Gypsies – ‘my bestloved prisoners, if I may put it that way’ – Hoess reflects, ‘Nothing surely is harder than to grit one’s teeth and go through with such a thing, coldly, pitilessly and without mercy.’ To implement the Final Solution, ‘I had to exercise intense self-control in order to prevent my innermost doubts and feelings of oppression from becoming apparent .... My pity was so great that I longed to vanish from the scene...
Loathsome undertaking that it was, the judeocide was supposed to be executed with stoicism. ‘Sadism’, reports Heinz Hohne, ‘was only one facet of mass extermination and one disapproved of by SS Headquarters.’ Repudiating ‘crude’ anti-Semitism, the Nazi elite sought to ‘solve the so-called Jewish problem in a cold, rational manner.’ ‘The new type of man of violence’, Joachim Fest likewise observes, ‘was concerned with the dispassionate extermination of real or possible opponents, not with the primitive release of sadistic impulses.’ This ideal Nazi rejection of compulsive in favour of calculated violence, Hans Mommsen emphasizes, was ‘fundamental to the entire system’. It did not at all, to be sure, spring from humanitarian impulses. Rather, gratuitous cruelty was seen as beneath the moral dignity and undermining the combat discipline of the German executioners.

Cruelty in the Camps
Rejecting ‘from inner conviction’ the ‘Bolshevist method of physical extermination of a people as un-Germanic’, SS leader Heinrich Himmler resolved to implement the Final Solution ‘coolly and clearly; even while obeying the official order to commit murder, the SS man must remain “decent”.’ (Hohne) ‘We shall never be rough or heartless where it is not necessary; that is clear’, Himmler admonished. ‘Be hard but do not become hardened’ and ‘intervene at once’ should ‘a Commander exceed his duty or show signs that his sense of restraint is becoming blurred.’ Regarding unauthorized assaults on Jews, Himmler’s legal staff accordingly instructed that, if the motive was ‘purely political, there should be no punishment unless such is necessary for the maintenance of discipline... If the motive is selfish, sadistic or sexual, judicial punishment [69] should be imposed for murder or manslaughter as the case may be.’ Thus, in one notorious SS and Police Supreme Court verdict, an SS officer was convicted not for the actual murder of Jews but inter alia for the ‘vicious excesses’, ‘Bolshevik methods’, ‘vicious brutality’, ‘cruel actions’, and so forth that attended the murders. (Goldhagen refers to this proceeding but not the conviction for gratuitous cruelty. HWE, p. 585 n. 73) ‘Himmler, in short, was not a simple, bloodthirsty, sadistic monster’, concludes biographer Richard Breitman. ‘If a sadist is one who delights in personally inflicting pain or death on others, or in witnessing others inflict them, then Himmler was not a sadist... Himmler was the ultimate bureaucrat.’
The ‘horrors of the concentration camps’, Hoess avows, did not receive his sanction. Evidently the Auschwitz commandant intends, not the systematic mass extermination overseen by him, but rather the sadistic outbursts he purports to have ‘used every means at my disposal to stop.’ ‘I myself never maltreated a prisoner, far less killed one. Nor have I ever tolerated maltreatment by my subordinates.’ ‘I was never cruel.’ Repeatedly professing profound disgust at the ‘malignancy, wickedness and brutality’ of SS guards who did gratuitously torture camp inmates, Hoess muses, ‘They did not regard prisoners as human beings at all ... They regarded the sight of corporal punishment being inflicted as an excellent spectacle, a kind of peasant merrymaking. I was certainly not one of these.’ The Kapos – prisoner-functionaries in charge of the work detachments – indulging in orgies of violence aroused Hoess’s deepest contempt: ‘They were soulless and had no feelings whatsoever. I find it incredible that human beings could ever turn into such beasts ... It was simply gruesome.” (60) Indeed, former inmates of the Nazi concentration camps typically testify that the Kapos were, in the words of Auschwitz survivor, Dr. Viktor E. Frankl, ‘harder on the prisoners than were the guards, and beat them more cruelly than the SS men did. (61) To reckon by Goldhagen’s standard, not Hoess or Himmler but the Kapo underling was the quintessential ‘Nazified German mind’ in thrall to ‘demonological anti-Semitism.’
On the other hand, Goldhagen does, for example, mention that a senior SS official ‘who was no friend of the Jews’, Das Schwarze Korps, ‘the official organ of the SS, the most ideologically radical of all Nazi papers and naturally also a virulently anti-Semitic one’, and ‘even the commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess, who presided over the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of Jews’, repudiated, indeed were ‘repelled’ by, the ‘unnecessary brutality’, ‘frenzied sadists’, ‘senseless acts of terror’, and so forth. He does not, however, register the potentially fatal implications of [70] these acknowledgements for his thesis. (HWE, pp. 105, 121, 394, 509-10 n. 165) Compounding error with contradiction, Goldhagen instead avers that the ‘Nazified German mind’ was equally compatible with a broad spectrum of types – ranging from the ‘revelling, sadistic slayers’ and the ‘zealous but faint-of-heart killers’ to the ‘dedicated but non celebratory executioners’ and the ‘approving but uneasy and conflicted killers’ – and that ‘it is hard to know what the distribution of the various types was.’ (HWE, pp. 259-61; see also pp. 509-10 n. 165) That being the case, gratuitous cruelty plainly did not distinguish the ‘Nazified German mind’. Goldhagen’s fixation on the gratuitous cruelty of Germans is thus, even on his own terms, wrong headed: the ‘sadistic slayer’ is, for Goldhagen, no more proof of a ‘Nazified German mind’ than the ‘uneasy and conflicted killer.’
Consider now Goldhagen’s complementary empirical claim. The gratuitous cruelty of the police battalions was pervasive. Goldhagen’s study is mostly given over to chronicling German atrocities attendant on the Final Solution. Undaunted by the ‘horror, brutality, and frequent gruesomeness of the killing operations’, the police battalions, according to Goldhagen, ‘easily became genocidal killers’ of Jews. Indeed, Goldhagen maintains that the police battalions tortured and murdered Jews with ‘relish and excess’, ‘cruel abandon’, ‘unmistakable alacrity’, ‘evident gusto’, ‘dedication and zeal’, as a ‘pleasurable pursuit’, ‘in the most gratuitous, willful manner’. (HWE, pp. 19, 185, 191, 237, 238, 255, 256, 259, 378, 387, 447) Goldhagen underlines that the police battalions committed their monstrous deeds openly – for example, with ‘loved ones’ in attendance – and even ‘memorialized’ them in photographs: ‘It is as if they were saying, “Here is a great event. Anyone who wants to preserve for himself images of the heroic accomplishments can order copies”.’ (HWE, pp. 241-7)
First, a brief word about this latter argument. To prove that ordinary Germans were in thrall to homicidal anti-Semitism before Hitler’s rise to power, Goldhagen points to the public aspect of the atrocities. Yet compare the war in the Pacific. Recalling that the Allied combatants’ practice of collecting Japanese ears ‘was no secret’, John Dower reports:

‘The other night’, read an account in the Marine monthly Leatherneck in mid-1943, ‘Stanley emptied his pocket of “souvenirs” – eleven ears from dead Japs. It was not disgusting, as it would be from the civilian point of view. None of us could get emotional over it.’ Even as battle-hardened veterans were assuming that civilians would be shocked by such acts, however, the press in the United Sates contained evidence to the contrary. In April 1943, the Baltimore Sun ran a story about a local mother who had petitioned authorities to permit her son to mail her an ear he had cut off a Japanese soldier in the South Pacific. She wished to nail it to her front door for all to see. On the very same day, the Detroit Free Press deemed newsworthy the story of an underage youth who had enlisted and ‘bribed’ his chaplain not to disclose his age by promising him the third pair of ears he collected.

Scalps, bones, and skulls were somewhat rarer trophies, but the latter two achieved special notoriety ... when an American serviceman [71] sent President Roosevelt a letter opener made from the bone of a dead Japanese (the President refused it), and Life published a full page photograph of an attractive blond posing with a Japanese skull she had been sent by her fiancé in the Pacific. Life treated this as a human-interest story ... Another wellknown Life photograph revealed the practice of using Japanese skulls as ornaments on US military vehicles. 62

Yet as shown above, Dower’s account of the Pacific war does not at all rely on the kind of ‘monocausal explanation’ that Goldhagen purports is the only plausible one. Note incidentally that, unlike the Americans, the Germans firmly forbade such publicity. ‘To every normal person’, a German chief of staff lectured, ‘it is a matter of course that he does not take photographs of such disgusting excesses or report about them when he writes home. The distribution of photographs and the spreading of reports about such events will be regarded as a subversion of decency and discipline in the army and will be punished strictly.’
Indeed as Goldhagen suggests, those violating the Nazi taboo suffered harsh penalties. (63)
Returning to the main argument, nearly all the ordinary Germans assembled in the police battalions, according to Goldhagen, brutalized Jews with ‘gusto’, ‘relish’ and ‘zeal’. Compare first the extreme case of ‘those soulless automata’ (Hohne) staffing the concentration camps. ‘Among the guards there were some sadists, sadists in the pure clinical sense’, Victor Frankl recalled. Yet the ‘majority of the guards’, although morally ‘dulled’ by the relentless brutality of camp life, ‘refused to take active part in sadistic measures’. The ‘sadists, brutal criminals ... who enjoyed torturing human beings, and did it with passionate conviction’, Auschwitz survivor Dr. Ella Lingens-Reiner similarly suggested in her memoir, were only a minority among several SS types in the camp. ‘Compared with our general living conditions’, gratuitous cruelty ‘played an insignificant role. The deaths and cases of grave, permanent physical injury caused by those acts of brutality were, comparatively speaking, not so very numerous.’ ‘There were few sadists’, Lingens-Reiner later testified at the Auschwitz trial. ‘Not more than five or ten per cent.’ ‘Nothing would be more mistaken than to see the SS as a sadistic horde driven to abuse and torture thousands of human beings by instinct, passion, or some thirst for pleasure’, concurred Auschwitz survivor Benedict Kautsky. ‘Those who acted in this way were a small minority.’ Thus ordinary Germans were, if Goldhagen’s thesis is correct, much more pathologically cruel than the concentration camp personnel. Seen from Goldhagen’s theoretical side, that would also make ordinary Germans much more in thrall to Nazi-like anti-Semitism than the camp guards. (64)

[72] Interpreting the Evidence
Amid the manifold repetitions of his sweeping generalization, Goldhagen suddenly reveals that its empirical basis is but fragmentary, indeed paper-thin.

Few survivors have emerged, and so it is often up to the Germans to report their own brutality – however much there was – and thereby to incriminate themselves, which they are naturally reluctant to do. Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany’s investigating authorities were generally not interested in learning about instances of cruelty, since by the time of these investigations, all crimes, except murder, had passed the time limit for prosecution that is specified in the statute of limitations. No matter how much a German in a police battalion had beaten, tortured, or maimed a Jew, if he did not kill the victim, he could not be prosecuted for his actions. (HWE, p. 255; see also p. 261)

And again in an endnote:

... the interrogations focus on establishing what crimes were committed and who committed them. The only crime with which all but the earliest investigations (and they were few and unrevealing) were concerned was murder, because the statute of limitations had expired for all other crimes. So the investigators were generally interested in acts of cruelty only insofar as they were perpetrated by the tiny percentage of perpetrators whom they indicted or believed they might indict, because such acts of cruelty would help to establish a perpetrator’s motive; investigators, therefore, did not ask about or delve into the cruelties that the vast majority of perpetrators committed. (HWE, p. 600 n. 5)

The actual documentation, according to Goldhagen, at best ‘suggests’ that gratuitous cruelty figured as a ‘part’ of the police battalions’ repertoire. (HWE, p. 255) The wonder would be were it otherwise. Who ever doubted that there were sadistically cruel Germans? To sustain his thesis, however, Goldhagen must prove considerably more. What marks off its novelty, after all, is the audacious indictment of nearly all battalion members – hence ordinary Germans – as sadistic anti-Semites.
[73] The evidentiary basis of Goldhagen’s thesis is not only exiguous. It is also highly selective. He categorically discounts all ‘self-exculpating claims of the battalion men to opposition, reluctance, and refusal’. Explaining his methodology, Goldhagen recalls that criminals do not typically confess to more than can be proven against them. What can be denied is denied. Hence Goldhagen infers that the police battalions, although acknowledging the genocide, concealed their sadism: ‘Even when they could not completely hide that they had given their bodies to the slaughter, they in all likelihood denied that they had given to it their souls, their inner will and moral assent.’ (HWE, pp. 467-8, 534 n. 1) Leaving to one side the purely speculative nature of this claim, the fact is that the police battalions did openly confess to more – much more – than could have been proven against them. (65) Consider just a tiny sample of the incriminating admissions that Goldhagen reports or cites:

One killer even tells of a time he was sent alone with a Jew to the woods. He was under absolutely no supervision, so it was a perfect opportunity to let a victim flee, had he opposed the existing war of racist purgation. But he shot him. (HWE, p. 193)

‘I would like to mention now that only women and children were there. They were largely women and children around twelve years old ... I had to shoot an old woman, who was over sixty years old. I can still remember, that the old woman said to me, will you make it short or about the same.’ (HWE, p. 219)

‘I would like also to mention that before the beginning of the execution, Sergeant Steinmetz said to the members of the platoon that those who did not feel up to the upcoming task could come forward. No one, to be sure, exempted himself.’ (HWE, p. 220)

‘I must admit that we felt a certain joy when we would seize a Jew whom one could kill. I cannot remember an instance when a policeman had to be ordered to an execution. The shootings were, to my knowledge, always carried out on a voluntary basis; one could have gained the impression that various policemen got a big kick out of it.’ (HWE, p. 452) (66)

Indeed, Goldhagen’s evidence of gratuitous brutality is culled almost entirely from the gratuitously self-incriminating testimony of the police battalions. Plainly this was not, by his own reasoning, typical criminal testimony. The police battalion members did not seek at every opportunity to minimize their responsibility. Yet Goldhagen indiscriminately excludes all ‘self-exculpating’ testimony on the assumption that they did.
It bears emphasis that the issue is not whether the testimony of the police battalions was riddled with lies, distortions and omissions. Of course it [74] must have been. The point rather is Goldhagen’s blanket dismissal of all testimony impeaching his thesis. Thus he reports a police battalion member’s gratuitous admission about killing Jewish patients in a hospital, while maintaining that the member’s explanation that a superior officer threatened him ‘must be discounted’ on principle. (HWE, pp. 200-1, 533 n. 74) Indeed, Goldhagen highlights the absence of testimony that the police battalions dissented from this or that criminal act. (HWE, p. 201) Yet all claims of dissent are anyhow automatically disregarded by him.
Acknowledging that the police battalions did initially recoil from their murderous assignment, Goldhagen nonetheless denies that this demurral at all registered moral qualms. Emphatically and repeatedly, he instead diagnoses the ‘unhappy, disturbed, perhaps even incensed’ state of the police battalions as merely a ‘visceral reaction’ to the ‘physically gruesome’, ‘aesthetically unpleasant’ task at hand: ‘The men were sickened by the exploded skulls, the flying blood and bone, the sight of so many freshly killed corpses of their own making.’ Contradicting himself, Goldhagen also states in the very same breath that the police battalions were ‘given pause, even shaken by having plunged into mass slaughter and committing deeds that would change and forever define them socially and morally.’ (HWE, pp. 192, 220-2, 250, 252, 378, 400-1, 538 n. 39, 543 n. 98)
‘Had this reaction been the consequence of principled opposition and not mere disgust’, Goldhagen critically argues, ‘the psychological strain would, with subsequent killings, have likely increased and not subsided completely... But like medical students who might initially be shaken by their exposure to blood and guts yet who view their work as ethically laudable, these men easily adjusted to the unpleasant aspect of their calling.’ (HWE, p. 261)

The Killers’ Mental Anguish
Thus the police battalions’ effortless psychological accommodation to the genocide demonstrates their Nazi-like anti-Semitism. Yet consider Goldhagen’s treatment of the Nazi ‘ideological exponents’ recruited from bodies such as the SS, SD and the Gestapo to form the Einsatzgruppen. (67) As the genocide unfolded, the Einsatzgruppen did suffer, according to Goldhagen, escalating psychological distress. Goldhagen recalls the Nuremberg testimony of Einsatzgruppe commander, Otto Ohlendorf: ‘I had sufficient occasion to see how many men of my Gruppe did not agree to this [genocidal] order in their inner opinion. Thus, I forbade the participation in these executions on the part of some of these men and I sent some back to Germany.’ On account of the severe emotional strain, Goldhagen further reports, ‘transfers occurred frequently’ in the Einsatzgruppen and Himmler even issued explicit orders allowing for Einsatzgruppen members to excuse themselves. To explain why ‘the SS and security units were so lenient’, Goldhagen also cites Himmler’s assessment that the judeocide ‘could only be carried out by... the staunchest individuals ... [by] fanatical, deeply committed National Socialists.’ Goldhagen further highlights SS leader Reinhard Heydrich’s orders that [75] the Einsatzgruppen recruit local collaborators for the killings in order to preserve the psychological equilibrium of our people.’ (HWE, pp. 149, 380-1, 578-9 n. 13) Indeed precisely on this account, Goldhagen emphasizes, the Nazi leadership eventually switched to gas chambers:

Himmler, ever solicitous of the welfare of those who were turning his and Hitler’s apocalyptic visions into deed, began to search about for a means of killing that would be less burdensome to the executioners ... The move to gassing... – contrary to widely accepted belief – was prompted not by considerations of efficiency, but by the search for a method that would ease the psychological burden of killing for the Germans. (HWE, pp. 156-7; see also p. 521 n. 81)

The severe disorientation of Einsatzgruppen members – culminating in the breakdown of some and the barbarization of others – and its repercussions for Nazi policy – the use, for example, of local collaborators, gas chambers, and military style executions to assuage the sense of individual guilt – are in fact amply attested to in the documentary record. ‘Even Himmler’s most aggressive Eastern minion’, Hohne recalls

became a victim of the nightmare [some text may be missing] von dem Bach-Zelewski was taken to the SS hospital ... suffering from a nervous breakdown and congestion of the liver. Haunted by his guilt, he would pass his nights screaming, a prey to hallucinations... The Head SS doctor reported to Himmler: ‘He is suffering particularly from hallucinations connected with the shootings of Jews in the East.’ (68)

Goldhagen also suggests that the specific genocidal task allotted the Einsatzgruppen was less stringent than that of the police battalions: ‘The men in some of the police battalions had a more demanding, more psychologically difficult road to travel. Unlike the Einsatzkommandos, they were not eased into the genocidal killing, and integral to their operations was the emptying of ghettos of all life, with all the brutalities that it entailed.’ (HWE, p. 277)

Distilling the essence of Goldhagen’s argument, we reach yet another truly novel conclusion: ordinary Germans in the police battalions ‘easily adjusted’ to the genocide; the specialized units in the Einsatzgruppen, although less morally taxed, experienced acute psychological strain; ordinary Germans were much more Nazified than the Nazi ideological warriors in the Einsatzgruppen. QED.

The Death Marches
With the Red Army rapidly advancing on the Eastern front in the war’s last stages, Himmler ordered the evacuation of the concentration camps. Goldhagen analyzes one of these ‘death marches’ leaving off [76] from the Helmbrechts camp. Even at the war’s end and effectively left to their own devices, Goldhagen argues, ordinary Germans brutalized Jews. The general significance of Goldhagen’s case study is not at all clear. He first claims that there were ‘certain patterns and recurrent features of death marches.’ But then he immediately qualifies that the death marches were a ‘chaotic phenomenon, with sometimes significant variations in their character;’ that ‘the disparities among the death marches were such that it would be hard to construct a persuasive model of them;’ and that the death march was an ‘incoherent phenomenon’ emerging out of the ‘chaos of the last months of the war.’ (HWE, pp. 364, 369)

The guards leading the death marches were drawn from concentration camp personnel. One ‘typical’ male guard, Goldhagen reports, was a Romanian of German ancestry who was ten years old when Hitler came to power. It is not immediately obvious what his sensibility might reveal about anti-Semitism in Germany before the Nazi era. (HWE, pp. 336-7) Goldhagen also reports that all the female guards belonged to the SS, at least half of them volunteers. Because they did not enter the elite Nazi order until late 1944, he maintains, these female SS guards were nonetheless typical Germans. Yet so late in the war when defeat was in sight, arguably only fanatics would embrace the Nazi cause. (69) To clinch his argument, Goldhagen recalls that ‘the head woman guard referred to them in her testimony as “SS” guards with ironical quotation marks around “SS”.’ Wasn’t Goldhagen’s ‘methodological position’, however, to ‘discount all self-exculpating testimony’? (HWE, pp. 337-8, 467, original emphasis)

Trying to cut a last-minute deal with the Americans, Himmler issued explicit orders not to kill the Jews. Yet ‘the Germans’, Goldhagen observes, indulged in ‘multifarious cruel and lethal actions’ against them. Indeed, ‘the purpose of the march in the minds of the guards, no matter what the higher authorities conceived it to have been, was to degrade, injure, immiserate, and kill Jews.’ Thus, the comparatively youthful female guards ‘were without exception brutal to the Jews’. On the other hand, a survivor credited by Goldhagen recalls that ‘the older men of the guard unit were for the most part good-natured and did not beat or otherwise torment us. The younger SS men were far more brutal.’ But then ‘the Germans’ were not a homogeneous lot. Indeed recall Goldhagen’s claim that avowed Nazis were not more anti-Semitic than ordinary Germans and that the Hitler regime did not exacerbate anti-Semitism. But in a striking refutation of his thesis, the overall evidence cited by Goldhagen suggests that younger SS guards were much crueler than unaffiliated, older guards ‘bred not only on Nazi German culture.’ (HWE, pp. 276, 337, 339, 346, 356-7, 360-1)

Goldhagen also adduces the guards’ zigzag line of retreat as prima facie evidence of their sadistic anti-Semitism. The manifest intent was to further torture the Jews: ‘the aimlessness of the routes that they followed ... suggest that the marches, with their daily, hourly yield of debilitation and death, were their own reason for being’, ‘viewing the maps ... should be sufficient to convince anyone that the meanderings could have had no end [77] other than to keep the prisoners marching. And the effects were calculable – and calculated’. (HWE, pp. 365-6) Yet ten pages earlier Goldhagen reported that the guards ‘had no prescribed route, so they had to feel their way towards some undetermined destination. They did not even possess a map ... As one guard states: “Throughout the march, the guards were unaware of where we were supposed to march to.” The guards had to improvise constantly with the changing conditions.’ (HWE, p. 356) It would seem that sadistic anti-Semitism is not the only plausible explanation for the ‘aimlessness’ and ‘meanderings’ of the death marches.
Even if Goldhagen’s malignant spin on the evidence is credited, however, his thesis is scarcely proven. Just yesterday a heady dream, the Third Reich was for many Germans now a ghastly nightmare. The world had come crashing in. Abject surrender was only a matter of time. The arch-criminal, arch-enemy Judeo-Bolsheviks of incessant Nazi propaganda were fast closing in. Judgment Day was at hand. Yet Himmler had ordered that the remnant Jews – these ambulatory skeletons of an evil past, these terrifying tokens of the vengeance to come – be kept alive. Some guards deserted. (HWE, p. 360) Hating them and fearing them, wishing they would just die, the hardened and cowardly core tormented the Jews. The death march is, for Goldhagen, irrefutable proof that ‘situation factors were not what caused the Germans to act as they did.’(HWE, p. 363) Yet is wanton brutality, under these circumstances, really so surprising?
Goldhagen also indicts the cruelty of German bystanders. He points up, for instance, the ‘frequent unwillingness of local German citizens’ along the death march route to ‘spare food for Jewish “subhumans”.’ (HWE, pp. 365, 348) Yet in the directly ensuing narrative, Goldhagen recounts that despite the ‘chaos and general food shortage of the time’ on the ‘first day of the march ... German civilians responded to the supplications of the Jews for food and water, only to meet the interdiction of the guards’; on the ‘seventh day, a town’s Mayor proposed to accommodate the Jewish women in the hall that had been prepared with bedding for a large group of women auxiliaries of the German army who had been expected’; on the ‘eighth day... a few women from Sangerberg tried to pass to the prisoners some bread. A male guard threatened one of the women who wanted to distribute food that he would shoot her if she should try again to pass food to the prisoners’; on the ‘sixteenth day... [the guards] allowed the Jews to have some soup that the people of Althutten had prepared, but forbade them from receiving any other food’; and on the ‘twenty-first day... the guards still refused to allow townspeople... to feed the Jews.’ Indeed, civilians ‘freely offered’ food to Jews ‘throughout the march.’(HWE, pp. 348-9; see also p. 365) To judge by Goldhagen’s account, the truly noteworthy fact would seem to be not the infrequent but the frequent willingness of ordinary Germans even after twelve years of Nazi rule to reach out to Jews (70) [78] ‘German children’, recalls a survivor of the Helmbrechts death march, ‘began to throw stones at us.’ Clinching his thesis, Goldhagen concludes: ‘The German children, knowing nothing of Jews but what they learned from their society, understood how they were to act.’ (HWE, p. 365) Thus, to dispel any lingering doubt that pre-Nazi homicidal German anti-Semitism explains the Final Solution, Goldhagen points to German children stoning Jews in 1945.

6. An Ordinary Slaughter?
Imbued as his study is with the ideological imperatives of ‘Holocaust studies’ (on which more presently), Goldhagen unsurprisingly harps on the categorical uniqueness of the Nazi genocide. Thus ‘there is no comparable event in the twentieth century, indeed in modern European history... the theoretical difficulty is shown by its utterly new nature’, ‘the Holocaust was a radical break with everything known in human history ... Completely at odds with the intellectual foundations of modern western civilization ... as well as the ... ethical and behavioural norms that had governed modern western societies’. The perpetration of the genocide by the Germans accordingly ‘marked their departure from the community of “civilized peoples”.’ (HWE, pp. 4, 5, 28, 386, 419) No doubt facets of the Nazi holocaust – for example, the annihilation centres such as those at Treblinka and Sobibor – were unique. The case Goldhagen mounts, however, sheds less light on the historical singularities of the judeocide than it does on his own singularly ahistorical sense. It bears emphasis that the matter at issue is not whether the crimes of the Nazi era were monumental. Rather it is whether these monumental crimes are without any historical precedent or parallel.
What distinguished Hitler’s rule above all, according to Goldhagen, was the concentration camp. It was the ‘emblematic’, ‘novel’, ‘distinctively new’, ‘revolutionary’, institution of Nazi Germany, one that ‘most prominently set Germany apart from other European countries, and that to a large extent gave it its distinctive murderous character’. (HWE, pp. 170, 456-60) Yet, as Hitler more or less accurately charged, ‘the idea of concentration camps was born in British brains’ during the Boer War. Some 150,000 women and children were corralled in what pro-Boer British MPs dubbed at the time ‘concentration camps’. In a litany that would soon become numbingly familiar, a contemporary witness to the Boer repression reported ‘the wholesale burning of farms ... the deportations ... a burnt out population brought by hundreds of convoys ... deprived of clothes ... the semi-starvation in the camps... the fever-stricken children lying ...upon the bare earth... the appalling mortality.’ Fully a quarter of the internees eventually succumbed to measles, typhoid and other pestilence. (71)
[79] Recalling Aktion Reinhard, Goldhagen observes that ‘in the value-inverted world of Germany during the Nazi period, naming a genocidal undertaking after someone – in this case, the assassinated, Reinhard Heydrich – was to honour him.’ (HWE, p. 532 n. 55) In an insane society like Nazi Germany, a campaign of mass murder was named after a mass murderer. In a sane society like ours, the first atomic bomb, which killed 200,000 Japanese, was christened ‘Little Boy’, and a programme of mass assassination that left 20,000 Vietnamese dead was named after the phoenix, the legendary symbol of rebirth and regeneration. In the ‘bizarre world’ of Nazi Germany, Goldhagen highlights, more ‘solicitude’ was shown for dogs than Jews: ‘The dog’s fate... was greatly preferable to that of Jews. In every respect, Germans would have agreed, it was better to be a dog.’ Goldhagen goes on to observe that ‘any but those beholden to the Nazi creed’ would have found such a state of affairs ‘deeply ironic and disturbing’, ‘psychologically gripping, even devastating’. The ‘sensibilities’ of these Nazified Germans, however, did not ‘remotely approximate our own.’ They were ‘too far gone’, their ‘cognitive framework’ was such that this ‘telling juxtaposition could not register.’ (HWE, pp. 268-70) Yet foreigners visiting the United States are almost immediately struck that more solicitude is shown for pets than the homeless. Indeed the ‘cognitive framework’ of many an American is such that the ‘telling juxtaposition’ of supermarket aisles lined with pet food while children in the US go to bed hungry does not ‘register’. (I leave to one side the ‘telling juxtaposition’ of pampering animals while world-wide 35,000 fellow human beings perish each day from starvation.)
The ‘perversity of the Nazified German mind was such’, according to Goldhagen, that the deaths of German children during the Allied terror-bombing’ did not ... arouse sympathy ‘for Jewish children: ‘Instead, thinking of their children spurred the Germans to kill Jewish children.’ (HWE, p. 213) Recall that the attack on Pearl Harbor aroused no pangs of sympathy for the Japanese. ‘Japan’s surprise attack’, John Dower reports, ‘provoked a rage bordering on genocidal among Americans.’ The firebombing of Tokyo in 1945, which left some 100,000 civilians dead – ‘scorched and boiled and baked to death’, in the words of the mastermind of the new strategy, Major-General Curtis LeMay – not only evoked ‘no sustained protest’ but was ‘widely accepted as just retribution’. The President’s son and confidant, Elliott Roosevelt, supported bombing Japan ‘until we have destroyed about half the civilian population’, while a key presidential advisor favoured the ‘extermination of the Japanese in toto.’ Nearly one-quarter of the respondents in a December 1945 Fortune magazine poll wished that the United States had had the opportunity to use ‘many more’ atomic bombs before Japan surrendered. (72)

Pervasive Racism
An egregious feature of Nazism, Goldhagen emphasizes, was its racist underpinnings. In fact, so aberrant were the racist ravings of Nazi Germany, according to Goldhagen, that ‘we ‘can barely grasp them:

[80] Germany during the Nazi period ... operat[ed] according to a different ontology and cosmology, inhabited by people whose general understanding of important realms of social existence was not ‘ordinary’ by our standards. The notion, for example, that an individual’s defining characteristics were derived from his race and that the world was divided into distinct races ... was an extremely widespread belief. That the world ought to be organized or reorganized according to this conception of an immutable hierarchy of races was an accepted norm. The possibility of peaceful coexistence among the races was not a central part of the cognitive landscape of the society. Instead, races were believed to be inexorably competing and warring until one or another triumphed or was vanquished. (HWE, P. 460; see also p. 458)

For argument’s sake, let us leave to one side Goldhagen’s bizarre claim that judging an individual by his race and dividing the world into distinct races is ‘not “ordinary” by our standards’, indeed, is alien to our ‘ontology and cosmology.’ Yet even racist Social Darwinism was very far from peculiar to Nazi Germany. Consider the views – altogether unexceptional until quite recently – of Theodore Roosevelt. ‘It is for the good of the world’, opined one of the most revered twentieth-century US presidents, ‘that the English-speaking race in all its branches should hold as much of the world’s surface as possible.’ Elaborating on this theme in his classic Winning of the West, Roosevelt reflected:

The settler and pioneer have at bottom justice on their side; this great continent could not have been kept as nothing but a game preserve for squalid savages ... It is indeed a warped, perverse, and silly morality which would forbid a course of conquest that has turned whole continents into the seats of mighty and flourishing civilized nations. All men of sane and wholesome thought must dismiss with impatient contempt the plea that these continents should be reserved for the use of scattered savage tribes, whose life was but a few degrees less meaningless, squalid, and ferocious than that of the wild beasts with whom they hold joint ownership...

Or, as Roosevelt succinctly put it in his private correspondence, ‘if we fail to act on the “superior people” theory .... barbarism and savagery and squalid obstruction will prevail over most of the globe.’ (73)
[81] The intent on killing, Goldhagen concludes, was the defining feature of the Nazi genocide: ‘It was the will and the motivation to exterminate European Jewry... the will ... that is the crucial issue.’ And again: ‘This issue – the issue of will – is the crucial issue.’ Goldhagen goes on to maintain that ‘in this sense the German perpetrators were like the perpetrators of other mass slaughters’. Thus as in ‘any other mass slaughter or genocide’, Germans killed because they ‘believed that they were right to kill’. In fact it is a ‘grave error’, Goldhagen warns, to assume that people cannot ‘slaughter whole populations – specially populations that are by any objective evaluation not threatening – out of conviction. The historical record, from the ancient times to the present, amply testifies to the ease with which people can extinguish the lives of others, and even take joy in their deaths.’ (Reply, pp. 44-5, HWE, p. 14, original emphasis)
Yet Goldhagen also maintains that the Nazi genocide was singular precisely because Germans killed from ‘conviction’ and a sense of ‘right’:

One of the remarkable features of the genocide ... is how readily and naturally Germans... understood why they were supposed to kill Jews ... Anti-Semitism in Germany was such that when Germans ... learned that the Jews were to be killed, they evinced not surprise, not incredulity, but comprehension. Whatever their moral or utilitarian stances towards the killing were, the annihilation of the Jews made sense to them. (HWE, p. 403, original emphasis)

Leaving to one side this gross contradiction, yet another leaps off the page. If the Nazi genocide was, on the ‘crucial issue’, like ‘any other mass slaughter’, it could not have marked ‘a radical break with everything known in human history’. Indeed to judge by this account, it was a commonplace.
The circle is complete. From the mystifying premise that it was utterly new, through a welter of nonsensical assertions, misrepresentations, contradictions and non-sequiturs, to the trivializing conclusion that it was utterly old: thus Daniel Jonah Goldhagen makes ‘sense’ of the Nazi genocide.

7. The Holocaust Studies Industry
Hitler’s Willing Executioners adds nothing to our current understanding of the Nazi holocaust. Indeed, recycling the long discarded thesis of a sadistic ‘German mind’, it subtracts from our understanding. The fact is that Goldhagen’s book is not scholarship at all. Between the gross misrepresentations of secondary literature and the glaring internal contradictions, it does not deserve consideration as an academic inquiry. Yet the book did indisputably elicit an avalanche of praise. How does one account for this paradox and what is its significance? I want to address these questions in two areas: scholarship and politics. It bears emphasis that, however informed, the remarks that follow are speculation. They clearly belong in a separate category from the preceding analysis of the text itself.
[82] The Nazi extermination of the Jews spawned two parallel, indeed contradictory, bodies of literature. Historians working with the German materials have gradually reached consensus that most ordinary Germans did not share Hitler’s obsession with the Jews. A broad range of solid scholarly research has concluded that popular German anti-Semitism neither accounted for Hitler’s triumph nor was it the impetus behind the Final Solution. Focusing on the Jewish victims, a second corpus held as its major premise that popular German anti-Semitism was the mainspring of Hitler’s success and the Jewish catastrophe that ensued. Ideological and politically driven, this field, currently known as ‘Holocaust studies’, is largely devoid of scholarly interest. (74) Indeed virtually every substantive work touching on relevant themes – for example, Raul Hilberg’s The Destruction of the European Jews, Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, and Arno Mayer’s Why Did the Heavens Not Darken? has landed on the ‘Holocaust studies’ index. (75) The division of labour between those working with the German and Jewish materials on the Nazi genocide was, until the publication of Hitler’s Willing Executioners, mutually respected. For reasons not difficult to discern, neither side ventured too far afield: scholars in the German field steered clear of the political hornet’s nest of Holocaust studies; mainly a propaganda enterprise, Holocaust studies ignored German scholarship. (76)
Firmly anchored in the Holocaust paradigm, yet scrutinizing not the Jewish victims but the German perpetrators, Goldhagen’s book marks the first foray of a holocaust ideologue across the divide. The venture comes at a time when Holocaust studies is trying to entrench itself as a reputable field of scholarly inquiry. (77) Indeed, Goldhagen himself is a candidate for the first endowed chair in ‘Holocaust and Cognate Studies’ [83] at Harvard University. Although it obscures the meaning of the Nazi holocaust, Goldhagen’s foray does cast a harsh if unwitting light on Holocaust studies. Seeking to reconcile an ideologically loaded thesis with radically incompatible empirical findings, Goldhagen mangles the scholarly record and gets mired in a morass of internal contradictions. What Hitler’s Willing Executioners conclusively demonstrates is the intellectual barrenness of Goldhagen’s field: ignoring as they do the findings of German scholarship, the claims of Holocaust ideologues prove unsustainable when put to an empirical test. (78)
Holocaust studies first flourished in the wake of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This is the crucial political context for comprehending the Goldhagen phenomenon. It is a fact seldom noticed that, until the war, Israel and Zionism occupied barely a marginal place in American Jewish intellectual life. In the wake of Israel’s victory and its realignment with US power, Jewish intellectuals suddenly discovered the Jewish state, now celebrated as a bastion of Western Civilization doing battle on the front lines with and, against all odds, smashing the Arab hordes. They also suddenly discovered the Nazi genocide. (79) A tiny cottage industry before 1967, Holocaust studies began to boom. This was not a coincidence. Basking as they were in Israel’s reflected glory, American Jews had also to contend with increasing censure of its repressive policies. In these circumstances, the Nazi extermination proved politically useful but only as it was represented in a specific ideological account. Anti-Semitism, according to Zionist ideology, expresses the Gentile’s natural and irreconcilable animus for Jews. The Nazi genocide marked in this reading the ineluctable culmination of Gentile anti-Semitic hatred. Thus interpreted, the Nazi extermination both justified the necessity of Israel and accounted for all hostility directed at it: the Jewish state was the only safeguard against the next outbreak of homicidal anti-Semitism and, conversely, homicidal anti-Semitism was behind every attack on, or even defensive manoeuvre against, the Jewish state. ‘The Holocaust’ is in effect the Zionist account of the Nazi holocaust. It was seized upon and methodically marketed [84] because it was politically expedient. Politically inexpedient was the scholarly consensus showing that most ordinary Germans did not elect or later support Hitler because of his anti-Semitism; indeed, that they opposed Nazi violence and did not approve the genocide.
In this light, key elements of Goldhagen’s study take on new resonance. ‘Without a doubt... the all-time leading form of prejudice and hatred within Christian countries’, anti-Semitism, according to Goldhagen, ‘has been a more or less permanent feature of the western world.’ Effectively derogating all other forms of bigotry, Goldhagen thus endows anti-Semitism with a unique ontology, one that virtually defies historical analysis. We have already seen that, for Goldhagen, where anti-Semitism is not manifest it may yet be latent, and that anti-Semitism and even philosemitism ‘tend strongly toward a genocidal “solution”.’ (80) Thus all Gentiles are potential if not actual homicidal anti-Semites. Going well beyond Zionist, let alone standard scholarly, analyses, Goldhagen purports that anti-Semitism ‘is always abstract in its conceptualization and its source.’ Goldhagen conceives anti-Jewish animus as ‘divorced from actual Jews’, ‘fundamentally not a response to any objective evaluation of Jewish action’, ‘independent of the Jews’ nature and actions’, and so on. Indeed according to Goldhagen, anti-Semitism is strictly a Gentile mental pathology: its ‘host domain’ is ‘the mind.’ (HWE, pp. 34-5, 39, 42, original emphases)

A Manichean View
Seen through Goldhagen’s effectively ultra-Zionist lens, in the dialectic of anti-Semitism, not only can Gentiles do no good but Jews can do no evil. Ever-guilty Gentiles and ever-guiltless Jews: these are the reciprocal faces of the supra-historical, Manichean paradigm in which Goldhagen situates the judeocide. It is worth emphasizing that the issue is not the Nazi genocide per se but rather Goldhagen’s ideological framework. Indeed what makes Goldhagen’s ideological framework seem so plausible is that in the Nazi holocaust the reality was, if not absolute Gentile guilt, at any rate absolute Jewish innocence. Yet his approach implies that Gentiles always harbour homicidal anti-Jewish animus and Jews never bear responsibility for Gentile animus. By this logic, Jews a priori always enjoy total moral impunity. The Jewish state is accordingly immunized from legitimate censure of its policies: all criticism is and must be motivated by fanatical anti-Semitism. If Gentiles are always intent on murdering Jews, then Jews have every right to protect themselves however they see fit; whatever expedient Jews might resort to, even aggression and torture, constitutes legitimate self-defence. Is it any wonder that many Jews in particular, apologists for Israel warmed to Goldhagen’s thesis? (81)
[85] In this connection, one cannot but be struck by the parallels between the Goldhagen phenomenon and an earlier ideologically serviceable best-seller, Joan Peters’s From Time Immemorial, which maintained that Palestine was literally empty on the eve of Zionist colonization. In both cases, 1) a relative unknown claimed to scoop a stodgy, benighted academic establishment. Peters was an occasional journalist, Goldhagen a recent Harvard Ph.D. 2) the scholarly breakthrough was actually a caricatured version of a stale, Zionist thesis long repudiated in the academic literature. 3) purporting as it did to be an academic study, the book had to cite the documentary record and extant scholarship, both of which pointed to the opposite conclusion. Thus the evidence adduced in support of the novel thesis was either grossly misrepresented or else actually gainsaid the thesis. 4) prominent scholars with no specialized knowledge of the field helped to launch the ideological enterprise. Peters’s book jacket featured fulsome blurbs by Lucy Dawidowicz (‘the historical truth’) and Barbara Tuchman (‘a historical event’); Goldhagen’s book jacket has blurbs by Simon Schama (‘phenomenal scholarship and absolute integrity’) and Stanley Hoffmann (‘truly revolutionary... impeccable scholarship ... profound understanding). 5) once the ideological juggernaut achieved sufficient momentum, what little mainstream criticism there was subsided. (82)
Touted as the ultimate testament to the Nazi Holocaust, Hitler’s Willing Executioners in fact fundamentally diminishes its moral significance. For what is the essence of Goldhagen’s thesis if not that only deranged perverts could perpetrate a crime so heinous as the Final Solution? Lurid as Goldhagen’s account is, the lesson it finally teaches is thus remarkably complacent: normal people – and most people, after all, are normal – would not do such things. Yet the overwhelming majority of SS guards, Lingens-Reiner testified after the war, were ‘perfectly normal men who knew the difference between right and wrong.’ ‘We must remember’, Auschwitz survivor Primo Levi wrote, that ‘the diligent executors of inhuman orders were not born torturers, were not (with a few exceptions) monsters: they were ordinary men.’ Not deranged perverts but ‘perfectly normal men’, ‘ordinary men’: that is the really sensational truth about the perpetrators of the Final Solution. ‘From our findings’, observed the American psychiatrist responsible for the Nuremberg defendants, we must conclude not only that such personalities are not unique or insane, but also that they could be duplicated in any country of the world today. We must also realize that such personalities exist in this country and that there are undoubtedly certain individuals who would willingly climb over the corpses of one half of the people of [86] the United States, if by so doing, they could thereby be given control of the other half.
Indeed the men sitting in the dock at Nuremberg constituted Germany’s, as it were, ‘best and brightest’. Of the twenty-one Nazi leaders indicted at the Trial of German Major War Criminals, six scored ‘superior’ and twelve ‘very superior’ on the IQ test. Truly these were the ‘whiz kids’ of Germany. Or consider the Nazi elite murderers sitting in the dock at the Einsatzgruppen trial. ‘Each man at the bar’, recalled the Nuremberg Tribunal in its final judgement, has had the benefit of considerable schooling. Eight are lawyers, one a university professor, another a dental physician, still another an expert on art. One, as an opera singer, gave concerts throughout Germany before he began his tour of Russia with the Einsatzkommandos. This group of educated and well-bred men does not even lack a former minister, self-frocked though he was. Another of the defendants, bearing a name illustrious in the world of music, testified that a branch of his family reached back to the creator of the ‘Unfinished Symphony’... (83)
‘The most refined shedders of blood’, Dostoyevsky long ago recognized, ‘have been almost always the most highly civilized gentlemen’, to whom the official criminal misfits ‘could not have held a candle’. No doubt the intellectual class singing Goldhagen’s praises much prefers his conclusion that, unlike the crazed Nazis, truly ‘civilized gentlemen’ do not commit mass murder.

1. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York 1996. The author wishes to thank David Abraham, Roane Carey, Noam Chomsky, Samira Haj, Adele Olfman, Shifra Stern, Jack Trumpbour, and Cyrus Veeser for comments on an earlier draft. This essay is dedicated to the memory of my beloved parents, both survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto and the Nazi concentration camps: only a rational apprehension of what happened can give point to their suffering.
2. New York Times, 27 March, 2 April, 3 April 1996; Time, 23 December 1996. The New York Review of Books first gave Goldhagen’s book a tepid notice but then ran a glowing piece in which it was acclaimed as ‘an original, indeed, brilliant contribution to the mountain of literature on the Holocaust.’ (18 April 1996, 28 November 1996) Initially running a hostile review, The New Republic subsequently featured Goldhagen’s nine-page, ‘reply to my critics’ (29 April 1996, 23 December 1996). Crucial as it is to fully apprehending the Goldhagen phenomenon, the German reaction will not be considered in this monograph. Deciphering its anomalies would require a much more intimate knowledge of the German cultural landscape than this writer possesses.
3. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume ‘revised and definitive edition’ published in 1985: vol. 3, p. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994-See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: ‘Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.’ For the initial reaction to Hilberg’s damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg’s memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the ‘Holocaust industry’.
4. Hilberg specifically pointed to the Order Police the subject of Goldhagen’s study perpetrators whose ‘moral makeup’ typified ‘Germany as a whole’. The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, p. 1011.
5. Ibid.
6. For background and critical commentary, see Eric A. Zillmer et al., The Quest for the Nazi Personality, Hillsdale, NJ 1995. Sampling a wide array of clinical data, the authors dismiss the ‘simplistic’ notion of a ‘specific homicidal and clinically morbid’ German personality (P. 13).
7. Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, New York 1975, p. 47; see also pp. 163-6.
8. Goldhagen dissents from Christopher Browning’s estimates that 10-20 per cent of the German police battalions refused to kill Jews as ‘stretching the evidence’. (HWE, p. 541, n. 68; see also p. 551, n. 65) It is one of Goldhagen’s central contentions that the police battalions were prototypical of the murderous German mind-set (HWE, pp. 181-5, 463ff).
9. ‘A Reply to My Critics’, The New Republic, 23 December 1996 [hereafter Reply], p. 41.
10. HWE, p. 416, original emphasis, See also HWE, p. 582 n. 42.
11. Reply, p. 42; see also HWE, pp. 446-7. Not to be deterred by the hobgoblin of consistency, Goldhagen writes a couple of pages earlier: ‘By the time Hitler came to power, the model of Jews that was the basis of his anti-Semitism was shared by the vast majority of Germans’ (Reply, p. 40).
12. An unwitting ironist, Goldhagen elsewhere in the book counsels, ‘Germans should not be caricatured’. (HWE, p. 382)
13. In the endnote, Goldhagen cautions that his argument ‘obviously does not explain people’s capacity for cruelty in the first place or the gratification many derive from it.’ Yet, what needs explaining is not the mechanisms of these sadistic impulses but, as noted above, why the Germans succumbed and why the Jews fell victim to them.
14. Jewish Book News, 25 April 1996, P. 39. For equivalent formulations, see Reply, p. 43, and Goldhagen’s numerous interviews.
15. In an astonishingly disingenuous endnote, Goldhagen writes that ‘it is indeed striking how little or non-existent the evidence is that... Germans’ beliefs about Jews differed from the incessantly trumpeted Nazi one.’ (HWE, p. 593 n. 49, original emphasis) For a sample of this ‘little or non-existent evidence’, see section 4) below.
16. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York 1964, pp. 30, 70, and Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the Third Reich, Oxford 1983, p. 231. Both are basic texts. Consider Goldhagen’s other theoretical breakthroughs:

... each source of [anti-Semitism] is embedded in an extended metaphorical structure that automatically extends the domain of phenomena, situations, and linguistic usages relevant to the anti-Semitic compass in a manner paralleling the metaphorical structure itself. (HWE, p. 35)

All anti-Semitisms can be divided according to one essential dissimilitude which can be usefully thought of as being dichotomous (even if, strictly speaking, this may not be the case). (HWE, p. 37)

Prejudice is a manifestation of people’s (individual and collective) search for meaning. (HWE, p. 39, emphasis in original)

Comment is superfluous.
17. HWE, p. 494 n. 92. The counterpoint to Goldhagen’s homogenization of the German perpetrators is his heterogenization of the Germans’ victims. Thus, Goldhagen’s discriminations to prove that Jewish suffering was unique. (HWE, pp. 175, 294, 311ff, 340ff, 523 n. 1)
18. HWE, pp. 141, 146, 147, 153, 421. For a variation on this argument which conflates verbal abuse with ‘deportation and physical violence’, see HWE, p. 125.
19. In his rejoinder, Goldhagen downplays the import of this question: ‘Even if some would conclude that I am not entirely correct about the scope and character of German anti-Semitism, it does not follow that this would invalidate my conclusion ... about the perpetration of the Holocaust, [which] logically can stand on its own and must be confronted directly.’ And again: ‘My assertions about the reach of anti-Semitism in Germany before the Nazi period is [sic] supported by the works of some of the most distinguished scholars of anti-Semitism ... Where I depart from some of them is not over the extent of anti-Semitism in Germany, but over its content and nature.’ (Reply, pp. 40, 41) Yet, the ‘scope and character’, ‘content and nature’ of German anti-Semitism are not distinct from or subsidiary to but the very essence of his thesis.
20. Pulzer, Jews and the German State, Oxford 1992.
21. Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, pp. 279-80.
22. Ibid., p. 71.
23. HWE, pp. 61, 491 n. 51. Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, Oxford 1983, p. 229. Indeed, Goldhagen’s study is marred throughout by his penchant for double bookkeeping. Thus, in the text’s body Goldhagen implies that no police battalion member initially refrained from killing infants. Turning to the back of the book, we learn that, according to one member, ‘almost all the men’ refused, and according to another, ‘as if by tacit agreement, the shooting of infants and small children was renounced by all the people.’ In the endnote Goldhagen grudgingly concedes that ‘undoubtedly, some of the men did shy away’. (HWE, pp. 216, 538 n. 37, n. 39).
24. Pulzer, Jews and the German State, pp. 42, 14.
25. Eva G. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, London 1950, p. 154. See Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the ‘Jewish Question’, Princeton 1984, p. 27.
26. I will not elucidate all Goldhagen’s methodological points on contemporary anti-Semitism. These include:

While its cognitive content was adopting new forms in the service of ‘modernizing’ anti-Semitism, of harmonizing it with the new social and political landscape of Germany, the existing cultural cognitive model about Jews provided a remarkable underlying constancy to the elaborated cultural and ideological pronouncements. (HWE, pp. 53-4)

In ‘functional’ terms, the changing manifest content of anti-Semitism could be understood, in one sense, to have been little more than the handmaiden of the pervasive anti-Jewish animus that served to maintain and give people a measure of coherence in the modern world... (HWE, p. 54)

Previously, a welter of anti-Semitic charges and understandings of the source of the Jews’ perniciousness had characterized the outpouring of anti-Jewish sentiment since the ‘Jewish Problem’ had become a central political theme as a reaction to the movement for their emancipation. (HWE, p. 66)

The cognitive model of ontology that underlay the essential, racist Volkish worldview contradicted and did not admit the Christian one that had held sway for centuries. (HWE, p. 68)

These are typical of the ‘insights and theories of the social sciences’ that Goldhagen says ‘inform’ his enterprise, unlike the criticism which ‘betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the social scientific method.’ (Reply, pp. 38-9, 43).
27. HWE, pp. 55-7, 64-73. For Goldhagen’s recourse to this genre of argument for the Nazi period, See HWE, pp. 106, 113-15, 126, 431.
28. Joachim Doron, ‘Classic Zionism and Modern Anti-Semitism: Parallels and Influences (1883-1914)’, in Studies in Zionism, Autumn 1983, pp. 169-204 (quote at 171). See Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, London 1995, ch. 1.
29. Donald L. Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, Baton Rouge 1980, p. 9.
30. Michael H. Kater, ‘Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases’, in Yad Vashem Studies, xvi, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69(working class quote), p. 70; Putzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
31. Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the ‘Jewish Question’, p. 48. For a balanced presentation of German Jewry during the Weimar years, see especially Niewyck’s The Jews in Weimar Germany.
32. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. William Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that ‘relatively few people read Mein Kampf before 1933. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Sereny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal-Hitler speculates that if twelve or fifteen thousand... Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas’, Germany might have won World War I. Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler’s genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler’s January 1939 ‘prophecy’, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the Jewish Question, p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n. 36.
33. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedlander puts more stress on Hitler’s public anti-Semitism throughout the 1920s but concurs that in the early 1930s ‘the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric’); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the Jewish Question, pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler’s speeches collected in Domarus’s standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes’s earlier collection of Hitler extracts that ‘practically exhausts the material on the subject’ of the Jews, the only item before 1933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating ‘violent anti-Semitism’, declares that he ‘would have nothing to do with pogroms’ (p. 726). Although ‘unjust and harsh’, as Domarus recalls, Hitler’s forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
34. Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, p. 37; see Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, pp. 243-4; Lothar Kettehacker, ‘Hitler’s Final Solution and its Rationalization’, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, p. 83; Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, pp. 108-11.
35. Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, pp. 46-7, 152, 154, 161, 230, 233, 235-8, 239 (second quote), 250 (first quote), 252; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 273.
36. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the Jewish Question, pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton 1982, pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607 n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler’s victory; see especially Peter H. Merki, Political Violence under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was ‘representative of a significant percentage of the German people’ during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membership ‘was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew’ (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that ‘many non-ideological reasons’ induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
37. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 231-3. Long out of print, this luminous work should be reissued.
38. Childers, The Nazi Voter, P. 267.
39. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 231, 261 n. 380.
40. HWE, p. 594 n. 56; for a similar argument for the war years, see pp. 251-2.
41. Goldhagen’s citation of this document is doubly ironic. Not only does it undercut his claim about the inefficacy of Nazi propaganda but also his claim about restoring the dimension of individual responsibility. Seeking to mitigate the culpability of the Einsatzgruppen commanders, the brief lent support to a plea of temporary insanity: ‘The defendants... were obsessed with a psychological delusion based on a fallacious idea concerning the identity of the aims of Bolshevism and the political role of Jewry in Eastern Europe.’ Although effectively endorsed by Goldhagen, this last defense was fortunately for justice’s sake rejected by the Military Tribunal. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. 4, ‘The Einsatzgruppen Case’, Washington, DC n.d., pp. 342, 344, 350, 354, 463-4.
42. Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society, Oxford 1990, pp. 111, 129, 135-6, 146-7, 160-1, 171, 172, 177, 179, 186-7, 205-7, 213, 256.
43. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports ‘should be read with circumspection’ because the ‘agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people... evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.’ (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy even the Gestapo attested to their veracity and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the Jewish Question, pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, pp. 6-8.
44. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4, Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 105 (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, ‘Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany’, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The Hitler Myth, pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, ‘The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich’, in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426, Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, Athens, 1977, pp. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi Germany carried ‘Aryan only’ signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
45. For the Nuremberg Laws, see Helmut Krausnick, ‘The Persecution of the Jews’, in Helmut Krausnick et al., Anatomy of the SS State, New York 1965, pp. 32-3; and Hans Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, pp. 103-5. For popular German reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, see especially Otto Dov Kulka, “‘Public Opinion” in Nazi Germany and the “Jewish Question”’, The Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall 1982, pp. 124-35. Kulka concludes that most Germans supported the laws, although a ‘quite sizable portion of the population was indifferent’ (p. 135). The US Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The Supreme Court first declared a state miscegenation law unconstitutional in 1967 (Loving v. Virginia).
46. HWE, p. 95. Directly contradicting himself, Goldhagen writes elsewhere that ‘Germans’ profound hatred of Jews... had in the 1930s by necessity lain relatively dormant.’ (HWE, p. 449, my emphasis)
47. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier’s conclusions, see Friedlander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germany and the Jewish Question’, pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, ‘German Popular Opinion and the “Jewish Question”, 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections’, in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The ‘Hitler Myth’, pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, “‘Public Opinion” in Nazi Germany and the “Jewish Question”‘, pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, ‘The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich’, p.432; Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201,233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, pp. 37,40; Herbert A. Strauss, ‘Jewish Emigration from Germany Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses’, in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book xxv, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that ‘we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.’
48. The scholarly consensus is that, ‘Although without doubt some individual members of the white community condemned lynching, it is equally clear that a majority supported outlaw mob violence’ Stewart E. Toinay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930, Chicago 1992, p. 28; see also Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey, Chicago 1989, ch. 7, especially pp. 238ff; and Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, New York 1969, p. 47. One may add that, for sheer brutality, Southern violence was in a class apart: the grisly torture, dismemberment and even roasting of its victims, along with the collection of bodily parts as souvenirs, were inconceivable in pre-war Nazi Germany. For an example, see Toinay and Beck, A Festival of Violence, p. 23.
49. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy, New York 1986.
50. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, pp. 124-30.
51. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, ch. 9; Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, pp. 136-45, 334-5.
52. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the ‘Jewish Question’, pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, ‘What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?’ in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
53. Kershaw, ‘German Popular Opinion and the “Jewish Question”‘, pp. 366-84 (quote at pp. 383-4, original emphasis); Ian Kershaw, ‘German Public Opinion During the Final Solution: Information, Comprehension, Reactions’, in Asher Cohen et al., Comprehending the Holocaust, New York 1988, pp. 146-55 (quotes at pp. 146-7, 155).
54. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Barcov’s companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler’s Army, Oxford 1991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally ‘refused to allow his men to participate in the killing of the Jews ... was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extreme ardor and brutality towards the victims.’ (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is ‘brutalization’ so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as ‘nonsense’ the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to Allied atrocities: ‘Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.’ (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 the focus of Goldhagen’s study-embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terrorbombing of German cities. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Germany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
55. A perpetrator is anyone who knowingly contributed in some intimate way to the mass slaughter of Jews, generally anyone who worked in an institution of genocidal killing. This includes all people who themselves took the lives of Jews, and all those who set the scene for the final lethal act, whose help was instrumental in bringing about the deaths of Jews. So anyone who shot Jews as part of a killing squad was a perpetrator. Those who rounded up these same Jews, deported them (with knowledge of their fate) to a killing location, or cordoned off the area where their compatriots shot them were also perpetrators, even if they themselves did not do the actual killing. Perpetrators include railroad engineers and administrators who knew that they were transporting Jews to their deaths. They include any Church officials who knew that their participation in the identification of Jews as non-Christians would lead to the deaths of the Jews. They include the by now proverbial “desk murderer”... who himself may not have seen the victims yet whose paperwork lubricated the wheels of deportation and destruction.’ (HWE, p. 164; see also pp. 165, 523 n. 3)
56. For Goldhagen’s misrepresentation of the German archives, see Ruth Bettina Birn, ‘Revising the Holocaust’, The Historical Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, 1997, pp. 195-215. After submitting this manuscript for publication, I came across Birn’s important review. Although our arguments occasionally overlap, her focus is Goldhagen’s misuse of the archival sources, a topic I do not directly address.
57. HWE, pp. 181-5, 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, ‘Command and Compliance’, in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the SS State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Hohne, The Order of the Death’s Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, ‘The Good Old Days’, New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
58. Browning, Ordinary Men, pp. 73, 150ff, 184.
59. HWE, pp. 17, 188, 228, 256, 259, 386, 388-9, 396-8, 400, 457, 480 n. 40, original emphasis. Faulting ‘conventional explanations’ for ignoring the cruelty dimension, Goldhagen, in his inimitable style, alleges: ‘They do not acknowledge the “inhumanity” of the deeds as being anything other than epiphenomenal to the underlying phenomenon to be explained.’ (HWE, p. 392)
60. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, New York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, ‘Command and Compliance’, pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70,142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Hohne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., ‘The Good Old Days’, pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable’, p. 99.
61. Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, New York 1984, p. 18, see also p. 93; Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror, Princeton, 1997, pp. 137-49.
62. Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 65.
63. HWE, pp. 268, 585 n. 73. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. I, p. 325; Klee et al., ‘The Good Old Days’, p. 195ff. For the German photographs, see also Bartov, Hitler’s Army, pp. 104-5.
64. Hohne, The Order of the Death’s Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Todorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen’s review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this the crucial point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned:

When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel ... that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and ‘normal’ aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the far deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)

65. Note that, according to Browning, ‘there was a pronounced reluctance of the witnesses to criticize their former comrades’ and that ‘such denunciations by the policemen, even of unpopular superiors, much less of their comrades, were extremely rare.’ Ordinary Men, pp. 108, 151-2.
66. For other examples, see HWE, pp. 198, 228, 252, 540 n. 58.
67. For the Einsatzgruppen, see especially Trials of War Criminals, vol. iv (cited phrase on p. 490).
68. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. I, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Hohne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., ‘The Good Old Days’, pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. iv, pp. 83, 206, 245, 311.
69. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, p. 150.
70. Goldhagen’s treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that ‘a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.’ (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 percent agreed that ‘the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.’ Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the Jewish Question, pp. 197-209. juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitter’s anti-Semitism against another – albeit in response to a ‘badly phrased question’ – that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys.
71. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase ‘concentration camps’ was borrowed from the notorious reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
72. Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 36,40-1, 53-55
73. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis’ racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech:

But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellow man. The higher race – at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization – subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason.

Although plainly racist, Hitler’s argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt’s. In the Tribunal’s final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity’s dark history, the first was ‘President Theodore Roosevelt’. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
74. Compare, for example, Raul Hilberg’s scathing assessments of Lucy Dawidowicz, the doyenne of Holocaust studies in the US, and Israel Gutman, director of the Research Centre of Yad Vashem in Israel. See Hilberg, The Politics of Memory.
75. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of ‘Jewish partisan activity’ was the Einsatzgruppen’s main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt’s relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt’s ‘calumnies about the Jews’. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt’s indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: ‘We didn’t figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death... There isn’t another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.’ A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192 , 208-9. Arno Mayer’s main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
76. Alongside Holocaust studies, a veritable Holocaust industry has sprung up. The recent publication of a Holocaust cookbook – to rave notices, no less – points up the marketing possibilities of Holocaust kitsch. Cara DeSilva, ed., In Memory’s Kitchen, New York 1996.
77. Revealingly, Holocaust studies has been exempted from the current mainstream assault on what is disparagingly dubbed ‘victim studies’ – for example, women’s and gay and lesbian studies. The explanation for this discrepancy is plainly not comparative scholarly worth. One may also note that the field of Judaic studies has enjoyed comparable immunity from current mainstream attacks on ethnic studies.
78. Indeed, Goldhagen is to Holocaust scholarship what Elie Wiesel is to Holocaust memory. In a highly-praised new memoir, All Rivers Run to the Sea, New York 1995, Wiesel documents his credibility as a witness. Recently liberated from Buchenwald and only eighteen years old, he reports, ‘I read The Critique of Pure Reason don’t laugh! in Yiddish.’ (pp. 139, 163-4) Leaving aside Wiesel’s acknowledgement that at the time ‘I was wholly ignorant of Yiddish grammar’ (pp. 139, 163-4), The Critique of Pure Reason was never translated into Yiddish. This is only one of a number of extraordinary episodes in the book (for others, see pp. 121-30, 202). He who ‘refuses to believe me’, Wiesel protests, ‘is lending credence to those who deny the Holocaust.’ (p. 336)
79. In Alexander Bloom’s Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that ‘none of us were Zionists’ (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that ‘the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point’ (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was ‘now the religion of the American Jews’ (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
80. Goldhagen locates ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ – the tendency towards extermination – in Germany. Yet, in his formulation, it must be a general tendency. At any rate, Goldhagen never specifies why it was peculiar to Germany. To adduce the Nazi holocaust as evidence is plainly a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument.
81. A full discussion of the origins of Holocaust culture would also have to include domestic sources. Aligned with black people against the Jim Crow system in the South, many Jews broke with the Civil Rights alliance in the late 1960s when the struggle for equality no longer turned on caste discrimination from which they themselves had suffered but rather economic privilege. Articulating the class outlook of an ethnic group that had largely ‘made it’ in the US, Jewish neo-conservatives figured prominently in the assault on the poor. Playing the Holocaust card to deflect criticism, they wrapped themselves in the cloak of virginal innocence and bandied about the claim of ‘black anti-Semitism’. In addition, former Jewish leftists joining the political mainstream exploited the Holocaust as they tarred the New Left with charges of anti-Semitism.
82. For the Joan Peters hoax, see Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds, Blaming the Victims, New York 1988, ch. 1; and Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, ch. 2. For the record, an abridged version of this manuscript was submitted to Harper’s, The Nation, The New Republic and The New York Review of Books. No editor disputed the findings; none, however, expressed interest in publishing them.
83. Naumann, Auschwitz, p. 91; Primo Levi, The Reawakening, New York 1965, p. 214; Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, pp. 79, 48; Trials of War Criminals, vol. iv, p. 500. 54

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW: REVISING THE HOLOCAUST By RUTH BETTINA BIRN [The views expressed in this article are those of the author and not those of the Department of justice, Canada.]

Chief Historian, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Section, Department of Justice, Canada (in collaboration with Dr Volker Riess)

Hilter’s willing executioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. By Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. London: Little Brown and Company, 1996. Pp. x+622. £20.


Questions about the motives of the perpetrators and, by implication, the causes of the Holocaust, have long been in the forefront of academic or non-academic discussions of the Nazi period – from the time of contemporary observers to the present day. A wide range of possible responses to these questions has been put forward, drawing on concepts from a variety of disciplines, such as history, psychology, sociology or theology. Daniel Goldhagen’s book on the motivation of the perpetrators of the Holocaust claims to be a ‘radical revision of what has until now been written’ (p. 9). This claim is made on the book-jacket and by the author himself. His thesis can be summarized as follows: Germany was permeated by a particularly radical and vicious brand of anti-Semitism whose aim was the elimination of Jews. The author defines this as ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’. This viral strain of anti-Semitism, he states, ‘resided ultimately in the heart of German political culture, in German society itself’ (p. 428). Medieval anti-Semitism, based as it was on the teachings of the Christian religion, was so ‘integral to German culture’ (p. 55) that with the emergence of the modem era it did not disappear but rather took on new forms of expression, in particular, racial aspects. By the end of the nineteenth century ‘eliminationist anti-Semitism’ dominated the German political scene. In the Weimar Republic, it grew more virulent even before Hitler came to power. The Nazi machine merely turned this ideology into a reality. The course of its actualization was not deterred by anything save bare necessity: ‘the road to Auschwitz was not twisted’ (p. 425). When the ‘genocidal program’ was implemented along with the German attack on the Soviet Union, it was supported by the general German population, by the ‘ordinary Germans’ – the key phrase of the book – who became ‘willing executioners. They had no need of special orders, coercion or pressure because their ‘cognitive model’ showed them that Jews were ultimately fit only to suffer and to die’ (p. 316).
Daniel Goldhagen’s book has become an international event. He has been interviewed and quoted, appeared on TV and travelled widely to discuss his work. [196] Reviews, both enthusiastic and critical, have poured from the presses in many countries. It is hard to think of a large academic book that has had such a reception and even harder to explain why. The book itself is made up of three parts: an overview of German history and the significance of anti-Semitism therein, three case studies, and roughly two pages of conclusions. The first, general section has been the subject of most of the attention of reviewers. This review will, therefore, concentrate on the case studies, the sources which Mr. Goldhagen has used and the methodology on which the book rests. I only want say one thing with respect to the general issues that Mr. Goldhagen raises. His assertion that German anti-Semitism was unique can only be made by comparing it to other forms of anti-Semitism. If one claims that only Jews were treated in a special way, one has to analyse the treatment of other victims; if one claims that only German committed certain deeds, one has to compare them to the deeds of non-Germans; if one claims that all Germans acted in a certain way, one has to compare the behaviour of different groups in German society. It is odd that a professor of political science makes no attempt to look at his evidence in a comparative framework.
The evidence itself has not been examined by reviewers, because most of them are not familiar with Mr. Goldhagen’s sources. In fact, the author uses historical documents only to a minimal extent; apart from some Nuremberg documents and a few files from the German Federal Archives, he relies mainly on secondary literature. For his case studies, he uses material mainly from German post-war investigations of Nazi crimes, which are, for the most part, to be found in the ‘Central Agency for the Prosecution of Nazi Crimes’ (1) in Ludwigsburg, Germany.

[1 Abbreviated as ZStL.]

The importance of investigation and trial records for research on the Nazi period has been recognized by scholars for more than twenty-five years. However, historians also appreciate that these records must be interpreted critically. Not only are witness statements recollections of things past, and therefore subject to retrospection, but due to the context of a criminal investigation itself, they demonstrate how additional incentives for distorting the truth must be taken into account. Goldhagen’s methodology for dealing with statements of perpetrators is to ‘discount all selfexculpating testimony that finds no corroboration from other sources’. The bias created by this selection he considers ‘negligible’ (p. 467, see p. 601, n. 11).
This approach is too mechanical and inadequate for dealing with the complexities of the issue, in particular since Goldhagen’s stated aim is to study the complex motivational aspects of murder. Statements about their motives form an integral part of a perpetrator’s testimony, and evaluating them is not as easy as sorting out corroborated from uncorroborated facts. A number of other variables have to be considered: (1) the context of the investigation (great differences exist between individual investigations, in part due to the investigative body responsible, when the investigation took place, and in part due to contrived testimonies), (2) the context of the statement (perpetrators often gave different statements, in different settings and at different times, which can differ considerably in content), (3) the manner in which the statement was recorded (statements in the German legal system are not verbatim transcriptions, but are a summary prepared by the interrogator. They are not the words of the person himself. Only in some cases are direct quotations inserted.)
A comparative approach is imperative when evaluating interrogations. Only by reviewing as broad a base of statements as possible are discrepancies, distortions and [197] omissions likely to be revealed. Moreover, only the comparative method can place the statements into their proper historical, and individual, context and allow for informed conclusions. In this respect, Goldhagen’s study falls short. His evidentiary base is extremely small; for each of his major topics, he has concentrated on only one investigation, or parts of investigations. The number of statements on which he bases his conclusions is fewer than 200, which is a very narrow selection from the tens of thousands of statements in existence on those topics.
In addition, he uses only snippets of indictments, verdicts or case summaries by German prosecutors. He also uses portions of statements from a wide range of investigations which are unrelated to the topics he discusses in the book. In light of this paucity of sources, it is not surprising that Goldhagen’s book had neither a bibliography nor a listing of archival sources.


The empirical evidence, which Goldhagen marshals in support of his hypothesis, is derived from three aspects of the Nazi era: (a) the Order Police and Police Battalions, (b) Jewish labour and (c) the death marches.
Goldhagen rightly deplores the fact that a comprehensive history of the Order Police in the Nazi period has not as yet been written. The participation of the Order Police in the Holocaust has, however, been dealt with in the major general histories of the Holocaust, as for instance by Raul Hilberg in The destruction of the European Jews, or by Browning in his recent study of Police Battalion 101. (2) Goldhagen, while contending that Police Battalions provide ‘an unusually clear window’ (p. 181) for the understanding of the genocide, does not think a ‘thorough comprehension of institutional development’ (p. 181) necessary for an analysis of its significance. Consequently, he has not dealt with any of the extensive materials on the Order Police (apart from four files from the R 19 collection in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz), though he could have avoided a number of basic mistakes through a closer acquaintance with the subject.

[2 Christopher Browning, Ordinary men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the final solution in Poland (New York, 1992).]

Goldhagen’s argument asserts the following: police battalions were the ‘organizational home of a large number of Germans’ (p. 182), who were ‘randomly selected’ (p. 183); these battalions were ‘populated by neither martial spirits nor Nazi supermen’ (p. 185). In order to substantiate this, he examines the members of one battalion, ‘Polizeibataillon 101’, in greater detail. Its members, when sent to Eastern Poland in 1942, were mainly reservists. They were older men, neither over-proportionally party members nor SS members, and, as Goldhagen argues, their collective social backgrounds are such that they can be seen as a representative sample of German society as a whole. They are ‘... representative of German society – that is, ordinary Germans – in their degree of Nazification...’ (p. 207). Despite the controversy in the social sciences as to the presumed correlation between a person’s social background and behaviour in a given human situation, Goldhagen turns presumption into premise by abandoning all pretence of examining empirical data. He boldly asserts that this allows for insight into the ‘...likely conduct of other ordinary Germans’ (p. 208). This leap from a limited quantity to a collective quality, by which real events are grossly relativized is rather breathtaking – particularly given the existence of other police [198] battalions which were also active in the Holocaust and were not comprised of reservists, but comprised of career police officers or volunteers. (3)

[3 For instance: Police Reserve Battalion 45, ZStL SA 429 Indictment StA Regensburg 14 Js 1495/65; Police Battalion 306, ZStL SA 447 Verdict LG Frankfurt 4 Ks 1/71; Battalion 316; ZStL, SA 387, Verdict LG Bochum 15 Ks 1/66.]

Goldhagen’s argument develops in the following way: the statements of former members of Police Battalion 101 disclose an incident in which the commander, Major Trapp, explicitly told his men that they did not have to shoot if they did not want to. This was on the occasion of the unit’s first mass-shooting of Jews. Obviously, the commander here is unwilling to comply with his orders. A few men availed themselves of the offer not to shoot, the majority did not. This raises the obvious question of what the motives of the complying men were. The motivating force for compliance was, according to Goldhagen, the ‘...great hatred for the Jews’ (p. 425). Goldhagen suggests that they took part because they wanted to kill, and, in one of his many extrapolations on all police battalions, he states that, one can ‘... generalize with confidence ... by choosing not to excuse themselves... [that] the Germans in police battalions themselves indicated that they wanted to be genocidal executioners’ (p. 279).
During the investigation into their activities, members of Police Battalion 101 gave explanations for their behaviour. They form the core of Christopher Browning’s study. These statements point towards a different interpretation of motivation from that supplied by Goldhagen, particularly with respect to the first mass-execution. By and large, the men were not eager to conduct the mass-killing operation, a fact which is corroborated by those who remained behind and did not shoot. But they did participate in the executions, nevertheless. Over time, when mass-killings continued, certain character types emerged: the very few who continued to stand apart, those who enjoyed the killing and who volunteered and gave free reign to their sadistic impulses and those who simply continued on with mass-murder and grew increasingly barbaric. Browning discusses a wide range of explanations for this behaviour, based on sociopsychological concepts, and argues that the most likely explanation is a mixture of peer-pressure, careerism and obedience.
In order to support his hypothesis, Goldhagen is forced to reject not only Browning’s interpretation but also the explanations offered in statements themselves. The statements are attacked as ‘...unsubstantiated, self-exculpating claims’ (p. 534, n. 1) and Browning as gullible enough to fall for them. It is noteworthy that a considerable part of Goldhagen’s discussion of factual evidence is given over to attacking Browning in unusually strong language. Why has Goldhagen concentrated exclusively on Police Battalion 101 when there are roughly one hundred and fifty investigations of other police battalions to choose from? While it would make sense in the context of a larger study to revisit this one case, it is peculiar to concentrate on this one case when it has already been evaluated by a reputed historian.
In evaluating witness testimony, one can reject or view circumspectly all perpetrators’ statements, particularly as to motive. They are a reflection of the perpetrators’ selfimage based on the desire for exculpation and tainted by retrospection. In doing so, however, one would lose one of the few possibilities available of gaining insight into the mentality of perpetrators, especially in those cases where a perpetrator feels compelled to unburden himself by confessing to his criminal acts and then tries to offer an explanation for his behaviour. Nevertheless, wholesale rejection [199] is a legitimate position. Goldhagen does not avail himself of this option though. He seems to follow no stringent methodological approach whatsoever. This is the problem. He prefers instead to use parts of the statements selectively, to re-interpret them according to his own point of view, or to take them out of context and make them fit into his own interpretative framework.
One example cited by Goldhagen is a letter by a captain in Battalion 101. He considers that it is of the greatest importance: ‘This one letter provides more insight ... than do reams of the perpetrators’ self-serving post-war testimony’ (pp. 3-4, 382). The captain complains to his superiors about having to sign a declaration not to plunder. Goldhagen depicts this as significant proof that Germans had a scale of values and were able to make moral choices. However, when one examines this letter in the context of his other correspondence, the captain is revealed to be a malcontent. This letter has no great significance. (4)

[4 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 27/62, III, pp. 379-412. Goldhagen also depicts the content of the letter wrongly.]

Another example of Goldhagen’s handling of the evidence is his description of an incident in which one of the officers brought his newly-wed to a ghetto-clearing and mass execution, angering many of the battalion members. (5) Trapp reprimanded this behaviour publicly. Goldhagen interprets this as merely ‘a sense of chivalry’ (p. 242) and concern for ‘her welfare’ (p. 242), because the woman was pregnant. He also insinuates that wives ‘participated’ (p. 241) rather than simply being spectators of mass-murder, which they were occasionally. Later on in the book, the whole incident is generalized (pp. 267, 378) as a representation of the fact that perpetrators routinely shared their murderous experiences with their wives. This generalization rests on a very small foundation of evidence, and totally disregards the many examples of strict separation by the perpetrators of their ‘home life’ from their life in ‘the East’. This, by the way, led presumably to the disproportionally high number of divorces among perpetrators immediately after the war.

[5 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 27/62 V, pp. 1031-38, F.B.; VI, pp. 1359-68, F.B., VII, pp. 1493-96, H.E.; VIII c, indictment StA Hamburg 141 Js 1957/62, pp. 430-47.]

Expressions of shame and disapproval in the statements, if not rejected out of hand for methodological reasons (p. 533, n. 74, in connection with Pol Btl 65), are discredited by Goldhagen as mere expressions of ‘visceral disgust’ (p. 541, n. 68) and not of ‘ethical or principled opposition’ (p. 541, n. 68). To illustrate how this view is a misrepresentation and, thus, unacceptable, one need only refer to the statement of the medical orderly of Battalion 101, who, due to his function, did not have to shoot. He is very open and forthright in his interrogation. He describes his feelings with respect to the killing of the sick in a ghetto hospital quite sincerely: ‘it was so repulsive/disgusting to me and I felt so terribly ashamed’. (6) While the notion of ‘principled opposition’ would make sense when, for instance, dealing with attitudes of the German civilian population, its heuristic value becomes questionable when dealing with a group who, after all, did participate in crimes and can hardly claim ‘opposition’ of any kind. For an honest statement under similar circumstances, one should more likely turn to one of the tentative and groping explanations Browning analyses, in which the person is very open about what he saw, using descriptions like ‘cruel’ [grausam], ‘murder plain and simple’ [glatter Mord], ‘a crying shame’ [lausgesprochene Schweinerei] and also very candidly talks about his participation in [200] it. At the same time he describes his frame of mind within the context of the war, i.e. that he could not even imagine refusing to obey an order. (7) There are even examples of expressions of shame and guilt coupled with self-incriminating statements. One such statement cited by Browning (Browning, pp. 67-8) is, not surprisingly, ignored by Goldhagen.

[6 ‘Derartig angeekelt und ich habe mich derartig geschaemt.’ ZStL, 208 AR-Z 27/62, V, pp. 971-9, F. V. See also Goldhagen’s version, p. 546, n. 16.
7 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 27/62, VI, pp. 1114-28, E. N.]

Using Goldhagen’s method of handling evidence, one could easily find enough citations from the Ludwigsburg material to prove the exact opposite of what Goldhagen maintains.


Goldhagen uses the activities of police Battalion 65 as another illustration of his theory that ‘the Germans’ killed ‘any Jew whom they discovered’...with neither ‘prompting nor permission’ (p. 194), because this reflected ‘their own inwardly held standards’ (p. 193), their ‘internalized... need to kill Jews’ (p. 193). As proof, he recounts a number of killings which are contained in the investigation report of a German prosecutor. A reading of this report in full, and not selectively as does Goldhagen, reveals that the activities of Police Battalion 65 mirror the course of the German occupation policy; they implemented whatever orders were given to them at a specific time and place. They killed Jews and Russians in Lithuania and Russia, Jews and Poles in Poland. They deported Jews from Denmark and, at the end of the war in Northern Yugoslavia, they killed Yugoslavs. (8) The report does not support Goldhagen’s interpretation that priority was given to the killing of Jews and that ‘every German was inquisitor, judge and executioner’ (p. 194).

[8 ZStL, 206 AR-Z 6/62, VIII, Einstellungsverfugung, pp. 2073-97.]

Individual statements are treated with similar selectiveness. Goldhagen cites the account of one witness who describes how a person was beaten to death, just because the name Abraham appeared in his papers (p. 532, n. 54). (9) This incident is mentioned on page 2 of the statement, and on pages 3-4, the brutal and sexually sadistic murder of a young girl by one of the officers is described in graphic detail, vividly illustrating the atmosphere prevalent in Russia. Goldhagen makes no reference to it. The victim was not Jewish.

[9 ZStL, 206 AR-Z 6/62, III, pp. 782-5, E. L.]

Goldhagen describes the activities of Police Battalion 309 in June 1941, in Bialystok (pp. 188-191) as ‘... the emblematic killing operation of the formal genocide’ (p. 191) He maintains that the battalion knew of the planned destruction of the Jews before its entry into the Soviet Union. (For a number of years, the majority of holocaust scholars has endorsed the view that initially an order was given to kill Jewish men and Soviet functionaries which was enlarged after roughly two months to a general killing order, including women and children.) Consequently, when entering Bialystok ‘these Germans could finally unleash themselves without restraint upon the Jews’ (p. 188), so the whole battalion without any prompting ‘became instantaneous Weltanschauungskrieger or ideological warriors’ (p. 190). The Jewish quarters were searched, accompanied by many acts of cruelty, the Jewish population was herded into the market place, finally in part forced into the Synagogue, and there burned alive.
Detailed examination of the statements themselves modify this one-dimensional picture and show Goldhagen’s conclusions to be without foundation. Goldhagen stresses the importance of the extermination order, and attacks Browning for having [201] failed to mention it (pp. 529-30, n. 22). However, while some former members of the battalion confirm its existence, (10) others give differing statements, among them the clerk [Schreiber] through whose hands the orders would have had to pass. (11) One battalion member changes his story radically in a series of statements, and he speaks of an order to kill all Jews in his final statement only, the one which Goldhagen relies upon. (12) This should arouse the suspicion of a researcher. Closer scrutiny reveals the likely reason for the change of story as a defence strategy of the main defendants. As soon as the investigation commenced, intensive communication between former battalion members took place. (13) Two defence strategies emerge: to suggest a superior order in support of ‘military necessity’ and to shift blame to the commander, who died during the investigation. This conclusion is corroborated by investigations against other battalions of the ‘Polizei Regiment Mitte’ that, by the end of July 1941, still murdered male Jews only. (14)

[10 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, V, pp. 1339 rs, A. A.; VI, p. 1416, J. B.; 202 AR 2701/65, I, pp. 95-6, H. G.
11 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, I, pp. 289-90, G. E.; see IV, pp. 1115-16 and IX, indictment StA Dortmund 45 Js 21/61, p. 2303, H. Sch.; III, p. 681 and VII, p. 1926 rs.; R-J.B.; II, pp. 485-6, E.O.; II, p. 514, T. D.
12 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, III, p. 764 (1963); XII, pp. 2794-95 (1965); VII, p. 1813 rs (1966), E. M.
13 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, I, pp. 73-7, M.R. P. 78, letter E.W., pp. 177-93; E.W., II, pp. 459-62, H.Sch.; see: Heiner Lichtenstein: Himmlers gruene Helfer. Die Schutz-und Ordnungspolizei im ‘Dritten Reich’ (Koeln, 1990), pp. 86-8. This has happened in other cases concerning Order Police.
14 Police Battalions 316 and 322, see ZStL SA 387; verdict L. G. Bochum 15 Ks i/66 and SA 133; verdict LG Freiburg 1 Ks 1/63.]

The incident described by Goldhagen seems to have been in the nature of a pogrom, caused by a group of officers who, through their proximity to the SS, were ideologically zealous. (15) This is corroborated by two men from the regular members who say that they were hustled into the action before they knew what was happening to them. (16) One describes how he was disgusted by the burning alive of defenceless people in the synagogue. Since both men confess, their testimony should carry great weight. While Goldhagen only speaks of ‘the Germans’, the perpetrators in this case can be specifically identified. Of the fourteen main perpetrators who stood trial, 13 were career police officers and one came via the Waffen-SS; 8 were party members. (17) One of the two company leaders had been involved, after World War I, with right wing groups such as the ‘Freikorps’ while the other was a SS member in 1933. They can hardly be considered ‘ordinary Germans’.

[15 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, V, pp. 1217-20, H.B.; II, p. 374, A.O.; 11, pp. 465-73, H. Sch.; V, PP. 1343-44, J.O.; SA 214, verdict LG Wuppertal 12 Ks 1/67, pp. 60-5.
16 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, III, pp. 788-92, R.I. and V, pp. 1280-84, W. L.; IX, pp. 2327-33, indictment StA Dortmund 45 JS 21/61.
17 ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, IX, indictment StA Dortmund 45 Js 21/61; SA 214, verdict LG Wuppertal 12 Ks 1/67, P. 8, ad R-J. B.]

The inadequacy of conclusions which are reached by not using a comparative approach is clearly illustrated by Goldhagen’s discussion of the decision-making process within the phenomenon of the Holocaust. The lack of a comparative approach also illustrates that he, himself, ignores his own warning about the uncritical use of sources. He is not adverse to using exculpatory statements if it suits his line of argument. Goldhagen, as mentioned above, supports the older view that a general order was given to the Operational Task Forces [Einsatzgruppen] before they set out. His argument, [202] though, is not up to the present level of the international debate on the subject. He bases his opinion mainly on two statements made by former Commanders of Einsatzkommandos, Blume (p. 149) and Filbert (p. 149), as ‘conclusive evidence’ (p. 153). Blume stood trial in Nuremberg, and he was part of a defence strategy organized by Otto Ohlendorf which had as its purpose the proving of an alleged order by Hitler before the murder commenced. The presence of this order was intended to provide the foundation for a defence which used superior orders as an excuse. Alfred Streim has demonstrated the existence of such a strategy by means of a painstaking and thorough analysis of the wide range of statements available. He also showed how statements by the same person could change substantially over time. The Blume and Filbert statements are examples of this. (18) Goldhagen, in his account, accepts uncritically the Ohlendorf line; he wrote a paper on Ohlendorf in his undergraduate degree. Goldhagen habitually dismisses as inadequate the works of the most respected scholars of the Holocaust, yet refers repeatedly to his own B.A. work (p 583, n. 45). The most telling example of the uncritical use of sources is what Goldhagen announces as ‘what may be the most significant and illuminating testimony after the war’ (p. 393). This testimony corroborates, according to him, that the perpetrators were genuinely motivated by ‘demonological hatred’ against all Jews. The testimony is given by R. Maurach in defence of Ohlendorf in Nuremberg. Again, the best line of defence available, in the face of the indisputable number of murders committed by Einsatzgruppe D, was to claim orders from above and sincere ideological convictions. This, however, does not make this defence, which was rejected at Nuremberg, conclusive proof; the one argument ‘leaving us no choice but to adopt it’ (p. 583, n. 46). In general, Goldhagen seems to have difficulty comprehending that when perpetrators claim to have been motivated by Nazi propaganda, it need not be sincere; it can be a subterfuge or a very plausible line of self-exculpation psychologically. It attempts to supply ‘idealistic’ motives for crimes committed.

[18 Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener im Fall ‘Barbarossa’, (Heidelberg, 1981); Alfred Streim, The task of the SS Einsatzgruppen, volume 4, Alfred Streim: Reply to Helmut Krausnick, volume 6, both: Simon Wiesenthal Center Annual.]


In general terms, Goldhagen’s descriptions of the activities of these police battalions entirely ignores the fact that the police units operated in an occupied country during a war and that some of these units had been conducting killings for some time in Poland, or other areas, before being sent to the Soviet Union. This neglect also applies to the examples he uses. (19) The factual, social and historical context in which these policemen operated is entirely omitted. A police environment has a specific culture which is particularly manifest in a para-militaristic setting. One illustration of this is Goldhagen’s attack on Browning who accepted the perpetrators’ explanation of not wanting to appear cowardly if they refused the order to shoot. Goldhagen overlooks entirely the scale of values and perceptions of manly behaviour prevalent in these particular settings at the time. It might be disturbing that somebody would shoot children because he did not want to ‘appear soft’, as expressed in a statement, but it captures something of the atmosphere of the time. (20) The framework of permissible action delineated by war and occupation is neglected in the same way. Failing to refuse [203] a given order is imperceptibly changed into an entirely voluntarist act of Jew-killing. Examples of the voluntary killing of Jews do, of course, exist, but they are not to be seen in the cases to which Goldhagen refers.

[19 For instance, Battalion 309: see ZStL, 205 AR-Z 20/60, II, pp. 462-4, H.Sch. and pp. 482-4, E.O.
20 Ed. E. Klee, W. Dressen, V. Riess, Schoene Zeiten (Frankfurt, 1988), pp. 81-3.]

The most severe shortcoming of Goldhagen’s treatment of the Order Police is that he analyses activities outside of their proper historical and institutional context. In his introductory description of the Order Police, cited above, he states that police battalions are ‘most intimately involved in the genocide’ (p. 181). How is this a given? A more plausible argument with respect to this can be made for the smaller units of the Order Police, stationed all over the occupied cast. They were involved in every step of the ghettoization, exploitation and, finally, murder of the Jewish population over a prolonged period of time. They might have known the victims; they witnessed every detail of the Holocaust. In contrast, mobile units like the police battalions only sporadically moved into a particular region for mass-killings. So why not choose the smaller units instead? If he had used stationary police units as his defining example, his hypothesis would have been devoid of any real content.
The Order Police in the Second World War grew enormously. The shortage of German personnel prevented effective policing of the occupied east. Non-German police forces had to be used to a great degree. The ratio of Germans to non-Germans ranged from between 1: 10 to 1: 50; in some places it was even higher. The majority were incorporated into the structural organization of the Order Police. In practical terms, the dispersion of limited resources meant that any rural police post would have been manned by a few German, and a much larger group of non-German, policemen. All of them took part in the persecution of Jews. Goldhagen would have had to address the question of what differences are to be seen in their respective behaviour. And the same question can be asked of the police battalions themselves. ‘Schutzmannschaften’, comprised of non-Germans, had been set up and were assigned the same functions as the German units. For example, Police Battalion 11, mentioned by Goldhagen in connection with its murderous activities in Belorussia in the fall of 1941 (p. 271), was augmented by the Lithuanian ‘Schutzmannschaftsbattalion 2/12’, manned by Lithuanian volunteers. (21) Germans and Lithuanians rotated in the killing actions – two companies were shooting while two were guarding. A number of statements of a type Goldhagen habitually accepts (though one might have reservations about such denunciatory statements), refer to the Lithuanians’ particular bloodthirstiness. (22) Does this mean that Goldhagen’s theory of the cognitive models of Germany’s eliminationist anti-Semitic culture applies to Lithuanian cognitive models as well?

[21 ZStL, SA 119, indictment StA Kassel 31 Js 27/60, pp. 14-17; Report of the investigations of war criminals in Australia, edited by the Attorney-General’s Department, Canberra (1993), pp. 124-9.
22 StA Kassel 3a Ks 1/61. F.W.; E.B.]


The second empirical basis of Goldhagen’s argument is the fact that Jews were used as forced labour. This part of his book he considers to be the ‘toughest test’ of his hypothesis (p. 465). He studies conditions in Jewish work-camps, using concrete examples of two camps in Lublin: the Lipowa camp and the ‘Flughafen’ camp. The many acts of cruelty and torture to which inmates were subjected are described in great detail. Goldhagen sees the economic irrationality of these conditions as a crucial feature. ‘Why did Germans put Jews to work?’ (p. 283), he asks. ‘Why did they not simply kill them?’ (p. 283). The answer he gives is that the German ‘cultural cognitive [204] model of Jews’ (p. 285), which was ‘ingrained in German culture’ (p. 320), did not allow for Jewish work to be rationally motivated but only allowed such work to have ‘a symbolic and moral dimension’ (p. 285). The view expressed by Hitler, namely, that Jews are ‘lazy’ and ‘parasites’, is taken as ‘the common view in Germany’. This collective view ‘echoed Hitler’s’ (p. 285) own and led to the wish to make Jews suffer. ‘Germans derived emotional satisfaction’ from putting Jews to work (p. 284). They enjoyed the ‘production of Jewish misery’ (p. 320), even if it was counterproductive. ‘Jewish “work” was not work... but a suspended form of death. In other words, it was death itself’ (p. 323).
Though not without a certain explanatory potential, Goldhagen’s concept of the use of work to inflict gratuitous suffering on a doomed population is vitiated by the examples he cites. The work camps he is describing were operating in 1942/43. At that time, the genocide, i.e. the overall plan to murder the Jewish population of Europe, had been in effect for two years. The idea of making Jews work was not a change in plans but rather a side issue, borne out of the idea of getting the most use of the victims before having them killed. These facts are set out in detail in Goldhagen’s main source, (23) in the prosecutor’s report. However, the general, immutable plan in which this occurred involved ultimate destruction. Therefore, to compare the Lublin work-camps to slave labour programmes is nonsensical. Slave labour of Polish or Russian people was designed to utilize their work capacity, albeit under the harshest of conditions. Consequently, work conditions varied, in particular, when individual labourers were working on German farms, where some of them were not treated too badly. His premise that a German farmer treating a Polish forced labourer with some decency can be proof of the theory that Germans tortured only Jews, because concentration camp guards ill-treated Jews, is clearly illogical (pp. 313ff.). A more viable comparison to the situation of Slavic forced labourers would be with the situation of those Jews who were, in 1942/43, still within a German environment. (24) In order to support his stance that ‘Germans were murderous and cruel towards Jewish workers and murderous and cruel in ways they reserved especially for Jews’ (p. 315), Goldhagen depicts the conditions of Slavic forced labourers in somewhat too rosy a manner (p. 314). For instance, he ignores the fact that Russian women were forced to abort their unborn children, or were killed when found to be pregnant, even when the pregnancy resulted from rape. He also overlooks the fact that millions of soviet POWs were starved to death before it dawned on the German authorities that they had a problem with a labour shortage. These and other examples do not support the thesis that Germans dealt with everybody but Jews in a manner that was dictated by economic rationality.

[23 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 74/60, LIV. Secondary sources exist as well.
24 In detail described in: Victor Klemperer, Ich will Zeugnis ablegen bis zum letzten (Berlin, 1995), 11, pp. 21-48.]

The appropriate comparison for the conditions in the Lublin work camps is the conditions in other camps. Everything Goldhagen describes was a daily occurrence in every concentration camp (which parenthetically existed from 1933 on before and apart from the Nazi policy to kill every person just because they were Jewish): the endless roll-calls during which inmates perished from excessive heat, excessive cold, cruel punishments, public hangings, senseless work which was only meant to exhaust, health-care which was a means of expediting death, and the plethora of arbitrarily inflicted humiliations and tortures from guards. What Goldhagen describes as being inflicted by the ‘camp’s ordinary Germans’ (p. 307) onto ‘Jews, and only for Jews’ [205] (p. 313) reflects what really happened if one replaces ‘Germans’ with ‘guards’ and ‘Jews’ with ‘inmates’. Of course, the behaviour of guards was a reflection of the hatred of Jews, which was at the centre of Nazi beliefs, but it also reflects the multitude of other individual personalized hatreds. Jews were very often the object of the cruelty of guards, but so were gays, people wearing glasses, intellectuals, people with a disability, overweight people, and people who offered any type of resistance.
The Commander of the ‘Flughafenlager’ in 1942/43 was Christian Wirth and the majority of guards were his men. Wirth, who started out as a career police officer, was, from 1939/40 on, one of the central figures in the ‘Euthanasia’ programme, in which mental patients were killed. He moved on to the Lublin district where he was instrumental in setting up death camps. Wirth was an expert in the gassing of people. To refer to Christian Wirth and his subordinates as ‘the camp’s ordinary Germans’ (p. 307) is misleading. In the same vein, the guards in the ‘Lipowa’ camp, who are referred to as ‘an unextraordinary lot’ (p. 299), were three quarters SS men, hardened in camp duty. (25) In contrast to the behaviour of these men, a group of 15 employees of the SS-company in charge of production in the camp, are depicted by all victims as essentially harmless. (26) Goldhagen cannot have missed this telling juxtaposition; he cites the prosecutor’s report in the middle of the page after these facts are set out. How does this fit into Goldhagen’s claim that ‘post-war testimony ... reveals little consciousness of differences in attitude or action between those who were either Party or SS members and those who were not’ (p. 274)?

[25 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 74/60, XLVI, pp. 8400-12, Aktenvermerk.
26 ZStL, 208 AR-Z 74/60, XLVI, pp. 8441-42, Aktenvermerk.]

One additional point should be made in connection with Goldhagen’s description of the Lublin work camps. An all too common feature of his discussion is a use of nearly malicious language for the description of particularly terrible facts, which is presumably intended to be sarcastic detachment. It is wholly undignified. A reader can conclude for him or herself that the murder of forty thousand people within a few days is an enormous crime and that the code-name ‘Action Harvest Festival’ is a travesty, without being told by the author that this was ‘aptly named in keeping with the German’s customary love of irony’ (p. 291) – to name only one of many examples.
One final example comes from the Helmbrechts camp, in which there were male and female guards. It is reported that sexual relationships between the guards existed. Goldhagen deliberates on this ‘community of cruelty’ (p. 338) as follows: ‘the Germans made love in barracks next to enormous privation and incessant cruelty. What did they talk about when their heads rested quietly on their pillows, when they were smoking their cigarettes in those relaxing moments after their physical needs had been met? Did one relate to another accounts of a particularly amusing beating that she or he had administered or observed, of the rush of power that engulfed her when the righteous adrenalin of Jew-beating caused her body to pulse with energy?’ (p. 339)


The third empirically-based section of this book deals with ‘death marches’. One march, concerning the Helmbrechts camp, is described in detail. A group of Jewish female inmates were taken on foot, accompanied by male and female guards, through the border area of Germany and Czechoslovakia. No contextual framework for these events is provided; the events are merely related in a narrative style. Conditions on the [206] march were terrible, as they had been in the camp. The Jewish women were already emaciated and starving, food and shelter were denied them and they were relentlessly forced to continue marching. A number of them were killed during the march. Even after an explicit order by Himmler to refrain from killing, the murder continued.
Supported by a few similar examples from other death marches, Goldhagen arrives at a general explanation: this irrational, extremely cruel behaviour by ‘ordinary Germans’, directed exclusively against Jews, is proof of the demonological, undying hatred of ‘Germans’ against ‘Jews’. ‘To the very end, the ordinary Germans willfully, faithfully and zealously slaughtered Jews’ (p. 371). He argues that, in this situation, the behaviour of the German guards was entirely irrational, since Germany had already been defeated. He posits that the only reasonable thing in the circumstances would have been a change in behaviour and that the reason for a continuation of the killing must reside in deeper irrational urges.
Goldhagen’s account of the death marches is extremely distorted. In consulting the secondary sources he cites, we quickly encounter a number of facts which contradict the picture drawn. Krakowski, for instance, relates the fact that there were Jewish and non-Jewish inmates on death marches and gives detailed break-downs of the percentages of each group on the marches he mentions. In the period of March-April, 1945, in which the Helmbrechts march took place, Krakowski estimates that 250,000 prisoners were forced to take part in marches, one third of whom were Jewish. (27) Other examples, not cited by Goldhagen, show that conditions on all of these marches were very similar, including those with only non-Jewish inmates. (28)

[27 Shmuel Krakowski, ‘The death marches in the period of the evacuation of the camps’, in: The Nazi concentration camps (Yad Vashem, 1984), p. 482; Krakowski, Death marches, in: Encyclopedia of the Holocaust.
28 See, for instance, the death march from Wiener-Neudorf, where no Jews were present, Bertrand Perz, Der Todesmarsch from Wiener Neudorf nach Mauthausen. Eine Dokumentation, in: DOW jahrbuch 1989 pp. 117-37. 29. Perz, Der Todesmarsch, pp. 117-137.]

When compared with investigations of other death marches, one finds that the range of behaviour patterns is much wider than that suggested by Goldhagen. One can find examples for almost any attitude on the part of the guards, ranging from extreme cruelty to what might be considered its opposite, and, also to some degree, of the two attitudes co-existing.(29) [Text of footnote 29 is missing] On an individual basis, guards behaved quite differently from each other, reflecting their own degree of identification with camp behaviour. This is reported to be the case in the Helmbrechts march, although Goldhagen does not mention it. (29) The same diversity of behaviour can be observed in the civilian population. In the Helmbrechts march, the German population seems to have been supportive of the victims, offering food and shelter, but all succour was disallowed and thwarted by the guards. (30) One also finds entirely different behaviour, like the sudden outbursts of animosity and violence towards the miserable marchers, who were already in a desolate condition. (31)

[29 ZStL, SA 343, verdict LG Hof Ks 7/68, p. 82; see pp. 58-9 and 210.
30 ZStL, SA 343, verdict LG Hof Ks 7/68, pp. 57-9, 82-3, 194-5 and 210.
31 As examples of both types of behaviour: Solly Ganor, Der Todesmarsch, in: Dachauer Hefte 11, 1993; Peter Sturm: Evakuierung, in: Dachauer Hefte 11, 1995; Verdict LG Marburg 6 Ks 1/68, ZStL, SA 386; Indictment StA Hannover 11 Js 5/73, ZStL, SA 503, Verdict LG Hannover 11 Ks 1/77, ZStL, SA 503.]

A comparative perspective casts further doubt on Goldhagen’s notion that the only rational behaviour for the guards, in the shadow of the imminent defeat of Germany, would have been to either release the inmates or treat them humanely. The extensive [207] materials on crimes committed in the last weeks of the war (32) show numerous instances when the police, SS and German Army members turned, in a rabid and destructive way, not against Jews, but against the German population themselves, i.e. against whomever was showing signs of ‘defaitisme’. Hitler’s own response to the certainty of defeat was the wish to see the German population destroyed. In this period of chaos and destruction, human behaviour did not seem to conform to what Goldhagen describes as being the only ‘rational’ way.

[32 Available in published form, for instance, in the edition of German verdicts by Rueters, also in numerous printed works.]


Thus far, a close review of Goldhagen’s evidentiary base has shown the selective way in which he has interpreted his sources. On a larger scale, the greatest short-coming of the book is that he uses such a small sample of the investigations and sources available. He takes selected parts and blows them up out of proportion. Sweeping generalizations then emerge from these distortions so that they look like an image reflected from a magnifying mirror. However, if he had used a broader source-base and applied the comparative method, a truer picture would have revealed itself. In the last part of the book, a brief section has the heading ‘comparative perspective’ (p. 406). It does not serve the purpose of making any real comparisons, as Goldhagen only brushes the whole issue aside by applying his own style of argument and logic. He starts out with a question: Could we conceive of Danes and Italians committing the Holocaust? This is a biased rhetorical question since these are the two generally well-known examples of groups who did not participate in the genocide. So why is the question asked? Danes were not enlisted in any of the units that committed massmurder, so how is it that they can be used in a comparison?
Goldhagen’s theory of the motivation of perpetrators is flawed by the absence of any comparison between a German and non-German perpetrator. As mentioned above, the contribution of non-Germans to policing Eastern Europe was substantial, and policing in the context of German occupational policies included the involvement in crimes. Did their behaviour differ? And if so, in what way? For Eastern Europe, comparisons would have been made easier as Germans and non-Germans in police units and posts were working side by side. Comparisons with collaborating police forces, such as with the French, or with allies like the Croatian or Hungarian police, might have been more complex.
A classic example of non-Germans, who fit the picture Goldhagen wishes to paint of Germans, is the ‘Arajs Kommando’. Named after their leader, Viktor Arajs, this was a group composed of Latvian men, mainly students or former army officers with rightwing political backgrounds. Within days of the arrival of the German forces in Riga, Arajs made contact with the leader of Einsatzgruppe A, Stahlecker, and offered his services. In the following months, his group, officially known as the ‘Latvian Auxiliary Security Police’, did nothing but kill Jews. They were active in Riga and moved around all of Latvia; parts of the group were sent to Byelorussia. The guards in camps located in Latvia were Arajs Commando members. The killing actions were extremely gruesome, with the perpetrators literally wading in blood, getting drunk during the killing, and afterwards participating in large celebrations. Survivor accounts describe the terrible conditions under which the Jews were kept in the basement of the commando headquarters. There they were tortured, degraded, and raped. All of the [208] Arajs Commando members were volunteers. They were free to leave at any time. (33) Goldhagen offers evasive explanations for non-German perpetrators: ‘The Germans had defeated, repressed and dehumanized Ukrainians and there were pressures operating on the Ukrainians that did not exist for the Germans’ (pp. 408-9). He also states that the ‘German’s conduct towards their eastern European minions... was generally draconian’ (p. 409). Apart from smacking considerably of standard revisionism, these assumptions certainly do not apply to the Arajs Commando. All the ‘typical German’ patterns of behaviour like ‘rage, lust for vengeance, that unleashed the unprecedented cruelty’ (p. 414) were present here as well. How does this fit into Goldhagen’s explanatory framework?

[33 StA Hamburg 141 Js 534/60, ZStL, 207 AR-Z 7/59.]

Admittedly, the Arajs Commando is an extreme case, but it is by no means an isolated one. Many similar examples exist. Camps in the occupied Soviet Union were run with a minimum of German personnel. The Koldyczewo camp, north of Baranowice in

Byelorussia, for instance was run by one German. (34) All the other guards were non-German. The camp was operated in the same way as all camps; inmates were tortured and worked to death and large killing actions were conducted. A great number of camps in Soviet territory functioned without German personnel at all and with only minimal supervision. How does this fit into the notion of the ‘camp system’... being the German ‘society’s emblematic institution’ (p. 459) and the view of a potential ‘Germanic Europe, which essentially would have become a large concentration camp, with the German people as its guards’ (p. 459)?

[34 ZSt Dortmund 45 Js 19/6, ZStL, 202 AR-Z 94/59.]

To forestall possible misinterpretation, all of the foregoing certainly resulted from German policies. Orders for Koldyczewo, for instance, were received from the Security Police in Baranowice. The introduction of a comparison with non-German perpetrators does not take anything away from the overall responsibility of Germany for the Second World War and the Holocaust. But it is certainly highly relevant to the question of individual motivation and its root causes.
Goldhagen studiously avoids putting his theory to such a comparative test. Even though it is evident from the footnotes that he is familiar with the investigation on the Arajs Commando and other similarly telling cases, these facts are never mentioned. He simply dismisses comparisons as irrelevant since the Germans were ‘the central and indispensable perpetrators of the Holocaust’. This tactic allows him to analyse the motivation of the German perpetrators while excluding a comparison which would have revealed the falsity of his conclusions and, thus, would have denied him the authority to conclude that all this was specifically an expression of the German national character. He then postulates that any research on the behaviour of non-Germans, if it were to be undertaken, would only serve as an illumination of the Germans’ actions, because only Germans were ‘the prime movers’ (p. 409). According to him, this research would not change his results. An argument of immaculate circularity.
Germany was certainly responsible for the Holocaust and it is also clear that Viktor Arajs became a mass-murderer only because of the overall German plan to destroy the Jewish population of Latvia. Yet Goldhagen’s procedural negligence, which results in false conclusions, is evident with respect to the policemen in Police Battalion 101 and all other examples discussed in the book as well. Even the concentration camp guards would have stayed in the jobs they held before the Nazi government opened up camps. None of the people discussed here were making policy, they all responded, at least initially, to a given political situation. On the level of the personal response of [209] individual perpetrators, the question of the overall political and moral responsibility, which lies with Germany, is not relevant.


In light of his circumscribed and biased use of archival sources, it is perhaps not surprising that Goldhagen is also highly selective in his use of secondary literature. This is seen early on in the book, in the part which is devoted to an overview of German history from the Middle Ages to the Second World War. This part is based entirely on secondary sources. As the main facts of German history are widely known, it does not seem worthwhile to devote too much time on a review of this part of the book. Suffice it to say, that Goldhagen produces a tunnel-vision view of ‘this pre-Holocaust age (p. 70), which leaves no room for either historical context or for a comparative framework. Goldhagen posits an unbroken continuity in Germany from the anti-Judaism of the Christian churches in the Middle Ages to the racial anti-Semitism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which Jews were seen as ‘a binary opposite of the German’ (p. 55). Consequently, German history appears as one great endless struggle of the Germans against the Jews, regardless of the context. When the Nazis were ‘elected to power’ (sic!) (p. 419), the teleology of German history fulfilled itself. Needless to say, in order to support this view, Goldhagen substantially manipulates the secondary sources he uses.
Goldhagen eliminates the political context of the Nazi movement and ignores the fact that the Nazi regime was a repressive system from the start. There is no reference made to the fact that the Nazis were a right-wing party, promoting conservative and right-wing political views (some of which turn up in the creed of right-wing movements to this day). Indeed, by playing down all political factors, Goldhagen is able to make statements like ‘... the Nazi German revolution was, on the whole, consensual’...’a peaceful revolution’...’the repression of the political left in the first years notwithstanding’ (p. 456). This beautifies the realities of the Nazi regime to an uncomfortable extent.
The questions of how widespread and deeply-rooted anti-Semitism was, to what extent the German population supported the Nazis’ anti-Semitic measures and how exactly the persecution of the Jews had an impact on Hitler’s and the Nazis’ popularity are important ones indeed. They are certainly not resolved. Goldhagen does not contribute to the debate.


Goldhagen’s book is not driven by sources, be they primary or secondary ones. He does not allow the witness statements he uses to speak for themselves. He uses material as an underpinning for his pre-conceived theory. The book is driven by the author’s choice of language, and it can only be understood by analysing these choices and his generally argumentative style. Verbosity and repetitiveness are the most striking features of the book.

[210] Discursive techniques
Goldhagen uses several techniques to transform his assumptions into what he describes as the ‘unassailable truth’. In particular, the introductory and concluding chapters are full of examples, of which a few must be demonstrated in detail. One is to use a single fact to support an overall generalization. For instance, a protest letter by Pastor Hochstaedter is described as being ‘all but singular’ (p. 433), a ‘tiny, brief flame of reason and humanity ... flickering invisibly ... in the vast anti-Semitic darkness that had descended upon Germany’ (p. 434). It is used as a foil to ‘cast into sharp relief’ (p. 431) (a favourite expression of the author) the attitude of the Christian churches in general who did not object to the ‘Nazi’s ferocious anti-Semitism’ (p. 435). They were eliminationist anti-Semitic themselves. Based on another single document taken entirely out of context, (35) he arrives at a sweeping conclusion that the churches gave ‘an ecclesiastical imprimatur of genocide’ (p. 433).

[35 See Kirchliches Jahrbuch fur die Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 1933-1944 (Guetersloh, 1948).]

A second technique is the application of a form of reasoning, which is boldly presented as common sense, and therefore as being the only logically possible explanation. Goldhagen maintains that the ‘indifference’ of the ‘German people’ (p. 439) towards the fate of the Jews is a ‘psychologically implausible attitude’ (p. 440) since ‘people generally flee scenes and events that they consider to be horrific, criminal or dangerous’ (p. 440). Thus, since part of the German population watched the burning of synagogues in the November pogrom ‘with curiosity’ – a modifier added by the author (p. 440) – they were not indifferent but rather pitiless (p. 440).
A third technique is a twisted manipulation of the interpretations of other scholars in order to provide foils for his own line of argument. This has already been demonstrated in a number of earlier examples. A particularly striking one, is Goldhagen’s discussion, and rejection, of what he calls ‘conventional explanations’. One of these, according to the author, is the assumption that ‘the Germans were in principle opposed ... to a genocidal program’ (p. 385). Raul Hilberg is depicted as ‘an exemplar of this sort of thinking’ (p. 385) because he contemplates the question of how the German bureaucracy overcame its moral scruples (p. 385). After accusing Hilberg of heresy for assuming that ‘the German bureaucracy naturally had moral scruples’ (p. 383), Goldhagen rejects Hilberg’s analysis on the basis that ‘explanations proceeding in this manner cannot account for Germans ... volunteering for killing duty’ (p. 385) – which, of course, misses Hilberg’s point entirely.
Another frequent tactic is the omission of a sufficient context or other possible evidence that might be contradictory. Goldhagen mentions celebrations at either the conclusion of large killing actions, as in Chelmno or in Stanislawo, or at a particular stage in the extermination programme, as in Lublin after the 50,000th victim had been killed (at which the ‘Germans’ ‘ take joy, make merry and celebrate their genocide of the Jews’ (p. 453). He omits to mention that the same parties took place in ‘Euthanasia’ institutions, as in Hadamar, to celebrate the 100,000th corpse (36) or, for that matter, in Grafeneck also. (37) The victims of the ‘Euthanasia’ programme were mostly Germans. While this suggests that a possible explanation for this behaviour is the progressive brutalization of members in mass-killing institutions, the available evidence [211] does not support Goldhagen’s notion of ‘the transvaluated world of Germany during the Nazi period [where] ordinary Germans deemed the killing of Jews to be a beneficent act for humanity’ (pp. 452-3). Goldhagen’s crowning misrepresentation is the description of such a celebration in Cesis, Latvia: ‘On the occasion of their slaughter of the Jews of Cesis, the local German security police and members of the German military assembled to eat and drink at what they dubbed a ‘death banquet’ (38) for the Jews. During their festivities, the celebrants drank repeated toasts to the extermination of the Jews’ (p. 453). Goldhagen fails to mention that Latvians and Germans were sitting down at the same table and that one local Latvian police officer instigated target practice at Jews in the course of the festivities. This was viewed with disgust by the German army officers. (39)

[36 ZStL, 439 AR 1261/68, Sonderband 19, S.2878-79, I.Sch.
37 Ernst Klee, Dokumente zur ‘Euthanasie’ (Frankfurt, 1985), p. 119, ZStL, Anlageband 13 AR 179/65, Vernehmungsprotokolle GStA FFM Js 8/61 u. Js 7/63, G.S.
38 ‘totenmahl’.
39 ZStL, 207 AR-Z 22/70, Sonder bande II, V. L. and III, R. K.; StA Luebeck 2 Js 394/70.]

Finally, one can even find blatantly false rendering of original text, as when Goldhagen refers to a verse written by a member of Police Battalion 9, which was attached to Einsatzkommando 11 a. He states that this member ‘managed to work into his verse, for the enjoyment of all, a reference to the “skull-cracking blows”... that they had undoubtedly delivered with relish to their Jewish victims’ (p. 453). These words, found in a disgusting and anti-Semitic poem, refer however to ‘the cracking of nuts’. (40)

[40 In German: ‘Fernder (sic) die Juden und Krimtschaken/verlernen Schnell das Nessknacken’, ZStL, 213 AR 1900/66, DokBd IV, p. 672-7.]

The creation of the ‘ordinary German’
‘Ordinary Germans’ is one of the key terms of Goldhagen’s book. It rests on the shaky empirical foundation of an evaluation of the social background of members of Police Battalion 101, and on the author’s conclusion that the backgrounds of these members do not differ significantly from the social stratification of German society overall. As mentioned in other instances above, one can question whether this equation is correct since it ignores the concrete historical and institutional context of the time. The evidence is not examined by means of comparisons with other units because this would have yielded quite different results. Instead, Goldhagen simply relies on the technique of greater and greater generalization to make his point.
This he does by an indiscriminate use of language. The term ‘ordinary German’ is used everywhere. Concentration camp guards are ‘ordinary German women’ (p. 365), all perpetrators are ‘ordinary Germans’ (p. 371). It becomes apparent that there is no sociological or factual meaning in this term. This is shown to be true in a phrase like: ‘other ordinary Germans in the SS and the Party’ (p. 178). ‘Ordinary German’ is nothing but an empty label.
The word ‘German’, both as a noun and an adjective, is used excessively throughout the book. This is entirely in keeping with the author’s view that the specific traits of German culture are the root cause of the Holocaust. He states this right at the beginning of his book where he speaks of perpetrators ‘only in the understood context that these men and women were Germans first and SS men, policemen and camp guards second’ (p. 7, also p. 6). For Goldhagen, nationality is of the essence. Surprisingly, what is not of the essence is a person’s actual activity or function. This is evident in the language he uses: ‘Concentration camp guard’ becomes ‘German guard’ and, then, ‘the Germans in the camps’ (pp. 306, 307, 371). The actual function of the perpetrator in the commission of the crime has been eliminated. Only the [212] nationality remains. It should be noted that this same ‘logic’ is not applied to every instance. When describing the attacks on Jews in Vienna after the ‘Anschluss’, Goldhagen uses the term ‘Nazis’, and not ‘Austrians’ (pp. 286-7), for those who are torturing Jews. By the similarly excessive use of the adjective, for instance in the phrase ‘German culture of cruelty’ (p. 255), a further step is taken. It is not German nationals any more who commit cruel acts, but cruelty itself becomes a German trait. ‘Cruelty’ in the camps is ‘revealing of the Germans’ state of mind’ (p. 308).
By this method of enlarging the meaning and use of the word, ‘German’, Goldhagen is able to make the Holocaust a ‘German national project’ (p. 11). Finally, he combines the two methods. The genocide was committed by ‘Germans’ with the Germans’ ‘general propensity to violence’ (p. 568, n. 108) and all perpetrators were ‘ordinary Germans’, meaning for the author ‘Germany’s representative citizens’ (p. 456). He extends the inference to every other German: ‘the conclusion drawn about the overall character of the members’ actions (42) can, indeed must be, generalized to the German people as a whole. What these ordinary Germans did also could have been expected of other ordinary Germans’ (p. 402).

Goldhagen argues that a full picture of the normal lives of the perpetrators is needed to understand them fully, that they should be shown in every facet of their existence. Only such a ‘thick’, ‘rather than the customary paper-thin description’ (p. 7) can explain their actions. One can only agree with this approach. Certainly, a more detailed and extensive description of perpetrators and, in particular, their mind-set at the time of committing their crimes than can be found in available historical literature would be of the greatest interest. Goldhagen claims to achieve what all previous studies have failed to do, namely, to integrate ‘the micro, meso and macro levels’ of the individual with the ‘institutional and social context’ (p. 266).
For this purpose, Goldhagen examines a number of ‘Daily Orders’ [Tagesbefehle] issued by the Commander of the Order Police in Lublin in the years from 1942 to 1944, which are housed in the archives of the ‘Central Agency’. These ‘Daily Orders’ communicate everyday events, like guard duties, sports events or movies or whatever the commander wants to be made public. Around the fifteen orders he selected, Goldhagen weaves a web of fantasies about the ‘more conventional type of German cultural life’ after the ‘slaughtering [of] unarmed Jews by the thousands’ (p. 263). He speculates on such questions as ‘... how many of the killers discussed their genocidal activities... when they went at night to their wives and girlfriends...’ (p. 268), or as to ‘whether they might have seen the irony in the title of a play “Man Without Heart”‘ (p. 270).
Goldhagen has not one shred of a fact to rely on here. Everything is written in the ‘if’ style used in bad historical novels. This is not true historical research.
The reason for the paucity of scholarly writing on the ‘thick lives’ of perpetrators, is not due to the lack of interest on the part of historians. Rather, it is a result of the fact that there is hardly any material available on which to base a study. Occasional finds in investigative files, for example, are so few and far between that the methodical research required would exceed the capacity of any researcher. Ordinarily, scholars accept the limitations that are imposed on them by the sources.


[213] Goldhagen started out his book with some fundamentally disturbing questions: Why do we believe that Germans are like us? Why do we believe Germany was ‘a normal society ... similar to our own’ (p. 15)? Why assume the ‘normalcy of the German people’ (p. 31)? These remarks are made without any qualifiers as to a specific historical period. Goldhagen’s recommendation is not to assume, but to review the Germans ‘with the critical eye of an anthropologist’ (p. 15), as if studying a foreign species.
Goldhagen’s book abounds with examples of his particular image of ‘the Germans’. Suffice it to cite only a few here: the German is ‘generally brutal and murderous in the use of other peoples’ (p. 315), and is a ‘member of an extraordinary, lethal political culture’ (p. 456) whose cruelties stand out ‘in the long annals of human barbarism’ (p. 386). Similar expressions, as graphic as those cited, can be found on almost every page of the book, confirming Goldhagen’s image of the counter-species his anthropological view has detected. Goldhagen’s book is based on his Ph.D dissertation. Would someone receive a Ph.D. at Harvard who begins by posing the question whether blacks or women are human beings like ‘us’?
While the reader is not left in any doubt about ‘the Germans’, the more interesting question remains: Who are the normal ‘we’ referred to by Goldhagen in his book? The author never clarifies this explicitly. Instead the author offers his views on how people should normally react and hence how far outside normal human behaviour the perpetrators were. Normal people ‘regard and respect’ elders (p. 189), feel ‘sympathy’, pity (p. 357) and the ‘instincts of nurturance’ (p. 201) towards sick people, towards undernourished people, towards people lying in an exhausted condition on the street. ‘After all, there is usually a natural flow of sympathy for people who suffer great wrongs’ (p. 441).
Goldhagen’s concept of ‘natural’ human behaviour is striking. One glance at present day American social realities should be enough to raise doubt as to whether sick and weak people do necessarily arouse ‘instincts of nurturance’. He ignores the equally evident human potential for evil and destructiveness. In a footnote (p. 581, n. 25) Goldhagen addresses this potential, but sees its acceptance as ‘cynicism’. Hence he must attack any socio-psychological concepts that involve the allegedly ‘universal psychological and social psychological factors’ (p. 390, see also p. 409). He dismisses them as ‘abstract, ahistorical explanations... conceived in a social-psychological laboratory’ (p. 391, see also p. 389). Milgram’s experiments on cruelty are brushed aside as providing ‘untenable’ (p. 383) explanations.
By denying the possibility that the crimes committed during the Holocaust are within the scope of human behaviour, he places these crimes and its perpetrators outside the realm of human possibility open to others. Only the Germans could have behaved the way they did; nobody else. Their behaviour is ‘unfathomable’ and outside of ‘our’ world. As a consequence, it cannot be repeated by someone else. The Holocaust is reduced to a specific historical event, outside of ‘our’ world, separated from ‘us’.
The same can be said of Goldhagen’s description of anti-Semitism. He insists that it is divorced from any real historical or social framework. On this basis, he rejects explanations which equate economics or ‘scapegoat strategies’ with motives (pp. 39, 44). In his view, anti-Semitism is divorced from reality; it is irrational, wild, and hallucinatory. It is outside of the context of human interaction, and outside the context of human reason. He argues that there is a ‘generally constant anti-Semitism becoming [214] more or less manifest’ (p. 39) so that the observation of the decrease ... of anti-Semitism is not accurate. It represents a ‘diminution of anti-Semitic vituperation’ (p. 43) not ‘a decrease in anti-Semitic belief and feeling’ (p. 43), only ‘a differential expression’ thereof (p. 43); a true observation and appraisal of reality has become impossible.
The insistence with which Goldhagen promotes this theory – the word ‘must’ is in constant use (see pp. 392ff.) – shows the centrality of his argument. Anti-Semitism is a demonological, hallucinatory force, out of the reach of ordinary perception. Germans’ crimes are outside the realm of human behaviour. This extreme polarization has its consequences. In juxtaposition with the enormity of the injustice done to the Jews, other events take on a much more benign aspect. Jews are slaughtered while non-Jews are killed (p. 195). Non-Jews in concentration camps live ‘a life of comparative luxury’ (p. 343) and enjoy ‘shocking longevity’ (p. 340). This is jarring. Worse still is when wider comparisons are drawn. In Soviet Gulags, the ‘cruelty of the guards did not even begin to approach that which the Germans inflicted on the Jews’ (p. 587, n. 91). Goldhagen presumes to claim that other genocides were actually supported by rational motivation, including the Armenian genocide and the genocide between the Hutus and the Tutsis (p. 412, n. 86, p. 587).
In Goldhagen’s view, the Holocaust is both separated from what is considered normal human behaviour and also demonstrates, from the perspective of today, an historical terminableness. Goldhagen’s ‘we’ could not have commuted the indignities of the Holocaust, but even ‘the Germans’ suddenly and drastically changed after the war. Here, Goldhagen’s argumentation takes on almost farcical proportions. After drawing the sinister picture of a nation that for centuries was in the grip of ‘demonological, hallucinatory anti-Semitism’, of a people impregnated with vicious notions of Jews, the idea of such a sudden behavioural change is unrealistic. The change is due, according to him, to American re-education efforts – the only time any historian has attributed real influence to this programme (pp. 593, n. 53, 582, n. 38) Anybody who knows anything about the real Germany is aware, of course, that the reverse is true. Although Goldhagen’s argument is illogical, its function is clear; the Holocaust is now firmly outside the realm of ordinary people’s actions and it is over historically. The Holocaust is sanitized.


One of the most striking features of this book is the very broad, narrative style with which events are recounted. Goldhagen states what his intention in having adopted this style was ‘to eschew the clinical approach’ (p. 22). We should ‘describe for ourselves every gruesome image’ (p. 22) in order to better understand the reality of the Holocaust. In accordance with this, the author fills page after page with graphic descriptions of gruesome events during mass-murder actions and in camps.
Whether this is really the role of a scholar is doubtful. After all, there is an extensive collection of survivors’ memoirs and testimonies, in which we can hear the voice of the victims themselves. In the approach Goldhagen advocates, the historian takes on the position of an intermediary who is nominally interpreting sources. We hear his voice, retelling the events in the light of his own imagination.
More than fifty years have passed since the end of the Second World War. The ranks of Holocaust survivors are getting thinner. More and more, the Holocaust is moving into the realm of interpreters, be they scholars or artists, or simply anyone making use of the lessons history teaches. This transition brings with it an obligation. We, i.e. [215] people without acute personal involvement – be it as members of the second or third generation – have to resist both the temptation to assume the voice of survivors and the moral authority that goes with it. The Holocaust is the one event with the greatest morally explosive force in the Western world. But its meaning is being diminished by constant trivialization. Everyone can observe daily, for himself or herself, how the terms of reference of the Holocaust are morally abused in political and public life; every abortion clinic is called an Auschwitz. In no way can this process be stopped. The community of Holocaust scholars, however, is under a special obligation to counter the ongoing process of trivialization by scrupulously differentiating between oneself and one’s position as a researcher and the object of one’s studies, thereby preserving and protecting the meaning of the Holocaust.
Goldhagen’s book is not a revision of everything that has been written in fifty years on the Holocaust. A solidly researched work on any of the topics he touches – for instance, on the involvement of the Order Police in the Holocaust – would have been most welcome. As it stands, this book only caters to those who want simplistic answers to difficult questions, to those who seek the security of prejudices.
Why then review the book at such length? It was promoted aggressively in the mass media, well before it was published and any historian had had a chance to read it. There is no limit to what a professional American marketing strategy can achieve, but to date, hardly any inroads into academia have been made by this book. Its marketing presents a challenge to the scholarly community. When the historical agenda can be dictated by advertising and marketing, professional historians must respond.
The discourse among scholars, as it has evolved over the centuries, respects certain rules: arguments count, not the people pushing them. One discusses the factual value of arguments and does not defame their authors. These rules are well worth defending. One can learn from a time when Einstein’s theories, for example, were rejected, not because of the arguments themselves but because their proponent represented ‘Jewish physics’. So far, all of the experts in the area of the Holocaust, regardless of their personal background, have been unanimous in severely criticizing Goldhagen’s book. That this is the case, fifty years after the fact, and on such a highly emotional and complex subject, is a very hopeful sign.

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