A fair assessment of the Obama administration’s
Midddle East policy must focus on the gap between goals and outcomes. But it
must also consider the constraints under which it operated and the difficult
realities that persist in the Middle East.
President Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech was greeted with
hope by Palestinians and with concern by the Israeli government. Both expected
that the United States would take a more assertive and less pro-Israeli role in
this process.
The administration’s pressure on Israel led to a
temporary settlement freeze. The expectation that this would result in the
resumption of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations proved futile. The Palestinian
leadership was both too weak domestically, and too skeptical of the willingness
of the right-wing Israeli government to make meaningful concessions to enter
negotiations. The upshot was an accelerated Israeli settlement activity. Under
the Obama/Clinton watch, Israeli West Bank population grew by 20% to 350,000.
The split between the P.L.O. and Hamas persists, and
the level of dissatisfaction and frustration among Palestinians is on the rise
again. The Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic equation in 2013 is fundamentally the
same as the one that existed when Clinton took office. However, the situation on
the ground makes the implementation of a two-state solution — a principle to
which all sides seem to subscribe — much more difficult than it had been four
years ago.
The gap between the professed goals of the
administration and the outcomes of its policies is substantial. But the
Obama/Clinton team faced an uphill battle. It had to deal with a hard line
Israeli government. It had to lure a politically weak and irresolute
Palestinian Authority to take high risks with low probability of success.
Moreover, other agenda items overshadowed the
Israeli-Palestinian process — Iran’s movement towards acquisition of nuclear
weapons and the Arab Spring. Under these circumstances, it is doubtful that any
administration could accomplish much more.
Secretary Clinton’s mediocre record in the
Israeli-Palestinian track seems to vindicate the philosophy that has guided her
husband’s Middle East policy. The United States can help the parties carry out
the tough decisions it would take to accomplish peace. It cannot force them to
make these decisions, nor can it make these decisions for them. The parties
themselves must come to a realization that peace is their best option.
Without such a realization, even the United States —
with all of its power and influence — cannot make it happen.
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