Ernest Bevin, Labour’s postwar foreign secretary,
once told the Zionist leader, David Ben-Gurion, that the Balfour Declaration of
1917 was the worst mistake in western foreign policy in the first half of the
20th century. From the perspective of British interests, it was certainly a
strategic blunder. It committed Britain to support the establishment of a “national
home” for the Jewish people in Palestine when the Jews constituted less than
10% of the population. Britain’s promise paved the way for the establishment of
the state of Israel, but also unleashed one of the most bitter conflicts of
modern times.
The story of the Balfour Declaration has been told
many times. Geoffrey Lewis has chosen to focus only on the part played by the
two principal architects of the declaration: Arthur Balfour and Chaim Weizmann,
the Gentile Zionist and the ardent Jewish nationalist. The result is a
perceptive, elegantly written and fair-minded book.
At first sight, Balfour seems an unlikely candidate
for the role of mover and shaker. He was a languid aristocrat with a
philosophical turn of mind. A popular saying went: “If you want nothing done,
Balfour is your man.” Yet he was moved by a strong conviction that the case for
a Jewish homeland in Palestine was wholly exceptional and that it overrode the
natural right of the Arabs to self-determination.
Weizmann, a lecturer in chemistry at Manchester
University, was a consummate diplomat and an eloquent advocate who converted
many in the British establishment to the Zionist cause. The first meeting between
Balfour and Weizmann took place in 1906, three years after the Zionist
leadership had turned down the offer of a Jewish homeland in Uganda. Their
conversation lasted more than an hour and contained within it the germ of the
Balfour Declaration.
Balfour could not understand why the persecuted
Russian Jews refused the offer of a safe asylum. Weizmann tried to explain why
the Zionists could not accept a home anywhere but Jerusalem. “Suppose,” he
said, “I were to offer you Paris instead of London.” “But, Dr Weizmann, we have
London,” Balfour replied. “That is true,” Weizmann said, “but we had Jerusalem
when London was a marsh.” “Are there many Jews who think like you?” wondered
Balfour. “I believe I speak the minds of millions of Jews,” replied Weizmann. “It
is curious,” Balfour remarked, “the Jews I meet are quite different.” “Mr
Balfour,” said Weizmann, “you meet the wrong kind of Jews.”
In fact, most of the leaders of British Jewry were
opposed to the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Prominent among them was
Edwin Montagu, the secretary of state for India. Montagu rejected the notion
that the Jews were a nation and warned that a Jewish home in Palestine would
undermine the struggle for equal rights for Jews in the rest of the world.
Balfour, however, was persuaded by Weizmann that race, religion and geography
were linked in a unique way for Zionist Jews.
Weizmann’s refusal even to look at the Uganda scheme
greatly impressed Balfour. He concluded that the Jewish form of patriotism was
without parallel, that Zionism was a noble project and that Britain ought to
support it on idealistic grounds. This perception led directly to the famous
declaration that bore Balfour’s name, one that changed the course of Middle
East history.
Avi Shlaim is a professor of international relations
at the University of Oxford. His books include Lion of Jordan: King Hussein’s
Life in War and Peace (Penguin)
No comments:
Post a Comment