PPS No. 23
(1948) by George F. Kennan
Memo by George Kennan, Head of the US State
Department Policy Planning Staff. Written February 28, 1948, Declassified June
17, 1974. George Kennan, "Review of Current Trends, U.S. Foreign Policy,
Policy Planning Staff, PPS No. 23. Top Secret. Included in the U.S. Department
of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1948, volume 1, part 2 (Washington DC
Government Printing Office, 1976), 509-529.
Policy Planning Staff Files [1]
Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning
Staff (Kennan) [2] to the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)
TOP SECRET
[Washington,] February 24, 1948.
When Mr. Acheson [3] first spoke to me about the
Planning Staff, he said that he thought its most important function would be to
try to trace the lines of development of our foreign policy as they emerged
from our actions in the past, and to project them into the future, so that we
could see where we were going.
During the first months of the operation of the
Staff, I hesitated to undertake any such effort, because I did not feel that
any of us had a broad enough view of the problems involved to lend real value
to our estimate.
I have now made an effort toward a general view of
the main problems of our foreign policy, and I enclose it as a Staff paper. It
is far from comprehensive and doubtless contains many defects; but it is a
first step toward the unified concept of foreign policy which I hope this Staff
can some day help to evolve.
The paper is submitted merely for information, and
does not call for approval. I made no effort to clear it around the Department,
since this would have changed its whole character. For this reason, I feel that
if any of the views expressed should be made the basis for action in the
Department, the views of the offices concerned should first be consulted.
This document should properly have included a chapter
on Latin America. I have not included such a chapter because I am not familiar
with the problems of the area, and the Staff has not yet studied them. Butler,
[4] who is taking over for me in my absence, [5] has had long experience with
these problems and I hope that while I am away he and the Staff will be able to
work up some recommendations for basic policy objectives with regard to the
Latin American countries.
George F. Kennan
[Annex]
Report by the Policy Planning Staff
TOP SECRET
[Washington,] February 24, 1948. PPS/23
Review of Current Trends
U.S. Foreign Policy
I. UNITED STATES,
BRITAIN, AND EUROPE
On the assumption that Western Europe will be rescued
from communist control, the relationships between Great Britain and the
continental countries, on the one hand, and between Great Britain and the
United States and Canada on the other, will become for us a long term policy
problem of major significance. The scope of this problem is so immense and its
complexities so numerous that there can be no simple and easy answer. The
solutions will have to be evolved step by step over a long period of time. But
it is not too early today for us to begin to think out the broad outlines of
the pattern which would best suit our national interests.
In my opinion, the following facts are basic to a
consideration of the problem.
1. Some form of political, military and economic
union in Western Europe will be necessary if the free nations of Europe are to
hold their own against the people of the east united under Moscow rule.
2. It is questionable whether this union could be
strong enough to serve its designed purpose unless it had the participation and
support of Great Britain.
3. Britain's long term economic problem, on the other
hand, can scarcely be solved just by closer association with the other Western
European countries, since these countries do not have, by and large, the food
and raw material surpluses she needs; this problem could be far better met by
closer association with Canada and the United States.
4. The only way in which a European union, embracing
Britain but excluding eastern Europe, could become economically healthy would
be develop the closest sort of trading relationships either with this
hemisphere or with Africa.
It will be seen from the above that we stand before
something of a dilemma. If we were to take Britain into our own U.S.-Canadian
orbit, according to some formula of “Union now”, this would probably solve
Britain's long term economic problem and create a natural political entity of
great strength. But this would tend to cut Britain off from the close political
association she is seeking with continental nations and might therefore have
the ultimate effect of rendering the continental nations more vulnerable to
Russian pressure. If, on the other hand, the British are encouraged to seek
salvation only in closer association with their continental neighbors, then
there is no visible solution of the long term economic problem of either
Britain or Germany, and we would be faced, at the termination of ERP, with
another crisis of demand on this country for European aid. [6]
To me there seem only two lines of emergence from
this dilemma. They are not mutually exclusive and might, in fact, supplement
each other very well.
In the first place, Britain could be encouraged to
proceed vigorously with her plans for participation in a European union, and we
could try to bring that entire union, rather than just Britain alone, into a
closer economic association with this country and Canada. We must remember,
however, that if this is to be really effective, the economic association must
be so intimate as to bring about a substantial degree of currency and customs
union, plus relative freedom of migration of individuals as between Europe and
this continent. Only in this way can the free movement of private capital and
labor be achieved which will be necessary if we are to find a real cure for the
abnormal dependence of these areas on governmental aid from this country. But
we should also note carefully the possible implications of such a program from
the standpoint of the ITO Charter. [7] As I see it, the draft charter, as well
as the whole theory behind our trade agreements program, would make it
difficult for us to extend to the countries of western Europe special
facilities which we did not extend in like measure to all other ITO members and
trade agreement partners.
A second possible solution
would lie in arrangements whereby a union of Western European nations would
undertake jointly the economic development and exploitation of the colonial and
dependent areas of the African Continent. The realization of such a program
admittedly presents demands which are probably well above the vision and
strengths and leadership capacity of present governments in Western Europe. It
would take considerable prodding from outside and much patience. But the idea
itself has much to recommend it. The African Continent, is relatively little
exposed to communist pressures: and most of it is not today a subject of great
power rivalries. It lies easily accessible to the maritime nations of Western
Europe, and politically they control or influence most of it. Its resources are
still relatively undeveloped. It could absorb great numbers of people and a
great deal of Europe's surplus technical and administrative energy. Finally, it would lend to
the idea of Western European union that tangible objective for which everyone
has been rather unsuccessfully groping in recent months.
However this may be, one thing is clear: if we wish
to carry through with the main purpose of the ERP we must cordially and loyally
support the British effort toward a Western European union. And this support
should consist not only of occasional public expressions of approval. The
matter should be carefully and sympathetically discussed with the British
themselves and with the other governments of Western Europe. Much could be
accomplished in such discussions, both from the standpoint of the clarification
of our own policy and in the way of the exertion of a healthy and helpful
influence on the Europeans themselves. In particular, we will have accomplished
an immense amount if we can help to persuade the Western Europeans of the
necessity of treating the Germans as citizens of Europe.
With this in mind, I think it might be well to ask
each of our missions in Western Europe to make a special study of the problem
of Western European union, both in general and with particular reference to the
particular country concerned, and to take occasion, in the course of
preparation of this study, to consult the views of the wisest and most
experienced people they know in their respective capitals. These studies should
be accompanied by their own recommendations as to how the basic problem could
best be approached. A digest of such studies in this Department should yield a
pretty sound cross-section of informed and balanced opinion on the problem in
question.
II. EUROPEAN RECOVERY
PROGRAM
The course of the debates in Congress now makes it
possible for us to distinguish with some degree of probability the outlines of
the action toward which this Government is moving in the question of aid to
Europe.
1. The administration of
the program.
The most significant feature of the emerging recovery
program is that it is to be conducted by this Government as a technical
business operation and not as a political matter. We must face realistically
the fact that this will reduce drastically the program's potential political
effect and open up the road to a considerable degree of confusion,
contradiction and ineffectiveness in this Government's policies toward Europe.
The conduct of relations with the European governments by a separate agency of
this Government on matters of such great importance, over so long a period of
time, cannot fail to cut deeply into the operations of the Department of State
in European affairs and to reduce the prestige, the competence, and the effectiveness
of its Missions in Europe.
In these circumstances, the possibilities for the
exertion of influence by this Department over the course of our relations with
European countries will become predominantly a matter of the extent to which it
can influence national policy through the White House. This means that greatly
increased importance must he attached to the means of liaison between the
Department and the White House, and particularly to the National Security
Council.
But we should not deceive ourselves into hoping that
national policy conducted through channels as round about as this, and
involving the use of a new and separate organization such as the ERP
administration, can be as clear cut or as efficacious as that which could be
conducted if policy-making functions continued to rest clearly with the regular
agencies of government. No policy can become really effective unless it
commands the understanding of those who carry it out. The understanding of
governmental policies in the field of foreign affairs cannot be readily
acquired by people who are new to that field, even when they are animated by
the best will in the world. This is not a manner of briefing, or instructing,
which could be done in a short time. It is a matter of educating and training,
for which years are required.
Our experience with ad hoc wartime and
post-hostilities agencies operating in the foreign field has demonstrated that
not only are new agencies of little value in executing policies which go beyond
the vision and the educational horizon of their own personnel, but that they
actually develop a momentum of their own which, in the final analysis, tends to
shape—rather than to serve—the national policy.
I do not think that the manner in which this aid
program is to be undertaken is necessarily going to mean that its basic purpose
will not be served. While we will hardly be able to use U.S. aid tactically, as
a flexible political instrument, the funds and goods will nevertheless
themselves constitute an important factor on the European scene. The mere
availability of this amount of economic assistance will create, so to speak, a
new topographic feature against which the peoples of Western Europe will be
able to brace themselves in their own struggle to preserve political independence.
But we must recognize that, once the bill has been
passed, the matter will be largely out of our hands. The operation of the ERP
administration will make it difficult for this Department itself to conduct any
incisive and vigorous policy with relation to Europe during the period in
question. This does not relieve us, of course, of the duty of continuing to
study carefully the development of the European scene and of contributing as
best we can to the formulation of national policy relating to the European
area. But it thrusts this Department back—with respect to one great area of the
world's surface—into the position it occupied in many instances during the
recent war:—the position of an advisory, rather than an executive, agency.
2. The time factor and
the question of amount.
The dilatoriness of the Congress in acting on this
matter presents a definite danger to the success of the program. A gap between
the date on which the aid becomes available and the point to which European
reserves can hold out could nullify a great part of the effect of the program.
There is probably not much that we can do, by
pleading or urging, to expedite Congressional action. But I think we should
state very plainly to Congress the time limits involved (which our own economic
analysts must determine) and the possible consequences of delay. Furthermore,
we should make clear that aid granted subsequent to the specified time limits
cannot be considered as a response to the recommendations of the Executive
branch of the Government, and that the latter cannot take responsibility for
the desirability or effectiveness of the program in these circumstances.
The same principle applies in case the program is cut
in amount below what we consider to be the minimum necessary for the recovery
purpose.
In either case, there will be charges we are trying
to "dictate" to the Congress. But there is a serious question of
responsibility involved here; and the Executive branch of the Government will
find itself embarrassed in its future position if it allows itself to be forced
now into accepting a share of responsibility for a program of aid which it
knows will be too little, too late, or both.
3. The question of
European Union.
The original reaction to the Harvard speech, [8] both
in Europe and here, demonstrated how vitally important to the success of an aid
program is the concept of European unity. Unless the program actually operates
to bring closer together the countries participating in it, it will certainly
fail in its major purpose, and it will not take on, in the eyes of the world
public, the dignity and significance which would set it apart from the previous
efforts at foreign economy aid.
There is real danger that this basic fact be lost
sight of at this stage in the deliberations, not only in the Congress, but also
in the Department.
We should therefore make it a point to lose no
opportunity to stress this element in the concept of the aid program, and to
insist that the principle of collaboration and joint responsibility among the
16 nations be emphasized throughout in our handling of the operation.
III. GERMANY [9]
The coming changes with respect to the responsibility
for military government in Germany provide a suitable occasion for us to evolve
new long-term concepts of our objectives with respect to that country. We
cannot rely on the concepts of the existing policy directives. Not only were
these designed to meet another situation, but it is questionable, in many instances,
whether they were sound in themselves.
The planning to be done in this connection will
necessarily have to be many-sided and voluminous. But it is possible to see
today the main outlines of the problem we will face and, I think, of the
solutions we must seek.
In the long run there can be only three possibilities
for the future of western and central Europe. One is German domination. Another
is Russian domination. The third is a federated Europe, into which the parts of
Germany are absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is
sufficient to hold Germany in her place.
If there is no real European federation and if
Germany is restored as a strong and independent country, we must expect another
attempt at German domination. If there is no real European federation and if
Germany is not restored as a strong and independent country, we invite Russian
domination, for an unorganized Western Europe cannot indefinitely oppose an
organized Eastern Europe. The only reasonably hopeful possibility for avoiding
one of these two evils is some form of federation in western and central
Europe.
Our dilemma today lies in the fact that whereas a
European federation would be by all odds the best solution from the standpoint
of U.S. interests, the Germans are poorly prepared for it. To achieve such a
federation would be much easier if Germany were partitioned, or drastically
decentralized, and if the component parts could be brought separately into the
European union. To bring a unified Germany, or even a unified western Germany,
into such a union would be much more difficult; for it would still over-weigh
the other components, in many respects.
Now a partition of the Reich might have been possible
if it had been carried out resolutely and promptly in the immediate aftermath
of defeat. But that moment is now past, and we have today another situation to
deal with. As things stand today, the Germans are psychologically not only
unprepared for any breakup of the Reich but in a frame of mind which is
distinctly unfavorable thereto.
In any planning we now do for the future of Germany
we will have to take account of the unpleasant fact that our occupation up to
this time has been unfortunate from the standpoint of the psychology of the
German people. They are emerging from this phase of the post-hostilities period
in a state of mind which can only be described as sullen, bitter, unregenerate,
and pathologically attached to the old chimera of German unity. Our moral and
political influence over them has not made headway since the surrender. They
have been impressed neither by our precepts nor by our example. They are not
going to look to us for leadership. Their political life is probably going to
proceed along the lines of a polarization into extreme right and extreme left,
both of which elements will be, from our standpoint, unfriendly, ugly to deal
with, and contemptuous of the things we value.
We cannot rely on any such Germany to fit
constructively into a pattern of European union of its own volition. Yet
without the Germans, no real European federation is thinkable. And without
federation, the other countries of Europe can have no protection against a new
attempt at foreign domination.
If we did not have the Russians and the German
communists prepared to take advantage politically of any movement on our part
toward partition we could proceed to partition Germany regardless of the will
of the inhabitants, and to force the respective segments to take their place in
a federated Europe. But in the circumstances prevailing today, we cannot do
this without throwing the German people politically into the arms of the
communists. And if that happens, the fruits of our victory in Europe will have
been substantially destroyed.
Our possibilities are therefore reduced, by the
process of exclusion, to a policy which, without pressing the question of
partition in Germany, would attempt to bring Germany, or western Germany, into
a European federation, but do it in such a way as not to permit her to dominate
that federation or jeopardize the security interests of the other western
European countries. And this would have to be accomplished in the face of the
fact that we cannot rely on the German people to exercise any self-restraint of
their own volition, to feel any adequate sense of responsibility vis-à-vis the
other western nations, or to concern themselves for the preservation of western
values in their own country and elsewhere in Europe.
I have no confidence in any of the old-fashioned
concepts of collective security as a means of meeting this problem. European
history has shown only too clearly the weakness of multilateral defensive
alliances between complete sovereign nations as a means of opposing desperate
and determined bids for domination of the European scene. Some mutual defense
arrangements will no doubt be necessary as a concession to the prejudices of
the other Western European peoples, whose thinking is still old fashioned and
unrealistic on this subject. But we can place no reliance on them as a
deterrent to renewed troublemaking on the part of the Germans.
This being the case, it is evident that the
relationship of Germany to the other countries of western Europe must be so
arranged as to provide mechanical and automatic safeguards against any
unscrupulous exploitation of Germany's preeminence in population and in
military-industrial potential.
The first task of our planning will be to find such
safeguards.
In this connection, primary consideration must be
given to the problem of the Ruhr. Some form of international ownership or
control of the Ruhr industries would indeed be one of the best means of
automatic protection against the future misuse of Germany's industrial
resources for aggressive purposes. There may be other devices which would also
be worth exploring.
A second line of our planning will have to be in the
direction of the maximum interweaving of German economy with that of the
remainder of Europe. This may mean that we will have to reverse our present
policies, in certain respects. One of the most grievous mistakes, in my
opinion, of our post-hostilities policy was the renewed extreme segregation of
the Germans and their compression into an even smaller territory than before,
in virtual isolation from the remaining peoples of Europe. This sort of segregation
and compression invariably arouses precisely the worst reactions in the German
character. What the Germans need is not to be thrust violently in upon
themselves, which only heightens their congenital irrealism and self-pity and
defiant nationalism, but to be led out of their collective egocentrism and
encouraged to see things in larger terms, to have interests elsewhere in Europe
and elsewhere in the world, and to learn to think of themselves as world citizens
and not just as Germans.
Next, we must recognize the bankruptcy of our moral
influence on the Germans, and we must make plans for the earliest possible
termination of those actions and policies on our part which have been
psychologically unfortunate. First of all, we must reduce as far as possible our
establishment in Germany; for the residence of large numbers of representatives
of a victor nation in a devastated conquered area is never a helpful factor,
particularly when their living standards are as conspicuously different as are
those of Americans in Germany. Secondly, we must terminate as rapidly as
possible those forms of activity (denazification, re-education, and above all
the Nuremberg Trials) which tend to set up as mentors and judges over internal
German problems. Thirdly, we must have the courage to dispense with military
government as soon as possible and to force the Germans to accept
responsibility once more for their own affairs. They will never begin to do
this as long as we will accept that responsibility for them.
The military occupation of western Germany may have
to go on for a long time. We may even have to be prepared to see it become a
quasi-permanent feature of the European scene. But military government is a
different thing. Until it is removed, we cannot really make progress in the direction
of a more stable Europe.
Finally, we must do everything possible from now on
to coordinate our policy toward Germany with the views of Germany's immediate
western neighbors. This applies particularly to the Benelux countries, who
could probably easily be induced to render valuable collaboration in the
implementation of our own views. It is these neighboring countries who in the
long run must live with any solutions we may evolve; and it is absolutely
essential to any successful ordering of western Europe that they make their
full contribution and bear their full measure of responsibility. It would be
better for us in many instances to temper our own policies in order to win
their support than to try to act unilaterally in defiance of their feelings.
With these tasks and problems before us it is
important that we should do nothing in this intervening period which would
prejudice our later policies. The appropriate offices of the Department of
State should be instructed to bear this in mind in their own work. We should
also see to it that it is borne in mind by our military authorities in the
prosecution of their policies in Germany. These considerations should be
observed in any discussions we hold with representatives of other governments.
This applies particularly to the forthcoming discussions with the French and
the British.
IV. Mediterranean
As the situation has developed in the past year, the
Soviet chances for disrupting the unity of western Europe and forcing a
political entry into that area have been deteriorating in northern Europe,
where the greater political maturity of the peoples is gradually asserting
itself, but holding their own, if not actually increasing, in the south along
the shores of the Mediterranean. Here the Russians have as assets not only the
violent chauvinism of their Balkan satellites but also the desperate weakness
and weariness of the Greek and Italian peoples. [10] Conditions in Greece and
Italy today are peculiarly favorable to the use of fear as a weapon for political
action, and hence to the tactics which are basic and familiar to the communist
movement.
It cannot be too often reiterated that this
Government does not possess the weapons which would be needed to enable it to
meet head-on the threat to national independence presented by the communist
elements in foreign countries. This poses an extremely difficult problem as to
the measures which our Government can take to prevent the communists from
achieving success in the countries where resistance is lowest.
The Planning Staff has given more attention to this
than to any single problem which has come under its examination. Its conclusions
may be summed up as follows:
(1) The use of U S. regular armed force to oppose the
efforts of indigenous communist elements within foreign countries must
generally be considered as a risky and profitless undertaking, apt to do more
harm than good.
(2) If, however, it can be shown that the
continuation of communist activities has a tendency to attract U.S. armed power
to the vicinity of the affected areas, and if these areas are ones from which
the Kremlin would definitely wish U.S. power excluded, there is a possibility
that this may bring into play the defensive security interests of the Soviet
Union and cause the Russians to exert a restraining influence on local
communist forces.
The Staff has therefore felt that the wisest policy
for us to follow would be to make it evident to the Russians by our actions
that the further the communists go in Greece and Italy the more surely will
this Government be forced to extend the deployment of its peacetime military
establishment in the Mediterranean area.
There is no doubt in our minds but thnt if the
Russians knew that the establishment of a communist government in Greece would
mean the establishment of U.S. air bases in Libya and Crete, or that a
communist uprising in northern Italy would lead to the renewed occupation by
this country of the Foggia field, a conflict would be produced in the Kremlin
councils between the interests of the Third Internationale, on the one hand,
and those of the sheer military security of the Soviet Union, on the other. In
conflicts of this sort, the interests of narrow Soviet nationalism usually win.
If they were to win in this instance, a restraining hand would certainly be
placed on the Greek and Italian communists.
This has already been, to some extent, the case. I
think there is little doubt that the activity of our naval forces in the
Mediterranean (including the stationing of further Marines with those forces),
plus the talk of the possibility of our sending U.S. forces to Greece, has had
something to do with the failure of the satellites, up to this time, to
recognize the Markos Government, and possibly also with the Kremlin's reprimand
to Dimitrov. Similarly, I think the statement we made at the time of the final
departure of our troops from Italy was probably the decisive factor in bringing
about the abandonment of the plans which evidently existed for a communist
uprising in Italy prior to the spring elections.
For this reason, I think that our policy with respect
to Greece and Italy, and the Mediterranean area in general, should be based
upon the objective of demonstration to the Russians that:
(a) the reduction of the communist threat will lead
to our military withdrawal from the area; but that
(b) further communist pressure will only have the
effect of involving us more deeply in a military sense.
V. PALESTINE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST
The Staff views on Palestine have been made known in
a separate paper. [11] I do not intend to recapitulate them here. But there are
two background considerations of determining importance, both for the Palestine
question and for our whole position in the Middle East, which I should like to
emphasize at this time.
1. The British strategic
position in the Middle East.
We have decided in this Government that the security
of the Middle East is vital to our own security. We have also decided that it
would not be desirable or advantageous for us to attempt to duplicate or take over
the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We have
recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal anyway, in
the event of war, and that to attempt to get them transferred, in the formal
sense, from the British to ourselves would only raise a host of new and
unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally unsuccessful.
This means that we must do what we can to support the
maintenance of the British of their strategic position in that area. This does
not mean that we must support them in every individual instance. It does not
mean that we must back them up in cases where they have gotten themselves into
a false position or where we would thereby be undertaking extravagant political
commitments. It does mean that any policy on our part which tends to strain
British relations with the Arab world and to whittle down the British position
in the Arab countries is only a policy directed against ourselves and against
the immediate strategic interests of our country.
2. The direction of our
own policy.
The pressures to which this Government is now
subjected are ones which impel us toward a position where we would shoulder
major responsibility for the maintenance, and even the expansion, of a Jewish
state in Palestine. To the extent that we move in this direction we will be
operating directly counter to our major security interests in that area. For
this reason, our policy in the Palestine issue should be dominated by the
determination to avoid being impelled along this path.
We are now heavily and unfortunately involved in this
Palestine question. We will apparently have to make certain further concessions
to our past commitments and to domestic pressures.
These concessions will be dangerous ones; but they
will not necessarily be catastrophic if we are thoroughly conscious of what we
are doing, and if we lay our general course toward the avoidance of the
possibility of the responsibility I have referred to. If we do not lay our
course in that direction but drift along the lines of least resistance in the
existing vortex of cross currents, our entire policy in the Middle Eastern area
will unquestionably be carried in the direction of confusion, ineffectiveness,
and grievous involvement in a situation to which there cannot be—from our
standpoint—any happy ending.
I think it should be stated that if this Government
is carried to a point in the Palestine controversy where it is required to send
U.S. forces to Palestine in any manner whatsoever, or to agree either to the international
recruitment of volunteers or the sending of small nation forces which would
include those of Soviet satellites, then in my opinion, the whole structure of
strategic and political planning which we have been building up for the
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas would have to be re-examined and
probably modified or replaced by something else. For this would then mean that
we had consented to be guided, in a highly important question affecting those
areas, not by national interest but by other considerations. If we tried, in
the face of this fact, to continue with policy in adjacent areas motivated
solely by national interest, we would be faced with a duality of purpose which
would surely lead in the end to a dissipation and confusion of effort. We
cannot operate with one objective in one area, and with a conflicting one next
door.
If, therefore, we decide that we are obliged by past
commitments or UN decision or any other consideration to take a leading part in
the enforcement of Palestine of any arrangement opposed by the great majority
of the inhabitants of the Middle Eastern area, we must be prepared to face the
implications of this act by revising our general policy in that part of the
world. And since the Middle East is vital to the present security concepts on
which this Government is basing itself in its worldwide military and political
planning, this would further mean a review of our entire military and political
policy.
VI. U.S.S.R.
If the Russians have further success in the coming months
in their efforts at penetration and seizure of political control of the key
countries outside the iron curtain (Germany, France, Italy, and Greece), they
will continue, in my opinion, to be impossible to deal with at the council
table. For they will see no reason to settle with us at this time over Germany
when they hope that their bargaining position will soon be improved.
If, on the other hand, their situation outside the
iron curtain does not improve—if the ERP aid arrives in time and in a form to do
some good and if there is a general revival of confidence in western Europe,
then a new situation will arise and the Russians will be prepared, for the
first time since the surrender, to do business seriously with us about Germany
and about Europe in general. They are conscious of this and are making
allowance for this possibility in their plans. I think, in fact, that they
regard it as the more probable of the two contingencies.
When that day comes, i.e. when the Russians will be
prepared to talk realistically with us, we will be faced with a great test of
American statesmanship, and it will not be easy to find the right solution. For
what the Russians will want us to do will be to conclude with them a
sphere-of-influence agreement similar to the one they concluded with the
Germans in 1939. It will be our job to explain to them that we cannot do this
and why. But we must also be able to demonstrate to them that it will still be
worth their while:
(a) to reduce communist pressures elsewhere in Europe
and the Middle East to a point where we can afford to withdraw all our armed
forces from the continent and the Mediterranean; and
(b) to acquiesce thereafter in a prolonged period of
stability in Europe.
I doubt that this task will be successfully
accomplished if we try to tackle it head-on in the CFM or at any other public
meeting. Our public dealings with the Russians can hardly lead to any clear and
satisfactory results unless they are preceded by preparatory discussions of the
most secret and delicate nature with Stalin. [12] I think that those
discussions can be successfully conducted only by someone who:
(a) has absolutely no personal axe to grind in the
discussions, even along the lines of getting public credit for their success,
and is prepared to observe strictest silence about the whole proceeding; and
(b) is thoroughly acquainted not only with the
background of our policies but with Soviet philosophy and strategy and with the
dialectics used by Soviet statesmen in such discussions.
(It would be highly desirable that this person be
able to conduct conversations in the Russians' language. In my opinion, this is
important with Stalin.)
These discussions should not be directed toward
arriving at any sort of secret protocol or any other written understanding.
They should be designed to clarify the background of any written understanding
that we may hope to reach at the CFM table or elsewhere. For we know now that
the words of international agreements mean different things to the Russians
than they mean to us; and it is desirable that in this instance we should
thresh out some common understanding of what would really be meant by any
further written agreements we might arrive at.
The Russians will probably not be prepared to “talk
turkey” with us until after the elections. But it would be much easier to talk
to them at that time if the discussions did not have to be inaugurated too
abruptly and if the ground had been prepared beforehand.
The Russians recently made an interesting approach to
Murphy in Berlin, obviously with a view to drawing us out and to testing our
interest in talking with them frankly and realistically on the informal plane.
I do not think Berlin a desirable place for the pursuit of further discussions
of this sort. On the other hand, I do not think that we should give them a
complete cold shoulder. We must always be careful not to give discouragement to
people in the Kremlin who may urge the desirability of better understanding
with us.
I think, in the light of the above, we should give
careful attention to the personnel arrangements which we make with relation to
the Russian field in the next few months, and that we should play our cards
throughout with a view to the possibility of arriving eventually at some sort
of a background understanding with the Kremlin. But we must bear in mind that
this understanding would necessarily have to be limited and coldly realistic,
could not be reduced to paper, and could not be expected to outlast the general
international situation which had given rise to it.
I may add that I think such an understanding would
have to be restricted pretty much to the European and western Mediterranean
area. I doubt that it could be extended to apply to the Middle East and Far
East. The situation in these latter areas is too unsettled, the prospects for
the future too confusing, the possibilities of one sort or another too vast and
unforeseeable, to admit of such discussions. The economic exchanges between
Japan and Manchuria might be revived in a guarded and modified form, by some
sort of barter arrangement. This is an objective well worth holding in mind,
from our standpoint. Rut we should meanwhile have to frame our policies in
Japan with a view to creating better bargaining power for such discussions than
we now possess.
VII. Far East
My main impression with regard to the position of
this Government with regard to the Far East is that we are greatly
over-extended in our whole thinking about what we can accomplish, and should
try to accomplish, in that area. This applies, unfortunately, to the people in
our country as well as to the Government.
It is urgently necessary that we recognize our own
limitations as a moral and ideological force among the Asiatic peoples.
Our political philosophy and our patterns for living
have very little applicability to masses of people in Asia. They may be all
right for us, with our highly developed political traditions running back into
the centuries and with our peculiarly favorable geographic position; but they
are simply not practical or helpful, today, for most of the people in Asia.
This being the case, we must be very careful when we
speak of exercising "leadership" in Asia. We are deceiving ourselves
and others when we pretend to have the answers to the problems which agitate
many of these Asiatic peoples.
Furthermore, we have about
50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population. This disparity is
particularly great as between ourselves and the peoples of Asia. In this
situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real
task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will
permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will
have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention
will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives.
We need not deceive ourselves that we can afford today the luxury of altruism
and world-benefaction.
For these reasons, we must observe great restraint in
our attitude toward the Far Eastern areas. The peoples of Asia and of the
Pacific area are going to go ahead, whatever we do, with the development of
their political forms and mutual interrelationships in their own way. This
process cannot be a liberal or peaceful one. The greatest of the Asiatic
peoples—the Chinese and the Indians—have not yet even made a beginning at the
solution of the basic demographic problem involved in the relationship between
their food supply and their birth rate. Until they find some solution to this
problem, further hunger, distress, and violence are inevitable. All of the
Asiatic peoples are faced with the necessity for evolving new forms of life to
conform to the impact of modern technology. This process of adaptation will
also be long and violent. It is not only possible, but probable, that in the
course of this process many peoples will fall, for varying periods, under the
influence of Moscow, whose ideology has a greater lure for such peoples, and
probably greater reality, than anything we could oppose to it. All this, too,
is probably unavoidable; and we could not hope to combat it without the
diversion of a far greater portion of our national effort than our people would
ever willingly concede to such a purpose.
In the face of this situation we would be better off
to dispense now with a number of the concepts which have underlined our
thinking with regard to the Far East. We should dispense with the aspiration to
"be liked" or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded
international altruism. We should stop putting ourselves in the position of
being our brothers' keeper and refrain from offering moral and ideological
advice. We should cease to talk about vague and—for the Far East—unreal
objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and
democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in
straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans,
the better.
We should recognize that our influence in the Far
Eastern area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and
economic. We should make a careful study to see what parts of the Pacific and
Far Eastern world are absolutely vital to our security, and we should
concentrate our policy on seeing to it that those areas remain in hands which
we can control or rely on. It is my own guess, on the basis of such study as we
have given the problem so far, that Japan and the Philippines will be found to
be the corner-stones of such a Pacific security system and if we can contrive
to retain effective control over these areas there can be no serious threat to
our security from the East within our time.
Only when we have assured this first objective, can
we allow ourselves the luxury of going farther afield in our thinking and our
planning.
If these basic concepts are accepted, then our
objectives for the immediate coming period should be:
(a) to liquidate as rapidly as possible our unsound
commitments in China and to recover, vis-à-vis that country, a position of
detachment and freedom of action;
(b) to devise policies with respect to Japan which
assure the security of those islands from communist penetration and domination
as well as from Soviet military attack, and which will permit the economic potential
of that country to become again an important force in the Far East, responsive
to the interests of peace and stability in the Pacific area; and
(c) to shape our relationship to the Philippines in
such a way as to permit the Philippine Government a continued independence in
all internal affairs but to preserve the archipelago as a bulwark of U.S.
security in that area.
Of these three objectives, the one relating to Japan
is the one where there is the greatest need for immediate attention on the part
of our Government and the greatest possibility for immediate action. It should
therefore be made the focal point of our policy for the Far East in the coming
period.
VIII. International Organization
A broad conflict runs through U.S. policy today between
what may be called the universalistic and the particularized approaches to the
solution of international problems.
The universalistic approach looks to the solution of
international problems by providing a universalistic pattern of rules and
procedures which would be applicable to all countries, or at least all
countries prepared to join, in an identical way. This approach has the tendency
to rule out political solutions (that is, solutions related to the
peculiarities in the positions and attitudes of the individual peoples). It
favors legalistic and mechanical solutions, applicable to all countries alike.
It has already been embodied in the United Nations, in the proposed ITO
Charter, in UNESCO, in the PICAO, and in similar efforts at universal world collaboration
in given spheres of foreign policy.
This universalistic approach has a strong appeal to
U.S. public opinion: for it appears to obviate the necessity of dealing with
the national peculiarities and diverging political philosophies of foreign peoples;
which many of our people find confusing and irritating. In this sense, it
contains a strong vein of escapism. To the extent that it could be made to
apply, it would relieve us of the necessity of dealing with the world as it is.
It assumes that if all countries could be induced to subscribe to certain
standard rules of behavior, the ugly realities—the power aspirations, the
national prejudices, the irrational hatreds and jealousies—would be forced to
recede behind the protecting curtain of accepted legal restraint, and that the
problems of our foreign policy could thus be reduced to the familiar terms of
parliamentary procedure and majority decision. The outward form established for
international dealings would then cover and conceal the inner content. And
instead of being compelled to make the sordid and involved political choices
inherent in traditional diplomacy, we could make decisions on the lofty but
simple plane of moral principle and under the protecting cover of majority
decision.
The particularized approach is one which is skeptical
of any scheme for compressing international affairs into legalistic concepts.
It holds that the content is more important than the form, and will force its
way through any formal structure which is placed upon it. It considers that the
thirst for power is still dominant among so many peoples that it cannot be
assuaged or controlled by anything but counter-force. It does not reject
entirely the idea of alliance as a suitable form of counter-force; but it
considers that if alliance is to be effective it must be based upon real
community of interest and outlook, which is to be found only among limited
groups of governments, and not upon the abstract formalism of universal
international law or international organization. It places no credence in the
readiness of most peoples to wage war or to make national sacrifices in the
interests of an abstraction called "peace". On the contrary, it sees
in universal undertakings a series of obligations which might, in view of the
short-sightedness and timidity of other governments, prevent this country from
taking vigorous and incisive measures for its own defense and for the defense
of concepts of international relations which might be of vital importance to
world stability as a whole. It sees effective and determined U.S. policy being
caught, at decisive moments, in the meshes of a sterile and cumbersome
international parliamentarianism, if the univeralistic concepts are applied.
Finally, the particularized approach to foreign
policy problems distrusts the theory of national sovereignty as it expresses
itself today in international organization. The modern techniques of aggressive
expansion lend themselves too well to the pouring of new wine into old
vessels—to the infusion of a foreign political will into the personality of an
ostensibly independent nation. In these circumstances, the parliamentary
principle in world affairs can easily become distorted and abused as it has
been in the case of White Russia, the Ukraine and the Russian satellites. This
is not to mention the problem of the distinction between large and small
states, and the voice that they should have, respectively, in world affairs.
This Government is now conducting a dual policy,
which combines elements of both of these approaches. This finds its reflection
in the Department of State, where the functional (or universalistic) concept
vies with the geographic (or particularized) in the framing and conduct of
policy, as well as in the principles of Departmental organization.
This duality is something to which we are now deeply
committed. I do not mean to recommend that we should make any sudden changes.
We cannot today abruptly renounce aspirations which have become for many people
here and abroad a symbol of our belief in the possibility of a peaceful world.
But it is my own belief that in our pursuance of a
workable world order we have started from the wrong end. Instead of beginning
at the center, which is our own immediate neighborhood—the area of our own
political and economic tradition—and working outward, we have started on the
periphery of the entire circle, i.e., on the universalistic principle of the
UN, and have attempted to work inward. This has meant a great dispersal of our
effort, and has brought perilously close to discredit those very concepts of a
universal world order to which we were so attached. If we wish to preserve
those concepts for the future we must hasten to remove some of the strain we
have placed upon them and to build a solid structure, proceeding from a central
foundation, which can be thrust up to meet them before they collapse of their
own weight.
This is the significance of the ERP, the idea of
European union, and the cultivation of a closer association with the U.K. and
Canada. For a truly stable world order can proceed, within our lifetime, only
from the older, mellower and more advanced nations of the world—nations for
which the concept of order, as opposed to power, has value and meaning. If
these nations do not have the strength to seize and hold real leadership in
world affairs today, through that combination of political greatness and wise
restraint which goes only with a ripe and settled civilization, then, as Plato
once remarked: "...cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the
human race, as I believe."
[Here follows Part IX,
"Department and Foreign Service."]
X. CONCLUSIONS
An attempt to survey the whole panorama of U.S.
policy and to sketch the lines of direction along which this country is moving
in its relations with the rest of the world yields little cause for
complacency.
We are still faced with an extremely serious threat
to our whole security in the form of the men in the Kremlin. These men are an
able, shrewd and utterly ruthless group, absolutely devoid of respect for us or
our institutions. They wish for nothing more than the destruction of our
national strength. They operate through a political organization of
unparalleled flexibility, discipline, cynicism and toughness. They command the
resources of one of the world's greatest industrial and agricultural nations.
Natural force, independent of our policies, may go far to absorb and eventually
defeat the efforts of this group. But we cannot depend on this. Our own
diplomacy has a decisive part to play in this connection. The problems involved
are new to us, and we are only beginning to adjust ourselves to them. We have
made some progress; but we are not yet nearly far enough advanced. Our
operations in foreign affairs must attain a far higher degree of purposefulness,
of economy of effort, and of disciplined coordination if we are to be sure of
accomplishing our purposes.
In the western European area communism has suffered a
momentary check; but the issue is still in the balance. This Government has as
yet evolved no firm plans for helping Britain meet her basic long-term economic
problem, or for fitting Germany into western Europe in a way that gives
permanence of assuring the continued independence and prosperity of the other
nations of western Europe.
In the Mediterranean and Middle East, we have a
situation where a vigorous and collective national effort, utilizing both our
political and military resources, could probably prevent the area from falling
under Soviet influence and preserve it as a highly important factor in our
world strategic position. But we are deeply involved, in that same area, in a
situation which has no direct relation to our national security, and where the
motives our involvement lie solely in past commitments of dubious wisdom and in
our attachment to the UN itself. If we do not effect a fairly radical reversal
of the trend of our policy to date, we will end up either in the position of
being ourselves militarily responsible for the protection of the Jewish
population in Palestine against the declared hostility of the Arab world, or of
sharing that responsibility with the Russians and thus assisting at their
installation as one of the military powers of the area. In either case, the
clarity and efficiency of a sound national policy for that area will be
shattered.
In the Far East, our position is not bad; and we
still have a reasonably firm grip on most of what is strategically essential to
us. But our present controls are temporary ones which cannot long endure, and
we have not yet worked out realistic plans for replacing them with a permanent
structure. Meanwhile, our own public has been grievously misled by the
sentimentalists on the significance of the area to ourselves; and we are only
beginning with the long and contentious process of re-education which will be
necessary before a realistic Far Eastern policy can receive the popular
understanding it deserves.
In all areas of the world, we still find ourselves
the victims of many of the romantic and universalistic concepts with which we
emerged from the recent war. The initial build-up of the UN in U.S. public
opinion was so tremendous that it is possibly true, as is frequently alleged,
that we have no choice but to make it the cornerstone of our policy in this
post-hostilities period. Occasionally, it has served a useful purpose. But by
and large it has created more problems than it has solved, and has led to a
considerable dispersal of our diplomatic effort. And in our efforts to use the
UN majority for major political purposes we are playing with a dangerous weapon
which may some day turn against us. This is a situation which warrants most
careful study and foresight on our part.
Notes
1.
Lot 64D563, files of the Policy Planning Staff
of the Department of State, 1947–1953.
2.
The Policy Planning Staff of the Department of
State was established on May 7, 1947, to consider the development of long range
policy and to draw together the views of the geographic and functional offices
of the Department. With the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the
Policy Planning Staff undertook responsibility for the preparation of the
position of the Department of State on matters before the National Security
Council. For additional information on the activities of the Policy Planning
Staff and its Director, see George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 313-500.
3.
Dean Acheson, Under Secretary of State, August
1945–June 1947.
4.
George H. Butler, Deputy Director of the Policy
Planning Staff.
5.
On February 26, Kennan departed for Japan to
consult with United States officials. Subsequent illness prevented him from
returning to the Department of State until April 19.
6.
For documentation on United States policy with
respect to the economic situation in Europe, see vol. III, pp. 352.
7.
For documentation on United States policy with
respect to the proposed International Trade Organization, see pp. 802 ff.
8.
For text of Secretary Marshall's address at
commencement exercises at Harvard University, June 5, 1947, see Foreign
Relations, 1947, vol. III, p. 237, or Department of State Bulletin, June 15,
1947, p. 1159.
9.
For documentation on United States policy with
respect to the occupation and control of Germany, see vol. II, pp. 1285 ff.
10.
For documentation on United States efforts in
support of democratic forces in Italy, see vol. III, pp. 816 ff. Regarding
United States economic and military support for Greece, see vol. IV, pp. 1 ff.
11.
For the views of the Policy Planning Staff on
this subject, see PPS 19, January 20, 1948, and PPS 21, February 11, 1948, in
vol. V, Part 2, pp. 545 and 656, respectively.
12.
Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.
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