RobertMGates. Duty. MemoirsOfASecretaryAtWar. Paragraphs pertaining toKorea.

1.      Levin went on to tell me that Iraq was not theonlychallenge I would face. He spoke of a resurgent Taliban inAfghanistan; an unpredictable nuclearpower in northKorea; Iran aggressivelypursuing nuclearweapons; theArmy and MarineCorps in need of tens of billions USD to repair and replace equipment; the declining readiness of our nondeployed groundforces; the continuing pursuit of weaponsprograms we couldn’t afford; the challenges in recruitment and retention of our forces; the problems of our military families after repeated deployments; and a department “whose image has been tarnished by the mistreatment of detainees in-AbuGhraib and –Guantanamo and elsewhere.”

2.      Condi is reallygood at just about anything she tries, a source of resentment for those like me who have no athletic, linguistic, or musical talent. But she and I quicklydeveloped a strong working relationship that radiated throughout our respective bureaucracies, as I’ve said. We would get together for dinner every few months, always at her favourite restaurant in theWatergatebuilding. On virtually all of the major issues during theBushadministration, she and I were prettymuch on thesamepage. On northKorea, where I was farmorepessimistic than she or her negotiators about any chance for denuclearisation, I saw no harm in trying – unlike the vicepresident, who opposed any talks.

3.      No President, not even in wartime, has the luxury of being able to focus on just oneproblem. Bush43 was no exception. Indeed, during the last twoyears of his administration, while fighting two major wars, we faced serious challenges with Russia, Syria, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, China, northKorea, NATO, easternEurope, Georgia, and, all of things, piracy. These problems collectively would take as much, if not more, of thePresident’stime, and that of his senior national securityteam, than the wars in-Iraq and –Afghanistan. And several of them would provoke serious disagreements among us.

4.      Reading from a script, Serdyu-kov immediatelysaid that our proposed system would diminish Russia’snucleardeterrent and have a negative effect on worldpeace. We had said the system was a counter to Iran and northKorea, but he contended that neither country had missiles capable of reaching-Europe or –theUnitedStates; nor was that likely in the foreseeable future. Russia, he said, was veryconcerned that our system could intercept Russia’s ballistic missiles. I responded that the concerns of both sides needed to be taken into account, that the opportunities for cooperation between us were unprecedented, and that we both needed to think tenortwentyyears into the future. My undersecretary for policy, EricEdelman, reassured that the russians that the radar in theCzechRepublic would be tooclose to get a fix on missiles launched fromRussia; the system had no capability again RussianIICBMs; and debris from the missiles would burn up in the atmosphere.

5.      On septembersixth, the israelis attacked the reactor and destroyed it. They insisted on keeping the existence of the reactor secret, believing – correctly, as it turned out – that the lack of public exposure of the reactor and embarassment over its destruction might persuade Assad not to retaliatemilitarily. But Condi and I were frustrated that Syria and northKorea had undertaken a bold and risky venture in violation of multiple SecurityCountilresolutions and international treaties to create a covert nuclear capability inSyria, probablyincluding other sites and labs, and had paid no politicalprice for it. Nor could we use their gambit to our advantage in detachingSyria fromIran or in seeking harsher sanctions onIran.

6.      In the winter of 2007-8, I was dealing with hot spots all around the world: Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, northKorea, Russia, China, Venezuela, and the IsraeliPalestinainconflict. My days were filled with problems of mindboggling variety. For example, sandwiched between my visit toRussia and meeting with the iraeli and afghan defense ministers, on october 15, 2007, aPatriotmissile at theUSbase inQatar was accidentalyfired during a training exercise and landed several miles away, in the backyard of the qatari chief of defense, a general who had been incrediblykind toUSsoldiers, opening his estate for recreational purposes. Fortunately, no one was hurt. How the hell does aPatriotmissile just go off? I asked my staff rather rudely. I said all questions should be directed toCentralCommand. [Who gives a shit?]

7.      I consulted with senior leaders at thePentagon. MikeMullen said cluster munitions were veryimportant, veryeffective weapons. EricEdelman said there was broad interagencyagreement that the munitions had utility and that 90percent of casualties from unexploded munitions are from conventional bombs. Banning clusterbombs therefore would increase the risk of innocent casualties because we would need to use moreconventional bombs. TheMarinecommandant, GeneralJamesTConway, observed that northKorea, Russia, Iran, and India all had clustermunitions and none would sign an agreement banning them. Our solution was to develop clustermunitions that would automaticallydeactivate after a certain time. We committed to replacing 99percent of our clustermunitions over a tenyearperiod.

8.      On january19, Bush’s last full day in office, the core national security teams for both Presidents gathered in theSituationRoom so that the old team could brief the new one on themostsensitive programs of the americanGovernment in dealing withTerrorism, northKorea, Iran, and other actual or potential adversaries. After some banter about which side of the table I should sit on, the remainder of the meeting was quite somber. I believe that, in broad terms, there weren’t many surprises for theObamateam, although some of the details were eyeopening. I had not heard of such a conversation between administrations in the past transitions – although Presidentselect received such briefings – and it was, I thought, a mark ofBush’sdetermination to have a smooth transition and of the receptivity of the newPresident to such a meeting. Such cordiality was uncommon.

9.      By 2009, I had come to believe that the paradigms of both conventional and unconventional war weren’t adequate anymore, as themostlikely future conflicts would fall somewhere in between, with a wide range of scale lethality. Militias and insurgents could get access to sophisticated weapons. Rapidlymodernising militaries, including China’s, would employ “asymmetric” methods to thwart american’s traditional advantages in the air and at sea. Rogue nations like-Iran or –northKorea would likely use a combination of tactics. Accordingly, I believed that our postColdWarstrategy of being prepared to fight two major retional conflicts at thesametime, which determined much of our military’s forcestructure, was outdated. We needed to sustain and modernise our strategic and conventional capabilities, but we needed also to train and equip for other contingencies.

10.   No President has the luxury of focusing on just a few issues, but it is hard to think of a President who entered office facing morechallenges of historic magnitude thanObama. The nation’s economic meltdown and the possibility of another GreatDepression while we were engulfed in twowars certainly were at the top of the list. But they were myriad other pressing problems as well, among them the iranian nuclearprogram and the related growing possibility of a newMiddleEastwar; a nucleararmed northKorea; a european economic crisis; increasinglynationalistic policies in both Russia and China; and Pakistan in possession of dozens of nuclearweapons and growing moredysfunctional by the day. Then they were Obama’s own initiatives, such as reshaping the federal budget and farreaching healthcarereform. During his firstfourmonths, he had to dealadditionally with the launch of a longrange northkorean missile overJapan on aprilfifth, which fortunatelyfailed; the killing of three somali pirates and the rescue of an american shipcaptain byNavySEALs on apriltwelveth; a northkorean nucleartest (which apparentlyfizzled) on maytwentyfifth; and working with the canadians to rescue two of their UNenvoys who had been kidnapped inMali by alQaeda. These and other such unforeseeable events made every day interesting, but they also made demands on thePresident’stime and, accordingly, the time of his senior national security team.

11.   I wroteimpertinenly that any new decision that abandoned his decisions in march or the vow he had made to theVFW in august would be seen as a retreat fromAfghanistan, with all the implicit messages that that would send to afghans, Pakistan, our arab and NATO allies, Iran, northKorea, and others about american will and staying power: “We need to give it [theMarchstrategy] a chance.” Knowing this President, I realised that, he, like me, had a number of questions that had to be answered before any decision would be made, and I laid out some of them:

12.   As strange as it may sound, Afghanistan was not an allconsuming issue for thePresident and his administration in the latter part of2009; it just seemed so for those of us in the national security arena. Preoccupied at home with a politicallytroubled healthcareinitiative and the continuing economic crisis, Obama alsofaced challenges with China, Russia, northKorea, theArabMiddleEast and Israel, Terrorism – and especially Iran. Unlike Afghanistan, there were generally no serious divisions within the administrartion on these issues during 2009 and 2010.

13.   TheUnitedStates began working on defenses against ballistic missiles in the1960s. Stringent limits were imposed on the development and deployment of missiledefenses in the1972AntiBallisticMissileTreaty we signed with theSovietUnion. Even so, the missiledefenseendeavour received a huge boost in1983 withPresidentReagan’sannouncement of theStrategicDefenseInitiative (SDI), intendedconceptually to provide a “shield” for theUnitedStates against an allout Sovietattack. Generally speaking, in the years afterReagan’sSDI (or “StarWars”) speech, most republicans supported virtually all missiledefenseprograms and most democrats opposed them as both unworkable and far toocostly. In2002, as we’ve seen, PresidentBush unilaterallywithdrew theUnitedStates from the1972treaty, thereby removing any restrictions on our development and deployment of missiledefenses. By the time I becameSecretaryOfDefense, most members ofCongress had come around – with widelyvarying levels of enthusiasm – to support deploying a verylimited capability intended to defend against an accidental launch or a handful of missiles fired by a “rogue” State such as northKorea or Iran. Few in either party supported efforts to field a system large or advanced enough to protect against a mass strike from the nucleararsenals of either Russia or China, an effort that would have been at once technologicallychallenging, staggeringlyexpensive, and strategicallydestabilising. Independent of these findings and assessments, in preparing the fiscalyear 2010budget, I decided to cancel several huge, expensive, and failing missiledefenseprograms, such as the airbornelaser and the kinetic energyinterceptor, as described earlier. At thesametime, I decided to keep the number of silobased GBIs inAL and CA at thirty rather than expanding the deployment to fortyfour, and I authorised continued research, development, and testing of our defenses against the longrange missilethreat from iranian and northkorean missiles. (I alsocanceled completion of a secondfield of silos for theGBIs atFortGreely, but after visiting there a few months later and seeing how close they were to completion, I reversed myself and approved finishing thesecondfield. I was no expert but was always willing to listen to those who were.) Meanwhile, reflecting the new emphasis on regional missiledefense, I allocated a great deal of money in the budget accelerate building the inventory ofSM3missileinterceptors, as well as other regional missiledefensesystems. I alsoagreed to fund improved missiledefensecapability on sixmoredestroyers.

14.   On any trip toAsia, even if China isn’t on the itinerary, it is on the agenda. Improving the militarytomilitary relationshipo withBeijing was a high priority. I had first traveled toChina at the end of1980, with then CIAdirector StanfieldTurner, to implement the1979agreement between JimmyCarter and DengXiaoping to begin technical intelligencecooperation against theSovietUnion (to replace the radarsites in northernIran that CIA lost after the1979revolution). That extraordinary relationship had continued uninterrupted over the decades through the ups and downs in the two nations’s politialrelationship. As SecretaryOfDefense, I wanted to build a similar relationship – that is, one largelyimmune to politicaldifferences – in the military arena. Above all, I wanted to open a dialogue on sensitive subjects like nuclearstrategy as well as contingencyplanning on northKorea. I was convinced that the prolonged dialogue between Washington and Moscow during our many years of armscontrolnegotiations had lad to a greater understanding of each other’s intentions and thinking about nuclearmatters; I believed that dialogue had helped prevent misunderstandings and miscalculations that might have led to confrontation. In my 2007visit toChina, I tried to lay the groundwork for such a relationship. M chinese hosts and I decided at that time to build on previous cooperative exchanges with a fairlyambitious list of initiatives, from exchanging officers among our military educational institutions to opening a direct telephonelink between ministers and beginning to expand a strategic dialogue. It was clear, though, that chinese military leaders were leery of a real [eyetalicised] dialogue.

15.   During my 2007visit, I had invited senior chinese military officials to theUnitedStates. On 26october2009, GeneralXuCaihou, vicechairman of theCentralMilitaryCommission, finallymade the trip. I hosted him and his delegation for dinner at the summercottage used byPresidentLincoln several times from downtownWashington. It was a crowded room, and the seating arrangement gave me my onlyopportunity to talkprivately withXu. I raised the subject of northKorea. I went into some detail about the risk of instability there and the dangers of its collapse both toChina and to the southkoreans, and I said we had a mutual interest in a frank dialogue about what we both would do in such circumstances – including how to ensure that theNorth’snuclearweapons and materials would be kept secure. It was plain that I was way out of Xu’scomfortzone in even raising these subjects. “Thank you for your view on northKorea” was all he said to me in response. We discussed the possibility of my visitingChina again in2010, but as always, the chinese made clear that all bets were off on our relationship if we continued armssales toTaiwan. Still, our public statements were largelypositive, if only to preserve a good atmosphere forObama’svisit toChina the following month.

16.   The internal fight heated up again on 01March, when Biden convened a meeting at his residence to push for a dramatic troop drawdown. The residence is a big victorianera house on the grounds of theNavalObservatory, firstoccupied byVicePresidentNelsonRockefeller in the mid1970s. As always, Biden was warm in welcoming us, a cordial host. When we got down to business, he asked whether the strategy had succeeded enough so we could “think bigger about transition sooner.” Could we meet our strategic goals with less “input” over the next two or more and that our commitment inAfghanistan was limiting our ability to deal with both Iran and northKorea. He contended that both publicopinion and Congress were becoming morenegative about the war. (In my view, virtually no effort had been made by theWhiteHouse to change the attitude during the fifteenmonths since thePresident’sdecisions on theAfghansurge.)

17.   As an old “Russiahand,” I had no objection toObama’s reaching out toMoscow as long as no unilateral concessions were involved. I was greatlyreassured in an early meeting when Hillary said that she had no interest “ever” in doing something for nothing. She sent surrian foreign minister SergeiLavrov a handwritten note on january29 outlining a number of areas where the twosides could work together constructively, including a followon strategic armsagreement, global economic challenges, MiddleEastpeace, Iran, northKorea, and Afghanistan. This was followed by a letter in earlyfebruary fromObama to russianPresidentMedvedev setting forth a similar agenda, adding that both of them were youngPresidents with a different mindset from those who came of age during theColdWar. (I wonder who he could have been talking about.) As reportedpublicly several weeks later, Obama wroteMedvedev that if we could satisfactorilyresolve the iranian nuclearproblem, the need for missiledefenses inEurope would be removed. This caused consternation in some conservative circles in theUnitedStates but in fact was veryclose to what CondiRice and I had toldPutin during theBushadministration. Although the administration would pursue a wide range of possibilities for cooperation in the months ahead, the focus of our dealings withRussia, as for so long before, narrowedprincipally to armscontrol and missiledefense. There was progress on the former, failure and rancor on the latter.| Although by2009 it was politicallyincorrect to describe-Iran and -northKorea as “rogue nations” or an “axis of evil,” they still acted as if they were, even in small things. In march2009, two american womenjournalists who had crossed on foot into northKorea fromChina were arrested for spying. A few months later, in july, three other american hikers- twomen and onewoman – crossed intoIran fromIraq and were arrested. Frankly, I had no patience with any of them; no sentient person goes tootling anywhere near either the northkorean or iranian border. But we had to try to get them out nonetheless. | The northkoreanGovernment said it would release the twowomen only if a former USPresident came to get them. Hillary, JimJones, several others, and I gathered inJones’soffice in earlyaugust to discuss what to do. Hillary had askedPresidentCarter to go, but he made clear that if he went, he would discuss broader aspects of theUSNorthKoreanrelationship – as ever, an unguided missile – in addition to negotiating the terms of their release. When Clinton toldCarter he could not go without a prior guarantee of the women’srelease by theNorth, the formerPresident responded, “You can’t dictate terms – they’re a sovereignState!” I was againstCarter or formerPresidentClinton going. I had no objection to lowerprofile emissaries who had been suggested, such as former DefenseSecretary BillPerry, formerSecretaryOfState MadeleineAlbright, or NMGoverner BillRichardson, but I was verymuch against giving the north[Korea] a chance to humiliate a formerUSPresident or allowingPyongyang to dictate terms to one. I don’t remember who it was who said the twowomen had a lot ofMediaConnexionx and the families could go public, charging that the administration had turned down a chance to get the women back. I was frustrated that the others seemed moresensitive to the domestic USramifications of not doing as northKorea wanted than to theForeignPolicyimplications. Ultimately, PresidentClinton made the trip and secured the release of the twowomen. The iranians released the womanhiker after about a year, but it was nearlythreeyears before the twomen were released. All of this took up an enormous amount of time and effort. | ThePresident wanted verymuch to reach out to theMuslimworld and looked for an opportunity to do so. There was general agreement he should give a major speech in theMiddleEast but considerable debateabout thebestlocation to do so. On 04june2009, eighteenmonths before theArabSpring, the stepped to the rostrum of a huge auditorium atCairoUniversity and delivered one of his best speeches. He spokeforthrightly about tensions between Muslims and theUnitedStates around the world, about shared principles, the dangers to all of violent extremists, theIsraeliPalestinianArabconflict, the iranian nuclearprogram, and the american commitment toGovernments that reflect the will of the people – Democracy. I thought he threatened the needle well in terms of advocating for human and politicalrights while not losing sight of the importance in the region of the american relationship withMubarak’sEgypt. His talk was welcomed in most muslim countries and raised our standing among the arabs. His words were notwellreceived inIsrael, and he was criticised by themorehawkish neoconservatives in theUnitedStates, who accused thePresident of apologising for his country. For me, the real downside of the speech was not that it was an acknowledgement of mistakes – free and confident nations do that – but that it raised expectations veryhigh on the part of many arabs that, for example, theUnitedStates would forceIsrael to stop building settlements and accept an independent palestinianState. It wasn’t long before perceptions of us reverted to the bythen normal distrust and suspicion.

18.   In the questionandanswer session, a retired PLAgeneral aggressivelypursued theTaiwanarmssalesissue. I replied that the chinese had known full well at the time we normalised diplomatic relations in1979 that armssales toTaiwan would continue. Why, then, I asked, did China stillpursue this line? The general’s response was as direct as it was revealing. China had lived with theTaiwanarmssales in1979, he said, “because we were weak. But now we are strong.” | Perhaps my mostimportant individual meeting inSingapore was withPresidentLeeMyungBak of southKorea. I reallylikeLee; he was toughminded, realistic, and veryproamerican. (All in contrast to his precedessor, PresidentRohMooHyun, whom I had met with inSeoul in november2007 and decided was antiamerican and probably a little crazy. He had told me that thebiggest securitythreats inAsia were theUnitedStates and Japan.) A little over twomonths earlier, on march26, the northkoreans, in a brazen provocation, had sunk the southkorean warship Cheonan. Lee told me he had warned the chinese premier that the north[Korea] must “feel consequences.” Failure to act, I said, would encourage KimJongIl’ssuccessor to show the military he is tough and can “get away with things.” Lee agreed and said theUN needed to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions on theNorth and that we needed show-of-force exercises. I said we were already talking about further exercises, but theUnitedStates was willing to follow his lead on timing and their nature. Lee was adamant that there could be no return to the sixpartytalks on theNorth’snuclearprogram “until they admit their wrongdoing and renounce it.” I concurred: “Resumption of the sixtypartytalks would be seen as a reward – the sequence must be consequences, then talks.” | In its disputes with neighbours, China alwaysprefers to deal with each country individually. They are easier to intimidate that way. Thus theUnitedStates looks for opportunities to encourage countries in the region to meet together, including withChina, to address these disputes. TheObamaadministration was particularlyactive in pursuing this task, including our own participation wherever possible. SecretaryClinton was verymuch in the lead. A major step forward in this regard was her planned official visit toVietnam in july2010, followed immediately by her participation in theAssociationOfSoutheasternAsianNations (ASEAN) regional forum inCambodia (where her comments on theSouthChinaSea disputes and the multilateral criticism ofChina’s aggressive behaviour would surprise and angerBeijing). While I was inSingapore attending theShangriLaconference, my vietnamese counterpart invited me to attend a meeting inHanoi in october of the tenASEANdefenseministers, expanded to cinlude the ministers from Australia, China, Japan, theRepublicOfKorea, NewZealand, Russia, and theUnitedStates. Because I knew Hillary was going to-Vietnam and -Cambodia in july, I assumed Washington would have no objection to my going later in the year, and so I accepted the invitation on the spot. This was exactly the kind of forum we wanted to encourage.

19.   My second noteworthy trip toAsia in2010 was in midjuly, to southKorea and Indonesia. The main purpose of the visit toKorea was the annual “twoplustwo” meeting ofSecretaryClinton and me and our two korean counterparts. This meeting took on significant added importance because of the sinking of theCheonan. Northkorean leader KimJongIl had been ill for some time, and speculation was that the sinking was the bright idea of his twentysomething son, KingJongUn, to prove to the northkorean military, as I suggested earlier, that he was tough enough to succeed his father. This line of thinking suggested that other provocations might be coming, so underscoring the strength of our alliance was veryimportant. | Apart from the meetings, an important symbolic part of Hillary’s and my program was visiting the demilitarised zone atPanmunjom. We were driven to a hilltop observationpost, where we rituallylooked through binoculars toward theNorth’sside of theDMZ. (We avoided the embarassment of an earlier USofficial who had earnestlylooked through the glasses for a photo op, notnoticing that the lenscaps were still on.) All I could see were trees. AtPanmunjom, we entered the small building situated right on theDMZline, where military representatives from theNorth and theUNcommand met. As we were briefed, a verylarge, menacing northkorean soldier stood outside the window glaring at-Hillary and -me. We worked hard to keep straight faces, and I resisted the temptation to go to the window and do something quite undiplomatic. Those kinds of offbeat ideas were always going through my head on such occasions; fortunately I mostlyresisted them.

20.   My last autumn as secretary was a busy one, with the wrap-up of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” review and all the courtactions surroundingDADT; a trip toVietnam and Belgium (a NATOmeeting); another to-Australia, Malaysia, and -Iraq; and my unforgettable visit toSatnaCruzBolivia. We had to deal with a verydangerous crisis beginning on novembertwentythird when the northkoreans unleashed an artillerybarrage at the southkorean island ofYeonpyeong. SouthKorea had suffered such provocations for thirtyyears [bullshit] with restraint, but northKorea’s sinking of its warship Cheonan the previous march had produced a change in attitude in theSouth, and there were demands for retaliation against the shelling, especiallysince several innocent southkorean civilians had been killed. SouthKorea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionatelyaggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery. We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. ThePresidentClinton, Mullen, and I were all on the phone often with our southkorean counterparts over a period of days, and ultimately southKorea simplyreturned artilleryfire on the location of the northkorean’s batteries that had started the whole affair. There was evidence the chinese were alsoweighing in with theNorth’sleaders to wind down the situation. The southkoreans and we agreed to carry out a naval exercise together – led by the aircraftcarrier GeorgeWashington – in theYellowSea to assert our freedom of navigation. Never a dull moment.

21.   In every meeting, I emphasised the importance of strengthening the militarytomilitary relationship, including a strategic dialogue covering nuclearweapons, missiledefense, space, and cyberaffairs. An onagain, offagain relationship served no one’s interests. Sustained and reliable ties insulated from politicalupsanddowns were, I said, essential to reduce miscommunication, misunderstanding, and miscalculation. I alsowarned that northKorea’snuclearandmissileprograms had reached a point where thePresident had concluded they represented “a direct threat to theUnitedStates,” and we would actaccordingly if they did not stop. I said that after thirtyyears of patientlyenduring northKorea’s lethal provocations, publicopinion in southKorea had changed with the sinking of their warship and shelling of their islands. They intended to reactforcefully to such provocations in the future, and that raised the risk of escalating hostilities on the korean peninsula. The chinese should weigh in with northKorea to stand down. I alsomade clear our view that China’s continued aggressive response to operations ofUSaircraft and ships operating in international airspace and waters in theSouthChinaSea could lead to an incident that neither country wanted. We were within our rights, and they should back off. Of course, I couched all I said in diplomatic terms full of sweetness and light (I could do that when the occasion demanded), but they understood what I was saying. | All my interlocutors supported strengthening the militarytomilitary relationship in principle but were hesitant about a sustained, formal, highlevel diplomaticmilitary strategic dialogue, arguing that there were alreadymultiple Mechanisms for such discussions. Given the sensitive agenda I had proposed, I think thePLAleaders were reluctant to sign on to a dialogue that would include chinese civilian officials from the party and theForeignMinistry. (It reminded me of theSovietgeneral in the strategic armstalks in theearly1970s who complained to theUSdelegationhead that he should stop talking about the detailed capabilities ofSovietmissiles and nuclearweapons because the civilians on theSovietside weren’t cleared for that information.) They didn’t want to dampen the atmosphere of my visit, so they didn’t reject the strategic dialogueidea; they just said they’d study it.

22.   The chosen “bad cop” for my visit was theForeignMinister, who treated me to a long, condescending, and occasionallythreatening diatribe that covered all the bases: Taiwan, surveillance, northKorea, US navaldeployments aroundKorea, and China’sneed to build up its military defenses. I responded in kind.

23.   Syria had been a problem for theUnitedStates for the last twodecades of theColdWar. The regime, controlled by theAssadfamily, had fought several wars withIsrael, invadedJordan, allied withIran, and supported a number of terrorist and militia groups causing trouble in theMiddleEast. In the spring of2007, the israelis presented us with compelling evidence that northKorea had secretlybuilt a nuclearreactor inSyria. The administration was divided about how to respond, our options constrained by the fact that the israelis had informed us of this stunning development and therefore were in a position to significantlyinfluence – if not dictate – what could be publiclydivulged and when. The case for the existence of the reactor and the northkorean role in building it dependedheavily on israeli intelligence. Our debates during the ensuing months as to whether to take military action, and about how closely to work with the israelis, were important regardingSyria, but they alsoprefigured in many respects the arguments regarding the iranian nuclearprogram in2008 and later. | Contacts between northkorean nuclearorganisations and highlevel syrians were believed to have begun as early as1997. In2005, we found a large building under construction in easternSyria, but its prupose became clear only with photographs of the inside of the building provided by the israelis in2007. The design was verysimilar to that of a northkorean reactor atYongbyon, and our analysts concluded that the reactor would be capable of producing plutonium for nuclearweapons. | Syria for years had been a highpriority intelligencetarget for theUnitedStates, as was anything to do with possible development of weaponsofmassdestruction, nuclearweapons in particular. Early detection of a large nuclearreactor under construction in a place likeSyria is supposedly the kind of intelligencecollection that theUnitedStates does superblywell. Yet by the time the israelis informed us about the site, the reactorcosntruction was alreadywelladvanced. This was a significant failure on the part of theUSintelligenceagencies, and I asked thePresident, “How can we have any confidence at all in the estimates of the scope of the northkorean, iranian, or other possible programs” given this failure? Surprisingly, neither thePresident nor Congress made much of it. Given the stakes, they should have.

24.   Incidents related toAfghanistan worsened it. In latefebruary, for example, AdmiralTimKeating, commander of all USforces in thePacific, told a pressconference aboutUScapabilities to shoot down northKorea’sTaePoDong2missile and that a prospective launch would be “a stern test” of the new administration. ThePresident was furious at what he called “freelancing” as well as the admiral’spresumption in appearing to judge thePresident. In his view, Keating’sremarks created serious problems for the administration: if thePresident ordered the missile shot down, Keating had telegraphed our punch and made nonattribution difficult to sustain; if thePresident decided not to act, people would wonder why. Mullen and I asked thePresident if he wanted Keating relieved. Obama said, No, that everyone deserved a secondchance, but he told me to recall Keating and reprimand him. Keating flew fromHawaii toWashington for a tenminutesmeeting with me. I told him of thePresident’s-unhappiness but that we all wanted him to say – and to learn from the experience. Tim asked me to convey his apologies to thePresident and tell him this kind of thing would neverhappen again. And it didn’t (at least withKeating). This episode, along with thePresident’sproblems with the outspoken director of national intelligence, DennyBlair, and increasingly MikeMullen, showed that presidential irritation with publicityprone admirals was another source of continuity between theBush and Obama administrations. All too early in the administration, suspicion and distrust of senior military officers by seniorWhiteHouseofficials – including thePresident and VicePresident – became a big problem for me as I tried to manage the relationship between the commanderinchief and his military leaders.

25.   Good arguments could get me to change my mind. Early on I had to decide on a new UScommander inKorea. The position had been filled for nearlysixtyyears byArmygenerals. I thought the time had come to rotate the position to another military service. Because our AirForce and Navy would play a big role in any conflict on theKorean peninsula, I decided to appoint anAirForceofficer as the new commander. Armychiefofstaff GeorgeCasey balked and made a strong case that the timing for the change wasn’t good, especially as we were negotiating with southKorea on a transfer of operational control of forces from theUnitedStates to the koreans. He was right, so I recommended that thePresident nominate another Armygeneral.

26.   I went to-China, -southKorea, and –Japan in earlynovember2007 on my secondtrip toAsia. PresidentBush and chinesePresident HuJintao had agreed that the militarytomilitary relationship between our two countries needed to be strengthened, and so I made my first pilgrimage toBeijing in more than fiftyyears. My firstvisit had been as a CIAofficer at the end of1980, when bicycles stillreigned supreme on the capital’sstreets. Now traffic was horrible, and the pollution made the air nearlyunbreathable. The chinese were preparing to host theOlympicGames thenextyear, and it was plain they had a lot of work to do to avoid all the visitors having to wear gasmasks. In all of my meetings, thesame threetopics were discussed: international and regional securityissues, with me spending a lot of time onIran; State-to-State relations between our twocountries; and specific issues in the military relationship. Bush and Hu had agreed in april2006 to pursue bilateral discussions of nuclearstrategy, but it was prettyplain that thePeople’sLiberationArmy hadn’t received the memo. Still, I pushed for beginning a “strategic dialogue” to help us understand each other’s military intentions and programs better.

27.   The forcesagreement was clearly the moreproblematic, and I suggested that the more it looked like similar SOFAagreements we had with other countries, the moreacceptable it would be to the iraqis. I proposed we tell the iraqis to talk to the southkoreans and japanese about their experience with theSOFAs we had with them. That was a monumentallybad idea. Representatives of those countries shared with the iraqis their frustrations about UStroops breaking localLaws. Immunities for contractors would be difficult given tha iraqis’s veryunhappy experience with them. In a videoconference on feburaryfifth withMullen, Petraeus, Fallon, Edelman, and others, I set out theDefenseDepartmentpriorities for the negociations. Most important would be optional freedom of action (including legal protection for our troops) and keeping detainees (violent extremists we believed the iraqis might release). “We could compromise on” contractors. They next day Edelman quotedCrocker as saying, with respect to protections for contractors, “This is radioactive and will blow up theSOFA.”