Kennan had been stationed at the U.S Moscow embassy
from 1944 as minister-counselor. Although he was highly critical of the Soviet
system, the mood within the US State Department was one of friendship towards
the Soviets, since they were considered an important ally in the war against
Nazi Germany.
In February 1946 the US Moscow embassy got a question
from the United States Treasury asking why the Soviets were not supporting the
newly created World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
In response, Kennan wrote his Long Telegram outlining
his views of the Soviets, which arrived in Washington on 22 February 1946.
Among its most remembered parts was that while Soviet power was
"impervious to the logic of reason," it was "highly sensitive to
the logic of force."
— Excerpted from The Long Telegram on Wikipedia, the
free encyclopedia.
Contents
Part 1: Basic Features of
Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
Part 2: Background of
Outlook
Part 3: Projection of
Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level
Part 4: Following May Be
Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies
on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government
Accepts no Responsibility
Part 5: Practical
deductions from standpoint of US policy
References
861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram[1]
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the
Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February
22--3: 52 p.m.]
511. Answer to Dept's 284, Feb 3 [13] involves
questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so
important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress
answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be
dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with
me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be
roughly as follows:
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
(2) Background of this outlook
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official
level.
(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US
policy.
I apologize in advance for this burdening of
telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance,
particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they
deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once. There follows:
Part 1: Basic Features of
Post War Soviet Outlook, as Put Forward by Official Propaganda Machine
Are as Follows:
(a) USSR still lives in antagonistic "capitalist
encirclement" with which in the long run there can be no permanent
peaceful coexistence. As stated by Stalin in 1927 to a delegation of American
workers:
"In course of further development of
international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a
socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism,
and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism.
Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate
of capitalism and of communism in entire world."
(b) Capitalist world is beset with internal
conflicts, inherent in nature of capitalist society. These conflicts are
insoluble by means of peaceful compromise. Greatest of them is that between
England and US.
(c) Internal conflicts of capitalism inevitably
generate wars. Wars thus generated may be of two kinds: intra-capitalist wars
between two capitalist states, and wars of intervention against socialist
world. Smart capitalists, vainly seeking escape from inner conflicts of
capitalism, incline toward latter.
(d) Intervention against USSR, while it would be
disastrous to those who undertook it, would cause renewed delay in progress of
Soviet socialism and must therefore be forestalled at all costs.
(e) Conflicts between capitalist states, though
likewise fraught with danger for USSR, nevertheless hold out great
possibilities for advancement of socialist cause, particularly if USSR remains
militarily powerful, ideologically monolithic and faithful to its present
brilliant leadership.
(f) It must be borne in mind that capitalist world is
not all bad. In addition to hopelessly reactionary and bourgeois elements, it
includes (1) certain wholly enlightened and positive elements united in
acceptable communistic parties and (2) certain other elements (now described
for tactical reasons as progressive or democratic) whose reactions, aspirations
and activities happen to be "objectively" favorable to interests of
USSR These last must be encouraged and utilized for Soviet purposes.
(g) Among negative elements of bourgeois-capitalist
society, most dangerous of all are those whom Lenin called false friends of the
people, namely moderate-socialist or social-democratic leaders (in other words,
non-Communist left-wing). These are more dangerous than out-and-out
reactionaries, for latter at least march under their true colors, whereas
moderate left-wing leaders confuse people by employing devices of socialism to
seine interests of reactionary capital.
So much for premises. To what deductions do they lead
from standpoint of Soviet policy? To following:
(a) Everything must be done to advance relative
strength of USSR as factor in international society. Conversely, no opportunity
must be missed to reduce strength and influence, collectively as well as
individually, of capitalist powers.
(b) Soviet efforts, and those of Russia's friends
abroad, must be directed toward deepening and exploiting of differences and
conflicts between capitalist powers. If these eventually deepen into an
"imperialist" war, this war must be turned into revolutionary
upheavals within the various capitalist countries.
(c) "Democratic-progressive" elements
abroad are to be utilized to maximum to bring pressure to bear on capitalist
governments along lines agreeable to Soviet interests.
(d) Relentless battle must be waged against socialist
and social-democratic leaders abroad.
Part 2: Background of
Outlook
Before examining ramifications of this party line in
practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.
First, it does not represent natural outlook of
Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for
experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of
possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own
labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts
forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant
in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for
outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret
police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.
Second, please note that premises on which this party
line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that
peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states
is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no
longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of
production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as
such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her
own backwardness. Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars;
and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of
intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and
after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. If not provoked by forces of
intolerance and subversion "capitalist" world of today is quite
capable of living at peace with itself and with Russia. Finally, no sane person
has reason to doubt sincerity of moderate socialist leaders in Western
countries. Nor is it fair to deny success of their efforts to improve
conditions for working population whenever, as in Scandinavia, they have been
given chance to show what they could do.
Falseness of those premises, every one of which
predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself
Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western
World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to
solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of
imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself
obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of
aim.
Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and
disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate?
It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of
situation beyond Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with
conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian
necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.
At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs
is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this
was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed
plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia
came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more
powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of
insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people;
for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively
archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable
to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For
this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact
between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians
learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world
within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly
struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and
compromises with it.
It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had
smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and
blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a
friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either
internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic
conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. After establishment of
Bolshevist regime, Marxist dogma, rendered even more truculent and intolerant
by Lenin's interpretation, became a perfect vehicle for sense of insecurity
with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers, were afflicted.
In this dogma, with its basic altruism of purpose, they found justification for
their instinctive fear of outside world, for the dictatorship without which
they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict,
for sacrifice they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed
every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot
dispense with it. It is fig leaf of their moral and intellectual
respectability. Without it they would stand before history, at best, as only
the last of that long succession of cruel and wasteful Russian rulers who have
relentlessly forced country on to ever new heights of military power in order
to guarantee external security of their internally weak regimes. This is why
Soviet purposes must always be solemnly clothed in trappings of Marxism, and
why no one should underrate importance of dogma in Soviet affairs. Thus Soviet
leaders are driven by necessities of their own past and present position to put
forward which [apparent omission] outside world as evil, hostile and menacing,
but as bearing within itself germs of creeping disease and destined to be
wracked with growing internal convulsions until it is given final Coup de grace
by rising power of socialism and yields to new and better world. This thesis
provides justification for that increase of military and police power of
Russian state, for that isolation of Russian population from outside world, and
for that fluid and constant pressure to extend limits of Russian police power
which are together the natural and instinctive urges of Russian rulers.
Basically this is only the steady advance of uneasy Russian nationalism, a
centuries old movement in which conceptions of offense and defense are
inextricably confused. But in new guise of international Marxism, with its
honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous
and insidious than ever before.
It should not be thought from above that Soviet party
line is necessarily disingenuous and insincere on part of all those who put it
forward. Many of them are too ignorant of outside world and mentally too
dependent to question [apparent omission] self-hypnotism, and who have no
difficulty making themselves believe what they find it comforting and
convenient to believe. Finally we have the unsolved mystery as to who, if
anyone, in this great land actually receives accurate and unbiased information
about outside world. In atmosphere of oriental secretiveness and conspiracy
which pervades this Government, possibilities for distorting or poisoning
sources and currents of information are infinite. The very disrespect of Russians
for objective truth--indeed, their disbelief in its existence--leads them to
view all stated facts as instruments for furtherance of one ulterior purpose or
another. There is good reason to suspect that this Government is actually a
conspiracy within a conspiracy; and I for one am reluctant to believe that
Stalin himself receives anything like an objective picture of outside world.
Here there is ample scope for the type of subtle intrigue at which Russians are
past masters. Inability of foreign governments to place their case squarely
before Russian policy makers--extent to which they are delivered up in their
relations with Russia to good graces of obscure and unknown advisors whom they
never see and cannot influence--this to my mind is most disquieting feature of
diplomacy in Moscow, and one which Western statesmen would do well to keep in
mind if they would understand nature of difficulties encountered here.
Part 3: Projection of
Soviet Outlook in Practical Policy on Official Level
We have now seen nature and background of Soviet
program. What may we expect by way of its practical implementation?
Soviet policy, as Department implies in its query
under reference, is conducted on two planes: (1) official plane represented by
actions undertaken officially in name of Soviet Government; and (2)
subterranean plane of actions undertaken by agencies for which Soviet
Government does not admit responsibility.
Policy promulgated on both planes will be calculated
to serve basic policies (a) to (d) outlined in part 1. Actions taken on
different planes will differ considerably, but will dovetail into each other in
purpose, timing and effect.
On official plane we must look for following:
(a) Internal policy devoted to increasing in every
way strength and prestige of Soviet state: intensive
military-industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays
to impress outsiders; continued secretiveness about internal matters, designed
to conceal weaknesses and to keep opponents in dark.
(b) Wherever it is considered timely and promising,
efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the
moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of
here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey,
possibly Bornholm However, other points may at any time come into question, if
and as concealed Soviet political power is extended to new areas. Thus a
"friendly Persian Government might be asked to grant Russia a port on
Persian Gulf. Should Spain fall under Communist control, question of Soviet
base at Gibraltar Strait might be activated. But such claims will appear on
official level only when unofficial preparation is complete.
(c) Russians will participate officially in
international organizations where they see opportunity of extending Soviet
power or of inhibiting or diluting power of others. Moscow sees in UNO not the
mechanism for a permanent and stable world society founded on mutual interest
and aims of all nations, but an arena in which aims just mentioned can be
favorably pursued. As long as UNO is considered here to serve this purpose,
Soviets will remain with it. But if at any time they come to conclusion that it
is serving to embarrass or frustrate their aims for power expansion and if they
see better prospects for pursuit of these aims along other lines, they will not
hesitate to abandon UNO. This would imply, however, that they felt themselves
strong enough to split unity of other nations by their withdrawal to render UNO
ineffective as a threat to their aims or security, replace it with an
international weapon more effective from their viewpoint. Thus Soviet attitude
toward UNO will depend largely on loyalty of other nations to it, and on degree
of vigor, decisiveness and cohesion with which those nations defend in UNO the
peaceful and hopeful concept of international life, which that organization
represents to our way of thinking. I reiterate, Moscow has no abstract devotion
to UNO ideals. Its attitude to that organization will remain essentially
pragmatic and tactical.
(d) Toward colonial areas and backward or dependent
peoples, Soviet policy, even on official plane, will be directed toward
weakening of power and influence and contacts of advanced Western nations, on
theory that in so far as this policy is successful, there will be created a
vacuum which will favor Communist-Soviet penetration. Soviet pressure for
participation in trusteeship arrangements thus represents, in my opinion, a
desire to be in a position to complicate and inhibit exertion of Western
influence at such points rather than to provide major channel for exerting of
Soviet power. Latter motive is not lacking, but for this Soviets prefer to rely
on other channels than official trusteeship arrangements. Thus we may expect to
find Soviets asking for admission everywhere to trusteeship or similar
arrangements and using levers thus acquired to weaken Western influence among
such peoples.
(e) Russians will strive energetically to develop
Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense
Strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. This applies to
such widely separated points as Germany, Argentina, Middle Eastern countries,
etc.
(f) In international economic matters, Soviet policy
will really be dominated by pursuit of autarchy for Soviet Union and
Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together. That, however, will be
underlying policy. As far as official line is concerned, position is not yet
clear. Soviet Government has shown strange reticence since termination
hostilities on subject foreign trade. If large scale long term credits should
be forthcoming, I believe Soviet Government may eventually again do lip
service, as it did in 1930's to desirability of building up international
economic exchanges in general. Otherwise I think it possible Soviet foreign
trade may be restricted largely to Soviet's own security sphere, including
occupied areas in Germany, and that a cold official shoulder may be turned to
principle of general economic collaboration among nations.
(g) With respect to cultural collaboration, lip
service will likewise be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural
contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any
way which could weaken security position of Soviet peoples. Actual
manifestations of Soviet policy in this respect will be restricted to arid
channels of closely shepherded official visits and functions, with
superabundance of vodka and speeches and dearth of permanent effects.
(h) Beyond this, Soviet official relations will take
what might be called "correct" course with individual foreign
governments, with great stress being laid on prestige of Soviet Union and its
representatives and with punctilious attention to protocol as distinct from
good manners.
Part 4: Following May Be
Said as to What We May Expect by Way of Implementation of Basic Soviet Policies
on Unofficial, or Subterranean Plane, i.e. on Plane for Which Soviet Government
Accepts no Responsibility
Agencies utilized for promulgation of policies on
this plane are following:
1. Inner central core of Communist Parties in other
countries. While many of persons who compose this category may also appear and
act in unrelated public capacities, they are in reality working closely
together as an underground operating directorate of world communism, a
concealed Comintern tightly coordinated and directed by Moscow. It is important
to remember that this inner core is actually working on underground lines,
despite legality of parties with which it is associated.
2. Rank and file of Communist Parties. Note
distinction is drawn between those and persons defined in paragraph 1. This
distinction has become much sharper in recent years. Whereas formerly foreign
Communist Parties represented a curious (and from Moscow's standpoint often
inconvenient) mixture of conspiracy and legitimate activity, now the
conspiratorial element has been neatly concentrated in inner circle and ordered
underground, while rank and file--no longer even taken into confidence about
realities of movement--are thrust forward as bona fide internal partisans of
certain political tendencies within their respective countries, genuinely
innocent of conspiratorial connection with foreign states. Only in certain countries
where communists are numerically strong do they now regularly appear and act as
a body. As a rule they are used to penetrate, and to influence or dominate, as
case may be, other organizations less likely to be suspected of being tools of
Soviet Government, with a view to accomplishing their purposes through
[apparent omission] organizations, rather than by direct action as a separate
political party.
3. A wide variety of national associations or bodies
which can be dominated or influenced by such penetration. These include: labor
unions, youth leagues, women's organizations, racial societies, religious
societies, social organizations, cultural groups, liberal magazines, publishing
houses, etc.
4. International organizations which can be similarly
penetrated through influence over various national components. Labor, youth and
women's organizations are prominent among them. Particular, almost vital
importance is attached in this connection to international labor movement. In
this, Moscow sees possibility of sidetracking western governments in world
affairs and building up international lobby capable of compelling governments
to take actions favorable to Soviet interests in various countries and of
paralyzing actions disagreeable to USSR
5. Russian Orthodox Church, with its foreign
branches, and through it the Eastern Orthodox Church in general.
6. Pan-Slav movement and other movements (Azerbaijan,
Armenian, Turcoman, etc.) based on racial groups within Soviet Union.
7. Governments or governing groups willing to lend
themselves to Soviet purposes in one degree or another, such as present
Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments, North Persian regime, Chinese Communists,
etc. Not only propaganda machines but actual policies of these regimes can be
placed extensively at disposal of USSR
It may be expected that component parts of this
far-flung apparatus will be utilized in accordance with their individual
suitability, as follows:
(a) To undermine general political and strategic
potential of major western powers. Efforts will be made in such countries to
disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to
increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity. All
persons with grievances, whether economic or racial, will be urged to spelt
redress not in mediation and compromise, but in defiant violent struggle for
destruction of other elements of society. Here poor will be set against rich,
black against white, young against old, newcomers against established residents,
etc.
(b) On unofficial plane particularly violent efforts
will be made to weaken power and influence of Western Powers of [on] colonial
backward, or dependent peoples. On this level, no holds will be barred.
Mistakes and weaknesses of western colonial administration will be mercilessly
exposed and exploited. Liberal opinion in Western countries will be mobilized
to weaken colonial policies. Resentment among dependent peoples will be
stimulated. And while latter are being encouraged to seek independence of Western
Powers, Soviet dominated puppet political machines will be undergoing
preparation to take over domestic power in respective colonial areas when
independence is achieved.
(c) Where individual governments stand in path of
Soviet purposes pressure will be brought for their removal from office. This
can happen where governments directly oppose Soviet foreign policy aims
(Turkey, Iran), where they seal their territories off against Communist
penetration (Switzerland, Portugal), or where they compete too strongly, like
Labor Government in England, for moral domination among elements which it is
important for Communists to dominate. (Sometimes, two of these elements are
present in a single case. Then Communist opposition becomes particularly shrill
and savage.)
(d) In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule,
work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence, economic,
political or moral. Their system can handle only individuals who have been
brought into complete dependence on higher power. Thus, persons who are
financially independent--such as individual businessmen, estate owners,
successful farmers, artisans and all those who exercise local leadership or
have local prestige, such as popular local clergymen or political figures, are
anathema. It is not by chance that even in USSR local officials are kept
constantly on move from one job to another, to prevent their taking root.
(e) Everything possible will be done to set major
Western Powers against each other. Anti-British talk will be plugged among
Americans, anti-American talk among British. Continentals, including Germans,
will be taught to abhor both Anglo-Saxon powers. Where suspicions exist, they
will be fanned; where not, ignited. No effort will be spared to discredit and
combat all efforts which threaten to lead to any sort of unity or cohesion
among other [apparent omission] from which Russia might be excluded. Thus, all
forms of international organization not amenable to Communist penetration and
control, whether it be the Catholic [apparent omission] international economic
concerns, or the international fraternity of royalty and aristocracy, must
expect to find themselves under fire from many, and often [apparent omission].
(f) In general, all Soviet efforts on unofficial
international plane will be negative and destructive in character, designed to
tear down sources of strength beyond reach of Soviet control. This is only in
line with basic Soviet instinct that there can be no compromise with rival
power and that constructive work can start only when Communist power is doming
But behind all this will be applied insistent, unceasing pressure for
penetration and command of key positions in administration and especially in
police apparatus of foreign countries. The Soviet regime is a police regime par
excellence, reared in the dim half world of Tsarist police intrigue, accustomed
to think primarily in terms of police power. This should never be lost sight of
in ganging Soviet motives.
Part 5: Practical
deductions from standpoint of US policy
In summary, we have here a political force committed
fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent modus vivendi
that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be
disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This
political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of
world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and
is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In
addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its
influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and
versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground
methods are presumably without parallel in history. Finally, it is seemingly
inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic reactions. For it, the
vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure
against which outlook is constantly being tested and re-formed, but a grab bag
from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to
bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant
picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest
task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to
face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff
work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same
thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if
necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to
suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem
is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military
conflict.. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of
a more encouraging nature I should like to make:
(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany,
is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It
does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is
highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and
usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the
adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he
rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no
prestige-engaging showdowns.
(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets
are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on
degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this
is factor which it is within our power to influence.
(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal
power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can
survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or
group to another. Lenin's death was first such transfer, and its effects
wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be
second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now
be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of
additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are
convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people
been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they
are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly
successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a
source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of
movement need not yet be regarded as assured.
(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security
sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively
easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.
For those reasons I think we may approach calmly and
with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach
should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following
comments:
(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and
recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing.
We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same
determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which
doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.
(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities
of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot
do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more
experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need
not be deterred by ugliness of the picture. I am convinced that there would be
far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this
situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous
or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more
information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on
Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here
involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better.
But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even
coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian
people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual
trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to
preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I
am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is
enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic
and matter-of-fact basis.
(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own
society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on
diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets Every
courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society,
to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own
people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes
and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face
of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit--Moscow cannot help
profiting by them in its foreign policies.
(4) We must formulate and put forward for other
nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would
like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people
to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in
Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less
interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance
rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give
them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.
(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence
to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the
greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet
communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we
are coping.
KENNAN
800.00B International Red Day/2 - 2546: Airgram
References
Keene, George, “Photocopy of Long Telegram -- Truman
Library”, Telegram, George Kennan to George Marshall February 22, 1946. Harry S. Truman
Administration File, Elsey Papers. Retrieved on 27 June 2011
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