Less than a month after Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu's 2012 warning to the UN General Assembly that Iran was 70 percent of
the way to completing its "plans to build a nuclear weapon", Israel's
intelligence service believed that Iran was "not performing the activity
necessary to produce weapons".
A secret cable obtained by Al Jazeera's Investigative
Unit reveals that Mossad sent a top-secret cable to South Africa on October 22,
2012, that laid out a "bottom line" assessment of Iran's nuclear
work.
It appears to contradict the picture painted by
Netanyahu of Tehran racing towards acquisition of a nuclear bomb.
Writing that Iran had not begun the work needed to
build any kind of nuclear weapon, the Mossad cable said the Islamic Republic's
scientists are "working to close gaps in areas that appear legitimate such
as enrichment reactors".
Such activities, however, "will reduce the time
required to produce weapons from the time the instruction is actually
given".
That view tracks with the 2012 US National
Intelligence estimate, which found no evidence that Iran had thus far taken a
decision to use its nuclear infrastructure to build a weapon, or that it had
revived efforts to research warhead design that the US said had been shelved in
2003.
Netanyahu plans to address the US Congress on March 3
and warn against the nuclear compromise currently being negotiated between
Tehran and world powers.
Media reports and public comments by senior current
and former officials have frequently indicated dissent from within Israel's
security services over Netanyahu's alarmist messaging on Iran.
However, the document leaked
to Al Jazeera makes clear that the Mossad's formal assessment of Iran's nuclear
capacity and intentions differs from the scenario outlined by the prime
minister at the UN.
The cable was relayed to South Africa's State
Security Agency (SSA) shortly after the September 2012 address in which
Netanyahu had displayed a cartoonish diagram of a bomb with a fuse, marked with
a 70 percent line and another "red line" at 90 percent.
The markers represented progress milestones in Iran's
uranium enrichment work. He argued that medium-enriched uranium (which Iran had
begun producing, saying it was needed to fuel a research reactor producing
isotopes to fight cancer) took Iran 70 percent of the distance to enriching
weapons-grade material.
The Israeli prime minister told the UN General
Assembly that "by next spring, by most at next summer at current
enrichment rates [Iran] will have finished the medium enrichment and move on to
the final stage", in which he said they would enrich uranium to weapons
grade.
'Not the right way'
Earlier in 2012, former Mossad chief Meir Dagan had
hinted at a disagreement with Netanyahu. In an interview in March, he warned of
overstating the danger of Iran's nuclear activities and of putting Israel on a
path to war with Iran.
Clayton Swisher, Al Jazeera's Director of Investigations,
discusses The Spy Cables
The spy chief said it would be a "stupid
idea" to attack Iran before other options were considered. "An attack
on Iran before you are exploring all other approaches is not the right
way," Dagan had said.
His comments would likely have been informed by his
former agency's analysis reflected in the document obtained by Al Jazeera.
It reveals that in October 2012, Israel's foreign
intelligence service estimated that Iran had 100 kilogrammes of uranium
enriched to a level of 20 percent.
Iran expanded that stockpile over the following year,
but then agreed to neutralise or destroy that material under an agreement with
the US, Britain, China, Russia, France and Germany - the so-called P5+1 group.
Reports of discord between
Netanyahu and the Mossad over Iran surfaced again last month amid reports -
later denied - that the Israeli intelligence service had warned Washington that
new US sanctions would sabotage nuclear negotiations between Iran and world
powers.
Iran and the P5+1 are currently pursuing a framework
pact for a permanent deal by the end of March, and a full technical agreement
by the end of June. Iran insists its nuclear work is entirely for peaceful
purposes; the premise of the nuclear deal currently being negotiated is to
strengthen verifiable safeguards against weaponisation of nuclear material.
This document is the property
of the originator. It contains classified information and must be handled in
accordance with established security procedures. It is loaned to your agency in
confidence and may not be further disseminated without prior consent of the
originator.
Date 22 October 2012
Report no. 9342
Urgency
Subject: Iran/Nuclear/Program status
Main points
1.
Iran’s enrichment abilities continue to improve.
The quantity of material enriched to 20& is not increasing at this stage as
some is being converted to nuclear fuel for TRR. In addition, Iran is making
great efforts to activate the IR40 reactor (which is expected to produce
military-grade plutonium) as quickly as possible. We assess that this will not
happen before mid-2014.
2.
Enrichment: Activity at the Kashan and QOM sites
has expanded to a limited extent only, apparently because of a lack of
available centrifuges, but there has been a significant increase in the rate
and efficiency of enrichment-approximately 230 kg uranium is enriched to 5% per
month, and approximately 12 kg is enriched to 20% per month.
3.
Iran has thus far accumulated about 5.500 kg of
uranium enriched to 5% 9after about 1.500 kg were allocated for enrichment to
20%) and about 100 kg enriched to 20% (after 75 – 100 kg were converted into
nuclear fuel for TRR).
4.
Besides enrichment, the atomic energy
organisation of Iran (AEOI) is focusing its efforts on completing the
construction of the IR40 heavy water reactor in Arak, and putting it into
service during 2014. Industrial production of dummy fuel for the reactor and preparations
to produce nuclear fuel have begun.
5.
We understand that Iran continues to improve its
enrichment abilities, and is even liable to advance them significantly when the
advanced IR2M or IR4 centrifuges, currently being run in in the pilot facility
in Natanz, are put into service.
6.
Even though Iran has
accumulated enough 5% enriched uranium for several bombs, and has enriched some
of it to 20%, it does not appear to be ready to enrich it to higher levels. It
is allocating some of it to produce nuclear fuel for the TRR, and the amount of
20% enriched uranium is therefore not increasing.
7.
We understand that Iran
is making efforts to put the IR40 into operation as quickly as possible. We
assess that this will not happen enough military-grade plutonium for one bomb
per year, but in the absence of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant (unknown in
Iran), this pollution will not be able to be used for weapons.
8.
In the area of nuclear weapons, there is
continued R&D activity at SPND, under the iranian Defence Ministry, which
we understand is intended for accumulating knowhow and creating an organisation
framework it will be able to make use of to produce nuclear fuel, when the
order is given.
9.
Bottom line: Though Iran at this stage is not
performing the activity necessary to produce weapons, it is working to close
gaps in areas that appear legitimate such as enrichment, reactors, which will
reduce the time required to produce weapons from the time the instruction is
actually given.
Details
Uranium enrichment track
10.
Expansion of activity at the Nantez and QOM
sites has been limited (apparently due to a lack of available centrifuges), but
enrichment activity continues to expand:
A.
In Iran, there are currently 10.500 centrifuges
operating, as follows:
(1). About
9.000 centrifuges operate at three enrichment units in a bunker in Natanz and
enrich to 5%.
(2). About
700 centrifuges operate in the above-ground pilot facility in Natanz, of which
about 350 enrich to 20% and about 350 advanced centrifuges are currently
running and being fed with depleted uranium.
(3). About
700 centrifuges operate in QOM and rich to 20%.
B.
In addition, there are another 1.000 centrifuges
installed that have not been put into operation in the fourth unit in Natanz
and other cascades in QOM.
C.
In Natanz: In recent months, installation has
begun of centrifuges at the site. In addition, there has been an increase in
enrichment to a low level, from about 170 kg a month in february to about 230
kg a month in may. This is apparently a result of stabilisation of enrichment
in the third unit.
D.
In QOM: No new centrifuges have been put into
operation at the site since january 2012 (about 700 enriching centrifuges). Apparently
installation of centrifuges at the site has been completed (about 2.800
centrifuges).
11.
Iran now has about 5.500 kg of material enriched
to 5% (after about 1.500 kg was allocated for 20% enrichment) and about 100 kg
of material enriched to 20% (after about 75-100 kg of uranium enriched to 20%
was converted into nuclear fuel to operate the research reactor in Tehran),
produced at a rate of about 12 kg a month (similar to the rate of use currently
made of the material to produce nuclear fuel).
12.
R&D of advanced centrifuges: There has been
an advanced in the stabilisation of model IR-2M, which is expected to improve
the enrichment ability of the iranian centrifuges threefold. This is after it
has been operated in the R&D cascade in the pilot facility in Natanz, where
it appears that IR-2M is more ready than the IR-4 to start industrial
production.
Plutonium track
13.
Along with the enrichment, AEOI is focusing its
efforts on completing the building of the heavy water reactor in Arak (IR40)
and activating it during 2014. In this context:
A.
In april 2012, industrial production was begun
of dummy fuel, intended for testing the reactor without a nuclear reactor. Its
completion will allow Iran to start testing the reactor in 2013.
B.
Iran is preparing to
increase the rate of production of power required to produce nuclear fuel (UO2)
and in february 2012 production of pellets began (the first stage of producing
nuclear fuel). However, it seems that special equipment is missing which is
necessary for beginning operation of the production line.
14.
When the reactor begins operating, production of
plutonium will begin at a quantity sufficient to produce one bomb a year, but
there will be no use for the weapons as long as there is no nuclear fuel
reprocessing plant.
Weapons
15.
Until 2003, there was a set nuclear program in
Iran for R&D of nuclear weapons under the iranian Defence Ministry, which
was called the Amad
Plan. The plan was reduced following exposure of the nuclear program and
concern about military attack.
16.
In 2011, many scientists from the Amad Program formed
an organisation called SPND, also under the auspices of the Defence Ministry.
At the head of the organisation is Mohsen Fakhrizader, former head of Amad.
17.
The organisation was established for the
purposes of preserving the technological ability and the joint organisational
framework of iranian scientists in the area of R&D of nuclear weapons, and
for the purposes of retaining the skills of the scientists. This is allow
renewal of the activity necessary to produce weapons immediately when the iranian
leadership decides to do so.
18.
Kind regards.
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